

SCOTTISH COMMERCIAL CONTACTS WITH THE
IBERIAN WORLD, 1581-1730

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A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
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Claire McLoughlin
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Abstract

This thesis analyses the commercial relations between Scotland and the geo-political area known as the Iberian world in the early modern period. Despite being geographically one of the largest areas of Europe, as well as arguably the politically most weighty, there has, until this thesis, been no scholarly research on Scottish trade relations with this area. Though the archives suggest regular and sustained contact, very little is known about Scottish-Iberian connections beyond the overtly political. When compared to northern Europe the region of Iberia and its dominions differed significantly, not only due to a different branch of Christianity being practised there but also due to the influence of the Habsburg empire and the power it was perceived to give the Spanish Habsburgs. Looking predominantly at Scottish commercial contacts with Spain, the Spanish Netherlands and Portugal, this project considers a number of angles such as England's impact on Scottish commercial relations with Iberia. For example, very little would be known about Scottish commercial relations with Iberia in the late-sixteenth century if it were not for the Anglo-Spanish war of that period. The central role of conflict in Scottish-Iberian relations continues into the seventeenth century, with the Cromwellian/Stuart struggles with the Dutch Republic and later disputes between the new state of Great Britain and Habsburg Spain all affecting trade. This thesis demonstrates the important role of triangular and entrepôt trade, which was popular with Scottish merchants who wished to obtain Iberian goods without the risks of sailing into North African corsair territory. Scots did not merely pick up Iberian goods from the entrepôt markets of London and the Dutch Republic they also organised trade to Iberia and its dominions via other Scots, providing evidence of a complex trade network. Further, this thesis has sought to ascertain that, despite the lack of a large Scottish community such as those seen in Poland-Lithuania and Scandinavia, Scottish commercial relations with Iberia were valuable both to the Scottish economy and its merchants. This thesis which continues the work of the *Scotland and the Wider World Project*, addresses a lack of scholarly work regarding Scottish commercial connections with this key geo-political area.

Declarations.

1. Candidate's declarations:

I, Claire McLoughlin, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 80,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

I was admitted as a research student in September 2010 and as a candidate for the degree of PhD; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2010 and 2013.

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2. Supervisor's declaration:

I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

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Upon reaching the conclusion of an academic journey that began almost ten years ago there are a number of individuals and institutions whose support have been fundamental to this thesis. Firstly, I extend my thanks to the *Arts Humanities Research Council* for their generous scholarship and to School of History at the University of St Andrews who provided financial support to my numerous research trips.

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Finally to Dave Jones, who has provided chocolate, cups of tea and has the patience of a saint.

Stylistic Conventions

Individuals who are documented in this thesis often appear in primary sources with several variations of both their given and surname. In Iberia, as elsewhere in Europe, it was common practise to have a local variant of names. For example, James Cunningham often appears in Spanish documents as 'Diego Coningam' and, indeed, signs his own name as either Coningam or Cunningham depending on the authorities he is dealing with. Therefore, where there is no possibility of ambiguity names have been standardised for coherency. Where there is no definable Scottish or British version of a name but an individual has been described as being from the British Isles the name provided in the source has been utilised. The one exception to this is King Charles II of Spain: due to the fact that he ruled at the same time as the Stuart King Charles II, he is referred to in this thesis as Carlos II to avoid any confusion with the Stuart Monarch. As to place names, common Anglicised versions have been used where present (eg. Seville, Lisbon). Further, for those locations which are not likely to be known a description location in regards to a well known town is given in the footnotes. It must also be noted that is very rare for documents from Spanish archives to contain folio numbers, with dates normally the only way for distinguishing one document from the other in the same bundle. Finally, unless stated differently in the footnotes, all translations have been undertaken by the author. Any errors in such translations are entirely my own.

List of Abbreviations

BL	The British Library
AFB	Archivo Foral de Bizkala [Bilbao]
AHN	Archivo Historico Nacional [Madrid]
AGS	Archivo General de Simancas [Simancas, Spain]
AGI	Archivo General de Indias [Seville]
ATT	Arquivo do Torre Tombo [Lisbon]
<i>Cecil Papers</i>	<i>The Cecil Papers</i> online at: http://cecilpapers.chadwyck.com/marketing.do
CRB	<i>Records of the Convention of Royal Burghs of Scotland, 1295-1711</i> , ed. James D. Marwick (4 vols, Edinburgh 1866-1880)
CSPD	<i>Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series</i> , 48 vols, online at: http://tannerritchie.com
CSP: Colonial	<i>Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies, China and Japan, 1617-21</i> , ed. W. Noel Sainsbury, online at: http://tannerritchie.com <i>Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies, China and Japan, 1622-24</i> , ed. W. Noel Sainsbury, online at: http://tannerritchie.com
CSPS	<i>Calendar of State Papers relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of Scots</i> , 12 volumes, online at: http://tannerritchie.com <i>Calendar of State Papers relating to Scotland and Mary Queen of Scots</i> , Volume 13, (Parts I & II, Edinburgh, 1969)
CSP:Spain	<i>Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers Relating to the Negotiations Between England and Spain</i> , 17 vols, online at: http://tannerritchie.com)
DNB	<i>Oxford Dictionary of National Biography</i> online at: www.oxforddnb.com
HCA	<i>The Records of the High Court of Admiralty of Scotland, 1627-1750</i> , eds. Sue Mowat and Eric Graham (Edinburgh, 2005)
NAS	National Archives of Scotland
ONA	Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, Oud Notariële Akten

<i>RPCS</i>	<i>Register of the Privy Council of Scotland</i> , 38 volumes, online at: http://tannerritchie.com
<i>RPS</i>	<i>Records of the Parliament of Scotland</i> , ed. Keith M. Brown, online at: www.rps.ac.uk
SP Online	State Papers Online: The Government of Britain, 1509-1714, online at: http://go.galegroup.com
<i>SSNE</i>	<i>Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database, 1580-1707</i> , eds. Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, eds., online at: www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne
<i>Salisbury</i>	<i>Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquis of Salisbury: The Cecil Papers</i> , online at: http://tannerritchie.com
TNA	The National Archives at Kew, London.

Introduction

'It certain that since 1581 Scots merchants have begun to make voyages to, and have factors in, Spain and other countries where they were not previously accustomed to have such intercourse'.¹

In 1722 a merchant of Inverness, John Steuart, made an agreement with George Ouchterlony, a Scottish merchant living in London. This business arrangement involved Steuart organising a cargo of cod to be sent to Barcelona.² On 12 December Steuart sent a letter on the ship the *Ann of London* to Messrs. Windar and Ferrand of Barcelona, instructing them to sell the cargo of fish as swiftly as possible and, once the master of the ship was paid, to remit the proceeds to Ouchterlony.

Several questions can be posed from this incident. Firstly, how did Steuart know who to write to; who informed him of these gentlemen based in Barcelona? Secondly, how was a merchant from Inverness, a town not recognised as a center of trade in Scotland, involved in commercial activities with Iberia? Finally, and most importantly, how indicative from a national perspective is Steuart's trade with a region in which Scottish commercial connections have, until now, remained unexamined?

The purpose of this thesis is to examine Scottish mercantile connections with Iberia and the Spanish Netherlands in the period from 1580-1730. This project not only examines the extent of commodity exchange but also explores the possibility that mercantile networks existed involving Scots in Iberian trade. Further, this study has sought to establish the relative importance of this trade in comparison to Scottish mercantile connections with other areas in Europe and provide evidence of Scottish involvement in a jurisdiction that, in the early modern period, spanned the globe.

The Iberian Peninsula itself consists of mainland Spain and Portugal, which until 1581 were separate kingdoms with individual monarchies. However, following the death of Cardinal Henrique of Portugal in 1581 the Portuguese throne was inherited by Philip II of Spain, a member of the Habsburg family.³ Portugal remained a territory of Habsburg Spain until the Portuguese revolt of 1640 when, following internal struggles in Catalonian Spain, the Portuguese, who had been discontented with Spanish rule for some time, took the chance to declare independence.⁴ The extent of the dominions that were directly and indirectly under the control of Portugal and Spain in the early modern

¹ CSPA, XI, 481. November 1594.

² William Mackay, ed, *The Letter-Book of Baillie John Steuart of Inverness, 1715-1752*, Scottish History Society, 2nd Series, IX (Edinburgh, 1915), 195. 3 November 1722.

³ Malyn Newitt, *A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion, 1400-1668* (Abingdon, 2005), 169.

⁴ John Lynch, *The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change, 1598-1700* (Oxford 1992), 150-154.

period is staggering. Obviously, this included the Spanish Netherlands and the major cities of Antwerp, Bruges, Brussels and Ostend. Due to the on-going conflict between Habsburg Spain and the new Dutch Republic following the revolt of 1566 these borders were liable to change.⁵ For the purposes of this thesis the search for Scottish mercantile connections with the Spanish Netherlands will cease after 1700. The death of the Spanish king Carlos II in November 1700 led to a succession crisis and subsequent conflict as European powers battled to install their favoured individual as the new king of Spain. As a result the jurisdiction of the Spanish Netherlands became increasingly changeable, with military successes leading to Dutch and English (post-1707 British) control of the area, before the eventual seceding of the territory to the Austrian Habsburgs after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.⁶

Furthermore, Habsburg Spain also controlled much of the Italian Peninsula, either directly or indirectly, from the 1560s until the Treaty of Utrecht.⁷ This included direct control over the kingdoms of Naples, Sardinia, Sicily and the Duchy of Milan, as well as an indirect influence over Genoa and the Papal States.⁸ These regions in Europe were supplemented, and by the end of the seventeenth century surpassed, in economic importance, by commercial expansion in the New World. During the period in which Spain and Portugal shared a single ruler the Habsburgs controlled the vast continent of South America. This territory made itself useful not only in terms of bullion but also in long-term commercial enterprise, albeit enterprise which was successful for the colonies rather than the Spanish monarchy.⁹ Finally, we must consider the activities of the Portuguese Crown in the East Indies. Scholars are already aware that William Carmichael, a Scot who was in the service of the Portuguese Crown for over thirty years during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, traded to China while living in Goa, India.¹⁰ The fall of Malacca in 1641 to the *Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* [Dutch East India Company or VOC] marked the end of Portuguese Crown involvement in the East following sixty years of decline with only an unofficial empire

⁵ C. Bruneel, 'The Spanish and Austrian Netherlands', translated by James C. Kennedy in J. C. H. Blom & E. Lamberts, eds., *History of the Low Countries* (Oxford, 1999), 242.

⁶ Ibid, 238-42.

⁷ Christopher Duggan, *A Concise History of Italy* (Cambridge, 1994), 75.

⁸ Thomas James Dandeleet and John A. Marino, 'Introduction', in Thomas James Dandeleet and John A. Marino, eds., *Spain in Italy: Politics, Society and Religion, 1570-1700* (Leiden, 2007), 1-18; Thomas James Dandeleet, *Spanish Rome: 1500-1700* (Harrisonburg, 2001), 215-18.

⁹ Lynch, *The Hispanic World*, 286.

¹⁰ Victor Enthoven, Steve Murdoch and Eila Williamson, eds., *The Navigator: The Log of John Anderson VOC Pilot-Major, 1640-43* (Leiden, 2010), 88-89; Steve Murdoch, 'The Good, The Bad and the Anonymous: A Preliminary Survey of Scots in The Dutch East Indies, 1612-1707', *Northern Scotland* 22 (Aberdeen, 2002), 63; Steve Murdoch, *The Terror of the Seas? Scottish Maritime Warfare, 1513-1713* (Leiden, 2010), 106.

remaining.¹¹ Thus Iberia and the Iberian world offer an opportunity for a detailed inspection of Scots and their activities in this region. This is a project with clear opportunities for research, which, as yet, remains untapped in any meaningful way. In this current work any Scot found trading with or residing in an area which, at that time, was under the control of the Spanish or Portuguese Crown has been included either directly in the thesis or in the online database *Scots in Iberia*.¹² However, the research primarily focuses on those Scots in the Peninsula itself and in the Spanish Netherlands. Those who served in the army, navy or worked in the Catholic colleges are better documented, and only feature where a commercial connection has been established.

During the last fifteen years, diaspora studies and, in particular, the extent of Scottish interaction with the rest of the world has received serious scholarly attention. These studies have surveyed the diplomatic, military and commercial activities of Scots in various kingdoms, regions and cities in the early modern period. Prior to this upsurge of interest there had been some study of Scots abroad. However, it was not until the work of Douglas Catterall, Alexia Grosjean, Waldemar Kowalski, Steve Murdoch and David Worthington in the late 1990s and early 2000s that Scottish diaspora studies came to be established as a subject in its own right, at least for the early modern period. By challenging previously understood orthodoxies, these scholars set out to establish Scottish links with early modern Europe rather than merely assume their existence. Basing their arguments on solid evidence gained from European archives (as well as Scottish repositories) Scottish relations with Europe are now known to be vastly removed from what was previously understood. This has, in some cases, lead to a prosopographical approach which has succeeded in providing not only direct information regarding individuals but also links to others and networks of families.

Two regions which had received scholarly attention prior to the recent interest in the early modern Scottish Diaspora are the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania. Scottish mercantile connections with the Dutch Republic were explored in the early twentieth century by John Davidson, Alexander Gray and Matthijs P. Rooseboom, all of whom primarily researched the Scottish Staple at Veere. More recently, however, Douglas Catterall has investigated Scottish connections with other parts of the region. Due to the influence of the Scottish Staple it is only because of Catterall's work that

¹¹ Newitt, *Portuguese Overseas Expansion*, 203, 237.

¹² See appendix 4.

other areas of the Dutch Republic have received serious scholarly investigation.¹³ In particular, Catterall has investigated the effects of Scottish migration upon the city of Rotterdam and has shown that, unlike other diaspora communities, the Scottish community in Rotterdam was centred around the Scottish Kirk. This was founded in 1643 and funded by a grant from the city authorities.¹⁴ In contrast to similar institutions in the city the Scottish Kirk had, along with the responsibility of dispensing poor relief to needy Scots, the right to fine and punish their parishioners.¹⁵ In this work Catterall has shown the frequency with which the Dutch Republic was a general destination of choice for migrating Scots. In conjunction he has pointed out that while the presence of the Scottish Staple was important, other areas, especially Rotterdam, were just as, if not even more, crucial by the mid to late seventeenth century.

Similarly scholars have been aware of Scotland's connections with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth since the beginning of the twentieth century; however, it has only been in recent years that scholarly work regarding this subject has been pursued in earnest.¹⁶ Waldemar Kowalski and Peter Paul Bajer have done the most to advance this study, not only in attempting to quantify how many Scots were in the area but also highlighting their commercial impact within local communities.¹⁷ In 2005 Kowalski stated that there was 'for the time being' no reason to 'refute the estimate of 30,000 or maybe even the 50,000 Scots in seventeenth century Poland-Lithuania'.¹⁸ This figure, often quoted by scholars, is taken from the contemporary account of the area by William Lithgow, who in his travel memoirs noted that there were as many as 30,000 Scottish families in Poland-Lithuania, thus leading to estimates of 50,000 individuals.¹⁹ However,

¹³ For example, investigations of the Scottish Staple can be found in historical literature since the beginning of the twentieth century. See John Davidson and Alexander Gray, *The Scottish Staple at Veere* (London, 1909); Theodora Pagan, *The Convention of Royal Burghs of Scotland* (Glasgow, 1926); Matthijs P. Rooseboom, *The Scottish Staple in the Netherlands* (The Hague, 1910).

¹⁴ Douglas Catterall, *Community without Borders: Scots Migrants and the Changing Face of Power in the Dutch Republic, c. 1600-1700* (Leiden, 2002), 194-232.

¹⁵ Douglas Catterall, 'Scots along the Maas, c. 1570-1750' in Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, eds., *Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period* (Leiden, 2005), 178-181.

¹⁶ The recent publication by Peter Paul Bajer provides an impressive and full evaluation of secondary sources which examines the Scots in Poland, with both Polish and English language sources scrutinised, see Peter Paul Bajer, *Scots in the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth 16th to 18th Centuries: The Formation and Disappearance of an Ethnic Group* (Leiden 2012), 11-26.

¹⁷ See Bajer, *Scots in the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth*; Waldemar Kowalski, 'The Placement of Urbanised Scots in the Polish Crown during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', in Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, eds., *Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period* (Leiden, 2005), 53-103; Waldemar Kowalski, 'Krakow Citizenship and the Local Scots, 1509-1655', in Richard Unger, ed, *Britain and Poland-Lithuania: Contact and Comparison from the Middle Ages to 1795* (Leiden, 2008), 263-285; Waldemar Kowalski, 'Scoti, Cives Cracovienses: Their Ethnic and Social Identity, 1570-1660', in David Worthington, ed, *British and Irish Emigrants and Exiles in Europe, 1603-1688* (Leiden, 2010) 67-85.

¹⁸ Kowalski, 'The Placement of Urbanised Scots', 64.

¹⁹ William Lithgow, *The totall discourse of the rare adventures and painefull peregrinations of long nineteene years travayles from Scotland to the most famous Kingdomes in Europe, Asia and Affrica* (Glasgow, 1906), 244.

a recent publication by Peter Paul Bajer has refuted this estimation. While admitting that, due to missing records and the unknown numbers of hidden migrants, an exact figure is impossible to calculate, Bajer has provided evidence for a much smaller community.²⁰ By utilising church records as well as the more traditionally recognised burgess registers he has estimated that there were somewhere between 5,000 to 7,000 individuals in Poland-Lithuania in the 1640s, a significantly lower estimate than previously understood by Kowalski.²¹ As Steve Murdoch and Esther Mijers have argued, the problem in this case is an inability to distinguish between Scottish-born individuals who migrated to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and individuals of Scottish descent, who, while identified with the Scottish community, were actually born abroad.²² While these foreign-born individuals may well have identified themselves as, and considered themselves to be Scottish, for the purposes of population history they cannot be included in discussions regarding Scottish demography.²³ This discourse on the region, despite quantitative disagreements, has given rise to an understanding of its importance in Scottish diaspora studies.

As a result of their doctoral studies Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch pioneered *The Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database* [SSNE], an online research facility with information on British and Irish individuals in Scandinavia and Northern Europe from 1580 to 1707.²⁴ The database provides service records for individuals (including commercial, military and political) religious affiliations and, where evidence has been provided, information about future generations, allowing the historian to discover links and patterns using a simple search engine.²⁵ This has been supplemented with publications which set out to examine Scottish relations with specific areas of Scandinavia and provide historical context surrounding the individuals involved.

Alexia Grosjean's work researching Scottish connections with Sweden from 1569 to 1654 includes mercantile connections in conjunction with a full evaluation of the military relationship between the two countries. It concludes that despite the 'Britishness' of the Stuart monarchy, Scots in Sweden believed themselves to be

²⁰ Bajer, *Scots in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth*, 114.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Steve Murdoch and Esther Mijers, 'Migrant Destinations, 1500-1700' in T. M. Devine and Jenny Wormald, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History* (Oxford, 2012), 327.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, *The Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern European Biographical Database*, online at: <http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne/index.php>

²⁵ For information as to how the database was constructed and its parameters see Steve Murdoch, 'The Database in Early Modern Scottish History: Scandinavia and Northern Europe, 1580-1707', *Northern Studies* 32 (1997), 83-103.

Scottish, as did the Swedish administration.²⁶ Furthermore, while there was no alliance on paper between the two kingdoms, Sweden assisted Scotland in the Bishops' Wars, providing military aid to what was essentially a 'rebel' cause.²⁷ Finally, Grosjean concludes that it was only with attempts to make a documented alliance during the 1650s when Scotland was under Cromwellian control and with the death of Axel Oxenstierna, the Swedish chancellor, that this unofficial relationship came to an end.²⁸

Steve Murdoch's analysis of Great Britain's official relations with Denmark-Norway from 1603 has laid out the political framework of Scottish interaction with Denmark-Norway from the Union of the Crowns to 1660.²⁹ This has been further developed in a commercial context by Nina Østby Pederson's investigation of Scottish merchants and burgesses in Bergen in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.³⁰ Grosjean and Murdoch have also examined the Scottish community in Gothenburg, where Scots were enticed to the town by the 15-year tax break awarded to foreigners who became burgesses.³¹ More recently, Murdoch has analysed the Scottish community in Stockholm, concluding that although Scots did not receive official recognition as they did in Gothenburg, this did not hinder Scottish activities and was actually advantageous.³²

David Worthington's work differs slightly from his contemporaries in the sense that, rather than investigating Scots in a particular area, he has researched the activities of Scots connected with a royal dynasty, the Habsburgs.³³ In particular, Worthington scrutinises Scots involved in political and military dealings of these predominantly Catholic regions during the Thirty Years' War. In this research he has provided evidence of Scots heavily associated with the court of Madrid and the imperial court of Vienna, indeed, one of these individuals, William Semple, was connected with Scottish trade to Iberia as shall be discussed in chapter two.³⁴ Worthington shows that far from being

²⁶ Alexia Grosjean, *An Unofficial Alliance: Scotland and Sweden 1569-1654* (Leiden, 2003).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Steve Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603-1660* (East Linton, 2001).

³⁰ See Nina Østby Pederson, 'Scottish immigration to Bergen in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', in Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, eds., *Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period* (Leiden, 2005).

³¹ Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, 'The Scottish Community in Seventeenth Century Gothenburg', in Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, eds., *Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period* (Leiden, 2005), 192, 196.

³² Steve Murdoch, 'Community, Commodity and Commerce: The Stockholm-Scots in the Seventeenth Century', in David Worthington, ed., *British and Irish Emigrants and Exiles in Europe, 1603-1688* (Leiden, 2010), 47-50.

³³ David Worthington, *Scots in Habsburg Service, 1618-1648* (Leiden, 2004).

³⁴ Ibid., 1-104.

uninterested in the conflict regarding the Palatinate, which previous orthodox histories have assumed, Scots in Habsburg areas were eager to involve themselves.

The Scotland and the Wider World project based at the University of St Andrews has also contributed to the field of Scottish diaspora history with individuals involved in the project completing theses and publishing their results. Kathrin Zickermann's study of the Elbe-Weser region of Germany is not confined to a single kingdom and concentrates on the geographical area as a whole, rather than a political enclave. Zickermann focused on Scottish networks in this area and in doing so discovered that the region was of significant commercial importance to Scottish merchants despite the lack of a structured Scottish community.³⁵ Siobhan Talbott's thesis focuses on trade with France between 1560 and 1713. She has determined that relying on 'official' records is not always indicative of actual trade relations, and in relation to France is inaccurate, as trade continued despite the lack of 'official' evidence.³⁶ These studies, exploring previously un-researched territories, add to the knowledge not only of migration history, but also to Scottish economic and commercial history.

Furthermore, Steve Murdoch has investigated the links between Scots in a specific region as well as connections between Scots throughout Europe in his publication, *Network North: Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Associations in Northern Europe, 1603-1746*. This monograph explores the connections that Scots made with each other on the basis of a common denominators including, but not exclusive to, familial, confessional and geographical networks.³⁷ For example, Murdoch examines the activities of the Spalding family, in which members of the same family were based in Scotland, Sweden and Northern Germany. The Spaldings, upon further scrutiny, were engaged in trade with destinations including most of Northern Europe, as well as Spain and Portugal.³⁸ Through this research, Murdoch has shown that far from being confined to geographical areas, networks of Scots were involved in various activities and were spread out over large areas that could involve dozens of individuals in numerous political regions.

The importance of diaspora studies and its contribution to Scottish history has been a topic of debate for scholars since the late 1990s. Keith M. Brown has criticised

³⁵ Kathrin Zickermann, *Across the German Sea: Scottish Commodity Exchange, Network Building and Communities in the Wider Elbe-Weser Region* (Leiden, 2013).

³⁶ Siobhan Talbott, 'An Alliance Ended?: Franco-Scottish Commercial Relations, 1560-1713', (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of St Andrews 2010), 13.

³⁷ Steve Murdoch, *Network North, Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Associations in Northern Europe, 1603-1746* (Leiden, 2006).

³⁸ Murdoch, *Network North*, 215; SSNE, ID: 4677, 4816.

the attention given to this subject area, remarking that the study has inflated Scottish emigration, where scholars have emphasised Scotland's links with Europe in order to avoid 'dealing with England' and the importance of English influence on Scotland.³⁹ Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch have parried this view in their edited collection, *Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period*. Far from detracting from the relationship that Scotland had with England, Grosjean and Murdoch counter that the examination of Scottish communities abroad has led to the discovery of the economic and military impact that such communities had on Scotland and, indeed, Britain.⁴⁰ Furthermore, Murdoch has argued that until Scottish migration to England is fully surveyed in a similar way to Scottish emigration overseas, it is impossible to ascertain the significance of England as a destination for emigrating Scots or of England to the Scottish economy.⁴¹ In addition, Murdoch expresses astonishment that scholars are more knowledgeable regarding the Scottish diaspora in Poland-Lithuania than that of her closest neighbour.⁴² Limited studies of Scots in England do exist, but most skirt the issue of quantification or do not focus on this aspect and merely give a cursory nod to Scots in England. John H. McCulloch's 1935 publication is an entertaining ramble through Scottish historical ties with England from early times but does not provide any attempts to quantify the number of Scots in England.⁴³ William Ferguson's *Scottish Relations with England: A survey to 1707* attempted to redefine the commonly-held belief that the Scottish economy needed the Treaty of Union of 1707 in order to survive and concluded that political management, personal greed and bribery were far more obvious reasons for the acceptance of the union by the Scottish Parliament.⁴⁴ Ferguson's publication focuses on political interaction with England rather than Scots actually based in that kingdom.

In 2003 Justine Taylor completed a history of the Royal Scottish Corporation, a London charity from 1603 to 2003. In her introduction Taylor points out that the corporation 'became a focal point for Scots in London, not just for Scots poor but as a rallying point for the Scottish nobility and merchants'.⁴⁵ Prior to 1680, however, the

³⁹ Keith M. Brown, 'Seducing the Scottish Clio: Has Scottish History Anything to Fear from the New British History' in Glenn Burgess, ed., *The New British History: Founding a Modern State, 1603-1707* (London, 1999), 243.

⁴⁰ Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, 'Introduction' in Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch, eds., *Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period* (Leiden, 2005), 22.

⁴¹ Steve Murdoch, 'Scotland, Europe and the English 'Missing Link'', *History Compass* 5:3 (2007), 903.

⁴² *Ibid*, 899.

⁴³ John Herries McCulloch, *The Scot in England* (London, 1935).

⁴⁴ William Ferguson, *Scotland's Relations with England: A Survey to 1707* (Edinburgh, 1994), 266-7.

⁴⁵ Justine Taylor, *A Cup of Kindness: The History of the Royal Scottish Corporation, a London Charity, 1603-2003* (East Linton, 2003), 2.

analysis of this charity is frustratingly brief, merely mentioning the most well-known London Scots (such as David Ramsay and George Ramsay) and not providing any investigation into the possibility of a larger community. Most recently, an edited collection by Stana Nenadic attempts to examine the Scots in London in the eighteenth century.⁴⁶ However, in the editor's introduction it is clear that a lack of scholarship on Scottish activities in early modern England has limited the work completed, and no comparison is made with this period prior to the Parliamentary Union of 1707.⁴⁷ A new project that started in January 2011 under the guidance Keith M Brown at the University of Manchester hopes to rectify this gap in our knowledge, investigating Scottish links with England pre-1707. What many of the above publications show is that detailed scrutiny of a geo-political region can tell us much about migration patterns, community development, networks and also the economic links with Scotland. Some of these studies also hint at Scottish connections to the Iberian world.

Publications regarding Scottish relations with Iberia do exist but these concentrate on military and political matters, not mercantile relations. For example, David Worthington's work detailing Scots in the service of the Habsburg dynasty is informative from both a religious and political perspective, but his work does not feature trading relations.⁴⁸ Several authors have also discussed the political relationship between Scotland and Spain. Concepción Saenz-Cambra's 2003 thesis on the links between Scotland and Philip II of Spain in the prelude to the Union of Crowns in 1603 is of particular note.⁴⁹ Keith M. Brown, Ruth Grant and Thomas M. McCoog have all mentioned Scotland's political links with Spain, or more particularly the links between the Scottish Catholic Earls and their Spanish supporters.⁵⁰ So while there is an understanding of political and crypto-political intrigue, commercial aspects of the Scoto-Iberian relationship remain enigmatic. The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to redress this gap and discuss the mercantile relationship between Iberia and Scotland.

⁴⁶ See Stana Nenadic, ed., *Scots in London in the Eighteenth Century* (Lewisberg, 2010).

⁴⁷ Stana Nenadic, 'Introduction' in Stana Nenadic, ed., *Scots in London in the Eighteenth Century* (Lewisberg, 2010), 14-41.

⁴⁸ Worthington, *Scots in Habsburg Service*.

⁴⁹ Concepción Saenz-Cambra, 'Scotland and Philip II, 1580-1598: Politics, Religion, Diplomacy and Lobbying' (unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2003).

⁵⁰ Keith M. Brown, 'The Making of a 'Politique': The Counter Reformation and the Regional Politics of John, Eighth Lord Maxwell', *Scottish Historical Review* 66:2 (1987), 152-175; Ruth Grant, 'The Brig o' Dee Affair, the Sixth Earl of Huntly and the Politics of the Counter-Reformation', in Julian Goodare and Michael Lynch, eds., *The Reign of James VI* (East Linton, 2000), 93-109; Thomas M. McCoog, *The Society of Jesus in Ireland, Scotland, and England 1541-1588: "Our Way of Proceeding"* (Leiden, 1996); Thomas M. McCoog, 'Pray to the lord of the harvest: Jesuit Missions to Scotland in the 16th Century', *Innes Review* 53 (2003), 127-188.

References to Scots trading with Iberia do appear in secondary literature, but always as part of a wider study on a different topic, rather than as comprehensive analysis of Scottish activities in this geo-political area. One of the earliest examples of such a study is T.C Smout's monograph, *Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union: 1660-1707*.⁵¹ This publication contains a brief investigation of Scottish trade connections with Spain and Portugal. Smout describes how Iberian goods were common in Scotland but concludes that until the 1680s Scottish trade with the region was only sporadic and that even post-1680 trade was still poor in comparison to Scottish connections to England.⁵² Smout believes that the lack of Scottish trade with the area was possibly due to an absence of resident factors with which Scottish merchants could conduct business.⁵³ Another scholar, Sue Mowat, discusses the activities of several Leith merchants engaged in trading tobacco from Spain; however, this information is part of a publication on the history of the port of Leith and not solely Scottish-Iberian mercantile connections.⁵⁴ Eric Graham also hints that Scottish trade with Iberia occurred in the early modern period, stating that ships of 50 to 80 tons were regularly making the journey to Iberian ports by the 1680s, yet he did not pursue this further.⁵⁵ In 2006 an edited collection was published entitled *Irish and Scottish Mercantile Networks in Europe and Overseas in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. Although this publication examines Irish connections with Spain and in the process unearths information on Scots, there is still no work included directly focusing on Scottish trade with Iberia.⁵⁶ In 2013 David Dobson's publication *Scots in Southern Europe, 1600-1900* provides the first attempt to quantify the number of Scots in Iberia.⁵⁷ However, this publication is not without problems. Firstly, Dobson's work only lists Scots and their basic biographical details and provides no historical context or further information regarding their activities. Secondly, of the 1,500 or so entries only 89 pertain to Scots in Iberia from the period 1580-1730.⁵⁸ Of those, more than half were students

⁵¹ See T. C Smout, *Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union: 1660-1707* (Edinburgh, 1963).

⁵² Ibid, 172-4.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Sue Mowat, *The Port of Leith: Its History and its People* (Edinburgh, 1993), 162-3.

⁵⁵ Eric J. Graham, *A Maritime History of Scotland* (East Lothian, 2002), 122.

⁵⁶ Óscar Recio Morales, 'Identity and Loyalty: Irish traders in Seventeenth Century Iberia' and Karin Schuller, 'Irish-Iberian Trade from the Mid-Sixteenth to the Mid-Seventeenth Centuries', both in David Dickson, Jan Parmentier and Jane Ohlmeyer, eds., *Irish and Scottish Mercantile Networks in Europe and Overseas in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Gent, 2007).

⁵⁷ David Dobson, *Scots in Southern Europe, 1600-1900* (Baltimore, 2013).

⁵⁸ Ibid. The number of entries in this publication was calculated using the median method with the number of Scots in Iberia during the period 1580-1730 calculated by the author. Any mistakes in these figures are my own.

at Scottish colleges in Iberia with only 30 noted as merchants.⁵⁹ As yet, these tantalising references have not encouraged more substantial research to establish the relevance of the Iberian world to Scotland and vice versa. What is still lacking is a specific study on whether commercial communities developed and whether the mercantile networks which we are aware of in northern Europe were replicated in the south, and if so, on what scale.

General economic histories of Scotland are also somewhat limited in their reference to Scottish trade with the Iberian Peninsula. S.G.E. Lythe and J. Butt refer to Iberia as a 'great potential market, never much exploited by Scotsmen'.⁶⁰ They further point to the length of the journey, described as a 'disincentive,' and remark that it was not until war with France in the late seventeenth century that Scottish trade with the Iberian Peninsula became a common occurrence.⁶¹ More recent publications by Ian D. Whyte do little to revise this view. Whyte briefly mentions that due to the Dutch Revolt of 1566 and the subsequent embargo against Dutch trade in Habsburg Spain, Scottish salt was increasingly demanded by Dutch markets in place of Biscay salt.⁶² Gordon Donaldson, in his history of Scotland between the reigns of James V and James VII, makes a brief reference to Scottish trade with Iberia, remarking that the General Assembly tried to prohibit trade with Spain in 1593 on religious grounds.⁶³ He also focuses on the will and testament of one Patrick Wood, an Edinburgh merchant involved in trade with various areas of Europe including Spain and the Canary islands.⁶⁴ Like other scholars noted above, this limited reference was not followed up but is suggestive that a viable trade network worthy of pursuit did exist.

As discussed above the edited collection *Irish and Scottish Mercantile Networks* does provide information about Scots - most commonly as part of investigations on the presence of Irish merchants in Iberia. It could be argued that the experience of Irish merchants in Iberia provides a comparison to this project: however, while the Irish merchant community within Spain in the early modern period has received serious scholarly attention by several historians, it is markedly different from

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ S.G.E. Lythe and J. Butt, *An Economic History of Scotland, 1100-1939* (Glasgow, 1975), 64.

⁶¹ Ibid, 64.

⁶² Ian D. Whyte, *Scotland's Society and Economy in Transition* (Basingstoke, 1997), 144; Ian D. Whyte, *Scotland Before the Industrial Revolution: An Economic and Social History c. 1050-c.1750* (London, 1995).

⁶³ Gordon Donaldson, *Scotland: James V-James VII* (Edinburgh, 1994), 194, 248-9.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 252.

the Scottish community and does not provide an adequate comparator.⁶⁵ As Karin Shüller has concluded, the Spanish were able to levy over 20,000 Irish troops in the mid-seventeenth century, with several Irish regiments serving in the Spanish Netherlands.⁶⁶ Morales has argued that employment in continental armies was an attractive option and that this pragmatic element to migration should not be obscured by attempts to label Irish migration to Spain as merely confessional in nature.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, students did enroll at Irish colleges in Spain, with seminaries providing another common link between the Irish and the Spanish.⁶⁸ As Spain saw England as a competitor on the world stage, it was sympathetic to the discontent of Irish subjects during the early modern period.⁶⁹ In periods of military strife Spain used this relationship to its advantage, with information being passed both ways to assist the Spanish Crown and the Irish rebels.⁷⁰ For example, Tom O'Connor has argued that the Spanish Habsburgs used Ireland to distract English attention away from the conflict with the Dutch Republic.⁷¹ The relationship between Ireland and Iberia, therefore, was completely different to Scotland's experience and has more in common with Scotland's relationship with France during the height of the Auld Alliance. For example, John Cross, British consul in Tenerife, discussed the privileges Irish merchants had on that island stating that they refused to pay consular fees and dominated the British merchant community there.⁷² In keeping with the actions of Scottish merchants during the Anglo-Spanish war in the late-sixteenth century, this domination was due to the War of Spanish Succession which allowed Irish merchants to fill the gap created when British

⁶⁵ See for example, Villar García, 'Irish Migration and Exiles in Spain'; Maria del Carmen Lario, 'The Irish Traders of Eighteenth Century Cádiz'; Morales, 'Identity and Loyalty'; Schüller, 'Irish-Iberian Trade', all in, David Dickson, Jan Parmentier and Jane Ohlmeyer, eds., *Irish and Scottish Mercantile Networks in Europe and Overseas in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Gent, 2007); Maria del Carmen Lario, *La Colonia Mercantil Británica e Irlandesa en Cadiz a Finales Del Siglo XVIII* (Cadiz, 2001); Mary Ann Lyons and Thomas O'Connor, *Strangers to Citizens: the Irish in Europe, 1600-1800* (Dublin, 2008). These are only a few examples.

⁶⁶ Karin Shuller, 'Irish Migrant Networks and Rivalries in Spain, 1575-1659' in Mary Ann Lyons and Thomas O'Connor, eds., *Irish Migrants in Europe After Kinsale, 1602-1820* (Dublin, 2003), 89-90.

⁶⁷ Óscar Recio Morales, 'Irish Émigré Group Strategies or Survival, Adaptation and Integration in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Spain' in Thomas O'Connor and Mary Ann Lyons, eds., *Irish Communities in Early Modern Europe* (Dublin, 2006), 240.

⁶⁸ Shuller, 'Irish Migrant Networks', 89. This aspect of Irish connections with Spain has also been subject to study by several historians. See Patricia O Connell, 'The Early-Modern Irish College Network in Iberia, 1590-1800' in Thomas O'Connor, ed., *The Irish in Europe, 1580-1815* (Dublin, 2001), 49-64. O Connell has argued that Irish colleges in Spain were (much like the Scots Church in Rotterdam) the focal point for Irish communities in the region.

⁶⁹ Samuel Fannin, 'The Irish Community in Eighteenth Century Cádiz' in Mary Ann Lyons and Thomas O'Connor, eds., *Irish Merchants in Europe After Kinsale, 1602-1820* (Dublin, 2003), 136.

⁷⁰ Schuller, 'Irish Migrant Networks', 94.

⁷¹ Thomas O'Connor, 'Ireland and Europe, 1580-1815: Some Historiographical Remarks' in Thomas O'Connor, ed., *The Irish in Europe, 1580-1815* (Dublin, 2001), 14.

⁷² George F. Steckley, 'The Wine Economy of Tenerife in the Seventeenth Century: Anglo-Spanish Partnership in Luxury Trade' *The Economic History Review: New Series* 33:3 (1980), 349.

merchants left Spain because of the conflict.⁷³ As chapter five will show, during Cromwell's war with Spain, Scottish merchants were considered fair game for the seizure of goods, whereas Irish merchants were not - despite the fact that both countries were part of the Cromwellian Commonwealth. Habsburg Spain, therefore, while not outwardly antagonistic towards Scottish merchants during times of peace, was almost benevolent in its treatment of Irish merchants, which was markedly different to its behaviour towards those from England and Scotland.

The start date of this study, 1581, marks the accession of Philip II of Spain to the throne of Portugal under the title of Philip I of Portugal. According to David, Laird of Wemyss, the Scottish royal ambassador to France, 1581 also marked the beginning of Scottish voyages to Spain and 'other countries that were not previously accustomed to have such intercourse'.⁷⁴ The report further adds that not only were Scots merchants voyaging to these areas but that Scottish factors were present within them, hinting that connections began at an even earlier date, but fixing 1581 as a date of importance.⁷⁵ For this thesis the investigation continues throughout the seventeenth century and terminates at 1730. This allows for a full examination of the effect of the 1707 Treaty of Union and, subsequent British foreign policy, upon trade. In a few individual cases studies are continued beyond this date in order to fully discuss an individuals career. Within the space constraints of this project it was not possible for the thesis to continue beyond this date but, as will be discussed in the conclusion, this is not to say that trade relations ceased.

The thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter examines the economic background of both Iberia and Scotland and will provide answers to the questions of who controlled this trade, who conducted commercial activity and dictated various treaties between the regions which had an impact upon trade. It also, with a comparison provided by English and Irish merchants, details the commodities that Scotland sent to Iberia and its dominions and vice-versa. This background to Iberian-Scottish commercial relations becomes all the more important when the complexities of the Iberian and more particularly Spanish economy are examined. In the second chapter the origins of Scottish commerce with Iberia are investigated. Evidence is drawn from the period of the Anglo-Spanish war and shows Scottish merchants were vital in keeping a clandestine trade alive between England and Spain. Significant quantities of

⁷³ Lyons and O'Connor, *Strangers to Citizens*, 95-6.

⁷⁴ *CSPS*, XI, 481. November 1594.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*.

Iberian goods made their way to Scotland either as part of triangular trade journeys or from the entrepôts of London and Rotterdam and this forms the basis of chapter three. Evidence provided indicates that it is not always wise to rely on official records for proof of where a vessel has been and that Iberian trade is often hidden by the fact that ships would call into other ports closer to home. Networks of Scots organizing Iberian trade from London and Rotterdam on behalf of colleagues in Scotland are included in this chapter, bolstering what is already known about Scottish factors in Europe. Commercial connections following the Union of the Crowns until 1660 forms the core of chapter four, which ascertains that Scottish merchants were not merely present in Spain for the use of their English counterparts. The fifth chapter concentrates on Scotland's direct trading activities with Iberia from 1660 until 1707. This involves scrutiny of ships that arrived into Glasgow and Leith, which shows patterns of trade as well as revealing the Scottish-based merchants involved. The last chapter is an examination of trade from 1707 until 1730. Finally, a database has been constructed from the information gathered while conducting this project.⁷⁶ It consists of individuals, skippers and ships, connected with the Iberian Peninsular only, which have been discovered during the duration of this project.⁷⁷ Due to the constraints of time and space the database is not intended to be exhaustive but rather to show that trade with the area was far more significant than previously understood.

Taken together, these chapters constitute the first dedicated research into early-modern Scottish-Iberian commercial contacts. By covering a 150-year period it has been possible to highlight the importance of this trade, or at least the contributions that Scots may have made to Iberian commerce or vice-versa. This thesis, as part of the Scotland and the Wider World Project, thus fills an identifiable vacuum in the knowledge of Scottish commercial activities in the early modern period. It should also provide a point of comparison with the works of other scholars previously mentioned and similar investigations focusing on other European nations.

⁷⁶ See appendix 4.

⁷⁷ Appendix 4 explains why the Spanish Netherlands have not been included in this project.

Chapter One: The Commercial Standing of Scotland and Iberia

‘The towne of Bilboa has a good trafficke ye Chief commodity it exports is wolle and iron’¹

In order to fully interpret trading connections between Scotland and Iberia an understanding of the various economies involved is required. Further, it is necessary to comprehend which authorities controlled and legislated for trade. It is also useful to discover whether the actions of these bodies had any meaningful effect on how trade was actually carried out by merchants. The first section of this chapter will therefore outline the relative economic states of the regions involved, while also examining the actions of regulatory bodies in relation to trade. For the Iberian world this will include a lengthy investigation of Spain, which - as the political and economic heart of the Iberian world - is crucial to this thesis. Moreover, the Portuguese, the Spanish Netherlands and South American economies will also be studied. In comparison the outline of the Scottish economy and industrial output is far less expansive but given the much smaller geographical area involved this is unsurprising. Secondly, this chapter discusses the commodities that were exchanged between Scotland and Iberia, with a comparison provided by English and Irish commodities. The relative importance of these goods to the economies in question has been contextualised. For example, it has been determined whether the goods that were being exported were essential primary products, such as wheat, fish or meat, or whether they were luxuries that could be forgone in times of economic depression or hardship, such as wine, oranges and lemons. Recognising the pattern of goods traded also gives further evidence as to which area held the balance of trade. Finally, alternative origins of commodities will be established in order to identify goods which must be excluded from entrepôt arrivals.

1. Iberian Economy and control of trade

1.1 Spain

In discussing the economy of the Iberian world several factors become immediately obvious. To begin with there are several separate areas that require attention. Spain, Portugal, the Spanish Netherlands, the Italian states and the New World all had separate economies and forms of economic control despite sharing a monarch during

¹ NAS, GD406/1/6474. Lord Archibald Hamilton to the Earl of Arran, 13 May 1697.

the early seventeenth century. Spain was the seat of power for the Habsburg monarchy and also the region within the Iberian dominions with which Scotland had the most prolific trading relations. However this area is also the most difficult to analyse economically. This is due, in part, to the regionalisation of the country. As Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin explain,

The crowns of Castile and Aragon were ruled by the same monarch after their late fifteenth century unification, but they remained fiscally distinct and their internal fragmentation lived on. There was also little fiscal integration between Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia in the seventeenth century. Parts of Andalusia kept a substantially distinct tax system after their late Reconquista, while in the north the three Basque provinces were governed by an entirely distinct fiscal regime.²

This is not a recent historical interpretation of the Spanish mainland; in 1971, Dominguez Ortiz commented that 'the Spanish empire was not an economic unit. Even Spain itself was not economic unit'.³ David Ringrose concurs, stating that the 'peninsula is best seen as a large mosaic of self-sufficient local economies buttressed by short range exchanges of basic commodities'.⁴ These observations are mirrored in numerous other scholarly works which stress the important role of regionalisation in Spain and the differing economic conditions in each separate area.⁵ It is far more fitting to describe Spain as a composite monarchy than as a single kingdom. When viewed in this way, it is easy to see why attempting to impose economic legislation upon the whole of Spain proved so difficult.

In order to guarantee loyalty from its subjects the Spanish Habsburgs were forced to allow a staggering amount of autonomy between the regions. One example of this is provided by the Basque economy, which was fiscally independent from Castile.⁶ The inhabitants of the Basque regions of Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, Álava and Navarre were allowed commercial freedom as no customs were payable on that coast, in contrast to

² Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin, 'Bargaining for Absolutism: A Spanish Path to Nation State and Empire Building', *Hispanic American Historical Review* 88:2 (2008), 177.

³ Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, *The Golden Age of Spain, 1616-1659*, translated by James Casey (London, 1971), 173.

⁴ David Ringrose, *Madrid and the Spanish Economy, 1560-1850* (London, 1983), 6.

⁵ For evidence of the economic regionisation of Spain see James Casey, *Early Modern Spain: A Social History* (London, 1999), 68; Bartolomé Yum Cansalilla and I.A.A Thompson, 'Introduction', 5 and Angel García Sanz, 'Castile 1580-1650: Economic Crisis and the Policy of Reform', 14, both in Bartolomé Yum Cansalilla and I.A.A Thompson, eds., *The Castilian Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: New Perspectives on the Economic and Social History of the Seventeenth Century* (Madrid, 1994); J.I Israel, 'The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?', *Past and Present* 91 (1981), 179. These are just a few of the examples which discuss the importance of Spanish regionalisation.

⁶ Henry Kamen, 'The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth', *Past and Present* 81 (1978) 46-7.

other regions.⁷ The Basque lands were also exempt from paying the *alcabala*, *cientos* and *millones*, which were the most important of the Castilian consumption taxes.⁸ While the Basque lands retained autonomy from Castile they were by no means the only area to do so; in fact, it appears that unity of economic practice was very much the exception rather than the rule in early modern Spain.

Henry Kamen has pointed out that the Spain of Carlos II was ruled in much the same way as the Spain of Philip II, in that areas were largely left to govern themselves.⁹ While this divested the Crown of responsibility (for specific regions) it made the passing of Spanish-wide legislation notoriously difficult. For example, in 1617, at the request of the kingdom of Valencia, and in an attempt to protect domestic production, foreign silk was banned from mainland Spain.¹⁰ The silk weaving area of Toledo saw this as an attempt by Valencia to corner the market and demanded access to imports of silk from abroad, which were of course cheaper.¹¹ In 1620 the Cortes was reminded by Toledo that Valencia 'has no greater right [sic. privileged access to the Castilian market] than the others we have been talking about, like China, Naples, Sicily or Italy'.¹² Toledo and Valencia did not see themselves as part of the same kingdom but rather as separate kingdoms who simply shared a monarch, and in commerce they were rivals.

As Grafe and Irigoin have pointed out, the number of judicial systems in use across Spain allowed for royal orders to be legally challenged, compromised and, in a number of cases, refused outright.¹³ Taxation could not be passed without the permission of the *Cortes* and in the reign of Philip III this body demanded control of the new taxes they levied, in order to ensure that the money collected was being spent responsibly.¹⁴ Until 1665 (following which the *Cortes* were no longer called) they were the point of negotiation between the Crown and the cities.¹⁵ By the reign of Philip III, the *Cortes* understood and took appropriate action concerning the levying of state funds and those finances which were granted to the king personally.¹⁶ Moreover, the common

⁷ Xabier Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust in the Eighteenth Century Atlantic World: Spanish Merchants and Their Overseas Networks* (London, 2010), 30.

⁸ Ibid, 30.

⁹ Henry Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century: 1665-1700* (Suffolk, 1980), 17.

¹⁰ Casey, *Early Modern Spain*, 54.

¹¹ James Casey, 'Spain: A Failed Transition', in Peter Clark, ed, *The European Crisis of the 1590s* (London, 1985), 218.

¹² Casey, *Early Modern Spain*, 54.

¹³ Grafe and Irigoin, 'Bargaining for Absolutism', 179.

¹⁴ Charles Jago, 'Habsburg Absolutism and the Cortes of Castile', *The American Historical Review* 86:2 (1981), 310.

¹⁵ I. A. A. Thompson, 'Castile' in J. Miller, ed, *Absolutism in Seventeenth Century Europe* (London, 1990), 80-82; I. A. A. Thompson, 'Crown and Cortes in Castile, 1590-1665', *Parliaments, Estates and Representation* 2:1 (1982), 29-45.

¹⁶ Jago, 'Habsburg Absolutism', 310.

phrase used in Spain in order to refuse a royal demand, 'se obedece, pero no se cumple', was invoked regularly on the basis of Roman law.¹⁷ It stated that a monarch who was properly informed would not do any harm to his subjects, thus by invoking a non-compliance code the subject implied that the monarch was unaware of the full circumstances and the harm that such a royal order could cause.¹⁸ This explanation of Spanish regionalism is important in understanding the state of the economy in the Peninsula during the early modern period and also the difficulties faced in crown attempts to pass unifying economic policy. Spain, rather than being controlled by an absolute monarch, was instead a conglomerate of states and kingdoms under the control, nominally in some areas, of a monarch who desired to be absolute but who lacked the power to be so.

Considering the scholarly emphasis on the fractured nature of Spain, it is surprising that much of the published research on the Spanish economy in the early modern period strives to deliver a verdict on Spain as a whole, rather than breaking the area into its political constituencies. Until recently the most common and accepted school of thought centred around the economic decline of Spain in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where any recovery was slow and not in evidence until the post-1660 period at the earliest. Common to this central argument is the decline of silver exports from the New World, which led to a serious economic recession not only in Spain but also in Europe more generally.¹⁹ Spain's export trade, which consisted mainly of primary goods, required silver in order to prop up the region's unfavourable balance of trade and thus, when the amount of silver became limited, the economy was in serious trouble.²⁰ As Casey points out, the huge influx of bullion in the sixteenth century led to a seismic shift in market relations which the Peninsula was unprepared for.²¹ By the 1590s the Crown was already becoming short of silver, at a time of huge war expenditure, and decided to debase the currency by using copper coins to replace the circulation of silver.²² In 1603 this *vellon* was stamped at double its face value and thus began a toxic cycle of inflation which hid the fall in real prices and caused

¹⁷ 'to obey but not comply'

¹⁸ John Leddy Phelan, 'Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy', *Administrative Science Quarterly* 5:1 (1960), 59.

¹⁹ Jaime Vicen Vives, *An Economic History of Spain*, translated by Frances Lopez-Morillas (Princeton, 1969; originally published in Spanish in 1959), 385.

²⁰ John Lynch, *Spain Under the Habsburgs* (Oxford, 1981), 153; J. H. Elliott, 'The Spanish Peninsula, 1598-1648' in F.C. Spooner, ed, *The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years War 1609-48/58* (Cambridge, 1970), 440.

²¹ Casey, *Early Modern Spain*, 68.

²² Ralph Davis, *The Rise of the Atlantic Economies* (London, 1975), 145.

economic destabilisation for the whole of Spain.²³ This led to a situation in which goods had two prices: a silver price, which to all intents and purposes was theoretical, and a price in copper *vellon*.²⁴ For the sixty years following 1620 the Spanish Crown alternated between cutting the value of copper by huge amounts, in an attempt to control the spiralling economy, and then legislating more copper issues whenever the monarchy needed ready cash.²⁵ In 1680 decisive action was finally taken, with *vellon* being devalued by seventy-five percent. While this resulted in what has been described as economic chaos it also gave the monetary system the stability it needed and finally allowed for meaningful recovery.²⁶ This turmoil in the monetary system has long been cited as a major reason behind the decline of Spain's economy in the seventeenth century.

However, other factors have also received attention by historians. An unfavourable balance of trade recognised from the period of Ferdinand and Isabella is believed to have contributed to an economic system which was perceived to have been dominated by foreign traders.²⁷ Henry Kamen has further added that the influx of silver resulted in a huge but unsustainable growth in wealth which could not to be supported by what Spain produced.²⁸ This led to domination by both foreign wealth and overseas traders who could exploit the economic situation in Spain.²⁹ These fiscal concerns were worsened by a demographic crisis at the beginning of the seventeenth century, particularly in Castile, with 'former cities becoming large towns'.³⁰ This is confirmed by contemporary reports, such as that by William Lithgow of Lanark, who described the Spanish countryside:

The most penurious peasants in the World be heere, whose Quotidian moanes might draw teares from stones. Their Villages stand as wast as like the Sabunck, Garamont, or Arabian Pavilleons, wanting Gardens, Hedges, Closses, Barnes, or Backe-sides: This sluggish and idle husbandry, being a natural instinct of their neighbour or paternal Moores.³¹

Segovia, which in the second half of the sixteenth century was the industrial hub of the interior, lost fifty percent of its population between its 1580 heyday and the mid-

²³ Elliot, 'The Spanish Peninsula', 444.

²⁴ Dominguez Ortiz, *The Golden Age of Spain*, 192.

²⁵ Davis, *The Rise of the Atlantic Economies*, 145.

²⁶ Henry Kamen, *Spain, 1469-1715: A Society of Conflict* (Harlow, 1983), 266.

²⁷ Israel, 'The Decline of Spain', 172.

²⁸ Kamen, 'The Decline of Spain', 42.

²⁹ Ibid, 42. This will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

³⁰ Ringrose, *Madrid and the Spanish Economy*, 315.

³¹ Lithgow, *The Totall discourse*, 378-9.

seventeenth century.³² Furthermore, the expulsion of the Moriscos in 1609 led not only to a catastrophic loss of population, but also to the removal of the most economically productive sector of the population.³³ This was combined with serious and sustained subsistence crises and the outbreaks of pestilence and disease which, although common throughout early modern Europe, piled more woes upon Habsburg Spain. Between 1596 and 1602 plague is believed to have claimed 600,000-700,000 lives in Castile alone. Given that the population of mainland Spain was estimated to be at best eight million towards the end of the sixteenth century, this number is staggering.³⁴ Further plagues and famines which struck throughout the first half of the seventeenth century were made more severe due to the fiscal crisis.³⁵

Other factors which influenced the economy of mainland Spain also included transportation, agriculture and the influence of the Mesta. Commercial transportation within Spain was an arduous, costly and time-intensive task.³⁶ There were few items of merchandise that were profitable and hardy enough to withstand a long inland journey on roads that were so poorly developed.³⁷ Tolls were supposed to be levied by public bodies in order to ensure the upkeep of roads and their suitability for commercial traffic; however, the money collected was not necessarily used for the purpose in which it was intended.³⁸ Beasts used to transport goods were also in short supply; they were often agricultural animals, so would be unavailable when needed on the land.³⁹ Transport by water would appear to be the most practical solution for the movement of goods throughout Spain, however, most rivers could only support insignificant trade traffic.⁴⁰ Agriculture in Spain was also problematic due in large part to the climate and topography of mainland Spain, which was described as being unyielding to agriculture and either too dry or, in areas where rainfall was adequate, too acidic.⁴¹ As Casey describes, a 'huge problem for Spanish farmers was the sheer lack of water'.⁴² This was

³² García Sanz, 'Castile 1580-1650', 27.

³³ Moriscos were converted Catholics of Islamic descent; however, they were believed to harbour Islamic sympathies and doubts were cast as to the sincerity of their conversions to Christianity. By 1614 around 275,000 people had been expelled, or four percent of the population of Spain. See Lynch, *The Hispanic World*, 64.

³⁴ Kamen, *Spain, 1469-1714*, 224.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 223-4.

³⁶ Cara Rahn Philips, *Ciudad Real 1500-1700: Growth, Crisis and Readjustment in the Spanish Economy* (London, 1979), 54.

³⁷ David Ringrose, 'The Impact of a New Capital City: Madrid, Toledo and New Castile, 1560-1660', *Journal of Economic History* 33:4 (1973), 763.

³⁸ Ortiz, *The Golden Age of Spain*, 177.

³⁹ Philips, *Ciudad Real*, 54.

⁴⁰ Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*, 127.

⁴¹ Lynch, *The Hispanic World*, 201.

⁴² Casey, *Early Modern Spain*, 43.

made worse by agricultural practices: mules were used for ploughing, but they did not plough to any great depth and thus quickly exhausted the land.⁴³ Finally, orthodox histories of the economy of Spain have stated that agriculture was in competition with the Mesta, who desired more land in order to graze their sheep: as a result this made Habsburg Spain dependent on imports of basic commodities and unable to support itself.⁴⁴

The corpus of scholarly work shows that Spain suffered a serious economic decline during the last ten years of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries. While Henry Kamen, like his contemporaries, accepts that Spain suffered in this period he argues that 'it is difficult to see how so undeveloped a nation could have 'declined' before ever becoming rich'.⁴⁵ While Kamen's viewpoint is the most radical of the 'decline' scholars, his view has been eclipsed in recent years by publications designed to shed new light on the state of the Spanish economy and to present an alternative representation.

Recent scholarship has attempted to view the Spanish economy in the same way that the politics of Spain are understood, that is, in a regionalised form. This presents its own problems. J. Israel, for example, while acknowledging that Spain was essentially a composite monarchy, points out that the Kingdom of Castile provided around eighty-five percent of the wealth of the Habsburg monarchy. He argues, therefore, that a concentration on the economy of Castile when discussing the early modern Spanish economy is justified.⁴⁶ Yun Cansalilla and Thompson agree and further add that Castile was 'in many ways the hub of the entire economy of Europe'.⁴⁷ This argument has been disputed by Angel Sanz García who points out that, rather than discussing Spanish economic behaviour in terms of Castile and the other areas, it is more helpful to contrast the economic experience of the coast and the interior.⁴⁸ Cara Rahn Philips concurs and examines the Spanish economy in three sections: Castile, Andalusia and the south west coast; the north and the north west coasts; and the east and south east coasts.⁴⁹ By examining the economic performance of coastal areas on a standalone basis it is clear that not all of Spain was as severely affected by the economic

⁴³ Kamen, *Spain, 1469-1714*, 225.

⁴⁴ Shepard Bancroft Clough and Charles Woosley Cole, *Economic History of Europe* (London, 1952), 207; J. H. Elliott, 'The Decline of Spain', *Past and Present* 20 (1961), 62. The recent repudiation of this theory is discussed later in the chapter.

⁴⁵ Kamen, 'The Decline of Spain', 35.

⁴⁶ Israel, 'The Decline of Spain', 179.

⁴⁷ Yun Cansalilla and Thompson, 'Introduction', 1.

⁴⁸ Sanz García, 'Castile 1580-1650', 14.

⁴⁹ Cara Rahn Philips, 'Time and Duration: A Model for the Economy of Early Modern Spain', *The American Historical Review* 92:3 (1987), 534.

depression that was so destructive for Castile. Regina Grafe has argued that a fundamental shift took place in the seventeenth century in which inland Castile was replaced in economic importance by the coastal regions.⁵⁰ Due to their maritime links with the outside world, coastal areas could expand their industries into new sectors confident that the need for basic commodities could be met by trading with Europe.⁵¹ Coastal areas did suffer from decline in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but it is apparent that, unlike the interior, they began to recover and prosper (to levels better than pre-1580) from around 1650.⁵² While Castile, as the seat of power, was undoubtedly the heart of political authority in Habsburg Spain, it does not necessarily follow that this area was imperative economically. In fact, as the seventeenth century progressed the coasts and their surrounding areas, which could easily connect to the outside world, became the main economic force in the Iberian Peninsula.

Despite regionalisation and the relative economic difference between areas of mainland Spain, several attempts were made to try and improve the domestic economy in the seventeenth century. This was, in part, due to the government understanding of the economic situation but also due to the recommendations of the literary movement of *arbristas*. As Elliott has stated, by the early seventeenth century 'the Spanish clearly felt the need to explain what had happened to their country'.⁵³ The *arbristas* felt that the discovery of riches abroad had tainted Spain, resulting in increasing bureaucracy and an extravagant and lazy nobility incapable of running their estates correctly.⁵⁴ It was believed that in the golden age of Ferdinand and Isabella, or occasionally under Philip II, the Spanish people had been hardworking, sober and dedicated to religion but that the wealth of the Indies had corrupted men and made them idle.⁵⁵ This was made worse by the sale of offices which was a quick way for the monarchy to raise funds but which led to an inflated and more importantly, poorly qualified administration.⁵⁶ The writing of the *arbristas* led to attempts to combat the 'lack of morality' and improve the economy starting with the establishment of the *Junta de Reformación*. However, by 1627 the purpose of this organisation shifted from economic reform to using policy to

⁵⁰ Regina Grafe, 'Northern Spain Between the Iberian and Atlantic Worlds: Trade and Regional Specialisation, 1550-1650' (Unpublished PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 2001), 18.

⁵¹ Ringrose, *Madrid and the Spanish Economy*, 5. In contrast, the interior was isolated from supplies when local crops failed.

⁵² Israel, 'The Decline of Spain', 14.

⁵³ J.H Elliott, 'Self Perception and Decline in Early Seventeenth Century Spain' in *Past and Present* 74 (1977), 46.

⁵⁴ Elliott, 'The Spanish Peninsula', 459-460.

⁵⁵ Elliott, 'Self Perception', 47-8.

⁵⁶ Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*, 30-33.

increase revenue to the Crown.⁵⁷ In 1623, in an attempt to boost home industry, an edict was issued forbidding the import of silk or woollen cloth.⁵⁸ It was hoped, that by banning foreign imports, more domestic wool and silk would remain in Spain and feed the home industries rather than being exported abroad.⁵⁹ In 1699 the export of raw silk was banned entirely in a further attempt to expand the Spanish textile industry and this legislation was reissued several times in the eighteenth century.⁶⁰ These attempts to improve the Spanish balance of trade recognised that exporting huge amounts of raw material and importing manufactured goods stifled home industry and thus prevented economic growth and prosperity.⁶¹ However, government attempts to protect or encourage trade suffered from the regular problems of bureaucracy. For example, in 1624, an attempt was made to protect trade from Dutch privateers by providing armed convoys.⁶² Goods from Andalusia to Northern Europe would be subject to a one percent tax in order to help pay for the twenty-four warships which were meant to protect trade in that direction, the rest would be gained from prizes and condemnations.⁶³ Unsurprisingly the institution (*Almirantazgo de Sevilla*) did not protect trade and instead concentrated on confiscating enemy goods, much to the fury of Spanish merchants who believed the institution to be a governmental money-making exercise that restricted trade.⁶⁴ In 1625 an attempt was made to bolster the failing economy with the establishment of the *Junta de Población, Agricultura y Comercio*, but its achievements were minimal.⁶⁵ These early efforts at improving trade, the economy and even the country's morality, proved ineffective due to the administration's overwhelming need for money. With short-term fiscal concerns dominating the vast majority of legislation, economic stability and growth did not rank highly.

It wasn't until the latter 1670s that more serious attempts were made to improve the industrial and economic condition of Spain, but even these did not prove successful. In 1679 the *Junta de Comercio* was established by royal decree, its purpose being to develop industry and the economy in Spain. One of the first orders of this institution was to bring expert cloth workers to Spain from northern and eastern Europe to attempt to

⁵⁷ García Sanz, 'Castile 1580-1650', 29.

⁵⁸ Casey, 'Spain: A Failed Transition', 219.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 218.

⁶⁰ Casey, *Early Modern Spain*, 64.

⁶¹ Kamen, *Spain in the later Seventeenth Century*, 67.

⁶² Lynch, *Spain Under the Habsburg's*, 154.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*, 76.

expand the home textile industry.⁶⁶ However, the Junta was beset with problems and, despite being given jurisdiction over all the territories of the Spanish monarchy, it was dissolved shortly after the devaluation of the *vellon* in February 1680. As has already been discussed, this caused economic pandemonium.⁶⁷ By 1682 the Junta was up and running again, and the king passed legislation allowing the nobility to become involved in industry - a move which previously would have resulted in a loss of noble status.⁶⁸ Although the achievements of the committee were not outstanding, it did draw up plans to improve inland water transport, passed measures which attempted to restore Spanish shipping and gave subsidies to manufacturers.⁶⁹ For example, in 1688 the king stated that Spanish textile factories were to be given preference over foreign merchants when purchasing raw materials.⁷⁰ In the early 1690s the Junta was reformed to deal exclusively with Castile and Madrid, while separate committees were formed for other regions.⁷¹ By the late 1680s mainland Spain was beginning to recover. The devaluation, although causing much short-term distress, worked to boost the Spanish economy.⁷² This led to a period of sustained, although slow, growth which appeared unaffected by the war of Spanish succession. Indeed Jean O McLachlan argues that the economic effect upon Spain of the new Bourbon monarchy was nothing less than 'remarkable' and that the French influence balanced the Spanish budget.⁷³ Kamen goes further and states that the War of Spanish Succession assisted the Spanish economy as it was no longer burdened by the 'dead weight of its European territories'.⁷⁴ National attempts to improve industry and commerce were therefore only partially successful. It is clear that in the long term the effects of the new Bourbon monarchy combined with the natural recovery of Spanish peninsula were far more effective.

1.2 The Control of Trade in Spain

As well as examining and debating the condition of the Spanish economy in the seventeenth century, historians have also discussed the question of who conducted

⁶⁶ Cara Rahn Philips and William D. Philips, *Spain's Golden Fleece: Wool Production and the Wool Trade from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1997), 205.

⁶⁷ Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*, 75.

⁶⁸ Philips and Philips, *Spain's Golden Fleece*, 205.

⁶⁹ Kamen, *A Society of Conflict*, 266.

⁷⁰ Philips and Philips, *Spain's Golden Fleece*, 205.

⁷¹ Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*, 77.

⁷² Philips, 'Time and Duration', 459.

⁷³ Jean O McLachlan, *Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667-1750: A Study of the Influence of Commerce on Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1940), 1.

⁷⁴ Kamen, *Spain, 1469-1714*, 268.

trade in particular regions of Spain. Such interrogation can impart much about the relative state of the economy in these areas. In this section the two areas with the strongest trade links to Northern Europe, Andalusia and Bilbao, are examined to discover who conducted trade in these districts and the role of foreign merchants in this. Andalusia was the centre for the trade between the Americas and Castile, with Seville and, later in the seventeenth century, Cadiz serving as the central ports for this trade. The Indies trade drew foreign merchants to Andalusia to trade either on their own account, or on behalf of others.⁷⁵ Foreigners were prohibited from dealing in the Indies trade but naturally this law was largely unsuccessful given that the use of Spanish middle-men, naturalisation and forgery of papers were all common ways for foreign merchants to engage in trade with the Americas from Andalusia.⁷⁶ The use of foreign vessels was another way for overseas traders to become involved as the Spanish were unable to provide a strong enough mercantile marine to support the Indies trade unaided. In July 1642 the government attempted to outlaw this practice but the legislation proved impossible to enforce as there were simply not enough Spanish vessels to conduct the trade.⁷⁷ The Spanish shipbuilding industry had suffered a serious decline in the seventeenth century in the face of the innovations of northern European shipbuilding, which were not employed by Spanish shipbuilders.⁷⁸ Spanish shipbuilding was further stifled by wars with the Dutch Republic which prevented the import of vital shipbuilding supplies.⁷⁹ This decline in Spanish vessels led to an increase in the use of foreign ships, and by 1612 Spaniards were shipping only 30 percent of the wool exported from Northern Spain, while foreign merchants organised shipments of the bulk to their countries of origin or to wherever their employers ordered.⁸⁰ As the economic efficiency of Northern Europe increased in comparison to Spanish decline during the seventeenth century, Spain came to rely more and more on foreign shipping, especially in the Indies trade.⁸¹ This was coupled with the fact that fleets to the Indies were carrying an ever increasing proportion of foreign goods: Sancho de Moncada recorded in 1619 that he believed ninety percent of Indies trade was handled by foreigners.⁸² The

⁷⁵ Lynch, *The Hispanic World*, 195.

⁷⁶ Lynch, *Spain Under the Habsburg's*, 170.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 172.

⁷⁸ Elliott, 'The Decline of Spain', 68.

⁷⁹ Elliott, 'The Spanish Peninsula', 459.

⁸⁰ Philips and Philips, *Spain's Golden Fleece*, 185.

⁸¹ Ringrose, 'Madrid and the Spanish Economy', 11-12. As Jean O McLachlan has discussed this provided another avenue for British shipowners who could use their vessels to engage in the carrying trade. There are several examples of this practise in the thesis. See McLachlan, *Trade and Peace with Old Spain*, 7.

⁸² Elliott, 'The Spanish Peninsula', 440.

number of overseas traders in Southern Spain also gives an indication as to who conducted trade in this area, where Alicante played host to consuls from all the major European nations by 1630.⁸³ The supremacy of foreign merchants in Andalusian trade was such that Lamikiz has argued that the Spanish monopoly on colonial trade existed in name only.⁸⁴ Even differing religious beliefs did not dampen this dominance in Andalusia as unfavourable peace treaties forced Philip III to allow Protestants to trade as long as they did not contravene local laws and behaved with decorum.⁸⁵ In Andalusia at least, not only were considerable numbers of overseas merchants conducting trade but they were also controlling large parts of it, both organising trade with their home countries and participating, albeit illegally, in the Indies trade.

Historical analysis into why foreign merchants dominated the economic market of Castile and especially Andalusia has determined the main cause for this to lie in peace treaties in which Spanish interests were decisively disadvantaged. For example, peace treaties with the Dutch, the 'English' and the French have been seen to be seriously detrimental to the activities of Spanish merchants especially by allowing foreign merchants to conduct trade in Spain. The Habsburg relationship with the Dutch, in particular, has important resonances for this thesis due to the importance of the re-export trade in Spanish goods to Scotland.⁸⁶ Until the Treaty of Münster in 1648 Dutch merchants had difficulties accessing Spanish markets due to the almost constant state of war between Habsburg Spain and the new republic. However, the Twelve Year Truce (1609) provided a brief respite and gave Dutch merchants the right to trade with Spain and its possessions with license from the king. This allowed Dutch traders access to Spain and Portugal. By 1621 war was resumed once more and the Dutch were subject to an economic embargo lasting from 1621 to 1648.⁸⁷ This certainly did not stop trade entirely, as Amsterdam became a trading centre for weapons and munitions for both sides, and trade continued between the Dutch Republic and Spanish Netherlands via overland routes.⁸⁸ Habsburg Spain, however, simply could not sustain war against both the Dutch Republic and France and thus made moves to conclude peace with the Dutch Republic.⁸⁹ The Treaty of Münster therefore recognised the Dutch Republic as an

⁸³ Kamen, *Spain, 1469-1714*, 230. The representation of Scottish merchant is discussed in detail later in the thesis.

⁸⁴ Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust*, 6.

⁸⁵ Philips and Philips, *Spain's Golden Fleece*, 184-5.

⁸⁶ This is examined in detail in Chapter 3.

⁸⁷ Israel, 'The Decline of Spain', 176.

⁸⁸ E.H Kossman, 'The Low Countries' in F. C. Spooner, ed, *The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years' War* (Cambridge, 1970), 370-1.

⁸⁹ Lynch, *The Habsburg World*, 165-6.

independent state and was followed by the Spanish-Dutch commercial treaty of 1650 which granted commercial privileges where, for example, Dutch traders were exempt from most of the customs inspection system.⁹⁰ The treaty was to have far reaching implications allowing Dutch merchants to ingratiate themselves in the Spanish market at the expense of the English, which led directly to the Navigation Acts and the Anglo-Dutch Wars.

France also secured advantageous trading rights in the seventeenth century, although not until after the Franco-Spanish war of 1635-1659. Evidence suggests that during this war, and in contrast to the Dutch experience, French commerce with Spain was seriously curtailed. For example, Dutch consuls in Alicante, Cadiz, Malaga and Seville reported that there were no French ships or merchants in these areas before 1659 and those French goods that were entering the Spanish markets arrived under the cover of Dutch merchants.⁹¹ However, following the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659 in which Philip IV's daughter was married to Louis XIV, French goods and merchants began to dominate the Spanish market.⁹² This treaty gave French merchants the same rights as the Dutch, with a limitation on customs duties, no inspection for merchant warehouses, their own consuls and a Judge Conservator for any judicial matters involving the French.⁹³ The number of French migrants, immigrants and traders in Spain became substantial thereafter, with it being estimated that in 1680 there were as many as 65,000 French workers in Spain.⁹⁴ France's domination of the commercial market of Andalusia cannot be under-estimated with with 37 percent of imports to Alicante in 1667 coming from France.⁹⁵ It is clear from the evidence above that foreign merchants were heavily involved in and even conducting large parts of Andalusian trade to Northern Europe. This foreign control was disastrous for the Spanish economy; a French memoir of 1691 stated that only five percent of the goods shipped from Cadiz to the Americas were actually Spanish.⁹⁶

The extent to which foreign merchants controlled and conducted trade in early modern Spain, especially in Bilbao and the surrounding area, has been subject to

⁹⁰ Israel, 'The Decline of Spain', 177.

⁹¹ Israel, 'The Decline of Spain', 177. This is of course excepting Northern Spain, especially Catalonia which had a much closer relationship with France, benefitting from French assistance in the Catalanian rebellion in 1640.

⁹² Lynch, *The Habsburg World*, 226.

⁹³ *Ibid*, 226.

⁹⁴ Kamen, 'The Decline of Castile', 68. Estimates for the French population in Spain in 1626 put the figure at 200,000; however, it is possible that the French-Spanish war seriously diminished this number, see Philips, 'Time and Duration', 557.

⁹⁵ Kamen, 'The Decline of Spain', 68.

⁹⁶ Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*, 137.

debate. Cara Rahn Philips and William D. Philips, for example, argue that although foreign merchants were well represented in the wool trade, Spaniards were still prominent; this was due to their role as middlemen between the flock owners and the foreign merchants who were based on the coast.⁹⁷ In her thesis examining the trade of the northwest coast of Spain, Regina Grafe has shown that far from being mutually antagonistic, Spanish and English merchants in Cantabria worked together in the north Atlantic trade.⁹⁸ Further, she adds that attempting to treat the Spanish and English colonial trades as completely separate networks is 'clearly wrong'.⁹⁹ Grafe is not alone in investigating the activities of local merchants: Xabier Lamikiz's publication concentrates on Spanish merchants and their overseas trading networks. His work provides some of the most comprehensive evidence as to the significant role played by Spanish merchants, especially in Bilbao.¹⁰⁰ As has been previously discussed, the Basque economy was fiscally independent from that of Castile and was therefore markedly different. The economic differences between the Basque economy and that of the rest of the Peninsula have been recognised by historians for some time, with it being understood that the north and northwest coast appeared to have escaped the demographic crisis that was so economically destructive for Castile.¹⁰¹ Kamen concurs, stating that international events in the seventeenth century actually assisted Bilbao, as war with France drove trade away from San Sebastian and into the Basque port.¹⁰² Bilbao itself was a major centre for the re-exportation of goods from Castile, such as Castilian wool, meat, wax and wood, to name only a few items.¹⁰³ Although overseas traders were as numerous in Bilbao as they were in the rest of Spain - Regina Grafe estimates there to have been 90 English merchants in Bilbao in the period from 1630 to 1650 - foreign merchants in Bilbao were expected to adhere to different rules.¹⁰⁴ For example, they could not own property and had to live in the houses of local Spanish merchants. Moreover, it was a long and arduous task for such individuals to gain citizenship.¹⁰⁵ While this was viewed as a serious inconvenience, Lamikiz argues that due to this system foreign merchants in Bilbao had closer connections to local

⁹⁷ Philips and Philips, *Spain's Golden Fleece*, 185-6.

⁹⁸ Grafe, 'Northern Spain', 237.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ See Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust*.

¹⁰¹ Philips, 'Time and Duration', 550.

¹⁰² Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*, 122; Lynch also agrees that Bilbao and the North coast did not suffer as badly as Castile in the seventeenth century, see Lynch, *Spain Under the Habsburgs*, 154.

¹⁰³ Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust*, 16.

¹⁰⁴ Grafe, 'Northern Spain', 188.

¹⁰⁵ Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust*, 34-5.

merchants and this assisted trade.¹⁰⁶ Grafe differs in her analysis of the situation, stating that 'on the whole, the English in Bilbao seem to have made no effort to be integrated in the local community'.¹⁰⁷ How stringently the rules against property ownership were actually policed is also debatable, and Grafe provides an example of English merchants renting land without any problems.¹⁰⁸ The move to Santander by English traders was not merely in response to what they perceived as a lack of privileges but also an ordinance in 1699 which stated that only local merchants could conduct trade.¹⁰⁹ From the 1660s onward merchants of Bilbao had worked hard in order to secure the impartiality and effectiveness of their mercantile court. This was followed in the 1680s by a serious upturn in the number of local merchants becoming involved in trade.¹¹⁰ The increasing reliability of local merchants angered foreign merchants, who began to see that their services would no longer be required.¹¹¹ The advantages that the Basque lands held in comparison to the rest of Spain, especially the fiscal and jurisdictional advantages, allowed this area to escape the worst of the economic crisis that was so devastating for Castile.

In this investigation it is clear that rather than being one single kingdom, Spain was instead a collection of composite regions with each area having separate judicial and local fiscal laws. The importance of regionalisation can also be carried into discussions of the Spanish economy. While historians agree that all parts of Spain suffered from economic crisis during the seventeenth century, it is apparent that various regions were affected at separate times and with differing levels of severity.¹¹² Some areas of Spain fared better than others, such as the northwest coast, and although foreign merchants were heavily involved, and it can be argued, controlled trade in the major trading area of Andalusia the situation was not as bleak for Spanish merchants in the north and interior Spain, where local merchants were still needed to act as intermediaries. Moreover Spain was not the only European economic area to be affected by decline in the seventeenth century. It has been recognised that with the exception of the Dutch Republic, most of Europe suffered some form of economic crisis in this period.¹¹³

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 38.

¹⁰⁷ Grafe, 'Northern Spain', 224.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*, 123.

¹¹⁰ Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust*, 36-40.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 40.

¹¹² Grafe, 'Northern Spain', 18.

¹¹³ Yun Cansalilla and Thompson, 'Introduction', 2.

1.3 Portugal and the Spanish Dominions

Spain, while obviously the political and, arguably, the economic heart of Iberia, was not the only kingdom to make up the Peninsula or the Iberian world. The purpose of this section, therefore, is provide a brief economic analysis of those areas that proved important to Scottish mercantile relations with Iberia in the early modern period. Beginning with Portugal, this section shall then discuss the Spanish Netherlands and finish with South America.

For a significant period of time covered by this thesis Portugal was under the rule of the Spanish Habsburgs. The period after 1580 marked the beginning of the end for Portuguese dominance in East Indies trade and signalled the end of a serious trading advantage which Portuguese merchants had long possessed: neutrality. Portuguese vessels and traders became fair game to privateers of those kingdoms at war with Philip, more specifically the Dutch Republic and England.¹¹⁴ Prior to union with Spain, the Portuguese had been the first to exploit the direct trading route to the Indies discovered by Vasco de Gama in 1498. In doing so the Portuguese directly challenged the Venetian monopoly in spices and pepper. The work of the second viceroy, Francisco de Alburquerque, helped to secure the Portuguese hold in the East Indies by capturing both Goa and the important trade centre of Malacca.¹¹⁵ The Crown took direct control of the trade with the cartez system, in which the Portuguese demanded payment from Asian ships for safe passage and, later in the century, the concession system in which the right to trading routes was sold, with both bringing revenue for the Crown.¹¹⁶ These systems worked with little cost to the Portuguese Crown and much profit; however, by the time of Philip II's ascension to the Portuguese throne, Dutch and English merchants were looking for a way to break into the trade with Portugal's new dynastic status providing the perfect excuse. As discussed by Victor Enthoven, Steve Murdoch and Eila Williamson, the English and Dutch trading companies initially worked together, viewing the Portuguese as 'common enemy'.¹¹⁷ The Dutch East India Company, under the leadership of Governor General Jan Pieterz Coen, in particular, dealt the heaviest blows

¹¹⁴ Newitt, *Portuguese Overseas Expansion*, 176; Enthoven, Murdoch and Williamson, eds., *The Navigator*, 60-73.

¹¹⁵ Arun Das Gupta, 'The Maritime Trade of Indonesia 1500-1800' in Om Prakash, ed, *European Commercial Expansion* (Hampshire 1992), 89-91; the port was so important it was noted that eighty-four separate languages were spoken in the city.

¹¹⁶ Om Prakash, 'Trade in a culturally hostile environment: Europeans in Japan trade, 1550-1700', 119; F.R Thomas, 'The Portuguese in the Seas of the Archipelago', 27, both in Om Prakash, ed, *European Commercial Expansion in Early Modern Asia* (Hampshire 1992).

¹¹⁷ Enthoven, Murdoch and Williamson, eds., *The Navigator*, 65.

with ships and territory lost throughout the 1620s.¹¹⁸ By the 1630s the Portuguese control of the East India trade was in ruins and after the fall of Malacca following a five month siege in January 1641, only a nominal empire remained.¹¹⁹ Being unable to hold on to the East Indies trade with such competition meant that Portugal began to concentrate instead on its South American empire and its relationship with other European states.¹²⁰ Nonetheless, Portugal's foray into foreign dominions had come at serious cost to the country and its economy. Prior to overseas expansion Portugal had been a largely self-sufficient kingdom able to produce basic necessities. The lure of empire, however, changed the economic wellbeing of the kingdom with emigration to Brazil and the excitement of riches from abroad drawing people away from the countryside.¹²¹ L.M.E. Shaw concurs, stating that in the same way as Spain nobles were forbidden from engaging in trade and that even the most basic goods like dried cod had to be imported.¹²² Portugal did possess some industry for the production of cloth; although, as in Spain, these industries failed to cope with competition from the Dutch Republic, England and France.¹²³ Just as with Spain, and indeed the rest of Europe, it is apparent that Portugal suffered a period of intense economic decline during the early seventeenth century and it was not until the closing decades of the century that the country's fortunes began to recover. However, from the 1690s the Portuguese balance of trade began to improve, with expanding wine exports and an increasing demand for the products of the textile industries.¹²⁴

The almost constant state of war between Spain and the Dutch Republic, from 1581 through to 1648, had an obvious economic effect upon the Spanish Netherlands. As C. Bruneel has commented, the Spanish Netherlands became a buffer zone between France and the Dutch Republic in the eighteenth century: but, in the seventeenth century their position served as point of attack for enemies of Spain.¹²⁵ Even a return to Spanish control caused problems for important centres of commerce, such as Antwerp. After Antwerp was brought back into Spanish jurisdiction in 1585 the authorities gave the people of the city a choice: convert to Catholicism or leave. The

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 67-70.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ An analysis of Portuguese territories in South America will follow later in the section.

¹²¹ Alan K. Smith, *Creating a World Economy: Merchant Capital, Colonialism and World Trade, 1400-1825* (Boulder, 1991), 88.

¹²² L.M.E. Shaw, *The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and The English Merchants in Portugal: 1654-1810* (Aldershot, 1998), 4.

¹²³ Ibid, 17.

¹²⁴ H.E.S. Fisher, *The Portugal Trade: A Study of Anglo-Portuguese Commerce 1700-1770* (London, 1971), 29.

¹²⁵ Bruneel, 'The Spanish and Austrian Netherlands', 222.

large numbers of those who chose the latter option resulted in a serious loss of population and, more importantly, skills as the population of 80,000 dropped to 42,000 in 1589.¹²⁶ Antwerp had previously been the single most important market for London cloth, taking 65 percent of cloth exports from London in 1550: although, the upheavals meant that many merchants began to re-locate to Hamburg.¹²⁷ In 1598 Philip II ceded the Spanish Netherlands to his daughter, Isabella, and her husband. This Act of Abdication listed strict rules, including banning the Southern Netherlands from trading with the Indies, which represented another blow for the trade of the area.¹²⁸ It can be difficult to truly understand the economy of the Spanish Netherlands due to the rapid and successful expansion of the Dutch Republic, which cast a shadow over its southern neighbour.¹²⁹ E. H. Kossman describes how the economy of the Spanish Netherlands, rather than declining, went through a period of transformation in the seventeenth century, with expansion in agriculture and rural industry providing the basis of the new economy.¹³⁰ Bruneel concurs, arguing that while restoring urban economic prosperity is a long and difficult process rural prosperity returns very quickly.¹³¹ Showing similarity to some coastal areas in mainland Spain, it appears that, while suffering some decline in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the economy of the Spanish Netherlands was transformed into a more sustainable and prosperous one.

South America and its precious metals were pivotal to the economies of Portugal and Spain during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Crown of Castile professed sovereignty over New Spain, comprising the Caribbean, modern-day Venezuela and all the Iberian possessions to the north of Panama, as well as Peru, Chile and Buenos Aires.¹³² The Crown of Portugal held dominion over the vast territory of Brazil, making the Iberian sovereignty of South America complete.¹³³ The historical facts relating to the conquest of South America by Iberian forces are well-known and do not require discussion for this thesis, although, it is important to note that, rather than

¹²⁶ Ibid, 228.

¹²⁷ Pauline Croft, 'The State of the World is Marvellously Changed' in Susan Doran and Glen Richardson, eds., *Tudor England and Its Neighbours* (Basingstoke, 2005), 186-7. For more information on the relocation of the English Merchant Adventurers to Hamburg and the company's privileges in that city see Erik Lindberg, 'The Rise of Hamburg as a Global Marketplace in the Seventeenth Century: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50:3 (2008), 657-660. Many thanks to Dr Kathrin Zickermann for this source.

¹²⁸ Bruneel, 'The Spanish and Austrian Netherlands', 224.

¹²⁹ Kossman, 'The Low Countries', 370.

¹³⁰ Ibid, 370.

¹³¹ Bruneel, 'The Spanish and Austrian Netherlands', 230.

¹³² W. Borah, 'Latin America, 1610-1660' in J. B. Harrison, ed, *The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years' War, 1609-48/59* (Cambridge, 1970), 707.

¹³³ Ibid.

make the new colonies a copy of Iberia, they were instead set to produce goods that could not be made in Iberia itself.¹³⁴ While the New World dominions had many commodities to export, such as sugar, tobacco, building materials, cochineal and other raw commodities, it was the precious metals and stones which excited the most interest in Europe.¹³⁵ Spain used silver from its dominions in the New World to prop up an unfavourable balance of trade. However, by the late sixteenth century the amount of silver making its way to Seville was decreasing rapidly.¹³⁶ This was in part due to a decline in the volume of silver that was being extracted but smuggling and bribery both in the New World and along the Andalusian coast also played a significant role.¹³⁷ This crisis also affected Portugal, with less silver reaching Lisbon in the early seventeenth century, and the Brazilian gold rush not underway until the 1690s.¹³⁸ While this period presented a decline in New World trade from mainland Iberia's perspective, it does not necessarily follow that South America itself was in any form of economic decline. A significant problem faced by the New World economy was a shortage of labour. This was in large part due to the decimation of the local population upon the introduction of European diseases such as smallpox.¹³⁹ The importation of slaves from Africa became increasingly common as a way in which to provide labour for the new plantation industries in South America, particularly in Brazil.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, it is estimated that 2-3,000 people a year may have emigrated from Iberia to South America, though the total number of Africans and Europeans remain estimates.¹⁴¹ Similarly to the development of the Portuguese empire in the east, South America began, over the period of the seventeenth century, to develop both an 'official' and 'unofficial' empire. The official empire experienced problems with illegal trade, poor bullion exports and increasingly bold Dutch infractions upon Iberian-held territory.¹⁴² From its formation the Dutch West Indian Company was aware that any trade expansion in the region would come at the expense of the Iberian monopoly.¹⁴³ However, in South America the Dutch

¹³⁴ Cara Rahn Philips, 'The Growth and Composition of Trade in the Iberian Empires, 1540-1740' in James D. Tracy, ed, *The Rise of Merchant Empires, Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750* (Cambridge, 1990), 76.

¹³⁵ Ibid, 55-6, 83.

¹³⁶ Elliott, 'The Spanish Peninsula, 1598-1648', 440.

¹³⁷ Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*, 136.

¹³⁸ Philips, 'The Growth and Composition of Trade', 64-65.

¹³⁹ Mark Harrison, *Disease and the Modern World: 1500 to the Present Day* (Cambridge, 2004), 72-78.

¹⁴⁰ Philips, 'The Growth and Composition of Trade', 55.

¹⁴¹ Borah, 'Latin America', 715.

¹⁴² Philips, 'The Growth and Composition of Trade', 56.

¹⁴³ Henk Den Heijer, 'The Dutch West India Company, 1621-1791' in Johannes Postma and Victor Enthoven, eds., *Riches from Atlantic Commerce: Dutch Transatlantic Shipping, 1585-1817* (Leiden, 2003), 85.

Republic could not count on additional pressure being applied on their common competitor by England. Although north Brazil fell for a time to Dutch control in 1630 it was recaptured by the Portuguese in 1654.¹⁴⁴ Further, the resources required to try and capture the Spanish treasure fleets actually cost more than was gained.¹⁴⁵ Despite these problems, when the unofficial or domestic economy of the New World is examined without reference to the Iberian mainland, the economic situation of the region is more positive. The growth of sustainable industries, such as forestry, sugar plantations and cochineal, served to provide a stable basis to an economy which was fast outgrowing that of its Iberian masters as well as fuelling a thriving trade between the various areas of South America.¹⁴⁶ Although bullion gave cause for initial excitement in the New World, more mundane industries provided the stability that in the long run made South America more economically sound than its European masters.

The purpose of this section has been to show the diversity and complex nature of the economic and commercial conditions of the Iberian world in the early modern period. The geo-political sphere of Iberian influence was vast and naturally making sound economic evaluations as to the state of so large an area would be foolhardy. However, what can be ascertained is that during the period covered by this thesis, each of these regions experienced economic recession during the early modern period, some more severely than others. This was then followed by an economic revival, although once again the rate of recovery was different between areas.

2. Scottish Economy and the Control of Trade

Analysing the Scottish economy in the early modern period poses far less of a challenge than analysing that of Iberia, for two main reasons. Firstly, and most obviously, Scotland is a far smaller landmass than the Iberian world, and even than Spain. Secondly, although there were local trends, the Scottish economy and trade was controlled by centralised regulatory bodies, albeit by separate groups. Regionalisation, which hampers any cohesive study of the Spanish economy, is not a problem for scholars of the Scottish economy in the seventeenth century. This section of the chapter seeks to establish the state of the Scottish economy in the early modern period, which is followed by an evaluation of who controlled Scottish trade.

¹⁴⁴ C. R Boxer, *Four Centuries of Portuguese Overseas Expansion, 1415-1825: A Succinct Survey* (Johannesburg, 1961), 51-2.

¹⁴⁵ Heijer, 'The Dutch West India Company', 97.

¹⁴⁶ Lynch, *The Hispanic World*, 346-7.

Scottish industry and the economy in the seventeenth century has previously been viewed as deficient and of too small a scale to be worthy of major consideration. Or, perhaps more accurately, the development of Scottish industry in the seventeenth century has often been overlooked by historians eager to discuss the success of post-1707 foundations. For example, T.C. Smout and C.A. Whatley describe Scottish manufacture in the seventeenth century as poor and economically backward.¹⁴⁷ Keith M. Brown concurs, stating that Scotland's exports consisted of a small number of raw materials and a very few manufactories.¹⁴⁸

More recently this orthodox view of Scottish industry and the economy has been challenged by Allan I. Macinnes, Gordon Marshall and Ian D. Whyte. Whyte's publications on the Scottish economy have made a thorough analysis of the impressive industrial advances made in Scotland during the seventeenth century, thus convincingly showing that Scotland was not as economically backward as has been portrayed.¹⁴⁹ Gordon Marshall has pointed out that the establishment of large-scale manufacturing enterprises, such as the Newmills cloth factory at Haddington, was indicative of the presence of a modern capitalist culture, previously believed to have been non-existent.¹⁵⁰ Macinnes has also argued that the legislation of the Scottish Parliament from the 1640s onward proves that the government considered the development of industry as essential to the kingdom's prosperity.¹⁵¹ These more enthusiastic views on seventeenth-century Scottish industry have been taken further by Steve Murdoch and Kathrin Zickermann. Murdoch argues that Scottish manufacturing entrepreneurs were well aware of the limitations in their native land and thus took their skills abroad to areas better suited to their particular industry.¹⁵² Daniel Young Leijonanker, for example, accelerated the textile industry in Sweden making it a sustained manufacture rather than a secondary occupation.¹⁵³ Zickermann concurs, providing evidence of the textile manufactory of Robert Hog and his Dutch partner Anton de Pau, who were equally successful in establishing their business abroad. These enterprising gentlemen took full advantage of the settlement arranged with Duke George Wilhelm of Braunschweig,

¹⁴⁷ C.A. Whatley, 'The Experience of Work' in T.M Devine and Rosalind Mitchison, eds., *People and Society in Scotland*, Volume 1: 1760-1830 (Edinburgh, 1988), 227; T.C Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 205.

¹⁴⁸ Keith M. Brown, 'Reformation to Union, 1560-1707' in R.A Houston and W.W.J. Knox, eds., *The New Penguin History of Scotland from the Earliest Time to the Present Day* (London, 2001), 207.

¹⁴⁹ See Whyte, *Scotland before the Industrial Revolution* and Whyte, *Scotland's Society and Economy*.

¹⁵⁰ Gordon Marshall, *Presbyteries and Profits: Calvinism and the Development of Capitalism in Scotland, 1560-1707* (Oxford, 1980), 129.

¹⁵¹ Allan I. Macinnes, *Union and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707* (Cambridge, 2007), 203.

¹⁵² Steve Murdoch, *Network North*, 202-204.

¹⁵³ Murdoch, 'The Stockholm Scots', 42-44.

which provided, among other privileges, exemption from excise charges and the right to employ impoverished individuals for seven years.¹⁵⁴ This new research does much to improve previous opinions of seventeenth-century Scottish manufacturing capabilities by demonstrating ownership and establishment of such industries in areas more suited to sustaining them.

T.M. Devine and S.G.E. Lythe have argued that economic growth required domestic stability, which in Scotland equated to a strong and capable monarch, and peace with the neighbouring kingdom of England.¹⁵⁵ This was achieved in Scotland during the reign of James VI, and finally allowed Scottish industry and thus the economy to expand and develop more rapidly than it had previously. The stability is also attested to by the changing nature of the Burgh Records of Edinburgh in the early seventeenth century; local residents were able to engage fully in industry without fear of serious internal disruption.¹⁵⁶ This stability did not lead, however, to an immediate free-for-all in Scottish industry. In comparison to the Iberian economy and especially Spain, the Scottish authorities made far more concerted attempts to improve and protect the economy in the seventeenth century. James VI and the Scottish Parliament were keen to protect Scottish resources from over-exploitation. For example, in 1609 the Scottish Parliament passed an act banning the destruction of Scotland's forests for the production of iron.¹⁵⁷ In April of the same year James angrily replied to a protestation of coal manufacturers, who were infuriated at a ban on the exportation of coal: he stated that coal did not grow and its supply declined with each day. He then asked the coal owners to consider how the kingdom would be affected if the domestic coal supply was exhausted.¹⁵⁸ This was not the only protectionist legislation passed in regards to Scottish resources. As discussed by T.C. Smout, Scotland was seriously affected by the Little Ice Age, which ran from the thirteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries.¹⁵⁹ Although Scotland was able to sustain itself, there were no reserves on which to fall back when times were hard and thus legislation was passed preventing the export of vital food products from the kingdom.¹⁶⁰ For example, in 1587, due to poor harvests in the kingdom, Parliament banned the export of any victual and permission was given to

¹⁵⁴ Zickermann, 'Across the German Sea', 164-166.

¹⁵⁵ T.M. Devine and S.G.E. Lythe, 'The Economy of Scotland Under James VI', *Scottish Historical Review* 50 (1971), 94.

¹⁵⁶ Marguerite Wood, ed, *Extracts from The Records of the Burgh of Edinburgh: 1604-1626* (Edinburgh, 1931), ix.

¹⁵⁷ *RPS*, A1609/1/10, 27 January 1609.

¹⁵⁸ *RPS*, 1579/10/43, 10 November 1579; A1597/5/8, 13 May 1597; *RPCS*, VIII, 575-6. 28 April 1609.

¹⁵⁹ T.C. Smout, 'Land and Sea: The Environment' in T.M. Devine and Jenny Wormald, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History* (Oxford, 2012), 21-25.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 25.

seize ships which attempted to leave Scotland carrying such cargo.¹⁶¹ As a result of this legislation vessels attempting to export corn to Spain were seized in 1591.¹⁶² Environmental concerns were therefore taken seriously by the Scottish administration demonstrating not only attempts to avoid hunger in the population but also to conserve Scotland's natural habitats and resources.

A further endeavour was made by the Scottish Parliament to bolster home industries. In 1581, for example, the wearing and importing of foreign cloth was forbidden by all but the king and the nobility. Parliament argued that the Scottish cloth industry kept many poor people employed and that the gentry should be supporting them.¹⁶³ This was followed in 1600 by a proposal by King James that 100 Flemish weavers and their families be commissioned to instruct their Scottish counterparts in the better production of cloth. Similarly to Philip III in the 1620s and the advisors of Carlos II in the 1680s, James believed that Scotland could decrease her dependence on foreign cloth if good quality, finished cloth was made within the kingdom.¹⁶⁴ This plan, however, did not flourish; the Flemish weavers received a frosty reception from their Scottish counterparts who resented their input and by 1609 they were no longer instructing Scottish workers.¹⁶⁵

The 1640s represented the beginning of a new era for the Scottish Parliament's attempts to bolster the economy. David Stevenson's investigation into the legislation of the Covenanting Parliaments of the 1640s shows an unprecedented interest in the state of Scottish manufacture.¹⁶⁶ In August 1641 a commission was appointed to discuss the best way to establish and maintain manufactories, while it also had the power to establish correction houses for the 'idle poor'.¹⁶⁷ Other attempts to improve the Scottish economy in the 1640s followed: unfortunately, the kingdom's political instability and financial destitution made it impossible for any real change to occur. These acts were not useless however, as they formed the basis of Restoration legislation, which made serious attempts to encourage and develop Scotland's manufacturing industry.

The Restoration period led to several pieces of legislation aimed at improving the condition of Scotland's manufacturing industry. 1661 alone saw numerous acts passed

¹⁶¹ *RPS*, 1587/7/49, 29 July 1587.

¹⁶² *CSPS*, X, 609, 31 December 1691.

¹⁶³ *RPS*, 1581/10/37, 29 November 1581.

¹⁶⁴ *RPCS*, VI, 123-124, 1 July 1600. The weavers were to be given burgess status and made exempt from taxation for a decade.

¹⁶⁵ Pagan, *The Convention of The Royal Burghs*, 208-210.

¹⁶⁶ David Stevenson, 'The Effects of the Revolution and Conquest on Scotland', Rosalind Mitchison and Peter Roebuk, eds., *Economy and Society in Scotland and Ireland: 1500-1939* (Edinburgh, 1988), 48-57.

¹⁶⁷ *RPS*, 1641/8/194, 16 November 1641.

with the sole purpose of creating a favourable economic environment for large industry. The most encompassing of these acts was the *Act for erecting manufactories*, passed in January 1661, which allowed tax exemptions and foreign investors to establish manufactories and to be naturalised as Scottish subjects. Further acts gave permission for joint stock companies, prohibited the export of linen and raw materials that could be finished in Scotland, and also banned the importation of goods that would compete with home production.¹⁶⁸ 1681 saw a renewal of this legislation in the *Act for encouraging Trade and Manufactories*, which stated

the import of foreign commodities (which are superfluous or may be made within the kingdom be encouragement given to the manufactories thereof) had exceedingly exhausted the money of the kingdom.¹⁶⁹

Ian D. Whyte has described Scottish economic policy of this period as ‘muddled’, stating that the government dealt best ‘with short term crises’ and ‘paid lip-service’ to the protection of the home market.¹⁷⁰ From the evidence examined above it is clear that from the 1640s onward, the Scottish parliament was determined to encourage home industries and prevent the import and export of any commodities which would threaten the establishment and livelihood of these ventures.

Discussions regarding Scottish manufacturing and industry during the seventeenth century have often been conducted with a bias towards the Treaty of Union and its perceived necessity for the benefit of the Scottish economy. Several historians point to falling exports of commodities, such as coal and linen, as indicative of the economic crises that Scotland faced in the late seventeenth century.¹⁷¹ Considering the protectionist legislation put in place by the Scottish Parliament after the Restoration, it is perhaps unsurprising that exports of raw materials, which were prohibited from being exported, declined. Unfortunately, smugglers have not left any records for scholars to analyse, although it is fair to assume that the smuggling of coal and other goods continued. On the Isle of Man, for example, smuggling to both Scotland and Ireland flourished in the wake of the Navigation Acts.¹⁷²

Prior to the Act of Union in 1707 there were three regulatory bodies that could make laws pertaining to Scotland’s trade: the Privy Council, the Scottish Parliament and

¹⁶⁸ RPS, 1661/1/344, 1 January 1661; 1661/1/339, 1 January 1661; 1661/1/340, 1 January 1661; 1661/1/342, 1 January 1661; 1661/1/388, 1 January 1661.

¹⁶⁹ RPS, 1681/7/36, 13 September 1681.

¹⁷⁰ Whyte, *Scotland before the Industrial Revolution*, 274.

¹⁷¹ See for example, Lythe and Butt, *An Economic History of Scotland*; Smout, *Scottish Trade*; T.C Smout, *A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830* (London, 1998); Whatley, ‘The Experience of Work’.

¹⁷² J.R. Dickenson, *The Lordship of Man Under the Stanleys: Government and Economy in the Isle of Man, 1580-1704* (Manchester, 1996), 331.

the Convention of Royal Burghs. For the most part the Convention dealt with matters of trade and were largely left to their own devices by the other regulatory bodies, although the Parliament and Privy Council did become involved during periods of conflict or dearth.¹⁷³ During the 1590s these institutions all passed legislation regarding trade with Iberia, in large part due to the Anglo-Spanish war, a fear of globalised Catholicism and, as previously discussed, famine.¹⁷⁴ In January 1593 the Privy Council issued a new proclamation in the wake of the 'Spanish Blanks' affair which banned Scots from having any interaction with anyone from Spain, with grave consequences for those who disobeyed.¹⁷⁵ As will be discussed in chapter two, this proclamation was largely ineffective.

The Church of Scotland also sought to limit those Scots trading with predominantly Catholic Iberia and made attempts to curtail the trade. In a meeting of the General Assembly held in April 1593 it was ordered that every Christian within the Kirk should refrain from going to any of the King of Spain's dominions, where the 'tyrranie of Inquisitioun is vsed'.¹⁷⁶ In June of the same year a minister, William Murray, approached the Convention of Royal Burghs and read an act that had been passed at the General Assembly requesting the Convention to either ban or suspend trade with the dominions of Spain.¹⁷⁷ The Convention responded that they were unable to make a decision of such magnitude but promised to give an answer to the Provost of Edinburgh in due course.¹⁷⁸ In July 1593 the Convention conceded, ratifying and approving a ruling that made traffic and negotiation with the dominions of Spain illegal.¹⁷⁹ The next chapter, however, will prove that these proclamations were wholly without success and that Scottish merchants and skippers continued to trade with Iberia.

In contrast to proclamations issued against trade with Iberia, trade with France was favoured and measures were taken to ensure advantageous rights for Scottish merchants. As Siobhan Talbott has shown, despite the effects of the Reformation, the

¹⁷³ See Claire McLoughlin, 'The Control of Trade in Scotland during the Reigns of James VI and Charles I', in *Northern Studies* (Gremista, 2013), 46.

¹⁷⁴ The commercial and political effects of the Anglo-Spanish war on Scotland's trade with Iberia will be examined in far greater detail in the second chapter.

¹⁷⁵ *RPCS*, X, 33-4, 5 January 1593. The consequences were described as the loss not only of lands and goods but also of body and soul.

¹⁷⁶ Thomas Thomson, ed, *Acts & Proceedings of the General Assemblies of the Kirk of Scotland, 1560-1618* (Edinburgh, 1839), 'Acts and Proceedings: 1593, April', 795-818.

¹⁷⁷ *CRB*, I, 402, 13 June 1593.

¹⁷⁸ This was despite the Convention of Royal Burghs' ruling against trade with Catholics in 1582. See *CRB*, I, 133-4. 22 June 1582.

¹⁷⁹ *CRB*, II, 5, 5 July 1597. Interestingly, according to this record the act had been previously discussed and passed in July 1593 and July 1595, respectively, but was not recorded in the Convention book.

'Auld Alliance' still functioned, especially on a mercantile level.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, France contained significant Protestant populations and maintained royal relations with Protestant countries including Sweden and Scotland. Both Talbott and Marie-Claude Tucker have pointed to the presence of a small but significant Scottish Protestant population in France.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, the military aspect of the relationship between Scotland and France continued. Levies of soldiers for France were held in the 1630s and 1640s when Scottish troops enlisted to assist in the fight against the Habsburg aggressors.¹⁸² The idea of Scottish soldiers serving in the French army to fight the aggression of the Habsburgs also provides another motive as to why trade with Iberia was not favoured by the authorities in the same way that trade with France was.

This was coupled with fear of the Inquisition which invaded popular thought and was largely disproportionate to the number of merchants who were actually brought before the institution.¹⁸³ Helen Rawlings investigated further, arguing that recent research has proven that the Inquisition was not as bloodthirsty as has been historically portrayed.¹⁸⁴ The Church of Scotland was not alone in its suspicion of those who traded with Iberia. Jason Eldred has pointed out that, in England, merchants who traded with Spain had to face questions about their faith and consequently their national obligations.¹⁸⁵ After 1605, however, the Convention of Royal Burghs began to ignore the 'official' stance against trade with Iberia. In July 1607 the burgh of Edinburgh and its neighbours along the Firth of Forth were given permission to meet and appoint a 'discreitt' man to be the 'Counsallado in Spayne'.¹⁸⁶ This was followed by the appointment of William Crawford as conservator in Portugal two years later.¹⁸⁷ The situation was a delicate one, as in the wake of the 'Spanish blanks' affair it was prudent for the Convention to agree with the General Assembly's attitude to trade with Iberia.

¹⁸⁰ See Talbott, 'An Alliance Ended?'. For a history of the Auld Alliance see Norman MacDougall, *An Antidote to the English: The Auld Alliance, 1295-1560* (East Lothian, 2001).

¹⁸¹ Siobhan Talbott, 'My Heart is a Scotch Heart': Scottish Calvinist Exiles in France in their Continental Context, 1605-1638' in David Worthington, ed, *British and Irish Emigrants and Exiles in Europe, 1603-1688* (Leiden, 2010), 197-214; Marie-Claude Tucker, 'Scottish Students and Masters at the Faculty of Law of the University of Bourges in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries' in Theo-van Heijnsbergen and Nicola Royan, eds., *Literature, Letters and the Canonical in Early Modern Scotland* (East Linton, 2002), 111-120.

¹⁸² M. Glozier, 'Scots in the French and Dutch Armies During the Thirty Years' War' in Steve Murdoch, ed, *Scotland and the Thirty Years War* (Leiden, 2001), 119. After the Peace of Prague in 1635, France became one of the most important anti-Habsburg forces on the continent.

¹⁸³ Alison Games, *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion* (Oxford, 2008), 65.

¹⁸⁴ Helen Rawlings, *The Spanish Inquisition* (Oxford, 2006), 2.

¹⁸⁵ Jason Eldred, 'The Just will pay for the Sinners': English Merchants, the Trade with Spain and Elizabethan Foreign Policy, 1563-1585', *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* 10:1 (2010), 10-11.

¹⁸⁶ *CRB*, II, 242. 4 July 1607.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 279-280. 5 July 1609.

However, once initial fears had died away, the Convention was more than happy to encourage what it recognised as a valuable trade connection.

3. Commodities

Evidence of trade with Iberia before the mid-seventeenth century often only becomes apparent in printed primary sources when normal trading practices were interrupted by untoward circumstances, such as bad weather, sabotage at sea or a change in the political relationship between the Stuart dominions and those of Spain and Portugal. Merchants would not trouble the Privy Council or the Scottish Parliament when trade was continuing as it should. This situation does provide an idea of the normality of trade with Iberia because, had the practice been uncommon, reports of those who traded with Spain would be expected. As the trade was not generally reported except where problems arose, it can be assumed that commerce with the region was common enough not to arouse suspicion of those who participated in it. Scottish customs records from the early seventeenth century period are disappointingly scarce. The late seventeenth century, however, is far more comprehensively provisioned with customs records providing evidence of Scottish trade with Iberia, along with evidence of the commodities exchanged between the two areas. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to determine the commodities that were exchanged between Iberia and Scotland, utilising both printed primary and manuscript resources.

The customs records of the Scottish cities of Aberdeen, Dundee, Glasgow and Leith provide evidence pertaining to the ships entering and leaving their ports and also the commodities on board. For example, ships leaving Leith for Iberia carried salmon, cod, lead, tallow, haddock, felt hats, candles, linen cloth, wheat, and occasionally, re-exports such as Irish butter.¹⁸⁸ *The Charles* which left Dundee for Cadiz in 1664 is a typical example, carrying salmon, linen cloth, wheat, plaiding and tallow.¹⁸⁹ From the records of *The High Court of Admiralty* we also learn of other commodities. In 1692 coal was transported by George Lockhart, a merchant of Glasgow, while Matthew Campbell, master of the *William and George of Glasgow*, delivered the fuel to Lisbon.¹⁹⁰ In 1716 grain was shipped to Lisbon, with beer and tar among other goods making the journey to the Peninsula.¹⁹¹ The planned destination of the vessel obviously made a difference

¹⁸⁸ NAS, E72/15.

¹⁸⁹ NAS, E72/2/1.

¹⁹⁰ HCA, AC7/9, 29 July 1692.

¹⁹¹ HCA, AC10/87, 1709; AC7/7, 1 June 1686; AC9/570, 1716; AC10/87, 1709; AC7/6, 1684.

to its cargo as ships intended for islands under Iberian control carried a far greater proportion of finished goods and domestic necessities. In 1682, for example, the *James of Wairwater* sailed from Glasgow to the Canaries with linen cloth, stockings, gloves, felt hats, shoes, feathers (for beds), shoemaker's thread and plaiding hose.¹⁹² The *Dolphin of Boston*, which departed Glasgow for Madeira in August 1686, left with gloves, thread, stockings, hats, sack cloth, coals, grind stones and various other textiles.¹⁹³

The commodities traded with Iberia by England and Ireland can also provide a useful comparison. While textiles featured heavily in English commodities to Spain, corn, calf skins and hides were also common.¹⁹⁴ Ireland also had a thriving trade with Spain.¹⁹⁵ Ireland's exports to Iberia were mostly unfinished and primary goods, such as hides, fish, meat, wood and wool.¹⁹⁶ It is clear from this evidence that imports to Spain from the British Isles consisted mainly of primary and low-grade manufactured goods. Grain, whether corn or wheat, was common, as was beef. Vessels engaging on voyages to islands such as the Canaries and Madeira carried a fuller range of goods, normally of the domestic variety such as candles and gloves, thus showing the islands' dependence on foreign imports for everyday items.

A large number of commodities came from Iberia to Scotland with some, like tobacco, originating in the Iberian empire. Due to its increasing popularity tobacco appears in printed sources frequently from the early seventeenth century. More specifically, this involved attempts to legislate and regulate the use of this new consumer product. King James despised tobacco and, although there is evidence to show that it was present in Scotland prior to 1612, on 22 May 1616 the import of tobacco was banned and its sale within Scotland prohibited.¹⁹⁷ James believed the weed was destructive and bewitched people, keeping them from their lawful duty. Interestingly, the act also stated that the customs officer who seized the commodity could keep half with the other half going to the king.¹⁹⁸ It appears, therefore, that while the king personally disliked the weed, he was certainly interested in generating revenue

¹⁹² NAS, E72/10/6.

¹⁹³ NAS E72/10/13. This vessel was on a triangular trading voyage, bringing colonial goods to Glasgow, loading the ship with Scottish goods for Madeira and then sailing back to the colonies with Madeira wine. See Chapter 3.

¹⁹⁴ Croft, 'The State of the World is Marvellously Changed', 187.

¹⁹⁵ Morales, 'Identity and Loyalty', 201. This was in part due to a belief in a shared mythical ancestry, shared religion and services that Irish soldiers had given to the Spanish crown.

¹⁹⁶ Óscar Recio Morales, 'Conectores De Imperios: La Figura Del Comerciante Irlandés en España y en el Mundo Atlántico del XVIII' in Ana Crespo Solana, ed, *Comunidades Transnacionales: Colonias de Mercaderes Extranjeros en el Mundo Atlántico (1500-1830)* (Madrid, 2010), 316.

¹⁹⁷ RPCS, X, 516-7, 22 May 1616.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, 516-7, 22 May 1616.

for himself from the product. In contrast, James did not ban tobacco in England, instead he levied a heavy tax on the commodity.¹⁹⁹ While the tax imposed a 4000 percent increase on that of his predecessor this did give him an avenue with which to dispose of tobacco that he had seized in Scotland, once again demonstrating his shrewdness.²⁰⁰ Essentially James had made tobacco a crown monopoly and as he procured it by confiscation he did not have any of the costs associated with its transport.²⁰¹ Despite the act, the importation of tobacco continued. By the end of 1617 nearly 50 men from Edinburgh and Leith had been fined for selling it.²⁰² In 1621 a Leith skipper, John Auchmowtie, died at Puerto Real north of Cadiz and among the goods listed on his ship was almost a 180 lbs of tobacco, presumably destined for Scotland.²⁰³

In July 1622 the previous act of 1616 prohibiting the import of tobacco was modified, with an admission that imports of tobacco could not be stopped. James allowed its importation, but under very strict conditions and with a customs duty for the Crown.²⁰⁴ Captain William Murray gained a monopoly over the import of tobacco in March 1623 and plans were discussed for planting tobacco in Scotland in order to combat those who were evading the customs tax.²⁰⁵ A further act passed in July of the same year attempted to prevent the evasion of the customs tax by prohibiting the landing of goods and passengers until all tobacco had been declared.²⁰⁶ Tobacco was clearly a fast growing commodity and the Crown was determined to have its share of the wealth. Unfortunately, it is difficult to gauge the success of the acts passed regarding tobacco regulation. Smuggling was obviously a problem and the extent of it is unclear.

Salt was another common commodity that came to Scotland from Iberia. Biscay salt was vital for the fishing industry and it is therefore unsurprising that it features in printed sources when it became difficult to obtain. In September 1630 it was deemed by the Privy Council to be illegal to re-export French or Spanish salt out of the kingdom as it was so important for the curing of fish.²⁰⁷ A number of records mention the import of salt from Iberia, such as the will and testament of James Logan, who died owning a share in *The Diamond*, which was collecting a cargo of salt from Spain at the time of his

¹⁹⁹ Joel Best, 'Economic Interests and the Vindication Deviance: Tobacco in Seventeenth Century Europe' in *The Sociological Quarterly* 20 (1979), 173.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ *RPCS*, XI, xxvi.

²⁰² Mowat, *The Port of Leith*, 163.

²⁰³ NAS, CC8/8/51. 24 May 1622. Many thanks to Sue Mowat for this source.

²⁰⁴ *RPCS*, XIII, 28-9. 30 July 1622.

²⁰⁵ Ibid, 189-192. 18 March 1622.

²⁰⁶ Ibid, 313-4. 29 July 1623.

²⁰⁷ *RPCS*, ii, IV, 41. 9 September 1630.

death.²⁰⁸ In 1641 the *James of Kirkcaldy* was seized by Royal Navy vessels. On board were 1,100 bolls of Spanish salt. The bolls were valued at £9 Scots each, the value of the salt therefore being almost £10,000 Scots.²⁰⁹ By the 1650s salt from the Bay of Biscay was becoming harder to acquire and the Council of Aberdeen pleaded with the Cromwellian Council of State to be allowed to procure it from friendly sources.²¹⁰ Jacob Davidsen, a Scoto-Dane from Denmark-Norway, for example, was able to procure Spanish salt from Copenhagen in 1611.²¹¹ Kathrin Zickermann has also provided evidence that Iberian and French salt reached Scotland via the merchants of Bremen and Hamburg, who brought the commodity to the Shetland Islands.²¹² Later in the seventeenth century salt was once again procured from Iberia directly; in 1681 the *Speedwell of Glasgow* returned from Cadiz with a cargo of Iberian goods, including almost 700 bolls of salt.²¹³ In 1689 the *Walter of Glasgow* returned from Lisbon similarly laden with a significant cargo of salt.²¹⁴

Iberian fruit was also a standard import, with oranges, lemons and dried figs often cropping up in lists of goods from Iberia. In a letter to Colin Campbell, Laird of Glenorchy, for example, Archibald Campbell wrote in the postscript that he had sent 'his lady' two dozen Spanish oranges and was awaiting the arrival of 'good new sack from Spain'.²¹⁵ The customs records from Aberdeen, Dundee, Glasgow and Leith all show fruits such as figs, lemons, oranges and raisins, as common imports along with olives and olive oil.²¹⁶ There were also small (compared to French) but significant imports of Iberian wine, which were sold to numerous Leith merchants in quantities both for personal consumption and obvious re-sale.²¹⁷ Notable amounts of wine were also making their way into the port of Glasgow.²¹⁸ Other imports included sugar, with the passengers of David Robertson bringing aboard with them at Lisbon 12 baskets of

²⁰⁸ NAS, CC8/8/43. 24 May 1622.

²⁰⁹ RPS, A1641/8/124, 12 November 1641. The seizure of this ship by the Royal Navy should be placed in the context of the activities of the Scottish Covenanters which, upon the adoption of the National Covenant in 1638, had left Charles at war with his Scottish subjects.

²¹⁰ Louise B. Taylor, ed, *Aberdeen Council Letters* III (6. vols. London, 1942-61), 213-15. September 1652.

²¹¹ Thomas Riis, *Should Auld Acquaintance Be Forgot, c. 1450-1707* II (2. vols. Odense, 1988), 165.

²¹² Zickermann, 'Across the German Sea', 68.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid, E72/1914.

²¹⁵ Ibid. GD112/39/5116. Archibald Campbell to Colin Campbell, Laird of Glenorchy, 3 March 1634. The term sack is difficult to define accurately, as it became a term encompassing almost all white wines and in some cases all varieties of wine. For the most part it appeared to define strong white wine. See A D Francis, *The Wine Trade* (London, 1972), 49-51.

²¹⁶ Ibid, E72.

²¹⁷ Ibid, E72/15.

²¹⁸ NAS, E72/19.

sugar and 2,000 oranges at Lisbon.²¹⁹ In 1641 a ship, which was on its way to Leith from Cadiz, was seized by Captain Green, an English parliamentary captain, and was found to be carrying Spanish fruits as well as wine.²²⁰ John Auchmowtie's vessel, the *Grace of God*, contained 36 barrels of figs as well as the previously mentioned cargo of tobacco.²²¹ Finally, another regular import was the cloth die cochineal, which arrived in all of Scotland's major ports.²²²

The popularity of Iberian wines in England is somewhat debated by historians, and this discussion provides useful comparison information for Scotland. Davis states that the import of Spanish wine to England grew substantially in the mid-part of the seventeenth century, partly due to their higher alcoholic strength than other wines.²²³ Shaw concurs similarly for exports of Portuguese wine to England, albeit this trade did not see significant growth until the 1690s and beyond.²²⁴ However, Francis disagrees, pointing out in his publication on the European wine trade that while Iberian wines were being exported to England their quantities were still small in comparison to French wines.²²⁵ In the case of Portuguese wines Francis argues that they 'were little heard of' and that when English merchants submitted a memorial to parliament in 1677 they pointed out that, in comparison to the 7,000 tons of French wine imported, only 33 tons of Portuguese wine were brought in despite the merchants' insistence that the wine was good wine.²²⁶ Figures calculated by Graviil showed that there were 176 tons of wine imported from Portugal in 1677, although this is still markedly less than the 9,645 tons imported from France and the 4,012 tons imported from Spain.²²⁷

The import of Spanish wine deserves to be given further attention due to the taxes placed on this specific commodity. The effects of taxation, in general, led to increased expenses for merchants. Goods from Iberia were no exception and, in the case of Spanish wine, were penalised for their very origin. General customs on goods entering the country became a permanent fact in trade during the early years of James VI's adult reign when poor crown finances forced him to establish a customs tax.²²⁸ The *Act Regarding the Impost of Wine*, passed in July 1590 allowed the King three 'crowns

²¹⁹ HCA, AC7/2, 10 April 1628.

²²⁰ Murdoch, *The Terror of the Seas?*, 206 and RPS, 1645/1/197, 8 March 1645.

²²¹ NAS, CC8/8/51. 16 May 1622.

²²² Ibid, E72.

²²³ Ralph Davis, *English Overseas Trade* (London, 1973), 27.

²²⁴ Shaw, *The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance*, 39.

²²⁵ Francis, *The Wine Trade*, 65-67.

²²⁶ Ibid, 79.

²²⁷ R Graviil, 'Trading to Spain and Portugal', *Business History* 10:2 (1968), 78.

²²⁸ Whyte, *Scotland Before the Industrial Revolution*, 195.

of the sun' of every ton of French and Spanish wine brought into the kingdom.²²⁹ Until over 50 years later this remained the case, with French and Spanish wine being taxed in the same manner. However, in the 1640s a flurry of legislation changed this situation and Spanish wine became more expensive than its French counterpart. The Scottish kingdom was in a dire financial position due to the costs of financing armies for both the Bishops' Wars and the requirements of the Solemn League and Covenant.²³⁰ Thus, in January 1644, to much public disgust, an excise tax was passed which, among many items, included Spanish wine.²³¹ Of more interest to this study, however, is the difference in tax between French and Spanish wine, with French wine costing only one shilling and four pence to import whereas its Spanish counterpart cost two shillings and eight pence, double the price.²³² This distinction continued into the 1660s and 1670s with no reason given in the legislation for the difference between the taxes placed on the wines.²³³ In 1690 the taxes became even more prohibitive on Spanish wine, which was charged at £70 pounds more per ton than French and Rhenish wine in Edinburgh.²³⁴ As yet there is no evidence to provide an explanation for this disparity; however, it is possible that the more cordial trading relationship with France allowed privileges to merchants bringing goods from that kingdom. It may be that initially French wine was subject to a lower duty due to the assistance the French government had provided, in the form of neutrality, to the Covenanting government in the 1640s.²³⁵ However, after the 1640s there is no clear reason as to the continuing tax discrepancy between French and Spanish wines.

Iberian coin is also occasionally recorded, with over £400 Scots worth of Portuguese *testans* part of the cargo of the previously mentioned *James of Kirkcaldy*.²³⁶ In August 1591 the *Act Regarding the Coin* restricted the types of foreign coin allowed in the kingdom, in response to the number of false coins that were circulating and differing values being ascribed to coins that held the same worth.²³⁷ In October 1598 the

²²⁹ *RPS*, A1590/7/3, 29 July 1590.

²³⁰ David Stevenson, 'The Financing of the Cause of the Covenants, 1638-51', *Scottish Historical Review* 51 (1972), 99.

²³¹ *RPS*, 1644/1/65, 31 January 1644. John Spalding described Scotland as 'this miserable country overburdened with uncouth taxation'. John Spalding, *The History of the Troubles and Memorable Transactions in Scotland 1626- 1645 II* (Edinburgh, 1829), 187.

²³² *Ibid*.

²³³ *Ibid*, 1642/5/60, 26 August 1662; 1672/6/36, 11 September 1672.

²³⁴ *Ibid*, 1690/4/131, 22 July 1690.

²³⁵ Steve Murdoch, 'The April Committee, 1640: The Projection and Reflection of the Covenanting Revolution' in Morag J. Munro-Landi, ed, *L'Écosse et ses Doubles, Ancien Monde - Nouveau Monde* (Paris, 2010), 45-53.

²³⁶ *RPS*, A1641/8/124, 12 November 1641.

²³⁷ *Ibid*, A1591/8/2, 6 August 1591.

Act Regarding the Course of Foreign Coin attempted to further define the value of foreign coins, including those from Iberia.²³⁸ By establishing what amounts to an exchange rate, King James tried to ensure that all foreign coins in the kingdom would command a uniform price. The fact that Spanish and Portuguese coins were listed provides evidence as to their presence as a commodity in Scotland. Further, in 1604 the family of Sir Thomas Kennedy of Coiff brought their case to the Scottish Parliament. They were seeking justice for their brother who was murdered. While the court case was a lengthy one, for the purposes of this thesis it is only necessary to note that listed among Kennedy's stolen possessions were Portuguese Ducats.²³⁹ It is possible that, for merchants, dealing in foreign coin was preferable to Scottish currency, as Spanish coins were internationally recognised. This certainly appears to be the case in the 1680s. During his time in Scotland, the Duke of York made attempts to obtain Spanish coin in the hope it could improve the buying power of Scottish merchants.²⁴⁰ In one example James Gilchrist, merchant of Edinburgh, requested that if any profit remained after James Home had bought Iberian goods on his behalf it was to be returned in pieces of eight.²⁴¹

Evidence of Iberian trade is further complicated by the use of non-Iberian ports as intermediary staging posts through which Iberian goods were shipped to Scotland. When examining the cargoes of ships arriving into Leith this appears to be the most common way for Iberian goods to enter Scotland. By identifying Iberian goods which arrived from direct journeys (as shown above) this information can then be used to recognise such goods arriving in Scotland from other ports. One vessel from Rotterdam, for example, which arrived in July 1691, records among its cargo, figs, raisins and sweet oil.²⁴² There are numerous other examples in the customs records for Aberdeen, Dundee, Glasgow and Leith. While this does provide another avenue for which to examine Iberian trade it is not without problems. Brandy, indigo, salt, sugar and tobacco, in particular, are problematic and unless arriving directly from an Iberian source are discounted from this present analysis. Brandy was produced in Spain; but it was also produced in France and, thus, when arriving in Scotland from a third party port it is impossible to determine the origin of the beverage. While indigo was produced in the Spanish colonies it also arrived from the East Indies and the Caribbean.²⁴³ The vital

²³⁸ Ibid, 1598/10/5, 30 October 1598.

²³⁹ Ibid, 1604/4/24, 11 July 1604.

²⁴⁰ Graham, *A Maritime History*, 53.

²⁴¹ HCA, AC7/7. 8 June 1686.

²⁴² NAS, E72/15/49.

²⁴³ Jenny Balfour-Paul, *Indigo* (London, 1998), 41-2.

mineral of salt also requires careful examination. There is certainly evidence of salt arriving directly from Iberia as previously discussed; however, often salt was referred to merely as 'Biscay salt' or 'bay salt' and thus it is impossible to tell if it originated in France or Spain. For example, in April 1672 the *Fortune of Borrowstones* arrived in Aberdeen with a cargo of pepper, figs and salt for the merchant Alexander Burnet, but there is no indication as to the origin of the salt.²⁴⁴ The commodities of sugar and tobacco are in the same position: they were both produced in Iberian dominions, but from the mid-seventeenth century were increasingly grown in Caribbean plantations or colonies in North America under Dutch or English control and thus, until a proven way of establishing point of origin is made available, they have been discounted from this thesis unless demonstrably from an Iberian port.²⁴⁵ However, this should not detract from the importance of third party ports in this body of work: as long as goods can be identified as Iberian the use of third party ports was an extremely valuable way of not only identifying the extent of Iberian trade, but also the individuals involved.

Conclusion

This chapter has confronted the difficulties of analysing Scottish-Iberian commercial connections in the early modern period. Iberia was, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a large geo-political area with several different structures of government in place. Indeed, in the case of Spain, regionalisation was so extensive it is almost impossible to discuss it as a unified kingdom and as concerns the economy it would be misleading to do so. Possessing such a large overseas empire not only gave Iberia great wealth but also caused significant problems, with Castile unable to cope with the fundamental market shift brought about by the influx of precious metals. Spain was not alone in experiencing economic instability though with Portugal and the Spanish Netherlands similarly affected. As a much smaller kingdom, examining the Scottish economy does not prove as much of a challenge, although it is not without problems. A tendency to focus on the growth of the Scottish economy during the eighteenth century has led to limited interest in Scottish economic development during the late sixteenth

²⁴⁴ NAS, E72/1/3.

²⁴⁵ Sidney M. Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (Middlesex, 1985), 32-39. Mintz points out that Portugal was supplying nearly all of Europe's sugar in 1625 but soon came up against competition from the Dutch and the English. Russell R. Menard, 'The Tobacco Industry in the Chesapeake Colonies, 1617-1730: An Interpretation' in *Research in Economic History* V (1980), 109-113. Menard shows that tobacco was produced in the Chesapeake by area from at least 1617 and that between 1630 and the late 1660s the amount of tobacco exported to British ports increased enormously.

and seventeenth centuries. Finally, an examination of primary sources shows the wide range of goods exchanged between Iberia and Scotland and vice-versa. However, it is important to note that while Scotland imported luxury goods that could be forgone in times of hardship, the goods exported to Iberia were essential items such as grain or fish. From this analysis the balance of trade was clearly in Scotland's favour.

Chapter Two: The Anglo-Spanish War and Early Mercantile Connections

‘the samyn day, ratefeis and approvis the act of burrowis maid agains the traffik and negotiatioun of burrowis within the dominions of Spayne’¹

In essence, early mercantile connections between Scotland and Iberia were only recorded as a knock-on effect of the Anglo-Spanish war of 1585-1604. While this thesis begins in 1580 this certainly does not suggest that Scottish-Iberian trade relations began at that point. However, it was only from the 1580s onward that significant evidence of Scottish-Iberian mercantile activities was recorded in any detail. The reason behind this is two-fold: firstly, surviving manuscript sources regarding trade, such as port books, are rare prior to 1600 and in Scotland still so even up to the 1660s. Secondly, as previously discussed, evidence of trade between Scotland and Iberia often only becomes apparent when that trade did not proceed normally. In the late sixteenth century this equated to the disruption caused by the Anglo-Spanish war in which, due to their close geographical proximity and language similarities, Scots were either mistaken for Englishmen or traded on behalf of their English counterparts. This led to the questioning of Scottish skippers by the English and Iberian authorities who were desperate to gain information on the military activities of their enemies. The Anglo-Spanish war has proved pivotal to this thesis by giving evidence of Scottish trading activities during this period. Without such a major political event involving Scotland’s closest geographical neighbour and Iberia, evidence of early mercantile connections between the two may have gone largely unrecorded.

The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to investigate trade between Scotland and Iberia during this early phase. Initially, this involves scrutiny of the delicate political situation that Scotland found herself in during the Anglo-Spanish war and how this influenced trade. Further, an examination of Scots who traded with Iberia in this period has been conducted. Finally the chapter discusses the activities of Scots who traded on behalf of their English counterparts.

As might be expected much of the information for this chapter has been discovered via English sources, in particular the early modern state papers. As Stephen Alford has described these documents were the working papers of daily government and provide an impressive insight into all aspects of domestic and foreign relations.²

¹ *CRB*, II, 5. 5 July 1597

² Stephen Alford, ‘Introduction to State Papers Online and the Sixteenth Century State Papers, 1509-1603’ *SP Online*, online at: <http://go.galegroup.com> Many thanks to Cynthia Fry for bringing this source to my attention.

Moreover, and importantly for this study, they often do so while at the same time illuminating various factors of ordinary life in the sixteenth century. Of the papers used for this study most report on Scottish-Spanish activities which were, due to the conflict, of particular interest to Elizabeth's government, such as the collation of sensitive or potentially valuable information concerning England's enemy.

As with all historical documents an element of caution is required in the use of these papers which were mostly the personal observations of one individual to another. When an ambassador or agents writes of his own daily actions one must consider our understanding of the individual concerned and whether historians have concluded that person trustworthy or not. If there is no consensus, we have to consider the correspondents motives and such issues as attempts to self-aggrandise or deceive for some personal motive. We must also consider how far from the origin of the source the author of a letter is and balance first hand reports with general gossip, hearsay or information derived through direct interview with a third party. Thus we are left in the usual historical quandary of finding that some reports can be corroborated from other sources while others remain more difficult to substantiate. That said it is difficult to see why English agents would deliberately lie; and to disregard all reports where corroboration from other sources is not available would be foolish. There are certainly cases where informants can be shown to be misled, or to have misread the information they have been given. As such the information derived from state papers here has been robustly tested against other sources where available and correspondents treated as legitimate unless there has been good reason to doubt their testimony.

Another source utilised in this chapter which requires more caution are the Inquisition records. The theological arguments presented in the records can be complex and at times difficult to make sense of. However for the purposes of this thesis it is only the details of the individual such as name, place of origin and occupation that are utilised. It would be difficult to discard such important information that tells us of a Scottish skipper and his ship trading with Iberia in this period - and in many cases reveals information on goods and destination. The discussion of whether the said individual was indeed a heretic, an agent of England or a good neutral trader as found in the final verdict of the Inquisition is more difficult to evaluate. Nonetheless, scrutiny of this archive has added considerably to the statistical data this thesis has provided and the research is enriched as a result.

1. Diplomatic relations and its effect upon trade with Iberia

From 1586 onwards the Anglo-Spanish war placed James VI in a difficult position. As Saenz-Cambra has pointed out, the advent of the 1580s marked a renewed period of Spanish interest in Scotland. Scotland's unstable position at the beginning of James's adult reign, coupled with the rising influence of his Catholic cousin, Esme Stewart, the Earl of Lennox, made the kingdom increasingly attractive to Philip II.³ Scotland was and generally had been considered the back door to England by various European dynasties, usually the French. That it was also thought of as small, insignificant and in need of money only supported this perception.⁴ It is therefore unsurprising that Elizabeth's network of agents kept a close eye on the Scottish king, his kingdom and his dealings with Philip's dominions. Their reports consisted of sightings of Spanish ships arriving in Scotland, and of Scottish ships leaving for Spain. For example, in a letter from Robert Bowes, an English agent, to Lord Burghley, advisor to Elizabeth, Bowes recorded the interview of Englishmen captured by Spanish ships and freed in Orkney. He wrote that they believed that a Spanish ship would continue to stay near the islands until a 'fleet of this country bound for Spain come that way', upon which they would sail to Spain in convoy.⁵ Furthermore, Bowes added that two ships of Kirkwall were preparing to sail to Spain although he was unaware if they would 'have any fellowship with the Spaniards', thus allowing for it to be a purely commercial connection.⁶ In March 1595 a report to Bowes from George Nicolson recorded the activities of Scottish ships that appeared to be detained in Spain. Nicolson had heard a rumour that they were not being allowed to leave due to fears that they would carry intelligence to England. He further noted that a Scot, Walter Lindsay, was also there 'well furnished with treasure, but not men, for these parts'.⁷ This corresponds with an earlier report about Lindsay which suggested that he was due to return to Scotland with treasure which he had received 'at the hands of many princes, and of the clergy and in the churches'; this treasure was earmarked for the rebels, presumably the Catholic lords of Scotland.⁸ Considering the previous attempts of Philip II's agent for Scottish affairs, William

³ Saenz-Cambra, 'Scotland and Philip II, 1580-1598', 199.

⁴ Susan Doran, 'Loving and Affectionate Cousins? The Relationship between Elizabeth I and James VI of Scotland, 1586-1603' in Susan Doran and Glen Richardson, eds., *Tudor England and its Neighbours* (Basingstoke, 2005), 203; Keith O. Morgan, *The Oxford History of Britain* (Oxford 2010), 292; Terence Alan Morris, *Europe and England in the Sixteenth Century* (Abingdon, 1998), 182.

⁵ *CSPS*, X, 392. Robert Bowes to Lord Burghley, 4 September 1590.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *CSPS*, XI, 547. George Nicolson to Robert Bowes, 9 March 1594-95.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 496. 12 December 1594.

Sempill, to both fund and encourage the Earl of Huntly, Lord Maxwell and various other Catholic nobles, the assumption that the purpose of this treasure was for covert operations seems plausible.⁹ This was not the only incidence of Scottish ships being impounded in the territories of the Spanish Habsburgs; in 1598 John Udale reported to the Earl of Essex that all Scottish vessels had been stopped from leaving Spain, along with their masters, so that they could be utilised by the Habsburg king.¹⁰ Occasionally, Scottish vessels were used in the knowledge that they would go, or were going near, the English coast, for example, in the repatriation of prisoners of war. In 1594, a Scottish vessel of Dundee was employed to transport Englishmen home from Spain, after the men had been captured by Spanish privateers.¹¹ These reports are often difficult to substantiate and references to the Scots involved are rarely repeated in multiple sources despite extensive searching.

As English merchants and vessels were technically banned from trading with Philip's dominions, gaining information about war-like preparations proved difficult for the English authorities. Thus there were occasions when Scottish ships were intercepted by Tudor warships and their crews ordered to give information regarding their observations while trading with Iberia. In February 1596 John Lowrie, a Scot returning from Bordeaux, stated that he had met a fellow countryman who was returning from Lisbon, who had told him that Scottish, Irish and Flemish masters were being prevented from leaving in order to act as pilots for the transportation of the Spanish army.¹² A Scotsman, sailing from Portugal with a cargo of salt in July of the same year, reported that two small Spanish vessels had taken several fishing boats in order to question the Englishmen on board.¹³ In September 1601 Gilbert Gardin, master of a ship from Dundee, was questioned by Henry Hayworth, the mayor of Dartmouth. Gardin reported that he had seen 8,000 troops ready to embark on 35 ships, with more expected.¹⁴ In a rare piece of corroboration, just over a week later Sir Walter Raleigh wrote to Secretary Cecil that two merchants of Aberdeen had reported that 36 large

⁹ Concepción Saenz-Cambra, 'Colonel William Sempill of Lochwinnoch (1546-1630): A Strategist for Spain', *Tiempos Modernos* 13 (2006), 1-20; Worthington, *Scots in Habsburg Service*, 25-29. War with England provided opportunity for those Scots who wished to see a return to Catholicism and thus the years of war between Spain and England left Scotland with several serious internal disturbances in the late 1580s and early 1590s, see Steve Murdoch, 'James VI and the Formation of a Scottish-British Military Identity' in Steve Murdoch and Andrew Mackillop, eds., *Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience c. 1550-1900* (Leiden, 2002), 5-11.

¹⁰ *Cecil Papers*, CP177/7. John Udale to the Earl of Essex, 27 April 1598.

¹¹ *Ibid*, CP29/69. Henry Browne to the Queen, 1594.

¹² *Ibid*, CP30/90. A. Douglas to Lord Burghley, 27 February 1595-6.

¹³ *CSPD*, 1595-97, 260. George Carey to Sir Robert Cecil, 25 July 1596.

¹⁴ *CSPD*, 1601-03, 97. Henry Heyward, Mayor of Dartmouth to Sir Robert Cecil, 17 September 1601.

ships had left Lisbon. They were accompanied by Irish vessels, an Irish bishop and many priests, with the ships containing 8,000 men, 6,000 of whom were soldiers and were headed, or so the Aberdonians believed, for Ireland.¹⁵ John Sempill was also questioned on 5 August 1602 in Bristol following a journey from Lisbon.¹⁶ In 1603 conflicting reports were given in a matter of weeks, with Sir Nicholas Parker reporting to Cecil that one Scotsman told him of preparations for a great armada in Lisbon. Fifteen days later, however, Thomas Brown from the west of Scotland had informed him that there was no threat as the fleet was bound for the East Indies.¹⁷ The validity of information being gathered obviously has to be questioned and the English agents were probably well aware of this. However, the quizzing of Scots was one of the few intelligence-gathering resources available to the English and was presumably better than no information at all.

The desire for information worked both ways. In August 1588 mariners from 'little Leith' gave details to the Spanish authorities on the political affairs in Scotland, such as the marriage of the Earl of Huntly to the sister of the Duke of Lennox.¹⁸ In March 1598 John Gibson, the Scottish master of a ship which arrived in Ayamonte, Spain, brought information about England to the Spanish authorities.¹⁹ These events proved to be simply intelligence gathering rather than suggestive of hostility towards the Scottish merchants themselves.²⁰ Occasionally more sinister plans were discussed. For example, in April 1587 the Duke of Parma advised using Scottish triangular trade to load Spanish troops onto Scottish ships at Dunkirk, from where they could then be taken to Leith.²¹ In November 1600 the Council of State debated a plan by an Irishman, Richard Owen, who stated that Scottish, along with Irish and Breton, ships should go to Spain for wine. Instead of wine, the masters of the vessels would be paid to load men and arms thus creating an invasion force.²² However, far more interest was shown in

¹⁵ *CSPD*, 1601-03, 105. Sir Walter Raleigh to Sir Robert Cecil, 26 September 1601. The Aberdonians also reported that the ships were well supplied, with money, munitions and 'many women'.

¹⁶ *Cecil Papers*, CP94/108. William Vawer, Mayor of Bristol to Sir Robert Cecil, 5 August 1602. It is unclear if John Sempill was any relation of William Semple.

¹⁷ *Cecil Papers*, CP99/83. Sir Nicholas Parker to Sir Robert Cecil, 2 April 1603.

¹⁸ *CSPSpanish*, XVII, 405. 27 August 1588.

¹⁹ AGS, Estado Legajo 181. Aldaya to Philip II, 2 March 1590.

²⁰ One recorded instance did appear to be malicious with the English ship the *Reprisal* attacking a Scottish merchant vessel owned by a Spaniard in 1600. However, the Captain of the *Reprisal* had an interesting change of heart agreeing to escort the ship to Tenerife after shots were exchanged. Steve Murdoch has pointed out that the Captain had perhaps remembered both Elizabeth's proclamation against such attacks and the likelihood of the next King of England being Scottish, see Murdoch, *Terror of the Seas?*, 126-7.

²¹ *CSPSpanish*, XVII, 68-9. The Duke of Parma to Bernardino de Mendoza, 13 April 1587.

²² *Ibid*, 673-4. 28 November 1600.

regards to Scottish diplomatic relations with Spain, and trade or the improvement of trade factored into this diplomacy.

In February 1592 Roger Aston wrote to James Hudson that one [John] Ogilvy, Laird of Poury, had proposed to go to Spain and procure liberty for Scottish merchants to transport English goods to Spain.²³ Ogilvy, son of Gilbert Ogilvy of Poury had a checkered past and had been implicated in the 'Spanish blanks' affair.²⁴ The author confidently wrote that 'he will get no such commission'.²⁵ The following day in a communication to Burghley, Bowes stated that King James had told Ogilvy that he would not give his permission unless he had the Queen of England's request to do so and the authorization of the ministers and the merchants.²⁶ It appears that despite James VI's ideas on the matter, Burghley was determined that Ogilvy would not succeed in his quest. In a letter to Burghley, Bowes stated that he had written to Aston and asked him to 'dashe' Ogilvy's mission to Spain by 'the delivery of weighty causes and reasons expressed in your lordship's letter mentioned'.²⁷ Furthermore, Bowes claimed to have written to Ogilvy attempting to dissuade him from going on his journey.²⁸ By 13 March it appeared that despite the efforts of Aston and Bowes, Ogilvy had been given leave to travel to Spain.²⁹ In further correspondence, on 22 March, Aston had clarified the situation and explained that he had conversed with King James, who had informed him that Ogilvy was given permission because 'he told the King he had received letters from yourself commending the journey to be profitable for both the realms'.³⁰ However, regardless of the opinion of the Scottish king or Elizabeth's advisors, the Scottish Privy Council clearly thought Ogilvy was dangerous. In September 1594 they denounced Ogilvy as a rebel, along with the previously mentioned Walter Lindsay, 'for thair oppin avowing of papistrie'.³¹

This ruling did not seem to stop Ogilvy from continuing in his attempts to achieve a Scoto-Spanish agreement, for in 1595 he once again advocated a trip to Spain, this time with a commission from James to conclude an alliance with Philip II.³² In this Ogilvy

²³ *CSPS*, X, 633-4. Roger Aston to James Hudson, 9 February 1591/2.

²⁴ *DNB*, Albert Loomie, 'Ogilvy, John (fl. 1587-1601)'. For more on the 'Spanish blanks' affair see Doran, 'Loving and Affectionate Cousins?', 209-211; Wallace T. MacCaffrey, *Elizabeth I: War and Politics: 1588-1603* (Princeton, 1992), 310-11. Many thanks to Cynthia Fry for providing examples of historiography on the Spanish blanks affair.

²⁵ *CSPS*, X, 633-4. Roger Aston to James Hudson, 9 February 1591/2.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 636. Robert Bowes to Lord Burghley, 10 February 1591/2.

²⁷ *Ibid*, 649. Robert Bowes to Lord Burghley, 7 March 1591/2.

²⁸ *Ibid*.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 656. Robert Bowes to Lord Burghley, 13 March 1591/2.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 659. Robert Aston to Robert Bowes, 22 March 1591/2.

³¹ *RCPS*, V, 172. 30 September 1594.

³² *CSPD*, 1595-97, 338. ?1595.

challenged a number of Scots, including 'Colonel [William] Sempill', to establish whether 'they knew any evil opinion formed of the King of Scots by Catholics as he could remove it'.³³ In June of the same year Ogilvy was in Flanders representing 'the Catholics of Scotland', though the appointment was entirely of his own making and carried no official authority.³⁴ December found Ogilvy in Rome, carrying a sealed paper which he claimed showed that James VI wanted to become a Catholic, although the Spanish Ambassador, the Duke of Sessa, remarked that he believed Ogilvy to be 'cunning', implying some sort of deceit.³⁵ Unfortunately for Ogilvy his travelling companion, John Cecil, an English priest, was actually an informer for Robert Cecil.³⁶ After travelling to Spain, Ogilvy's web became unravelled with the Spanish authorities at last aware that Ogilvy did not carry a royal commission. This, combined with the report of John Cecil, resulted in Ogilvy's imprisonment for a time.³⁷ For his part, James claimed to have no knowledge of Ogilvy's actions and promised to punish him severely.³⁸ In January 1601 a letter from Willoughby to Sir Robert Carey, later Earl of Monmouth, informed Carey to search for Ogilvy as he was believed to be in his district in the company of an Italian companion.³⁹ He was arrested by Carey and Sir Robert Cecil described him as 'the man I have heard as evil as I have heard of any'.⁴⁰ On 9 March 1601 James ordered Ogilvy to appear before the council for his 'disobedience'.⁴¹ Finally on 17 March, Ogilvy was once again denounced as a rebel and it was declared illegal to hide or assist him in any way.⁴²

Ogilvy was an interesting character whose career and activities are at times difficult to follow. However, of prime importance is the reaction of Elizabeth's circle of agents when it appeared that Ogilvy wished to go to Spain to secure a trade treaty. This

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ *DNB*, Albert Loomie, 'Ogilvy, John (fl. 1587–1601)'.

³⁵ AGS, Estado Legajo 967, fo. 35. Duke of Sessa to the Council, 30 January 1596. Upon arrival at the court in May, John Cecil informed the Council that Ogilvy 'claims to come on behalf of his king', and as a baron 'is anxious to be treated with deference'. See, AGS, Estado Legajo 967, fo. 89. John Cecil to the Council, 15 May 1596. Ogilvy is not actually named in the document but it is clear that Cecil is referring to him.

³⁶ *CSPD*, 1595-97, 144-6. John Cecil to Sir Robert Cecil, 30 December 1595.

³⁷ *DNB*, Loomie, 'Ogilvy'; *CSPS*, XII, 365-6. 1 December 1596.

³⁸ *CSPS*, XII, 295-6. Robert Bowes to Sir Robert Cecil, 3 August 1596.

³⁹ Joseph Bain, ed, *Calendar of Letters and Papers Relating to the Affairs of the Borders of England and Scotland*, II, online at: <http://tannerritchie.com>, 726. Willoughby to Sir Robert Carey, 11 January 1600-1. Sir Robert Carey was a courtier during the reigns of Elizabeth, James VI and Charles I. It was he who rode to Scotland to inform James that Elizabeth was dead and he was King of England. Being involved in diplomacy with both Scotland and Antwerp he would have been knowledgeable in both Scottish and Spanish affairs and may have already heard of Ogilvy, see *DNB*, Albert J. Loomie, 'Carey, Robert, first earl of Monmouth (1560–1639)'.

⁴⁰ *CSPS*Salisbury, XI, 21-22. Sir Robert Cecil to George Nicholson, 27 January 1600/1.

⁴¹ *RPCS*, VI, 220. 9 March 1601.

⁴² Ibid, 220. 9 March 1601; 226. 17 March 1601.

was something that simply could not take place in the eyes of Lord Burghley and all attempts were made to ensure that Ogilvy's plan did not go ahead.

When James did appoint a Spanish conservator, William Orde, it was a hushed affair. In June 1593 Bowes wrote to Burghley that a Scottish Catholic by the name of Orde, sent to Spain 'in favour of the papists', had been apprehended by the local authorities on his return to Dysart and sent to the provost of the town.⁴³ This was not the only English report concerning Orde. A letter from Anthony Standen to Anthony Ralston from the French town of Fontenay-le-Comte stated that Orde had passed through the town on his way to Scotland and that he had obtained a licence from the 'King of Spain that Scotch merchants may come and go with all sorts of merchandise'.⁴⁴ When Orde was arrested he was found to be carrying papers from un-named individuals in Spain and Flanders addressed to local Scottish merchants and other burghs. More importantly, Orde was in possession of a commission from the Scottish monarch which appointed him 'conservator' and gave 'him power and authority, for the benefit of the Scottish merchants trading to Spain'.⁴⁵ King James confirmed that this was the case and that he had given Orde his commission under the Great Seal.⁴⁶ It appeared that James had provided Orde with this commission in response to the activities of English merchants who had 'coloured' their goods in Spain by pretending to be Scots, which had brought Scottish merchants under suspicion.⁴⁷ Orde was therefore assigned the commission to protect Scottish merchants and the king requested that Orde be released unless he was held for other charges.⁴⁸ James obviously wished to provide Scottish merchants in Spain with a conservator but did not want to advertise this fact to Elizabeth's agents. The Scottish king was aware that having dealings with England's enemy would reflect badly upon his reputation in a kingdom that he one day hoped to rule.

The problem of English merchants pretending to be Scots was obviously widespread. As shall be discussed later in the chapter there are numerous examples of the practice. Indeed, in the February prior to Orde's arrest James had apparently written to Philip II and Philip had discussed the matter in a letter to Diego de Orellana de

⁴³ *CSPS, XI*, 107-8. Robert Bowes to Lord Burghley, 30 June 1593. Orde appeared to have been arrested as a result of the actions of Bowes, who had sent a message to the 'minister' informing him of Orde and his arrival. Dysart is in Fife.

⁴⁴ *Cecil Papers*, CP169/116. Anthony Standen to Sir Robert Cecil, 29 June 1593.

⁴⁵ *CSPS, XI*, 107-8. Robert Bowes to Lord Burghley, 30 June 1593.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* Scottish merchants had indeed suffered because of this as shall be discussed later in the chapter.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

Chaves, the *Corregidor* of several towns on Spain's north coast.⁴⁹ Philip stated that James had informed him that many merchants were forging his seal and his signature in order to be able to trade with Spain illegally.⁵⁰ Orellana was therefore ordered to embargo all Scottish ships and send an inventory of their cargo and more particularly their artillery.⁵¹ The practice of forging the seal of the King of Scotland was as widespread as English traders pretending to be Scottish. In his attempts to lessen his sentence from the Inquisition on the Canary Islands Bartholomew Cole discussed the practice, stating that (in regards to forged passports) 'any stamps needed can without difficulty be made in England'.⁵² He further confessed that he had made a number of stamps to mark merchandise that he traded and that he knew that merchants also used French and Flemish stamps.⁵³ In August of the following year John Clerk was arrested in England for forging the seal of the King of Scotland: however, he was released and according to Anthony Bacon, was believed to be on his way to Spain.⁵⁴ The fact that he was released does suggest complicity by the English authorities who, despite their state of warfare, knew the economic effect of the conflict was devastating to their own commerce. In this light Orde's appointment appears all the more important.

The description of William Orde as 'Conservator' by Bowes in the letter to Burghley is also of interest. The term conservator was normally reserved for the title of the administrator of the Scottish Staple in the Netherlands. The conservator had wide-ranging powers as the staple's highest representative and was the administrator of justice in matters concerning Scottish merchants. The Staple in the Low Countries itself was, in effect, a Scottish outpost, where Scottish merchants were provided with safe anchorage, their own church and the promise of safe lodgings should it be required.⁵⁵ As Murdoch has shown, the idea of a 'conservator' who represented all the merchants from one nation did cause problems with other British merchants who failed to fully

⁴⁹ L. Tom Perry Special Collections, Harold B. Library, Brigham Young University online at: <http://lib.byu.edu/digital/phil2/about.php>, Philip King of Spain: Correspondence, 5 February 1593. Many thanks to Wayne Cuthbertson for bringing this resource to my attention. Mayor.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² L de Alberti and A.B Wallis Chapman, eds., *English Merchants and the Spanish Inquisition in the Canaries* (London, 1912), 74. This edited collection has been originally taken from records held in the archives of the Marquess of Bute. Unfortunately, this private archive is currently closed and so it was not possible to verify; however, it can be assumed (due to the contents correlating with other sources) that what is contained within is accurate.

⁵³ Ibid, 75. 14 December 1593.

⁵⁴ *Cecil Papers*, CP169/115. Anthony Bacon to the Earl of Essex, 5 August 1593.

⁵⁵ Rooseboom, *The Scottish Staple*, 97-104; Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 186.

understand the Conservator's role.⁵⁶ Therefore, the description of Orde as a conservator, and not merely consul or factor, is of great interest.

Political discourse also provided tantalising references to the normality of Scottish-Iberian trade. Scottish vessels were obviously a common sight around the coasts of Spain, with one informer suggesting to his English masters that, rather than try and catch the Spanish fleet returning from South America while at sea, English vessels should merely disguise themselves as Scottish and wait in the mouth of the Guadalquivir.⁵⁷ In October 1592 Richard Tomson wrote to Burghley informing him that he had been told that many Scots who were 'evil affected to theire Kinge and countrie, are gotten into Spaine and there enterayned bye the kinge'.⁵⁸ Tomson wrote that he had been given this information by Scots who traded to Iberia over the summer.⁵⁹ In 1592 the Earl of Huntly arranged for a ship of Dundee to sail to Danzig and then onto Spain on the pretext of trading. Unfortunately its true purpose is not clear, however, the vessel was considered suspicious enough for Christian IV of Denmark to assure Queen Elizabeth that no Scottish vessels would pass through the Sound.⁶⁰ Huntly's plans give an indication of the normality of Scottish triangular trade involving Iberia. If the trade was considered suspicious, Huntly would not have contemplated such a plan as it would have drawn attention to his scheme; as it was he was caught out by English intelligence.⁶¹

2. Scottish trade with Iberia during the Anglo-Spanish War.

While these political dealings show James VI walking a tightrope between England and the Spanish Habsburgs, Scottish merchants themselves were also affected by the conflict. That said, Scottish merchants also traded as normal with their activities recorded by the English authorities. In October 1591, for example, it was reported by Bowes that four ships from Scotland were ready to sail for Spain.⁶² In August of the same year Juan Velazques, Captain of the province of Guipuzcoa [Basque region], granted a trading licence to the Scot William Home.⁶³ This allowed Home to enter into

⁵⁶ Murdoch, *Network North*, 148-9.

⁵⁷ Pauline Croft, 'Trading with the Enemy: 1585-1604', *The Historical Journal* 32:2 (1989), 288. The Guadalquivir was the river which led to Seville.

⁵⁸ SP Online, *SP 94, IV*, fo.136. Richard Tomson to Lord Burghley, 30 October 1592.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ *Cecil Papers*, CP174/70. Unknown to Archibald Douglas, July 1592.

⁶¹ Triangular trade involving Scotland and Iberia will be discussed in chapter three.

⁶² *CSPS, X*, 576. Robert Bowes to Lord Burghley, 3 October 1591.

⁶³ NAS, JC66/8, 23 August 1591.

any port in the province with his vessel in order to trade.⁶⁴ In January 1596 James VI wrote in favour of Thomas Bogg, a Scottish merchant trading in Spain.⁶⁵ In another example, John Simpson skippered the *New Ship of Aberdeen* to Spain in December 1596 returning in February 1598 with no consequences arising from the war.⁶⁶ Scots were also resident in Spain during this period and in May 1586 Gerald Paris, who was in Madrid, wrote to his Scottish friend, Thomas Ray, noting that he hoped that Ray's business would be completed successfully.⁶⁷ A letter from Philip II to Diego de Orellana de Chaves also sheds light on more Scottish traders, based, it appears, in the north of Spain. Jacques Lavar, David Devni, Thomas Valeux, David Balcar, Thomas Vallart, Baltar Morton and Thomas Enque were all described as carrying authentic licences from James VI in order to trade.⁶⁸ A letter from George Nicolson to Sir Robert Cecil noted that two ships of Leith owned by Watty Morton and Solomon Barker had sailed to Spain in June 1600 both carrying a cargo of coal.⁶⁹ In February 1603 William Clepham stated to English examiners that he had lived in Portugal for eighteenth months prior to his return, with the same entry additionally recording that an Englishman had arrived in Lisbon via a Scottish ship.⁷⁰ Spanish goods were also present in Scotland as William Lermouth of St Andrews owed James Flescher, master of the *Pearl of Dundee*, the sum of £300 Scots for Spanish wine.⁷¹ Finally, the will and testament of John Whippo, master of the *Dolphin of Leith*, records that Whippo died in Lisbon while he was on a trading voyage.⁷² Scottish commerce with Iberia clearly continued despite the Anglo-Spanish war with Scottish traders living in and including the dominions of the Spanish Habsburgs in their trade.

That said, Scottish trade with Iberia did suffer due to the conflict. An unsigned letter, written in early 1588 and obviously intended for English intelligence, indicates that Scottish ships were in danger of being seized for use in the Armada stating:

They embargo all kind of ships they can take, except Frenchmen; there was chase given to fourteen sail of English, Scottish, Flemish, and French ships

⁶⁴ Ibid. Home later traded in France and was summoned before a local Calais court due to unpaid debts. See NAS, JC99/6. 11 August 1600.

⁶⁵ *Cecil Papers*, CP222/28. 1 January 1595/6.

⁶⁶ Louise B. Taylor, ed., *Aberdeen Shore Work Accounts, 1596-1670* (Aberdeen, 1972), 31, 33.

⁶⁷ *Cecil Papers*, CP14/64. Gerald Paris to Thomas Ray, 3 May 1586.

⁶⁸ *L. Tom Perry Special Collections*, Philip King of Spain: Correspondence, 5 February 1593.

⁶⁹ *CSPS*, XIII II, 649-50. George Nicolson to Sir Robert Cecil, 12 June 1600.

⁷⁰ *Cecil Papers*, CP91/159. The Earl of Bath to Sir Robert Cecil, 26 February 1602-3.

⁷¹ NAS, RD1/73/2, 176. 2 February 1600. Many thanks for Professor Murdoch for this reference.

⁷² NAS, CC8/8/37. 6 January 1603. While the document was registered in 1603, Whippo died in July 1601. Many thanks to Sue Mowat for drawing my attention to this reference.

as they came out of the Straits by some of the Spanish Armada, whereof there are five taken.⁷³

It is not clear if any of the Scots escaped or were captured. Nevertheless, there are more specific examples such as Alexander McMath, a merchant of Edinburgh, who in 1590 loaded his ship, *The Angel*, with goods and sailed to Bilbao. Upon his arrival his ship and goods were seized because, according to the testimony of five Portuguese and Spanish witnesses, the goods were English.⁷⁴ McMath had gone to some length to get the goods restored with petitions from the King and magistrates in Edinburgh all stating to the authorities in Bilbao that the goods were Scottish.⁷⁵ However, it appeared that 'the Spanish would not listen to the testimony of heretics'.⁷⁶ In 1592 McMath was called before the Inquisition in Madrid for a profession of faith. He stated that he had been baptised Catholic as a child and that his father was a Catholic but that, when he was seventeen (after the death of his parents) he was persuaded into the Calvinist faith.⁷⁷ However, he had been trading with Spain for three years and saw the truth of the Catholic faith and the mother church. He had in all probability been trading with Spain since at least 1586. This was possibly an attempt by McMath to gain some form of restitution for the loss of his ship. If this was his intention he was unsuccessful as in February 1607 the Scottish Privy Council wrote to King James regarding the matter, and McMath was yet to receive any compensation.⁷⁸ While it is not known whether he ever did, it is interesting to note that by December 1607 a ship called *The Angel* with a cargo of tallow was arrested by the direction of the council and Alexander McMath was cautioned for 5,000 merks.⁷⁹

This was not the only time King James's assistance had been requested by Scottish merchants who suffered during the Anglo-Spanish war. In June 1591, in a letter to Philip II, James complained 'of the wretched condition of very many of his subjects'.⁸⁰ The Scottish king provided the example of John Mowbray whose vessel was intercepted while on a trading voyage.⁸¹ The crew were imprisoned, with Mowbray and

⁷³ Lincolnshire Archives, 8ANC3//58. March? 1588.

⁷⁴ *Cecil Papers*, CP120/61. The Scottish Privy Council to James VI, 5 February 1607; NAS, GD1/1126/1 February 1607.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ ANH, Inquisición 108, Exp. 24.1592.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ *RPCS*, VIII, 25. 17 December 1607.

⁸⁰ AGS, Estado Legajo. 839. James VI to Philip II, 4 June 1591. Many thanks to Cynthia Fry for drawing my attention to this reference and to Peter Maxwell for the translation.

⁸¹ Ibid.

Christopher Burkhead allegedly being consigned to the galleys.⁸² While it is unclear whether this ship was going to Iberia, James stated in his letter that Scotland should be able to trade freely without such incidences occurring.⁸³ Scottish vessels were also at risk from English warships and in September 1598 the Scottish king wrote to Queen Elizabeth complaining that a Scottish vessel from Kirkcaldy, the *Grace of God*, skippered by James Birrell, had been badly damaged by an English man-of-war, the *Green Dragon of Bristol*.⁸⁴ The vessel had been returning from Cadiz, laden with wine and cinnamon, when it was set on 'thirty-five leagues west of the Cape of St. Vincent'.⁸⁵ According to James, many of the crew were killed and the ship, taking on water, only just made land.⁸⁶ However, the vessel had landed on the Barbary coast and the men who had survived the attack on the vessel were enslaved. Freed by the actions of English factors, James VI requested that the master of the vessel be able to seek redress for his ship, his goods and interest from the inhabitants of Bristol - possibly threatening a letter of reprisal.⁸⁷ With characteristic shrewdness James pointed out,

yet we may more particularly recommend this injury done to the joy and contentment of our common enemy, to the disturbance of that trade which might be profitable to us both and noisome to our said enemy.⁸⁸

While not directly naming the Spanish Habsburg's (and thus protecting himself from accusations of partiality) James did implicitly refer to the Anglo-Spanish war and inferred that Scots were perhaps trading where Englishmen could not. Moreover, repercussions continued after the war.

In another example the *Hart of Leith*, owned by Edinburgh merchants James Arnott and Thomas Marshall, was attacked off Cape Finisterre in January 1597 by two ships of Plymouth owned by Sir Ferdinando Gorges who was Captain of Plymouth castle.⁸⁹ The ship was carrying a cargo of Scottish goods and over the space of four days and nights was entirely ruined by Gorges's vessels and the ship itself was

⁸² Ibid

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ SP Online, *SP 52, LXIII*, fo. 9. James VI to Elizabeth, 16 September 1598; *CSPS, XIII I*, 313-4. Sir Robert Melville to Sir Robert Cecil, 10 October 1598.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid; See Murdoch, *Terror of the Seas?*, 79-110.

⁸⁸ SP Online, *SP52, LXIII*, fo. 9. James VI to Elizabeth, 16 September 1598.

⁸⁹ *CSPS, XIII I*, 389. Archibald Douglas to Dr Julius Caesar, 20 January 1598/9. Cape Finisterre is on the North West Spanish coast, near La Coruña. Douglas was the Scottish ambassador to England as well as an English agent paid by Walsingham. He was also in correspondence with George Fausyde who was on the island of Madeira. Fausyde wrote that he did not have any wine that was worth sending but that he had sent Douglas a box of marmalade and two barrels of oranges. *DNB*, Rob Macpherson, 'Douglas, Archibald (c.1540–c.1602)'; Markham John Thorpe, ed, *Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Scotland, 1589-1603*, II (London, 1858), 623. George Fausyde to Archibald Douglas, 28 January 1593.

damaged. The ship managed to make port in Lisbon but due to contrary winds was stayed there for 15 weeks.⁹⁰ As the cargo had been spoiled the ship was unable to load a cargo for home and also had to pay a charge of £450 sterling for disposing of the spoiled cargo, which itself was valued at £420 sterling. According to Douglas's letter King James had 'very earnestly written to her Majesty craving that redress may be had in this matter'.⁹¹ Douglas's recipient Dr Julius Caesar was an acquaintance of Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Douglas wrote that he had done his best to ensure that James's complaint did not reach Elizabeth in order to give Gorges the opportunity to satisfy the Edinburgh merchants.⁹² It must be remembered that Douglas was an English agent as well as a Scottish ambassador and it is possible in this case that he was attempting to expand his own network. By giving Gorges the chance to resolve the matter without English royal involvement Douglas could gain himself a new ally. While it is not expressly stated that the *Hart* was journeying to an Iberian port as the vessel was carrying a cargo of goods to be sold and was attacked close to the North West Spain it is a reasonable assumption that it was in the area to trade.

The fate of the *Bruce* (possibly of Leith) provides a final case in point, albeit a slightly bizarre one. According to the information of George Bruce, the master and presumably owner of the *Bruce*, the ship was making its way from Ferrol back to England or Scotland, when it was met at sea by an English man-of-war the *Julian* and another man-of-war.⁹³ These ships had two pinnaces in their company which they had taken prize. The pinnaces' crews were also still on board and consisted of North Africans and Portuguese men. Bruce claimed that *Julian* fired upon his ship and then forced him to take on board 52 of the prisoners, before letting the ship go.⁹⁴ These new passengers were unwelcome and Bruce decided to sail his ship to the Portuguese coast hoping to discharge the men there. While on its way the *Bruce* was met by another, presumably English, man-of-war. The master of this vessel, a man named Busbrig, decided that due to the number of Portuguese men and North Africans on board, the ship had some affinity with the King of Spain and took the *Bruce* as prize.⁹⁵ Busbrig brought the ship to England and according to Bruce the ship was detained so

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ *CSPS, XIII I*, 345-347. Information of George Bruce. November 1598. Whether the ship sold its goods at an English or Scottish port depended on the state of the market. The *Julian* is spelt several different ways throughout this account thus the most common English spelling has been utilised here.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid. As the ship was taken to an English port it is likely that Busbrig's vessel was English.

long that when it eventually made it to Leith its cargo of wine was spoiled.⁹⁶ Bruce's story was corroborated by his crew whose depositions were taken in Scotland by Robert Bowes, English ambassador, and Alexander Home, provost of Edinburgh, on orders from the English Admiralty.⁹⁷ The case was heard by the English Privy Council who, while accepting that without the intervention of the *Julian* the *Bruce* would have completed its journey, also felt that the other man-of-war and Busbrig's vessel were to blame.⁹⁸ Therefore they could not decide how to compensate Bruce. While George Bruce's account is dated November the English Privy Council's indecision attracted the attention of King James in October as he wrote to David Foulis and ordered him to use his influence to gain an end to the case and secure justice for Bruce.⁹⁹

In May 1609 the Scottish Privy Council retrospectively appealed to James VI & I on behalf of Thomas Henderson. Following a journey to Spain, Henderson's vessel and goods were seized and he subsequently spent four years as a galley slave.¹⁰⁰ It is further noted that Henderson was promised restitution but was yet to receive it and this delay was described as 'not agreeable with conscience, equitie, nor justice, nor with the honour, credite, and reputation of thair placeis'.¹⁰¹ The date on which Henderson's ship was taken is not given but he is likely to be the same Thomas Henderson who was noted as returning to Scotland from the Canary Islands in December 1601.¹⁰² Given the time it took for such cases to reach the Privy Council's attention and in conjunction with Henderson's time as a slave it is fair to assume he was arrested while the Anglo-Spanish war was ongoing.¹⁰³

Vessels landing in Scotland from Iberia were also in danger. In 1600 the *William of Anstruther*, mastered by David Strang, sailed to Loch Ryan in Galloway with a cargo of salt from Portugal. However, upon deciding to leave for a more profitable market, Strang, who was on shore, was held captive by the admiral of the local area, Sir Robert Gordon of Lochinvar and his deputy Alexander Gordon. According to his testimony, Strang was tortured into agreeing to hand over the vessel.¹⁰⁴ However, the ship was not

⁹⁶ Ibid. Bruce claimed that his new guests had also consumed part of the cargo adding to his woes.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 309. King James VI to David Foulis, 8 October 1598.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 345-347. Information of George Bruce. November 1598.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 309. King James VI to David Foulis, 8 October 1598. David Foulis was a court official of the Scottish king and was sent to England numerous times during the 1590s and following James's accession to the English throne was knighted. *DNB*, Fiona Pogson, 'Foulis, Sir David, first baronet (d. 1642) court official and politician'.

¹⁰⁰ *RPCS*, VIII, 579-80. The Scottish Privy Council to James VI, 16 May 1609.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² *CSPS*, XIII II, 913-4. George Nicolson to Sir Robert Cecil, 26 December 1601.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ *RPCS*, VI, 88. 4 March 1600.

harboured correctly and the cargo was badly damaged by a storm and thus the merchants, James Strang, Thomas Watson and Robert Campbell, hoped to gain redress.¹⁰⁵ This is obviously an example of blatant piracy. In combination, this case, along with McMath's pleas to the Scottish authorities, the tale of Mowbray and his crew, and the fate of the *Grace of God* of Kirkcaldy provide interesting examples of problems that the Scottish merchants could face. Clearly, the Lochinvar example highlights that it was not merely Spanish or English vessels that caused problems for Scottish ships.

Scottish vessels freighted for trade by merchants from other kingdoms also came under attack. In January 1585 the French king, Henry III, wrote to Elizabeth regarding a Scottish ship of St Andrews, the *Salamander*, Thomas Lantion master. She had loaded goods at Rouen on behalf of French merchants but was taken by William Fenel, captain of an English vessel, and sailed into Falmouth despite carrying passports from the French king.¹⁰⁶ Another incident occurred in July 1588 and the French ambassador Monsieur de Chasteauneuf wrote to Burghley to complain about the seizure of a Scottish ship that was transporting corn from Dieppe to Lisbon on behalf of French merchants.¹⁰⁷ The vessel had been seized by Tudor warships and carried into Dartmouth, where it was being detained.¹⁰⁸ In a final example Sir James Elphinstone wrote on King James's behalf to Sir Robert Cecil regarding the *Marie Galland of Dundee*.¹⁰⁹ The ship, owned by William Man of Dundee and skippered by George Duncan, was freighted by French merchants with wine and captured by a Spanish vessel as it was believed to be carrying English goods.¹¹⁰ The ship was then retaken by an English vessel and Elphinstone wrote to Cecil to request that the ship and goods be released without further delay.

The Anglo-Spanish conflict was not the only war which affected Scottish ships: the Dutch-Spanish wars were also a threat to Scottish trade. In August 1589 Robert Tomson, an English agent in Calais, reported to Walsingham that four Scottish ships had been chased by Dutch warships off Dunkirk.¹¹¹ The ships had reportedly refused to strike their colours and were also carrying Spanish survivors from the Armada. Three of

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid; Sophie Crawford Lomas, ed, *Calendar of State Papers Foreign Series: Elizabeth I, September 1585-May 1586* (London, 1921), 416-7. The King of France to Elizabeth, 6-16 March 1585-6.

¹⁰⁷ Richard Bruce Wernham, ed, *Calendar of State Papers Foreign Series: Elizabeth I, July-December 1588* (London, 1936), 63. Monsieur de Chasteauneuf to Lord Burghley, 20 July 1588.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ *CSPS*, *XIII* II, 848-9. Sir James Elphinstone to Sir Robert Cecil, 30 July 1601.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. The letter does not note where the wine is from.

¹¹¹ SP Online, *SP78 XIX*, fo. 219. Richard Tomson to Francis Walsingham, 4 August 1589.

the vessels were chased to shore and one was captured.¹¹² These four vessels are highly likely to be the ships that were commissioned to take 600 armada survivors from Scotland back to Spain, having left Leith and Burntisland to sail towards the Low Countries on 25 July.¹¹³ Interestingly, William Asheby, an English agent, believed that some of the armada survivors, in particular high-ranking captains, would be kept in Scotland in order to use them to force the release of a Scot called Gilbert Lamb, who - along with several others - had his ship and cargo seized by the Inquisition.¹¹⁴ Ten years later the States of Holland issued a proclamation informing 'all princes' that any ships taken (by privateers) which were journeying towards Spain would be considered prize.¹¹⁵ It was also recorded that several Scottish ships laden with corn for Spain and Portugal had been captured by Dutch men-of-war due to this proclamation.¹¹⁶ King James had responded angrily to this proclamation informing the States General that his subjects could trade with whom they pleased and that the Dutch Republic consisted 'only of rebels and rebellion' who had no right to order 'lawful princes and their subjects'.¹¹⁷ While transportation by sea is always subject to risk from catastrophe or random acts of violence, these examples show that during a period of war, whether Scotland was involved in the conflict or not, Scottish ships were at risk.

3. The Inquisition.

Occasionally Scottish merchants experienced problems that were not due to the war and were instead interrupted by the Spanish inquisition. In 1583, for example, Thomas Ucci from Dumbarton, master of the *Minona*, was sentenced to three years in the galleys due to his religion.¹¹⁸ In November 1586 a Scottish vessel was seized at San Lucar after the discovery of 'Lutheran books' on board.¹¹⁹ An Englishman resident in Seville, James White, was recommended as an interpreter for the 24 Scots onboard the

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Saenz-Cambra, 'Scotland and Philip II', 139.

¹¹⁴ *CSPS*, X, 119. William Ashby to Lord Burghley, 14 July 1589. Gilbert Lamb, did appear to be a spy masquerading as a merchant but was assisted in gaining his release by Walter Lindsay. In much the same way as Ogilvy, his exploits are complicated; however, unlike Ogilvy, they have received scholarly attention: see Adam Yagüi-Beltrán and Laura Adam, 'The imprisonment of David Kinloch, 1588-1594: an analysis of newly discovered documents in the archives of the Spanish Inquisition', *Innes Review* 53 (2002), 1-39.

¹¹⁵ *CSPS*, XIII I, 494-5. Advices from Scotland, 8 June 1599.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ernst Schäfer, *Geschichte des spanischen Protestantismus und der Inquisition im sechzehnten Jahrhundert* (Gütersloh, 1902), 336. 1 March 1583.

¹¹⁹ AHN, Inquisición Legajo 2948, 18 November 1586.

vessel.¹²⁰ White was not the only interpreter used by the Spanish authorities. In January 1588 Ralph Hassal, an English Catholic refugee from London, requested a residence permit.¹²¹ In his petition he pointed out that he had assisted the authorities as interpreter 'por lengua y inglesa y escosesa en algunas ocasiones'.¹²² Two other Scots were also sentenced by the Inquisition at Toledo in the 1590s, though it is unclear if they were both traders. William Baird, noted as 'marinero escoces', was sentenced to be 'relaxed', with David Chinaloc's sentence being postponed.¹²³ In 1588 John Murray, master of the *Susanna of Aberdeen*, sailed to Dieppe with a cargo of salmon, then onto Bordeaux and from there to Middleburg with Gascon produce.¹²⁴ From Middleburg Murray sailed to San Lucar in Spain.¹²⁵ Unfortunately for Murray, while the journey proved free from interference, his arrival in Spain was not. Murray became embroiled in an argument with Breton sailors which led to Murray and his crew being imprisoned.¹²⁶ They were still in prison in June 1592 with it being noted that James Sunderland, the second helmsman, had died while in prison.¹²⁷ Other members of the crew were sentenced by the Inquisition, with 13 sentenced to two years in the galleys.¹²⁸ Interestingly, the records show a crew member from Porthcawl in Wales as well as men from the east coast of Scotland. John Gardiner, one of the sailors, was sentenced to three years of seclusion with Catholic teaching and was also banned from the coast and sent to interior Spain.¹²⁹ Gardiner's punishment for his alleged 'Lutheranism' was mild in comparison to Murray and Peter Gualcar (sailor) who were sentenced to be 'relaxed in person', which was often the sentence for those who refused to repent or relapsed into Protestantism.¹³⁰ It is noted that Murray was sentenced in this way due to his 'heretical teaching and imperfect confessions', while Gualcar was remanded in prison rather than executed.¹³¹

¹²⁰ Ibid. White was almost certainly part of the resident English Catholic community who remained in Iberia during the conflict. This will be discussed in further detail in chapter four.

¹²¹ Ibid, Inquisición Legajo 2949. 14 January 1588.

¹²² Ibid. 'for the language of English and Scots on some occasions.'

¹²³ Ibid, Inquisición Legajo 3077, 127. 6 June 1591; Schäfer, *Geschichte des spanischen Protestantismus*, 105, 106. 9 June 1591 and 1594/5. As Adam Yagüi-Beltrán and Laura Adam have shown in their investigation of David Kinloch there were normally three main outcomes of the Inquisition: acquittal, punishment and relaxation. Punishment involved completing penance and/or reconciliation, while relaxation equated to being burned either in person or in effigy. See Yagüi-Beltrán and Adam, 'The imprisonment of David Kinloch', 28.

¹²⁴ David Ditchburn and Marjory Harper, 'Aberdeen and the Outside World' in E. Patricia Dennison, David Ditchburn and Michael Lynch, eds, *Aberdeen Before 1800: A New History* (East Linton, 2002), 390-1.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Schäfer, *Geschichte des spanischen Protestantismus*, 341. 14 June 1592.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid, 338-341. 14 May 1592.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

In December 1594 the, presumably Scottish, crew of the Elizabeth were questioned by the Inquisition authorities of the Canaries islands, although it is unclear why they were questioned and what the result of the interrogation was.¹³² As Alexis D. Brito González has investigated the Inquisition in the Canaries islands would try to catch out suspect crews by questioning separate crew members and ask where the vessels was going, if it carried any pictures or books and the religious practises of the crew.¹³³ How the crew answered these questions would then determine how they were treated, with discrepancies in answers an obvious cause for suspicion. As shall be discussed in chapter 4 the threat from the Inquisition diminished considerably after 1607. That said, considering the previously discussed frequency of Scottish vessels to Spain and its dominions, it seems unusual that Scots, and in particular, Murray and his crew were brought before the institution. However, it may only have been their disagreement with Breton sailors in a Spanish port that brought them to the attention of the authorities. As Pauline Croft has pointed out, most merchants who traded with Iberia would ensure they did not draw attention to themselves and 'conformed to local practises when necessary'.¹³⁴ It would perhaps be unwise to attempt to convert Catholics and criticise Catholic practices while living as a merchant in Lisbon - as the Englishman Hugh Gurgeny found out to his cost.¹³⁵

There is a danger of lending more prominence than is necessary to the actions of the Inquisition. For example, Alison Games has discussed the actions of the Inquisition which meant that 'merchants and mariners were confined to their ships until the officer of the Inquisition inspected the men and their goods and searched for forbidden items'.¹³⁶ Quite apart from this being a normal practice when a suspicious vessel entered a port in a time of war it must be remembered that in the 1520s the English consul in Antwerp John Hackett intended to partake in exactly the same action in order to stop reformation material arriving from the continent to England.¹³⁷ Further, Games points to the ill-treatment that some English merchants received in the 1584 to 1600 period, perhaps forgetting that the ongoing Anglo-Spanish conflict would mean that

¹³² Alexis D. Brito González, 'Visitas de navío en el Tribunal de la Inquisición de Canaries en el siglo XVI' in *Vegueta* 3 (1997-8), 96.

¹³³ *Ibid*, 95-6.

¹³⁴ Croft, 'Trading with the Enemy', 299

¹³⁵ Games, *The Web of Empire*, 101. Gurgeny was threatened with execution, as the Inquisition viewed his crimes as more heinous due to his Catholic background (his mother was Catholic). However, he converted to Catholicism and following his release from prison remained in Portugal.

¹³⁶ *Ibid*, 100.

¹³⁷ J. S Brewer, ed., *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic of the Reigns of Henry VIII* 4:2 (London, 1872), 1296-7. Jack Hackett to Wolsey 20 February 1527. Many thanks to Dr Beth Tapscott for providing this example.

(Inquisition or not) English merchants and their refusal to accept/conform to local practices would not be welcomed.¹³⁸ Steve Murdoch has investigated this point further in regards to Scottish emigration to northern Europe stating that:

In many continental cities and most countries it was simply unfeasible not to (be seen to) conform to the local religious orthodoxy. An individual's rejection of the established religion was simply not an option.¹³⁹

Indeed, he records Calvinists appearing to convert to Anglicanism, Lutheranism, Russian Orthodoxy and even willingly to Islam, with many 'converting' back again on their return home.¹⁴⁰ Sincere devotion to Catholicism also did not appear to prevent merchants from working with their English and Scottish counterparts as Óscar Recio Morales has shown in his work on the Irish commercial community in Spain.¹⁴¹ It is clear therefore, that with the exception of a few cases, merchants cared more about profitable business than religious ideals and were sensible enough not to challenge a region's religion nor allow an individual's orthodoxy to stand in the way of a good deal.

4. Intermediaries and Exploits.

As Pauline Croft has stated, Anglo-Iberian trade was mutually beneficial and the Anglo-Spanish war was an unmitigated disaster for merchants from both areas.¹⁴² Richard Wernham goes further, arguing that the difficulty that English merchants had selling their cloth abroad had a knock-on effect for the whole country and damaged the economy.¹⁴³ Thus, there was a need to find a way round the trading embargo. It was not merely English merchants that found the war damaging, Spanish merchants also complained. In 1591 the Venetian ambassador reported that merchants in Seville were demanding to be allowed to import goods 'from any country whatsoever, especially from England, otherwise they declare that customs dues will be reduced to nothing'.¹⁴⁴ Some merchants made a thin attempt at disguising their destinations and over 25 vessels were freighted by numerous English merchants 'for the straits' and the return between

¹³⁸ Games, *The Web of Empire*, 100.

¹³⁹ Murdoch, *Network North*, 91.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 88-93.

¹⁴¹ Morales, 'Conectors', 329.

¹⁴² Pauline Croft, 'English Trade with Peninsular Spain, 1558-1625' (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Oxford, 1969), 173.

¹⁴³ R.B Wernham, *Before the Armada: The Emergence of the English Nation, 1485-1588* (New York, 1972), 388.

¹⁴⁴ CSPV, VIII, 528. Tomaso Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in Spain to the Doge and Senate, 2 March 1591.

late September 1588 and June 1591.¹⁴⁵ However, for those Englishmen who wished to trade without revealing their nationality it was easiest to imitate their Irish and Scottish neighbours.¹⁴⁶ This led to some amusing, almost farcical, situations where English ships attempted to disguise themselves as Scottish, with varying results. For example, in September 1587, the *James of Leith* sailed to San Lucar; however, the Scottish crew on board had been picked purely for their nationality and the vessel was actually named the *Dog of London*.¹⁴⁷ It had purposely sailed to Leith from London in order to pick up a Scottish crew and to change the name of the ship. Due to these activities William Semple was appointed in November 1597 to help weed out those Englishmen disguising themselves as Irish or Scottish.¹⁴⁸ Semple was successful in his task and it was revealed that the vast majority of the 'Scots' and 'Irish' ships at Huelva and Ayamonte were in fact English.¹⁴⁹ In the same correspondence it is noted that four 'Scottish' ships in Ayamonte were proven to be English despite their insistence that they were from Scotland.¹⁵⁰ Other Englishmen resident in Spain were arrested for attempting to conceal their origins, such as Richard Lawrence, Walter Thomas, Ronald Bainsley and John Barrett, all from Bristol but residing in Andalusia and pretending to be Scottish.¹⁵¹ Loomie has discovered other men in Andalusia from Bristol who attempted to assume Scottish identities. It is, therefore fair to assume that if Bristol merchants were trying to remain in Spain under this guise then other Englishmen were doing so too. One Edward Firman, who was actually a Scotsman, was also arrested allegedly for keeping property and business in Bristol.¹⁵² It was difficult for the Spanish authorities to tell the difference between English and Scottish merchants mainly due to the language similarities as lamented by Pedro de Aldaya, the author of the letter and judge at the Royal Court of Seville in 1598.¹⁵³

Despite Ireland's status as an English dominion, Óscar Recio Morales has proven that the Spanish authorities wished to protect Irish interests partly due to the affinity felt between the two nations, but also because of the role that Irish merchants

¹⁴⁵ SP Online, *SP12 CCXXXIX*, fo. 80-83. June 1591. While this does not necessarily mean that the ships went to Spain it is highly unlikely that the vessels sailed past Iberia without stopping. As chapter three will show, it is possible that the vessels did sail through the straits only to stop at an Iberian port on the return.

¹⁴⁶ Croft, *'English Trade'*, 173.

¹⁴⁷ TNA, HCA 13/26, 376. 13 November 1587.

¹⁴⁸ AGS, Estado Legajo 190. 26 November 1597.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, Estado Legajo 181. Aldaya to Philip II, 16 February 1598.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Albert J. Loomie, 'Sir William Semple and Bristol's Andalucian trade, 1597-1598', *Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological Society* 82 (1963), 184.

¹⁵² Ibid, 184.

¹⁵³ AGS, Estado Legajo 181. Aldaya to Philip II, 16 February 1598.

could play in providing information.¹⁵⁴ The Spanish were aware that not only were Englishmen pretending to be Irish, but that some were actually using Irishmen as intermediaries. In January 1598 Aldaya wrote that an Irish ship had arrived in Ayamonte from Dublin with a cargo of fish.¹⁵⁵ Aldaya seemed suspicious pointing out that the Irishmen were subject to the Queen of England and casting doubts as to the true owner of the cargo.¹⁵⁶ In another letter around a month later, Aldaya stated that Irishmen were conducting business in illegal goods on behalf of Englishmen and said that the discrimination in favour of the Irish was allowing this to continue unchecked.¹⁵⁷ The attempts of English traders to disguise themselves as Irish or Scottish was obviously one way to get round the trading embargo but it was not without risk. There was a far easier way for English merchants to proceed: pay Scottish merchants to conduct their trade for them.

This approach, however, could be dangerous for the Scottish merchants who chose to deal in banned English goods. One prominent Scot who took part in this practice was William Hunter. Hunter had the King of Scotland's letter of commendation which allowed him to trade in Spain. This was issued in August 1586 and was signed by James VI stating

this William Hunter, a citizen, servant and trader of ours, sending him forth to your Spain now and again, so that he can purchase certain good wines and other wares..... for use in our court.¹⁵⁸

The document goes further, asking that 'he himself and all his men are treated rather friendly..... and to be free from injustice'.¹⁵⁹ In January 1587 another Scot, Alexander Scott, stated to the local authorities that a vessel in which Hunter may have been master, was actually English.¹⁶⁰ However, it appeared that the master of the vessel had a stroke of luck (of sorts) when Drake's force arrived in Cadiz and this, combined with some careful bribery of the local officials, allowed him to claim that as their ship had been boarded and ransacked by Drake's forces, they could not possibly be English.¹⁶¹ While Hunter had managed to escape prosecution on this occasion, suspicion over his activities remained. On 5 April of the same year Bernardino de Mendoza reported to Philip III that he had

¹⁵⁴ Morales, 'Identity and Loyalty', 198-201.

¹⁵⁵ AGS, Estado Legajo 181. Aldaya to Philip II, 7 January 1598.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, Estado Legajo 181. Aldaya to Philip II, 23 February 1598.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, Estado Legajo 839. August 1586. Many thanks to Matthijs Wibier for translating this document.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ TNA, HCA 13/26. 319. 28 July 1587.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

heard from a good quarter that a Scots merchant, who says he is the King of Scotland's banker, is in Spain with twelve well fitted English boats freighted with merchandise from there [England].¹⁶²

In May 1588 Bernardino de Mendoza wrote to Martine Se Idiaquez that 'You will see by the reports how they [the English] trade under the name of that Hunter, and that the King's [James VI] letters are only a cloak for it'.¹⁶³ A copy of this letter was also sent to Philip II. The letter goes on to say that Scott could reveal for certain that the goods were English as 'from their character it was impossible they could be Scotch'.¹⁶⁴

Hunter was further condemned by the actions of Patrick Morris and Philip Shenston, who in October 1588 had, via an unnamed intermediary, sent forth intelligence to Spanish officials that they would shortly be landing in Spain with a consignment of 'English' goods.¹⁶⁵ The two Scottish vessels, the *New Ship of St Andrews* and an unnamed ship of Leith, were carrying goods for Edward Johnstone and a Mr Sapers, who is described as the 'principal dealer for the English and Scots in Turkey and Tripoli'.¹⁶⁶ Morris himself and Edward Johnstone owned 1,800 crowns worth of the cargo with the rest - including the goods on the second vessel - belonging to Mr Sapers.¹⁶⁷ The report described the goods on board as being English and Dutch but carrying 'the leaden seal of Edinburgh... and the seal is placed on them to deceive'.¹⁶⁸ The vessels were expected to travel with two other Scottish ships, in ballast, to either San Lucar or Cadiz and then a particular sequence of events was to be played out.¹⁶⁹ Mendoza instructed that when the vessels arrived Morris and Shenston were to be arrested along with all the officers. When questioned Morris would admit not only that the goods on board the vessel were English, but that he had carried letters from Spain to Queen Elizabeth and her advisers.¹⁷⁰ Morris would then tell his interrogators that the letters had been given to him by William Hunter, who had received them from English merchants.¹⁷¹ Mendoza requested that Morris and Shenston be well treated and released once they had given their statements, 'as the affair has been managed through

¹⁶² *CSPSpanish*, XVII, 62. Bernardino de Mendoza to the King, 5 April 1587. It is unclear if this is the same voyage mentioned in the High Court of Admiralty records or if this was a new journey.

¹⁶³ *Ibid*, 279-80. Bernardino de Mendoza to Martin Se Idiaquez, 8 May 1588.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 470-1. Bernardino de Mendoza to Martin Se Idiaquez, 13 October 1588.

¹⁶⁶ AGS, Estado K. 1567, 154. 1588.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 153. 13 October 1588

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*.

them'.¹⁷² The vessels and their cargo were believed to be worth £14,000 sterling.¹⁷³ Morris and Shenston would be given 1,800 crowns for their information, with Morris stating that he must be arrested along with his fellow officers so that when he returned to Scotland the owners of the merchandise would not blame him.¹⁷⁴ The event did take place with Hunter apparently none the wiser to the deceit of Morris. For his part Morris cheated everyone by returning to London overland and providing military information about the Spanish to Elizabeth and her council.¹⁷⁵ Hunter believed it was the actions of Morris leaving for England with military information which led to his imprisonment and not Morris's betrayal of Hunter to the Spanish authorities. As a result of Morris's actions Hunter was imprisoned from 9 November 1588 to late February 1589 as indicated in a letter from John Ogilvy to Archibald Douglas and Hunter's own letter to Queen Elizabeth.¹⁷⁶

Being imprisoned did not prevent Hunter from continuing his correspondence with both Walsingham and Burghley, with letters being written in January and February 1589.¹⁷⁷ In 1591 Hunter wrote to Burghley informing him that he had sent word to James VI of the events and that because of Alexander Scott's actions he had been questioned 'to his great danger' - clearly he had no idea it was actually Patrick Morris who betrayed him.¹⁷⁸ James VI had 'deemed the said Scott worthy of punishment', and Hunter requested that Burghley write to the Lord Chancellor of Scotland to ensure that Hunter would be defended.¹⁷⁹ The fact that Hunter chose to write to James VI suggests that the Scottish king was aware of Hunter's trading activities, at the very least. Indeed, the fact that James ordered the informer, Scott, to be punished indicates that James sanctioned Hunter's role as a conduit for English goods, although whether this permission extended to the role of informer is unclear. Despite being imprisoned, Hunter continued to trade for English merchants well into the 1590s, and was given a licence to export wheat and beer, although suspiciously the destinations of this cargo are not recorded.¹⁸⁰ Further, Hunter persevered in his efforts to gain military information on

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ *CSPS*, *XIII* II, 1122-4. William Hunter to Queen Elizabeth, undated but possibly October 1601.

¹⁷⁶ *Salisbury*, *XIII*, 403-405. John Ogilvy, Laird of Poury to Lord Ambassador Archibald Douglas, 26 February 1589; *CSPS*, *XIII* II, 1122-4. William Hunter to Queen Elizabeth, undated but possibly October 1601.

¹⁷⁷ SP Online, *SP94 III*, fo. 123. William Hunter to Francis Walsingham, 12 January 1589; *BL*, Cotton Manuscripts, Vespasian C VIII, fo. 207-9. William Hunter to Lord Burghley, 11 February 1589.

¹⁷⁸ *CSPS*, *X*, 544. Memorial to Burghley from William Hunter, 20 July 1591.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ *Salisbury*, *IV*, 587. 25 August 1594; *Salisbury*, *V*, 396. September 1596.

behalf of Queen Elizabeth and in 1597 organised two ships to Spain with this purpose in mind.¹⁸¹ In December 1598 Hunter was in France and wrote to another Scottish merchant, John Wilson, who, from Hunter's letter, had arrived in Wales in late November.¹⁸² Hunter discussed general business matters and stated that he had bonds due to him from a Flemish merchant based in Lisbon, Burchart Bruckman.¹⁸³ Hunter went on to say that he expected Wilson to receive the money due and that another Scot in Lisbon, John Descosse, would act on his behalf.¹⁸⁴ The instructions are complicated, so much so, that Hunter hoped that Wilson could come to Brest to discuss the matter face to face.¹⁸⁵ Hunter concluded with the news that he had received James VI permission to trade with Lisbon and indicated that if Wilson came to visit him he could give the pass to Wilson as long as certain conditions were met.¹⁸⁶ Interestingly, the Scottish king also tried to secure permanent employment for Hunter on two occasions. In 1599 James wrote to the Convention of Royal Burghs requesting that they appoint a Conservator (similar to the position in the Scottish Staple in the Dutch Republic) for England.¹⁸⁷ Hunter was recommended as James's preferred candidate for the position. English agents in Scotland were also aware of the Scottish king's plan, with William Bowes writing to Robert Cecil that Hunter was Scottish-born and was 'richly married in Bristol'.¹⁸⁸ Bowes went onto say that James planned to give Hunter letters for his employment, presumably the appointment of Conservator.¹⁸⁹ For a variety of reasons the Convention declined to acquiesce to the king's request.¹⁹⁰ Two years later James recommended Hunter again, this time to Queen Elizabeth, for his 'long and faithful service done to us and his unfeigned affection of the continuation of the th'amity betwixt our two estates'.¹⁹¹ Hunter continued to involve himself with Scottish merchants, such

¹⁸¹ *CSPS, XIII* II, 1122-4. William Hunter to Queen Elizabeth, undated but possibly October 1601. Both vessels had a trusted man on board. William Weymss, Hunter's godson, was on the London vessel and Edward Forman, his servant, was on the ship from Bristol.

¹⁸² *CSPS, XIII* I, 339-341. William Hunter to John Wilson, 4 December 1598.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.* Descosse is described as 'our countryman' who is known to be a 'man of credit' in Lisbon.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.* Hunter did want to go to Wilson but his wife would not let him as she had heard pestilence had broken out in that area.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ *CRB, II*, 48-49. 5 July 1599.

¹⁸⁸ *CSPS, XIII* II, 462-464. Sir William Bowes to Sir Robert Cecil, 7 May 1599.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ *CRB, II*, 48-49. 5 July 1599. See McLoughlin, 'The Control of Trade', 57 for a full examination of this incident and previous political events which influenced the Convention's decision.

¹⁹¹ *Salisbury, XI*, 444-5. James VI to Elizabeth, 24 October 1601.

as when Mark Dougal, a merchant of Edinburgh, used the services of a William Hunter 'indweller of Bristol' to sell his cargo of cloth in Spain.¹⁹²

Hunter was not the only Scotsman trading on behalf of Englishmen: William Scott, a merchant from Kirkcaldy, conducted commerce for London merchants from the Azores.¹⁹³ Scott had traded from the islands for at least four years, as stated in a letter written by James VI to Lord Burghley.¹⁹⁴ However, two Portuguese ships at the Azorean island of St Michael were captured by the Earl of Cumberland and as a result Scott was arrested while loading his own vessel, the *Christopher*. He was subsequently imprisoned for two and a half years and those who remained on board his vessel sailed it back to London in his absence.¹⁹⁵ Upon Scott's release merchants in London pursued him for sums owed, thus hindering his attempts to begin trading again. James requested that Scott be granted protection by Elizabeth in order to re-establish his trade.¹⁹⁶ This provides a clear example of a Scottish merchant trading to Spanish dominions on behalf of English merchants. James mentions that Scott had been trading there for at least four years, which would date Scott's entrance into this trade to the late 1580s. This is corroborated by the information given by Bartholomew Cole to the Inquisition, when he stated that he had seen Scott on the island of St Michael in 1587, 1588 and 1589.¹⁹⁷ Further, Cole added that on his last visit Scott came with two ships of his own and another vessel which he had bought in London with a mixed English and Scottish crew. Cole stated that he knew the cargo belonged to an Englishman in London.¹⁹⁸ If Cole's confession was correct the seizure of Scott's vessel takes on a different light, and Scott's operation seems more substantial than the letter from James VI indicates.

Archibald Dawson provides another example and carried goods on the behalf of English merchants in 1587 and 1588.¹⁹⁹ According to Cole this merchandise was

¹⁹² Winifred Coutts, *The Business of the College of Justice in 1600* (Edinburgh, 2003), 84. Hunter, it appeared, had sold the cloth but not paid the profits to Dougal. As William Hunter was known to have married a woman from Bristol and spent time there it is highly likely that this is the same individual.

¹⁹³ *CSPS*, XI, 36-7. James VI to Lord Burghley, 30 January 1592-3. The Azores are a group of islands over 900 miles west of Portugal in the Atlantic Ocean, known to sailors by the fourteenth century. See Newitt, *A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion*, 22.

¹⁹⁴ *CSPS*, XI, 36-7. James VI to Lord Burghley, 30 January 1592-3. Several Scottish ministers also attempted to assist Scott and wrote to the Privy Council of England on his behalf. Thorpe, ed, *Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Scotland, 1589-1603*, II, 624. Scottish Ministers to the Privy Council of England. 12 February 1593.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.* On the ship's arrival, several merchants, who had heard his fate, arrested the ship believing it to have been stolen.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ de Alberti and Chapman, eds., *English Merchants*, 73.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

consigned to John Rankin on both the islands of St Michael and Terceira. John Rankin, it appears, either was a Scot or had done a very good job of convincing the authorities that he was.²⁰⁰ Whatever the case, his position came under suspicion due to Cole's testimony which stated that he was English and from Bristol.²⁰¹ Rankin's brother Nicholas, captain of a vessel owned by the previously mentioned Archibald Dawson, was examined and questioned by Don Luis de la Cucua, governor of St Michael, in late spring 1591. He had sailed to Santa Cruz and then loaded his vessel with goods belonging to a local Canaries merchant, Pedro de Vchales, for a journey to St Michael.²⁰² Despite the questioning there was no evidence as to Nicholas Rankin's true nationality and so he was set free, although his ship and property were confiscated.²⁰³ This ship may well have been the *St Thomas*. In his witness statement regarding the case of Cole in July 1591, Alonso De Corral was asked if he was taking action against any other Englishmen (with the exception of Cole and the crew of *St James*).²⁰⁴ Corral replied that he was also investigating Nicholas Rankin and William Home. It is likely this is the same William Home who in August 1591 obtained a licence to trade from the Captain of the province of Guipuzcoa, showing a quick but not impossible return to trading.²⁰⁵

George Fausset can also be added to this trading group, again named in Cole's information. Cole stated that Fausset had been to the island three times in the years 1589 and 1590 and brought commodities on behalf of an Englishman.²⁰⁶ Richard Doddridge, the owner of these goods, was the mayor of Barnstaple and a prominent English merchant in the sixteenth century. Finally, the vessel on which Cole was arrested looks to have been part of a similar scheme. Cole was a supercargo aboard the *St James*, skippered by James Brown.²⁰⁷ Alonso de Corral also cast doubt as to the nationality of the crew, stating that some of the men on the vessel were from the town of Saltash in England.²⁰⁸ In his evidence to the Inquisition Diego del Billar Vgarte stated that all aboard the vessel claimed they were Scottish but that two Portuguese witnesses stated that they had been robbed by some Englishmen and indicated that Robert Brown

²⁰⁰ The name is certainly a Scottish surname, although it may have been false. Many thanks to Professor Murdoch for this information.

²⁰¹ Ibid, 75.

²⁰² Ibid, 74.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid, 54.

²⁰⁵ NAS, JC66/8. 23 August 1591. De Corral does say 'investigating' and not 'imprisoned' thus it is also possible that Home left the island on another vessel before the investigation could be concluded.

²⁰⁶ de Alberti and Chapman, eds., *English Merchants*, 73.

²⁰⁷ Ibid, 55.

²⁰⁸ Ibid, 54.

was one of the party.²⁰⁹ Robert Brown admitted to being the boatswain on the pinnace, but argued that he himself had been captured by the English on his way to Scotland which was the only reason he was involved. However, a third witness, Juan Lopez, the procurator of the Royal Court of the Azores stated that

in their confessions they declared that they were natives of the Kingdom of England, as well all the men on the ship, with the exception of one; and that they had left England some five months since; and that the said Cole in his first two confessions declared himself to be Scotch, and afterwards said he was English as well all the rest with the exception of one, the pilot, who was Scotch and that the ship was also an English vessel.²¹⁰

It is not clear what happened to Brown, but within a short space of time (and following torture) Cole saw the error of his heretical ways, converted to Catholicism and assisted the local authorities in their attempt to clamp down on illegal trading.²¹¹ While Cole's testimony must of course be questioned due to the circumstances in which it was made, his information appears to confirm other sources. In the case of the trade to the Azores and the Canaries it importantly shows that the trade was far more common than has been previously accounted for and that several Scottish skippers were regularly making the journey to the islands.

Scottish merchants in the new Dutch Republic may have also provided access to Iberia. In September 1599 a Dutch lawyer employed by Robert Offeley, a merchant of London, was instructed to prosecute Thomas Morey, a Scottish skipper, regarding a cargo of Spanish salt and a voyage from Rotterdam to Lisbon and London.²¹² While Rotterdam was by no means a neutral port in the eyes of the Spanish authorities, the connection of Scottish merchants with the Dutch Republic (due the presence of the Scottish Staple at Campvere) was well-established, and thus the arrival of a Scottish vessel to an Iberian port from this area was likely to be less suspicious than the arrival of a Scottish vessel from an English port. In another (albeit later) example, a Portuguese merchant resident in Amsterdam received un-named goods from Captain John Low a 'Scotsman of Lisbon'.²¹³

These examples indicate Scottish opportunism, as well as a pragmatic solution to trading difficulties for the English. These cases do show problems for the Scottish

²⁰⁹ Ibid, 55.

²¹⁰ Ibid, 56.

²¹¹ Ibid, 80-1. Despite his assistance Cole was sentenced on 21 December 1597 to eight years' imprisonment and was forbidden to return to sea. However, he was released the following day. It is possible that as he had already been in prison since summer 1591 he was released due to time already served.

²¹² ONA, Inventory no. 29, act no. 83/301, 28 September 1599.

²¹³ Ibid, Inventory no. 14, act no. 21/56. 4 June 1608.

merchants involved, although due to his actions as a spy Hunter must have been aware of the danger he was placing himself in. However, this could also provide an idea of the normality of these trading practices, and Hunter and Scot may only appear in historical records because their enterprises ran into difficulties. Hunter found himself under scrutiny when a fellow Scot informed the authorities of his activities. William Scot appears to have been the victim of a revenge attack by the disgruntled officials of the Azores, although the extent of the trading subterfuge involving the islands of Madeira and the Canaries was clearly far more substantial than previously understood. Reports from Spanish and English sources show that Scottish vessels were regularly trading with Iberian ports and were probably carrying English goods. Given that the trade embargo between England and Iberia was a disaster for both kingdoms, it is probable that officials turned a blind eye to Scottish merchants bringing English goods to Iberia. This hypothesis is accredited in several instances. A report in February 1593 by E. Palmer, another English agent based at St Jean de Luz in France, reported that 24 Scottish ships carrying cargoes of wheat, rye and salmon had sailed to Bilbao and San Sebastian in the previous two months.²¹⁴ Palmer went on to write,

In all these parts of Spain the King had given order that all Scotsmen should be well used. If the truth were known, these goods, would be found to be Englishmen's, taken in at Lynn market or thereabouts.²¹⁵

Around two months later Palmer dispatched a similar letter to Lord Burghley reporting that the Scots, along with Bretons and Flemings, were providing San Sebastian with corn which 'would be found Englishmen's goods'.²¹⁶ Even travellers from the time commented on the practice with Fynes Moryson, a Cambridge university graduate on a grand tour of Europe writing in 1598,

And whill the English had warre with the Spaniards, the Scots as neutrals by carrying of English commodities into Spaine and by having their ships for more security leden by English merchants, grew somewhat richer and more experienced in Navigation, and had better and stronger shippes then in former time.²¹⁷

This trade also continued in reverse; in February 1598 Pedro de Aldaya wrote that a Scot by the name of George Al had dispatched four ships from Huelva carrying wine

²¹⁴ Richard Bruce Wernham, ed, *Lists and Analysis of State Papers Foreign Series: Elizabeth I, May 1592-June 1593* (London 1984), 361. E. Palmer to Lord Burghley, 11-21 December 1593.

²¹⁵ Ibid, 361. This quote has been taken from Wernham's analysis of the letter not the letter itself.

²¹⁶ SP Online, *SP78 XXX*, fo. 256. E. Palmer to Lord Burghley, 6-16 April 1593.

²¹⁷ P. Hume Brown, ed., *Early Travellers in Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1891), 87. Fynes Moryson, 1598. Many thanks to Professor Steve Murdoch for drawing my attention to this reference.

and fruit to Bristol.²¹⁸ Aldaya believed that George and his brother William had a sophisticated operation and were in contact with a number of English merchants, including Edward Lewis and Richard Almeyton.²¹⁹ Another way to get round the trading embargo was to lie about the intended destination of the vessel. In a letter to Cecil, M. Chasteaumartin wrote from Bayonne that Scottish and Irish ships would load a cargo of grain in England stating the destination to be the south of France, but the cargo would actually be delivered to Spain.²²⁰ Further, once in Scotland, Iberian goods did not necessarily have to stay there. Commodities which were commonly found on ships arriving from Iberia were re-exported to Newcastle from Leith. For example, a cargo of figs and raisins were on board the *Andrew of Anstruther*, Alexander Thompson master, which arrived in Newcastle in November 1593.²²¹ It would have been difficult for the Spanish authorities to find out the true destination of many vessels and it is probable that many going to Scotland, the Dutch Republic and other ports stopped in an English port along the way. The need for Iberian goods would have dictated that trade continued despite the political situation between Queen Elizabeth and Philip. By 1602 the Spanish authorities could no longer ignore these activities and banned Scottish and Irish goods from Iberia along with English ones, in recognition that a significant proportion of 'Scottish' and 'Irish' commodities were probably English and hoping to halt the trade between the two areas.²²²

Conclusion.

All of these events give a sense of the precarious but highly profitable position that Scotland and Scottish merchants were in. Due to the dynastic situation with England, James VI was anxious not to anger Elizabeth, but he also did not want to cut off relations with the powerful Habsburg empire. Thus, he handled the case of Ogilvy with a pragmatism that may have bordered on duplicity. James was also in a profitable position as the Spanish Habsburgs viewed Scotland, and its remaining Catholic population in particular, as a way to antagonise England and turn the war in their favour. For her part, Elizabeth needed Scotland to remain neutral but still required the intelligence brought

²¹⁸ AGS, Estado 181. Aldaya to Philip II, 16 February 1598.

²¹⁹ Ibid, Aldaya to Philip II, 16 February 1598; Aldaya to Philip II, 7 January 1598.

²²⁰ *Cecil Papers*, CP169/121. M Chasteaumartin to Lord Burghley, 4-14 August 1593.

²²¹ This example has been discovered via Matthew Greenhall's thesis, 'The Evolution of the British Economy: Anglo-Scottish Trade and Political Union, an Inter-Regional Perspective, 1580-1750', (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Durham, 2011), however, the original sources were verified by the author. TNA, E190/185/6, Christmas 1593-Christmas 1594.

²²² *CSPD*, 1601-03, 259. John Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, 4 November 1602.

by Scottish merchants. James could have heavily exploited the situation to his own ends, however, he instead utilised the cautiousness which his reign became known for. The appointment of William Orde as a Conservator was not widely announced as James did not wish to irritate Elizabeth; after all, Orde had been appointed in part due to the actions of English merchants who were pretending to be Scottish. Scottish merchants also had to be careful because of the difficulty that Iberian officials had in distinguishing between the different nations of mainland Britain. This occasionally led to strife as Scottish merchants were assumed to be English or even just considered a suitable target for revenge as in the case of William Scot. However, it was also a period of opportunity for Scottish merchants, who could take advantage of the trade embargo between England and Spain by acting as carriers between the two areas. Numerous merchants took advantage of this situation and, in the majority of cases, there was little the Iberian authorities could do. On the island of Madeira the true state and complexity of the role of Scots as conduits for English goods was only revealed when an Englishman confessed all to the Inquisition. Moreover, economic necessity superseded proclamations from Castile; Iberia required the goods that Scots were bringing but also required a market for their own commodities. The Habsburg authorities were woefully unable to prevent merchants from other regions from dealing in English goods and Scottish merchants took advantage of the opportunities offered to them during this period of conflict.

Chapter Three: Triangular Trade and the Importance of London and Rotterdam.

'I am glad the uglie debate with our friends at Barcelona is ended thou at a loss'.¹

So far this thesis has focused on direct trade between Scotland and Iberia up to 1603 and has shown that Scotland and its merchants had a significant trading relationship with Iberia. However, there is another angle to consider - the role of triangular trade and secondary ports. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to explore these concepts in relation to Scottish-Iberian Commerce and provide a detailed examination of how they offered another conduit for the trade of Scottish merchants.

In regards to this investigation the importance of triangular trade cannot be over-estimated. To sail to Iberia was a considerable journey and, as shall be discussed later in this chapter, presented risks beyond the norm. Nonetheless, triangular trade provided merchants and skippers with a chance to gain an advantage. By exchanging commodities at several ports and instructing their skippers to contact factors at those ports merchants could receive information about a voyage which could take many months as well as maximise profits. Sailing along the coast proved safer for skippers than venturing into the open seas where North African corsairs or deadly storms could await. By visiting several ports skippers could join up with small local convoys for safety as well as carry out private trade to their own profit. Therefore, when sailing to Iberia triangular trade was the norm, not the exception, and to ignore the practice would prove seriously detrimental to this study. The investigation of triangular trade in its own right is also important; firstly, to show just how prevalent it was and secondly, to understand the networks created by merchants across Europe which involved Iberian trade. Initially, this chapter examines the role of triangular trade in Scoto-Iberian commercial relations. After an analysis of historiography surrounding this concept, with examples of other European destinations and Scotland, incidences involving Iberia are considered. The discussion includes more in-depth case studies, such as that of Baillie John Steuart of Inverness who was heavily involved in European trade.

Questions are raised and include topics such as why Scottish merchants and traders might prefer to obtain Iberian goods from entrepôts rather than travelling directly to the source of origin. By providing examples of Scottish ships that were attacked or captured by North African corsairs it is proven that for many the risks of sending a vessel to Spain could easily outweigh the profit of a successful voyage and thus it was

¹ Mackay, ed, *The Letter Book*, 228. 24 June 1725.

safer to obtain these commodities in other ports. An examination of London and ports in the Dutch Republic highlights their significance in European trade and includes a discussion of their representative Scottish communities. Scottish port records are again utilised to show that Iberian goods were arriving in Scotland via these ports facilitated by Scottish merchants within them. Their motivations for locating to given ports and their choice of merchandise are contextualised alongside their incentives for participating in specific areas of commerce.

The investigation conducted in this chapter proves that direct links, though present, were not necessarily required for Scotland and her merchants to maintain commercial connections with Iberia. Iberian goods could and did enter Scotland from other ports, showing not only the advanced international management of commodities between European ports, but also the ability of Scottish merchants to obtain commodities of international origins at ports which were far less dangerous to voyage to and geographically closer to Scotland. Thus, the minimal risk endured could still generate enough profit while ensuring demand for Iberian produce could be met.

1.1 Triangular Trade

The importance of triangular trade in the early modern period has been well established for several decades. The premise of triangular trade is simple: it involves a ship travelling to a number of ports in a single voyage in order to exchange commodities. In his 1963 publication Christopher Smout showed that Scottish merchants would collect a cargo of grain in the Baltic and sail to Bergen in Norway in order to exchange the grain for timber before returning to Scotland.² Thomas Riis has investigated Scottish triangular trade in the Baltic, providing evidence of Scottish vessels visiting more than one port once they had passed the Danish sound.³ Triangular trade allowed merchants to take advantage of the commodities that several cities, ports and regions had to offer. However, port records only list the last port visited when noting where a ship had arrived from. A ship could be recorded as arriving from London or Rotterdam; but what is not documented is the fact that this vessel may also have visited other ports in the same journey. Therefore the final cargo did not necessarily reflect the various ports visited and

² Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 165. Smout also points out that when 'Holland was fighting France, Scottish ships cashed in on the classic Biscay trade, bringing salt and wine to Danzig, and returning to Scotland laden with Baltic wares purchased by their earnings', 162.

³ Thomas Riis, 'Long Distance Trade or Tramping: Scottish Ships in the Baltic, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries' in T.C Smout, ed, *Scotland and the Sea* (Edinburgh, 1992), 59-76.

other cargoes carried. This can cause problems for historians trying to establish where vessels actually went on a trading voyage. Thus, once again, it is not unless trade is interrupted in some way that the historian generally becomes aware of the occurrence of triangular trade, as shown in the records of the High Court of Admiralty. However, there are other sources which reveal triangular trade involving Iberia, such as extant merchants' letters and charter parties.

While Scottish triangular trade with Iberia has not received scholarly attention prior to this thesis, historians have shown English and Irish merchants to be engaged in this practice. For example, Pauline Croft points out that due to coastal trade with Spain, destinations in English port books were often just listed as 'Hispania'.⁴ The *Calendar of State Papers Domestic* also provides similar examples of such trade which might otherwise have gone unnoticed. In 1638 a petition to King Charles I by a group of London merchants described how they were forced onto the coast of Picardy due to poor weather after a voyage from Cadiz and the Canary Islands.⁵ English voyages between the Canary Islands and Andalusia are also recorded in the *Archivo General de Indias* with numerous examples, such as the *St George*, captained by Thomas Grose, which sailed from Tenerife to Cadiz in 1721.⁶ In a letter from King Charles to his treasurer it became apparent that some English merchants were using triangular trade with Iberia to avoid customs charges. Merchants would sail to France in ballast to pick up a cargo which was carried to Spain or Flanders and then back to France without coming to Dover to pay customs.⁷ Irish merchants were also utilising triangular trade, between the west coast of Ireland, France and Iberian ports.⁸ The activities of English and Irish merchants not only provide a comparison but also show a plausible model for how Scottish merchants might engage in similar practices.

Examples of Scottish triangular trade involving Iberia or Iberian dominions are numerous. In December 1676 John Nesbit and other owners of the *Peter of Cockney* instructed the skipper of the vessel, James Cockburn, to sail from Scotland to Ostend and on to France.⁹ Unfortunately the ship was still in Ostend in May 1677 as the pass the vessel carried had been declared void by a proclamation of the Privy Council. The owners had attempted to petition the provost of Edinburgh for a new pass but had

⁴ Croft, 'English Commerce with Spain and the Armada War, 1558-1603' in Simon Adams and M.J. Rodriguez-Salgado, eds., *England, Spain and the Gran Armada 1585-1604: Essays from the Anglo-Spanish Conferences, London and Madrid 1988* (Edinburgh, 1991), 244.

⁵ CSPD, 1638-9, 243-4. Petition of Arnold Beake *et al* to the King, 1638.

⁶ AGI, Contratacion, 2867. 1721. This is only one example; there are many more.

⁷ CSPD, 1640, 3-4. The King to Lord Treasurer Juxon, 2 October 1639.

⁸ Schuller, 'Irish-Iberian Trade', 184.

⁹ RPCS, iii, V, 162. 2 May 1677.

been unsuccessful and had, therefore, taken their case to the Privy Council, who ordered the provost to issue a pass.¹⁰ In another example involving the Spanish Netherlands, John Hall and Andrew Stevenson, merchants of Edinburgh, pursued William Grierson, a skipper of Leith.¹¹ The *Susanna of Leith* had been commissioned in April 1676 to load coal in Fife for Ostend before sailing first to Rochelle for salt and onto Findhorn, Norway for timber, and then onto the Clyde for a cargo of fish and, finally, to the Danish Sound before sailing home to Leith.¹² While the vessel made the agreed destinations as far as Findhorn the skipper then refused to sail any further, stating that the vessel was too badly damaged. This breach of charter party resulted in the merchants claiming over £8,700 Scots in damages.¹³

Vessels were not necessarily commissioned for a triangular trade journey by merchants from one city. In February 1688 merchants in Glasgow, owners of the newly built *Concord of Glasgow*, sent her on her maiden voyage to Lisbon.¹⁴ While the vessel was in that port it was freighted by merchants (nationality unspecified) to sail to Amsterdam.¹⁵ Unfortunately, while en route it was captured by a French man-of-war, only to be recaptured by a Stuart Royalist vessel. However, it was then taken to Plymouth and the owners petitioned the Scottish Privy Council to plead for its return.¹⁶ In January 1714 John Stupartt recorded his payment of crown money for a voyage to Lisbon and then onto Danzig.¹⁷ David Deas documented his triangular trade journey in February 1715 in the *Sophia* from Leith to Rotterdam, Seville and Amsterdam.¹⁸ Later in the same year Thomas Gibb paid his dues for a sailing from Leith to Bilbao, Bordeaux and home; while Robert Gray paid £45 Scots for a voyage from Leith to Norway then onto Ireland and Portugal before returning to Leith.¹⁹

Focussing in on some of these post-Union cases, we learn even more due to the detailed record keeping of the time. In 1712 the *Catherine of Leith* sailed from Leith to Ireland, Bilbao and Cadiz, with the case coming to the attention of the High Court of

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ NAS, AC7/4. 4 August 1677. All references which refer to the *Scottish High Court of Admiralty Records* have been gathered using the CD Rom index collated by Sue Mowatt and Eric Graham. This excellent resource, which is word searchable, provided the initial proof that this thesis was viable and all *National Archives of Scotland* references which involve the admiralty records will have been initially discovered using this source. However, unless referenced otherwise, the original documents have been consulted in order to gain a greater understanding and context of the cases involved.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ *RPCS, iii, XIV, 75*. 21 August 1688.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ NAS, GD226/7/1. 23 January 1714.

¹⁸ Ibid, 11 February 1715.

¹⁹ Ibid, 15 March 1715, 27 May 1715.

Admiralty as the crew were seeking wages due to them from Robert Kay, the master.²⁰ Kay, counter-claimed that the crew were seeking payment for a month longer than they had worked. He stated he had only agreed to pay them under duress as they were a 'mutinous crew during the curse of a voyage' and that the promise he had made, 'could no more subsist than a promise made to a robber on the highway'. The judgement is not explicitly set out, although it does appear that the opinion of the court was in favour of the crew. We also have good evidence of how many ports could be involved in a triangular trade voyage. For example, in 1723 the *James of Leith* sailed to Lisbon and then on to Scilly, Cadiz, Alicante, Ostend and Bimmell before returning to Scotland.²¹ The owner of the ship, James Murray, claimed that the master, Robert Trail, had damaged the vessel beyond repair in Leith harbour, while Trail counter-claimed that he had not received expenses.²² The instructions given by Murray to Trail indicate the level of trust required in such transactions. In the charter party Murray stated that Trail was to present his cargo of coal to Mr Main and co. in Lisbon and subsequently endeavour to sell the vessel.²³ However, if this could not be done, Murray was to consult Main and freight for any port thought reasonable by themselves with the proceeds of the coals to be remitted to Murray.²⁴ Even further contingency is discussed, with Murray stating that if freight could not be sourced, Trail was to proceed to Norway with salt and present himself to a Mr James Wallace. Wallace was either to assist in selling the salt and procuring a cargo for Scotland, or to sell the vessel for £700 sterling or 'good bills of London or Holland'.²⁵ With such extensive contingencies and a degree of carte blanche it is easy to see how disagreements arose. Murray probably never intended for Trail to undertake such a long voyage involving so many ports. Indeed, during his testimony Murray stated that Trail had disembarked his supercargo (Gustavus Sinclair) in Cadiz in order to 'obtain his fraudulent ends', although no mention is made of this man in Murray's original instructions.²⁶ Murray was pursuing Trail for £500 sterling, the alleged profit from the voyages that Trail had undertaken, and £300 sterling which was to pay for damage to the vessel that Trail had allegedly caused.²⁷ This total amount is £100 more than Murray expected to receive from the sale of his ship; perhaps this indicates his true motive for bringing the complaint. The *High Court of Admiralty* agreed and ruled

²⁰ NAS, AC9/417. 24 June 1712.

²¹ NAS, AC9/6397. 1725.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid, 15 July 1723.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

in favour of the master Trail, and decreed that Murray pay him £164 sterling for the expenses of the voyage.²⁸ Without the example provided by this case study it would have been difficult to understand the degree of autonomy bestowed on skippers by merchants.

North West Germany appeared as a destination in conjunction with Iberia on one occasion when the *Isobel of Leith*, skippered by Bartholomew Bell, sailed to that region and then on to Cadiz in Autumn 1728.²⁹ In the same year Robert White, along with other crew members of the *Dorothea of Queensferry*, pursued the skipper Edward Hill for wages due for a voyage from Leith to Aberdeen and then on to Barcelona and Cadiz.³⁰ Having sailed to Barcelona, arriving on 2 December 1726, the vessel then sailed to Malaga with the crew taken prisoner in February 1727 and held until April.³¹ The crew demanded wages for seven months and two days, and Hill was ordered to appear before the admiralty to answer the said complaints.³² In a more informative example, George Ryder of Livorno wrote to the Marquess of Huntly regarding the *St George* skippered by James Crispin.³³ Crispin had loaded a cargo of fish and grain for Lisbon and was loading salt for his return to Scotland.³⁴ Ryder wrote that he had put on the vessel 'three chests of y best red wine' but that Crispin had 'found encouragement' in Spain and loaded Spanish sack 'for this place' and returned the wine which was destined for the Marquess. So, it appears that Crispin had sailed to Lisbon and was supposed to load a cargo of salt and Ryder's goods for the Marquess which he had sent from Livorno. However, Crispin instead decided to load a cargo of Spanish sack for Livorno and returned Ryder's wine in the process. It must be assumed that he then loaded his salt in the return journey, stopping at an Iberian or French port to do so.

Considering that Scottish skippers stopped at English ports during the Anglo-Spanish war, it is perhaps unsurprising that triangular trade involving English ports was popular. In an early seventeenth century peace-time example, the *Marie of Leith* was chartered by William Cochrane to sail to Plymouth and then on to Cadiz.³⁵ In another

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ NAS, AC9/1086. 1728; AC10/144. 9 September 1729 Due to a dispute regarding the cargo, Bell was unable to unload his ship and requested to be allowed to remove the cargo into storage so that he could continue to sail while the dispute was dealt with.

³⁰ NAS, AC9/1004. 13 December 1728.

³¹ Ibid; Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JO/10/3/231/33-37, 13 May 1735. While it is not explicitly stated, it is almost certain that these men were taken prisoner due to the British-Spanish conflict over Gibraltar in early 1727 (see chapter five).

³² NAS, AC9/1004. 13 December 1728.

³³ NAS, GD44/43/5. 16 July 1714.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Edinburgh City Archives, SL144/1/4. 7 March 1621.

instance, the *Joseph of Berwick* sailed from Leith to Newcastle for coal, which was then to be delivered to Edward Main & co. in Lisbon.³⁶ Similar situations happened in reverse with Spanish goods making their way from Scottish ports to England, thus providing further evidence both of triangular trade - in the distribution of commodities - as well as the presence of Spanish commodities in Scotland. Evidence for this practice has been provided through the research of Matthew Greenhall, which has shown that Scottish ships sailing to the North East of England did not merely carry Scottish domestic goods but also French wine and goods from Iberia and the Mediterranean.³⁷ Spanish salt, for example, was re-exported, making its way from Scotland to Berwick in May 1606.³⁸ The reverse occurred too, with Iberian goods being imported into Leith from Newcastle in the later part of the seventeenth century.³⁹

Scoto-Iberian triangular trade was not restricted to European ports. In January 1686 Thomas Pearson sailed to New Jersey with passengers and on the return journey visited both the Canary Islands and Madeira for a cargo of wine.⁴⁰ In his extensive investigation of the wine trade of the island of Madeira, David Hancock has pointed out that by the 1640s the island was an essential stopping point for ships sailing across the Atlantic.⁴¹ Stopping at Madeira solved the problem of an empty hold during the journey to America.⁴² For example, in Autumn 1686 the *Dolphin of Boston* was freighted by Glasgow merchants for a journey to Madeira, the cargo consisting of gloves, stockings, hats, coal and linen goods.⁴³ The ship had arrived in Glasgow from the Americas, and by stopping at Madeira on the return journey essential goods could be taken to the island, with wine then loaded for the colonies. As there was no domestic wine production in the Americas at this point the population was dependent on European wine and exports from Madeira increased five-fold in the seventeenth century.⁴⁴ The *Endeavour of New England* and the *Salisbury of Boston* were also freighted in September 1689 for the same journey, suggesting that these vessels were travelling

³⁶ NAS, AC9/1141. 11 December 1730.

³⁷ Greenhall, 'The Evolution of the British Economy', 55.

³⁸ TNA, E190/161/1, Berwick, January-November 1606.

³⁹ NAS, E72/15.

⁴⁰ *RPCS*, iii, XI, xxxiii-xxxiv. January 1686.

⁴¹ David Hancock, *Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste* (London, 2009), 1.

⁴² *Ibid*, 108.

⁴³ NAS, E72/19/13. This ship arrived in Glasgow from Boston carrying Virginia tobacco in July 1686 - thus can be confirmed as being from Boston, America and not Boston, England.

⁴⁴ Hancock, *Oceans of Wine*, 112.

across the Atlantic together.⁴⁵ It is interesting to note that the majority of vessels sailing to Madeira from Glasgow were not Scottish but were either colonial or Irish in origin.⁴⁶ This and the preference to sail to Madeira may have been a ploy to circumvent the Navigation Acts. As discussed by Allan Macinnes, the 1660 Navigation act stated that goods and commodities either being imported or exported from the colonies could only be transported in English ships with a master and crew that were predominantly English.⁴⁷ Sailing to Madeira and chartering vessels that were for the most part not-Scottish appears to have been a somewhat grey area. Glasgow could neither control which vessels came into its port nor where they sailed to, allowing trade to continue unhindered. While triangular trade can be difficult to establish, these examples show that this trade involving Scotland and Iberia was a well-known trading practice. The frequency of disputes in particular is telling. Most charter parties would have been carried out without problems which required the attention of the authorities. Therefore the number of successful triangular trade journeys involving Iberia could easily be in tens per year. With Iberia a more distant sailing than the ports of Scandinavia and northern France it is unsurprising that ships chose to stop at ports along the way and increase their profits.

1.2 Case Studies

1.2a. John Steuart of Inverness.

One prominent example of a Scottish merchant engaging in triangular trade is Baillie John Steuart of Inverness. As a merchant based in Scotland and of moderate means Steuart provides an excellent example of how merchants relied on trusted contacts to expand their business. Further his case provides evidence as to how geographically varied one merchants business dealings could be and as such, is an excellent example of how Scottish merchants traded with Iberia while utilising triangular trade. For example, Steuart was in correspondence with a Scottish merchant in London, George Ouchterlony, and in November 1722 Steuart decided to take up Ouchterlony's proposal

⁴⁵ NAS, E72/19/15. There may have been some connection between merchants in Glasgow and merchants in Boston. In 1657 twenty-eight Scots formed the Scots Charitable Society of Boston, Massachusetts - this was to provide relief to those individuals who had been sold as indentured servants by Cromwell following the battles of Dunbar and Worcester. Although the society had a shaky start it admitted 154 new members between 1684 and 1692. See William Budd, 'The Scots Charitable Society of Boston, Massachusetts', Appendix 5 in Justine Taylor, *A Cup of Kindness: The History of the Royal Scottish Corporation, A London Charity, 1603-2003* (East Linton, 2003), 255-261.

⁴⁶ NAS, E72/10, E72/19.

⁴⁷ Macinnes, *Union and Empire*, 156.

of freighting a vessel for Barcelona and Livorno.⁴⁸ The *Ann of London* was thus prepared for the voyage with Alexander Rose, a friend of Steuart's, accompanying the vessel skippered by James Cuthbert.⁴⁹ Upon Ouchterlony's recommendation Steuart included a letter to two gentlemen in Barcelona, Messers Windar and Ferrand, requesting their assistance in selling the cargo, remitting the profits of the fish to London and ensuring that the vessel was to be sent to Livorno as soon as possible.⁵⁰ William Windar would later become the British consul in Barcelona and Steuart clearly felt that this initial contact could lead to further trade involving these men stating,

If this small adventure finds a good market it will be an inlet to a further correspondence and much greater Consignations of this kind hereafter, but will entirely depend on the encouragement we find from you at present, and particularly your making speedy remittances of the proceeds of the Cargo as above.⁵¹

However, the event did not go entirely to plan as the cargo was apparently damaged. Steuart wrote to Ouchterlony in April 1723 asking him to remind Windar and Ferrand that the cargo was insured 'against all hazards'.⁵² While this debate raged on, the vessel sailed for Livorno with a letter similar to the one for Windar and Ferrand addressed to Messers Aikman and Windar in Livorno.⁵³ In this letter he requested their assistance in selling salmon and again hinted at a continued trading relationship if this task was completed successfully.⁵⁴ Steuart further wrote that Cuthbert should load salt at either Spain or Portugal on the return journey.⁵⁵ He also wrote to Alexander Rose advising him that he had written to Aikman and Windar regarding freighting the vessel with salt and giving instructions for the vessel's return home, telling Rose what to purchase depending on whether or not the vessel stopped at Cadiz or Lisbon.⁵⁶ If stopping in Cadiz, Rose was to purchase 20 barrels of raisins, six chests of oranges and two of lemons; if stopping at Lisbon he was to purchase four half hogsheads of white wine, and oranges and lemons.⁵⁷ Steuart was not the only merchant whose goods were aboard this vessel, and letters discussed a cargo of cod fish and salmon owned by

⁴⁸ Mackay, ed, *The Letter Book*, 195. 3 November 1722.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 197-8. 12 December 1722.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*.

⁵¹ Mackay, ed, *The Letter Book*, 197-8. 12 December 1722. Windar is noted as consul in both Spanish and British sources. See AGS, Estado Legajo 6879; TNA, SP94/215, 1727-1729.

⁵² *Ibid*, 207-8. 12 April 1723.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 198-9. 12 December 1722.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 202. 10 January 1723.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*.

Mr Dawson from Forres, who was also purchasing salt for the return journey.⁵⁸ Part of this return cargo may have been sold within Scotland; in June of the same year Steuart wrote to Donald Steuart, presumably a relation, instructing him to sail to Garloch and deliver 280 bushels of Spanish salt to the Laird of Garloch. The debate regarding the cod sent to Barcelona dragged on for sometime. In July 1725 Steuart wrote to Ouchterlony in London stating, 'I am glad the uglie debate with our friends at Barcelona is ended thou at a loss'.⁵⁹ It is likely that Windar and Ferrand could not, or indicated they could not, sell the cargo for the price that Steuart expected thus leading to the disagreement. However, the connection made with Aikman and Windar at Livorno continued, with a letter in October 1725 informing the men that the *Lark of Inverness* had left Scotland to sail to Livorno with a cargo of salmon which was owned by William McKay & Company.⁶⁰ Alexander Rose was aboard this vessel and was described by Steuart as 'your acquaintance', with Steuart recommending William McKay and company as reputable traders.⁶¹ As Steve Murdoch has discussed, when used by Scots in the early modern period the term 'acquaintance' meant more than it does in its modern day understanding. It signified a 'strong and active relationship', suggesting that Rose was more than a mere business partner to Windar and Aikman.⁶² It is highly unlikely that this vessel merely visited the port of Livorno on the off chance and the connection made by Steuart obviously assisted fellow Scottish merchants. As Steuart's example shows, triangular trade was far from simple for the merchants who undertook it. It required contacts in the cities that the ship would visit and crucially those contacts had to be trustworthy. For example, Steuart's contacts in Barcelona and Livorno were recommended to him by a fellow Scot living in London. Further, Steuart ensured that his personal friend and protégé was on the vessel to protect his interests. While the Barcelona connection proved to be unsuccessful, the Livorno connection was not and, like Ouchterlony before him, Steuart recommended both his Livorno contacts and his merchants' acquaintances to each other.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 197-8. 12 December 1722; 198-9. 12 December 1722.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 228. 24 June 1725.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 237-8. 15 October 1725.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Murdoch, *Network North*, 73-5.

1.2b. The Northern Continental Scots

Scottish merchants based away from Scotland also conducted trade with Iberia. *The Scotland Scandinavian and Northern Europe Biographical Database* provides examples of Scottish merchants in Scandinavia who engaged in trade with Iberia and other European ports. John Spalding is one example, with the Spalding family extensively researched by Steve Murdoch.⁶³ Born in Scotland at the beginning of the seventeenth century, Spalding arrived in Gothenburg in the early 1620s, and by 1640 was listed as a merchant and a councillor.⁶⁴ Spalding is noted in the Gothenburg shipping lists from 1639 to 1666 with his destinations listed across Europe, including Spain and Portugal.⁶⁵ Evidence also suggests that he traded with other Scots based in Sweden, England and the Dutch Republic, thus making his involvement in triangular trade likely.⁶⁶ This is made more probable by the economic influence of the Spalding family, which had expanded from small trade within Scotland to trade with England and, once established, trade overseas.⁶⁷ John's son, Gabriel, was also in the family business and followed his father as President of Commerce in Gothenburg, as well as trading with ports all over Europe, including Lisbon.⁶⁸ John MacLean, another Scottish merchant based in Gothenburg also traded with many European ports including those in Spain.⁶⁹ The Spaldings and MacLeans were not alone in engaging in triangular trade involving Iberia. The Scot Peder Sanderson was a councillor in the Oldenburg territory of Malmö, now part of modern day Sweden. In 1608, along with three other merchants of the city, Sanderson freighted his ship to Norway and from there to Spain with timber.⁷⁰

Another family heavily involved in trade which included Iberia was the Jolly family. Similarly to the Spalding family, the activities of the Jolly family have already received scholarly attention from Kathrin Zickermann.⁷¹ The brothers Alexander and Robert Jolly wrote regularly to each other, and particular letters discussed trade to Spain in November 1678 and a trading voyage to either Alicante or Marseille in July

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ SSNE, ID: 4677.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Murdoch, *Network North*, 215.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 134.

⁶⁸ SSNE, ID: 4816.

⁶⁹ Grosjean and Murdoch, 'The Scottish Community in Seventeenth Century Gothenburg', 216.

⁷⁰ SSNE, ID: 746.

⁷¹ See Zickermann, *Across the German Sea*, passim.

1684.⁷² In October 1678 Alexander freighted the *James of Leith* to Otto Danke, a merchant of Hamburg.⁷³ The vessel was to sail from Hamburg to Cadiz and back again.⁷⁴ Thus a Scottish ship was freighted on behalf of a Scottish merchant who resided in Scotland to a German merchant for a journey to Spain and then back to Germany.

This section has proved beyond doubt that Scottish merchants and ships engaged in triangular trade involving Iberian ports. Evidence also suggests that triangular trade was not confined to European waters with vessels, registered in America, setting off for Madeira from Glasgow, almost certainly as part of a triangular trade voyage. As can be shown from the Scottish High Court of Admiralty examples and the case study of Baillie John Steuart, the organisation of these voyages was complicated. In a sense, the physical presence of the ship in various ports was the simple part, while creating and maintaining links with merchants in different cities was far more complicated. As Natasha Glaisyer has stated,

For merchants, a good reputation was an essential asset, not only because trust was required in credit transactions but because every stage of buying and selling goods required trust.⁷⁵

The necessity of a trustworthy man in an area of commercial importance cannot be over emphasised. The term 'credit' did not merely have a monetary value: the credit of a reputation was just as important.⁷⁶ Xabier Lamikitz concurs, stating that 'reputation was the backbone of trade, as it was thanks to his good reputation that a merchant had access to credit'.⁷⁷ With such heavy emphasis on the importance of trust it is unsurprising that some merchants and skippers were so eager to defend their reputations in a court of law. The perceived loss of trustworthiness could easily lead to bankruptcy. As John Steuart found out to his cost, however, a merchant recommendation was no guarantee that a journey and its expectations would pass successfully. Whatever the reason for his disappointment, however, he certainly blamed the Barcelona contacts for it and subsequently did not conduct business with them again. As shall be seen in chapter six, this did not affect Windar and Ferrand, although it is easy to see how such an incident could lead to ruin for a merchant.

⁷² NAS, RH15/140. Robert Jolly to Alexander Jolly, 27 November 1678; Robert Jolly to Alexander Jolly 18 July 1684. Many thanks to Dr Kathrin Zickermann for drawing my attention to these letters and the activities of the Jolly family in general.

⁷³ Ibid. 20 October 1682.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Natasha Glaisyer, *The Culture of Commerce In England, 1660-1720* (Woodbridge, 2006), 38.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust*, 142.

2.1 The Importance of London and Rotterdam.

As discussed in the introduction of this chapter this section is designed to evaluate and analyse Iberian goods that came into Scottish ports via the ports of London and the Dutch Republic. These locations have long been marked as re-exporters of international commodities. However, it is clear that Scotland maintained direct trade links with Iberia, which begs the question why did Scottish merchants obtain significant amounts of Iberian goods from London and Rotterdam rather than from the actual source?

Sailing a vessel, no matter how far the distance or the time of year, has always presented significant risks. Whole ships could, and did, disappear. Pirates could cause devastation while straits, bays and harbours were rendered dangerous by sandbars and the weather was a huge consideration at all times. Nonetheless, some journeys were considered more dangerous than others, and the journey to Iberia - especially if travelling through the straits of Gibraltar - was one such route. The actions of North African corsairs made the voyage to the Mediterranean particularly dangerous. European vessels were regularly taken by corsairs from Morocco, Tunis, Tripoli and the Algiers.⁷⁸ The early to mid seventeenth century, in particular, was the peak of corsair activities in the Mediterranean - for a number of reasons. Firstly, due to the advice and skills of renegade Europeans, the corsair vessel of choice changed from galley ships to the faster and more manoeuvrable Dutch-style sailing ships.⁷⁹ Indeed, some of the most successful 'Barbary pirates' were actually Europeans, such as John Ward who dined with William Lithgow in September 1615.⁸⁰ Secondly, the major European powers were too absorbed in conflicts with each other to join forces and tackle the threat posed by North African corsairs, with the best opportunity - between 1604 and 1621 - passing unused and not resulting in any significant action against these vessels.⁸¹ This distraction was even pointed out by contemporaries at the time, as when James VI & I wrote on this subject to Pope Gregory XV in September 1622.⁸² In this letter James respectfully pointed out that both Catholics and Protestants worship the same God and that Christian rulers should work together - an acknowledgement of the threat from North Africa and the Ottoman empire.⁸³ The number of ships and people involved in

⁷⁸ Linda Colley, 'Going Native, Telling Tales: Captivity, Collaborations and Empire', *Past and Present* 168 (2000), 171.

⁷⁹ Alan G. Jamieson, *Lords of the Sea: A History of the Barbary Corsairs* (London, 2012), 75.

⁸⁰ Lithgow, *The Totall discourse*, 201-2.

⁸¹ Jamieson, *Lords of the Sea*, 93.

⁸² G.P.V Akrigg, ed, *Letters of James VI & I* (Berkeley, 1984), 383-5. James VI&I to Pope Gregory XV, 30 September 1622.

⁸³ Akrigg, ed, *Letters*, 383-5.

corsair engagements, as scholars have pointed out, are often exaggerated and need to be treated with caution. As a result of the harsh consequences of being captured by a North African corsair, the practice gained notoriety which has given a common conception that vast numbers of people were involved. For a suitable context we need only consider that between the years of 1695 and 1713 French privateers took around 600 ships a year, with 400 being either English or, more generally, British.⁸⁴ In contrast, North African corsairs only captured 15 English ships a year, even in their peak years of the 1620s and the 1630s.⁸⁵ However, as Linda Colley has discussed, the implications of being captured by the French as opposed to being captured by corsairs were very different. Capture in the Mediterranean meant enslavement in North Africa with (for British mariners at least) little chance of swift release or return home at all.⁸⁶ The ransom asked was beyond the means of most relatives and varied depending on gender; women and children commanded a higher price than men. For example, a ransom for a man was around 500 *dobles* while Alice Hays of Edinburgh was ransomed for 1,000 *dobles*.⁸⁷ Precise figures of those enslaved are difficult to accurately calculate due to the numbers of people who converted to Islam or died in captivity. Nevertheless, David Hebb estimates that there were over 7,000 'English subjects' who were taken by Barbary corsairs between 1622 and 1642.⁸⁸ Unfortunately, for British captives the chance of release was much lower than for their European counterparts, mainly because those Britons captured were common sailors and not people of importance.⁸⁹ According to Jamieson, this caused a detrimental effect for the Barbary states, who complained that 'English governments show little interest in ransoming the English slaves captured'.⁹⁰ Capture by North African corsairs was a constant threat and unlike capture by a ship from another European kingdom, not only was there little chance of release but there was none at all of receiving compensation for the ship and the cargo.

Numerous Scottish vessels were captured by North African corsairs and it is certain that of those several vessels were journeying to Iberia. For example, in September 1619 the *William of Burntisland* was taking pilchards from Ireland to Alicante

⁸⁴ Jamieson, *Lords of the Sea*, 152. In his examination of Scottish maritime history Steve Murdoch has shown that the overwhelming majority of those ships taken were English, while only 20 Scottish ships were taken prize between 1695 and 1713. See Murdoch, *Terror of the Seas*, Appendix VII:2, 404-7.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World* (London, 2002), 46, 54.

⁸⁷ Robert L Playfair, *Scourge of Christendom: Annals of British Relations with Algiers prior to the French Conquest* (New York, 1972), 63-5; Adrian Tinniswood, *Pirates of Barbary: Corsairs, Conquests and Captivity in the Seventeenth Century Mediterranean* (London, 2010), 195-202.

⁸⁸ David Hebb, *Piracy and the English Government, 1616-1642* (Aldershot, 1994), 139.

⁸⁹ Colley, *Captives*, 54.

⁹⁰ Jamieson, *Lords of the Sea*, 139.

when it was captured by Algerian corsairs and the men sold into slavery.⁹¹ The Privy Council had sent a circular letter to churches and burghs detailing the men's condition in order to assist in the collection of their ransom money. In a similar case, a warrant was issued for a collection for William Dawson who was on a Scottish ship (John Williamson master) from Malaga in September 1622 when it was captured.⁹² December 1624 saw another incident when the *Blessing of Kirkcaldy* was captured while journeying to London from the Canary Islands.⁹³ In this case all of the crew were released except the gunner George Wilson, who was apparently kept due to his skill in attempting to hold off the attack.⁹⁴ Another warrant was issued in February 1637 for the crew of the *Phoenix of Ayr* who were on a voyage to Bilbao.⁹⁵ A curious case was that of William Rankin, a Scottish skipper of a Spanish vessel which was sailing from Malaga to France when the vessel was seized.⁹⁶ However, according to Rankin the pilot for the corsairs fell overboard and he was requested by the pirates to steer the vessel. He took them to Dublin but was himself arrested and thrown in prison for piracy.⁹⁷ In November 1674 the families of the skipper and mate of the *Mary of Inverkeithing* requested to be allowed to collect money for their release after the ship was taken by a Turkish man-of-war.⁹⁸ The ship was on a voyage from Scotland to Nantes and on to Lisbon when it was taken, and the skipper and mate were unable to escape with the rest of the crew in the ship's boat.⁹⁹ In the spring of the following year the Privy Council ruled that wives and families of a ship bound for Cadiz could no longer collect money for their ransom as they were believed to have either escaped from captivity or to have died.¹⁰⁰ In another incidence, the *William and Jean of Glasgow* was taken by an Algiers corsair in July 1675 while on a journey from Scotland to Lisbon, but the ship was then retaken by the crew.¹⁰¹ However, the vessel was to suffer even more misfortune when it was taken by a Portuguese warship and, due to the presence of 'Turks' on board, was in danger of being taken as prize by the Portuguese.¹⁰² Even in the eighteenth century, when the threat had diminished considerably, a few Scottish merchants were still affected. While

⁹¹ *RPCS*, XII, 184-5. 25 January 1620. Many thanks to Professor Steve Murdoch for allowing access to his research on North African Corsairs and bringing these examples to my attention.

⁹² *RPCS*, XIII, 581-2. 29 July 1624.

⁹³ *RPCS*, ii, I, 144-5. 28 September 1625.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *RPCS*, ii, VI, 387-8. 21 February 1637.

⁹⁶ *CSPD*, 1623-25, 464, January 1625.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* Whether this was a relation of the previously mentioned John and Nicholas Rankin is unclear.

⁹⁸ *RPCS*, iii, IV, 294. 5 November 1674.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* 398. 5 May 1675.

¹⁰¹ *RPCS*, iii, V, 58-59. 23 November 1676.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

on a journey from Barcelona to Gibraltar (having sailed to Barcelona from Newfoundland) the Scottish ship the *Christian*, skippered by Alexander Hutton, was approached by two Algerian ships. Although they allowed the ship to sail on after inspecting its pass the captains of the North African ships still helped themselves to some of the *Christian's* cargo.¹⁰³ These examples provide a sense of the hopelessness of the situation. With the exception of the *Christian*, there is no information regarding any of the other vessels and it is not known if any of the men returned to Scotland. These are also only the examples which involve Iberian trade which, while providing more evidence of commercial relations between the Peninsula and Scotland, also show the extent of the corsair problem.

To sail safely in the Mediterranean, therefore, a larger vessel was often required, preferably in convoy with others. Norman Macdougall, in his study of James IV, discusses the issues that the Stewart king had with his naval ambitions due to the lack of deep water harbours in Scotland.¹⁰⁴ While Newhaven and Port of Airth were chosen by James IV as suitable deepwater harbours, Newhaven was exposed due to its position east of the Inchgarvie defences and Port of Airth was 12 miles west of the Queensferry narrows and thus a sizeable distance from the important Leith market.¹⁰⁵ Aberdeen's harbour was notorious for its dangerous northern approach, where a sand bar at high tide was covered by a mere two feet of water.¹⁰⁶ Thomas Tucker's report, regarding the economic state of Scotland in the 1650's, discusses the vessels in Scottish harbours and pays particular attention to their small size.¹⁰⁷ In the early eighteenth century the Convention of Royal Burghs alluded to the lack of suitable Scottish vessels for Iberian trade and requested that Scottish merchants be allowed to import foreign salt from neutral ports as 'we are not furnished with convenient ships for bringing salt from Spain or Portugal'.¹⁰⁸ As Scottish harbours could not accommodate larger vessels it is unsurprising that, in comparison to vessels which sailed to Northern Europe relatively few Scottish ships sailed to Iberia.

As has been shown in the previous paragraphs sailing to Iberia was risky and understandably some merchants were wary of putting cargo on vessels sailing to the region. For merchants without significant reserves of capital the loss of one cargo could

¹⁰³ NAS, RH9/14/102. 24 January 1727.

¹⁰⁴ Norman MacDougall, *James IV* (East Linton, 1997), 235.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 235.

¹⁰⁶ Gordon Jackson, 'The Economy: Aberdeen and the Sea' in Patricia E. Dennison, David Ditchburn and Michael Lynch, eds., *Aberdeen Before 1800: A New History* (East Linton, 2002), 164.

¹⁰⁷ John A. Murray, ed., *Report by Thomas Tucker upon the Settlement of the Revenues of Excise and Customs in Scotland A.D. MDCLVI*, Bannatyne Club, 7, (Edinburgh, 1825).

¹⁰⁸ *CRB, IV*, 427-431. 25 November 1707.

lead to financial ruin. Maritime insurance was therefore required but in the early modern period this form of business was not regulated. The insurance market was still fairly informal and insurers would often only take responsibility for part of a consignment, meaning that merchants would have to contact a number of insurers to protect an entire cargo.¹⁰⁹ Fraud was also a problem and insurers regularly asked for proof of damaged or lost goods before agreeing to pay out. Resulting disagreements often led to legal action which, on occasion, were lengthy and costly.¹¹⁰ For example, in 1707 the *Providence of Leith* was sailing in convoy to Lisbon when it was taken by French privateers leaving the skipper, Robert Gray, fighting to have the insurer pay for the loss.¹¹¹ Until the 1800s Scottish merchants often obtained insurance abroad such as the *Marie of Leith*, which obtained insurance in London for a journey from Leith to Plymouth and Cadiz in March 1621.¹¹² Baillie John Steuart commonly secured insurance from abroad with there being only one occasion where he insured a vessel in Scotland.¹¹³ Scots were not alone in obtaining insurance in this way. As Christopher Ebert has argued this ‘decentralisation’ was common and had emerged in the 15th century.¹¹⁴ Ebert provides examples of Catalonian merchants insuring vessels carrying cloth between Florence and England as well as arguing that such practices became more common as the 16th century wore on with Amsterdam, in particular, hosting a booming insurance market.¹¹⁵ Other methods of risk avoidance were also utilised, most commonly, risk distribution, whereby a merchant would place cargos on different ships so that if a ship was lost other cargos would, hopefully, provide a profit.¹¹⁶ Insurance was not merely confined to goods either with individuals obtaining insurance for their person, presumably to provide a ransom if captured. For example, in a letter to his father, John Dunlop discussed the impending journey of his brother to Cadiz.¹¹⁷ In this letter he wrote that a Mr Foulis was seeking to find out how much a man would insure himself for on such a voyage whether it be £100, £200, £300 or £400 (presumably

¹⁰⁹ Christopher Ebert, ‘Early Modern Atlantic Trade and the Development of Maritime Insurance to 1630’ in *Past and Present* 213:1 (2011), 107-8.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 108.

¹¹¹ NAS, AC9/284. 1707

¹¹² A.D.M Forte, ‘Marine Insurance and Risk Distribution Before 1800, *Law and History Review* 5:2 (1987), 407. The vessel was insured for £600 sterling a considerable sum of money and was chartered by William Cochrane. See also Edinburgh City Archives, SL144/1/4. 7 March 1621.

¹¹³ A.D.M Forte, ‘Marine Insurance and Risk Distribution Before 1800, *Law and History Review* 5:2 (1987), 400.

¹¹⁴ Christopher Ebert, ‘Early Modern Atlantic Trade and the Development of Maritime Insurance to 1630’ in *Past and Present* 213:1 (2011), 104-5.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 105-6.

¹¹⁶ See Chapter 5.

¹¹⁷ Glasgow City Archives, MSS 120/D12/10. John Dunlop to James Dunlop, 9 September 1682.

sterling).¹¹⁸ The danger of sailing to Iberian ports meant that some form of insurance was required and it would be foolhardy to send a vessel or indeed a person on such a voyage without any form of financial protection. With such risks in mind it is unsurprising that some Scots did not deem it worth sending cargo or ships to southern waters.

Further, while it is clear that there were Scots living in Iberia, this community was small and disparate in comparison to the large Scottish communities in both London and Rotterdam. There is, as yet, no substantial research available on the size of the Scots community in London in the seventeenth century, but preliminary research involving the index of the register of deeds in the Scottish national archives indicates the existence of a large community with several hundred merchants. The Scottish presence in the Dutch Republic, particularly the communities at Scottish staple at Veere and Rotterdam, has also received significant scholarly attention. Matthijs Rooseboom, John Davidson and Alexander Gray all investigated the Scottish staple at the turn of the seventeenth century.¹¹⁹ Recently, Douglas Catterall's work has proven that the Scottish community in Rotterdam was not only numerically substantial but also economically influential.¹²⁰ These ports, as well as containing significant Scottish communities, were also geographically closer than Iberia and well placed for triangular trade voyages involving the Baltic and Scandinavian ports.

In order to ensure that the goods brought from London and Rotterdam were Iberian in origin an investigation was undertaken of other areas from where goods such as lemons, oranges and figs may have originated. This was to counter the fact that there is a certain assumption among historians that these goods originated in the Levant.¹²¹ However, following a detailed investigation of the historiography, it can be ascertained that, with the exception of a few years between 1675 and the early 1680s - where the English were granted the right to export two boats per year of figs and raisins expressly for the king's table - the chief import from the Levant trade to England was

¹¹⁸ Ibid. This is probably James Foulis who was in correspondence with the Duke of Hamilton and wrote that merchant ships which he had an interest in were taken by the French while returning from Turkey. See NAS, GD406/1/10709. James Foulis to the Duke of Hamilton, 15 July 1693.

¹¹⁹ Rooseboom, *The Scottish Staple*; Davidson and Gray, *The Scottish Staple at Veere*, passim.

¹²⁰ See Catterall, 'Scots along the Maas' and Catterall, *Community without Borders*, passim.

¹²¹ Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 193.

textiles.¹²² Oranges and lemons are not mentioned in any of the historiography as originating in Levant. This, combined with the knowledge that Spain was England's chief market post-1630, to the point that when the Dutch Republic threatened this trade in post 1648 it caused outrage among English merchants, makes it highly unlikely that lemons, oranges, raisins and figs would have come from anywhere other than Iberia.¹²³ It is possible that goods were assumed to be coming from the Levant due to triangular trade - Dutch vessels would often load a cargo at Cadiz or Alicante and then sail on to Livorno, Genoa or Venice meaning that a visit to Iberia may not be recorded.¹²⁴ It has also been pointed out that the Dutch Republic was likely to use their direct East India trade for the spices and other Asian goods often available at market places in the Levant, which in conjunction with their strong re-entry into the Spanish market post-1648 makes it unlikely that these goods were coming from the Levant.¹²⁵

2.2. London

During the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the city of London experienced a population boom. In 1560 the population of London was around 110,000, but by 1680 this had risen to 430,000.¹²⁶ This growth led to the development of a crucial trade from the countryside around London and, indeed, the wider British coastline, which provided the goods necessary to allow the metropolis to function.¹²⁷ London's importance as a centre of trade during the seventeenth century was such that four-fifths of English imports during the period came through the city.¹²⁸ It has been estimated that the port of London, along with the shipping and supporting trades, possibly employed a quarter of

¹²² Remarkably, there is very little in the way of historiography regarding the English Levant Company: even modern texts, such as Christine Laidlaw's *The British in the Levant: Trade and Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 2010), use A.C Wood's 1934 publication, *A History of the Levant Company* (London, 1934), as the baseline for history on the Levant company. Ralph Davis in the 1970s completed an article on English imports from the Levant which discusses the import of fruit from this area. He pointed out that the legalisation of the trade in currants, figs and raisins in 1675 actually led to its demise as a trade from the Levant with it rapidly diminishing in the 1680s. See Ralph Davis, 'English Imports from the Middle East, 1580-1780', in M.A Cook, ed, *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day* (London, 1970), 201.

¹²³ See Wood, *A History*; Davis, 'English Imports' and J. I. Israel, 'Trade, Politics and Strategy: The Anglo-Dutch Wars in the Levant (1645-1675)' in Alexander Hamilton, Alexander H de Groot and Mauris van der Boogert, eds., *Friends and Rivals in the East: Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Levant from the Seventeenth to the Early Nineteenth Century* (Leiden, 2000), 16.

¹²⁴ J. I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Spanish World* (Oxford, 1982), 420.

¹²⁵ Wood, *A History*, 99.

¹²⁶ K Sakata, 'The Growth of London and its Regional Structure in the Early Modern Period', *Keio Economic Studies* 38 (2001), 2.

¹²⁷ F.J. Fisher, *London and the English Economy, 1500-1700* (London, 1990), 61-80.

¹²⁸ Davis, *English Overseas Trade*, 36; Brian Dietz, 'Overseas Trade and Metropolitan Growth' in A.L. Beier and Roger Finlay, eds., *London 1500-1700: The Making of the Metropolis* (Harlow, 1986), 131.

the capital's population by the early eighteenth century.¹²⁹ It was not merely Londoners who were involved, with Margrit Schulte Beerbühl stating that until the late eighteenth century the history of foreign merchants in England is 'essentially the history of the city of London'.¹³⁰ Studying actual statistics for the trade of London has been stated to be a difficult task due to the poor survival of London port books from the seventeenth century.¹³¹ Despite this, several scholars have made inroads into discussing both the volume of and goods of trade in London in the early modern period. Keith Wrightson, for example, has discussed the dominance of cloth in London's export trade, which he states made up just over 92 percent of London's domestic export trade in the 1640s.¹³² This had declined by 1700 but still consisted of an impressive 72 percent, with an expansion occurring in exports of goods such as victuals and items such as hides, coals, tin and salt.¹³³ A significant change in both the geographical origin and, subsequently, the type of imports reaching London also took place during the seventeenth century. Several historians agree on the increasing importance of and, indeed, fundamental shift in trade from eastern Baltic ports to southern Europe.¹³⁴ This shift was not confined to southern Europe as trade to the Americas and Asia also made its mark, although with some disagreement on their significance.¹³⁵ The seventeenth century also saw a noticeable increase in the practice of re-exporting goods, with it being noted that London merchants found the practice of selling imports more lucrative than exporting products.¹³⁶ From this very brief overview it can be surmised that during the seventeenth century London grew from a city into a metropolis, with a large growth in population and gaining an increasing standing in trade. London's trade expanded both in quantity and geographical reach with trade from southern Europe gaining a greater share of the market during the period investigated by this thesis.

¹²⁹ Jeremy Boulton, 'London 1540-1700', in Peter Clark, ed, *The Cambridge Urban History of Britain: 1540-1840* (Cambridge, 2000), 320.

¹³⁰ Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, 'Merchant Empires: Mercaderes Hamburgueses en Londres y Sus Redes De Comercio Internacional (1660-1815)' in Ana Crespo Solana, ed, *Comunidades Transnacionales: Colonias de Mercaderes Extranjeros en el Mundo Atlantico (1500-1830)* (Madrid, 2010), 105.

¹³¹ D M Woodward, 'Port Books', *Short Guides to Records No. 22* (Historical Association, reprinted 1994), 208. London was issued with 4000 port books for the period 1565-1697; these were expected to be returned to the exchequer at the end of each year but unfortunately only 700 have survived.

¹³² Keith Wrightson, *Earthly Necessities: Economic Lives in Early Modern Britain* (New Haven, 2000), 237.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ F. J Fisher, 'London's Export Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century', *The Economic History Review: New Series* 3:2 (1950), 154-5.

¹³⁵ Keith Wrightson, *Earthly Necessities*, 180; Dietz, 'Overseas Trade', 126. Wrightson argues that English overseas trade was still mainly concentrated on Europe while Asian and American trade routes were very much in their infancy. Dietz, however, appears to place more emphasis on the importance of these new trades describing a 'boom' in American trade between 1620 and 1640 and arguing that within twenty years of its foundation the East India Company held 5% of London's imports.

¹³⁶ Boulton, 'London 1540-1700', 321-322; Dietz, 'Overseas Trade', 123.

As established in chapter two, English trade with Iberia and its dominions, or rather the lack of it, was disastrous to the English economy prior to 1603. However, as the seventeenth century wore on, the resumption and continuation of this trade became economically vital. Ball has argued that trade with Spain, in particular, became more attractive as the economic situation in the Peninsula became worse, with the balance of trade becoming more favourable to foreign merchants.¹³⁷ English exports to Spain increased mainly due to the trade in 'New Draperies', which were lighter than traditional cloths.¹³⁸ This was supplemented by the trade in fish from Newfoundland, especially post-1630, which involved triangular trade with Biscay salt being taken to Newfoundland followed by salted fish to Iberia and then wine or fruit supplied for the return to London.¹³⁹ Other goods sent from Iberia to London were the same as those commodities discussed in chapter one. With London's previously established entrepôt status, commodities from Iberia exported to London were likely to be re-exported to other ports and in the case of Scotland this can be proven.

While the lack of London port books does cause problems for scholars wishing to examine the trade of that city, Scottish port books provide ample evidence of trade with London, particularly in the late seventeenth century but also earlier. For example, one Leith port book running from November 1626 to November 1627 deals with imports of tobacco with several of vessels collecting their cargo from London.¹⁴⁰ This example is useful for two reasons: one, it proves Scottish trade with London and two, it shows that London was acting as an entrepôt for foreign goods. Greenhall's thesis examining Anglo-Scottish trade in the early modern period has argued that despite the lack of London port books in the early seventeenth century, some pattern of trade can be established.¹⁴¹ Scottish ships trading with the English capital took victuals and other basic products in return for a range of goods including, but not limited to, gloves, hats, stockings, beer, drinking glasses, figs and raisins.¹⁴² Furthermore, Greenhall points out that those Scottish vessels which visited London usually did so either going to or returning from Europe, supporting the idea that trade to Iberia may well be hidden behind the 'last port' in a triangular trade journey.¹⁴³ An example of this is found in the Crown Money Book of Leith, with Archibald Drummond recording in October 1710 that

¹³⁷ Ball, *Merchants and Merchandise*, 191.

¹³⁸ Davis, *English Overseas Trade*, 22.

¹³⁹ Graviil, 'Trading to Spain and Portugal', 71.

¹⁴⁰ NAS, E71/29/10.

¹⁴¹ Greenhall, 'The Evolution of the British Economy', 61-62.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

he had undertaken a journey to Bilbao from Leith, stopping at London on the return.¹⁴⁴ If this journey had been recorded in a port record book it would have stated that the vessel came from London - without mentioning the prior stop - thus it is only due to Drummond's diligence in recording the whole journey that historians are aware of the Iberian element.¹⁴⁵ Later in the century evidence of Scottish trade with London becomes far more obvious, with the Leith port books in particular detailing dozens of ships arriving from London or going to London in the period 1663-1691.¹⁴⁶ Scotland's increasing trade with England during the seventeenth century has already been investigated by several historians and in the scope of this thesis a re-evaluation of this information is not necessary. It is only required to note that Scotland had a direct trade with London and that thus Iberian goods arrived in Scotland from this port.

Of the four major Scottish ports surveyed for this chapter in the period 1668-1696 - Aberdeen, Dundee, Glasgow and Leith - the vast majority of ships from London which carried Iberian goods were destined for the port of Leith. Very few ships carrying Iberian goods made it into the other major ports, with only one vessel from London arriving in Aberdeen, the *Richard and John of London* leaving Glasgow for Cadiz, and the *Providence of Dundee* arriving in Dundee from London.¹⁴⁷ Many of those merchants noted as buying Iberian goods do not, despite investigation, appear in any other records. One example is Andrew Kelmuir, who purchased several thousand lemons and oranges between December 1688 and March 1689.¹⁴⁸ John Smeaton was the recipient of figs, oranges, lemons and Brazil wood a number of times from December 1672 until March 1675, but again no further mention can be found of his activities.¹⁴⁹ Another example is that of James Miller, who purchased the same cargo of oranges and lemons several times between February 1681 and March 1685.¹⁵⁰ In Miller's case, however, the problem is not a lack of evidence but more the impossibility of connecting the different merchants of that name to the merchant who purchased the Iberian goods. An interesting occurrence is the number of women who were involved in purchasing Iberian goods. Anna Thomson, for example, is named several times in December 1685 as purchasing 3,000 lemons and oranges from John Brune's vessel which had arrived from London.¹⁵¹ The following spring she purchased over 10,000 lemons and oranges from

¹⁴⁴ NAS, GD226/7/1. 17 October 1710.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ See NAS, E72/15 Customs Books (second series) for Leith, 1663-1691.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, E72/1/16, E72/7/7, E72/10/13.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, E72/15/43, 40.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, E72/15/13, 16, 18, 19.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, E72/15/20, 31.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, E72/15/36.

three separate vessels arriving from London.¹⁵² Isobel Mitchell bought the same cargo in January and May 1685, along with Margaret Mitchell in March of the same year.¹⁵³ There are many more examples with several theories as to why there is so little information upon the activities of those who bought goods from the Peninsula. One possible reason, which is borne out by the frequency of Iberian commodities among the gentry classes, is the idea that those buying such goods were doing so on behalf of their masters with the amount purchased only for household consumption and not resale. While 2,000 oranges and lemons may seem a rather excessive amount for one household it must be remembered that they, along with figs, were seasonal goods arriving in London in the late autumn and winter months from Iberia and making their way to other ports in late winter and early spring.¹⁵⁴ Thus, the cargoes bought would have had to last until the next season's produce arrived and, of course, be in plentiful supply for the correct occasion. Another theory is that merchants who purchased Iberian goods were involved in domestic trade or trade to Northern Europe and only occasionally dealt in Iberian goods if a profitable opportunity arose. A combination of these theories seems most probable.

This does seem to be the case in the example of James Balfour, who is shown as buying Iberian goods from vessels arriving from Holland, London, Rotterdam and Spain throughout the 1680s and 1690s.¹⁵⁵ Balfour also bought Spanish wine, for example in April 1686, purchasing six and a half butts from the cargo of the *Alexander of Leith* which had arrived from Spain.¹⁵⁶ Balfour did not necessarily keep these goods for himself as documentation notes that in May 1693 Lord Bargany was due Balfour £17 13 shillings and sixpence for a variety of goods, including sack and raisins.¹⁵⁷ Balfour was also involved in a soap manufactory and a tobacco business in Leith.¹⁵⁸ One William Blackwood is another example of a prolific buyer of Iberian goods in Leith, purchasing oranges, lemons and raisins from 1673 onwards.¹⁵⁹ But he, too, was involved in other trade; in letters from John Carmichael in Amsterdam to Andrew Russell, Blackwood receives mention with Carmichael noting that he enclosed a bill

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid, E72/15/31.

¹⁵⁴ Gravi, 'Trading to Spain and Portugal', 81.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, E72/15.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, E72/15/38. Balfour also bought Spanish wine from another vessel arriving from Spain at the same time.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, GD109/2878. 13 May 1693; GD69/130. 13 October 1689; GD69/122. 28 September 1697

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, GD69/122. 28 September 1697.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, E72/15. Blackwood was also involved in trade with the Dutch republic, and is mentioned in letters from John Carmichael to Andrew Russell, RH15/106/236, 7 August 1677.

from him.¹⁶⁰ Blackwood resold goods: for example, in April 1690 he was due the significant sum of £197 and 17 shillings from Lord Forret.¹⁶¹ As shall be shown below, Blackwood was also heavily involved in trade from London. Both Balfour and Blackwood were prolific merchants dealing in commodities from all over Europe and not merely Iberia.

A case study in this trade is encapsulated by the activities of William Blackwood's contact in London, William Fraser. Fraser's inclusion in a number of different documents, in conjunction with his ledger and his will and testament show that he was a successful businessman who was trusted by the individuals that he dealt with and sourced commodities for. As will be discussed later in this chapter, due to a lack of research into the Scottish community in London, it is difficult to judge how typical Fraser's activities were. In regards to this thesis, however, Fraser provides an informative example of how a Scottish merchant based in London could have operated and shows the path that Scottish goods could travel once they reached the metropolis. Fraser's journal gives insight into both his trade with Iberia but also the life of a Scottish merchant in London. The journal covers the period from 1699 until 1711 and shows that he procured a wide range of goods for numerous merchants in Scotland.¹⁶² A great number of Fraser's transactions were with William Blackwood. Unfortunately, the source involved sometimes records the transactions merely in terms of money exchanged without a record of what that the commodities concerned actually were. For example, in April 1705 Fraser wrote, 'I sent to Wm Blackwood Wm Skeen bill on John Murrie for £5:15'.¹⁶³ Another example involving Iberia has Fraser recording that he had sent £50 for his own account on the *George of Leith* from Lisbon to London.¹⁶⁴ It is also unclear which form of currency Fraser was using in these transactions, although it is presumable, due to Fraser's residence in London, that he completed his transactions in sterling. Thankfully, he occasionally elaborated upon his transactions allowing a complex trading pattern to emerge. In November 1704 Fraser recorded one such venture with William Blackwood. He had sent a cargo of cloth to Lisbon on board the *Amelia*, of which Thomas Tertam was master.¹⁶⁵ This cargo was to be consigned to Messers Strange and Bonning for the account of both Blackwood and Fraser himself.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, RH106/106/236. John Carmichael to Andrew Russell, 7 August 1677.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, CS96/1/156, 1690.

¹⁶² Ibid, CS96/524. There is also evidence that Fraser was present in London prior to 1699 with John Watson, merchant of Edinburgh, keeping up a correspondence with Fraser, which started in August 1698 and flourished. See CS96/3309.

¹⁶³ Ibid, CS96/524. 28 April 1705.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, 11 May 1704.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 7 November 1704.

Fraser also documented how the cargo was originally paid for, with Blackwood paying for half and Fraser paying for the 'carriage' to London as well as the cost of dying and packaging the cloth.¹⁶⁶ Unfortunately, there is no further mention of this particular cargo and its profits. Despite this, the details contained in the example provide proof as to what the Leith port books suggest. Scottish merchants were dealing in Iberian goods both to and from Iberia via London. It is much easier to spot Iberian goods coming to Scotland purely due to the nature of the commodities; however, this example demonstrates that Scottish goods which were recorded as going to London did not necessarily stay there and were shipped onto third destinations. For example, without Fraser's journal it may never have become apparent that the final destination for Blackwood's cargo of cloth was Lisbon.

Fraser was also heavily involved in sending supplies to the Newmills textile factory in East Lothian. This enterprise functioned with the assistance of legislation which allowed the tax-free importation of commodities essential to cloth production.¹⁶⁷ In July 1701 a commission to Fraser from the factory requested that he buy 'fyve balls of best Sigovia wooll for accompt of the company'.¹⁶⁸ Fraser provided these items regularly, shipping goods for the Newmills factory, for example, in late October and early November 1701. The essential dyes of indigo and cochineal came from Spanish America and Fraser shipped both of these to Scotland on several occasions.¹⁶⁹ Other examples are given of Fraser detailing Iberian goods sent to Scotland. For example, in November 1707 Fraser recorded that he had shipped for William Murrie aboard the *Margaret of Leith* Spanish sack and Spanish claret, as well as cargo dated two days previously for Murrie that included indigo.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, in January 1708 a Newcastle vessel took oranges, lemons and sack to a Mr Campbell.¹⁷¹ The journal also makes several references to salt; however, as discussed in chapter one, as there is no definite proof of origin they cannot be included in this survey.

The High Court of Admiralty of Scotland provides further proof of Fraser's activities, where he was named in a dispute between a skipper of Leith, Arthur Reid, and Henry Bothwell of Glencourse.¹⁷² Reid was pursuing Bothwell in a dispute

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ RPS, 1661/1/334. 12 June 1661. See also chapter one.

¹⁶⁸ W. R. Scott, ed., *The Records of a Scottish Cloth Manufactory at New Mills, Haddingtonshire: 1681-1703*, Scottish History Society, XLIII (Edinburgh, 1905), 266. 16 July 1701. The order was countermanded, however, just over a month later on the 27th August. See page 273.

¹⁶⁹ Shaw, *The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance*, 34. NAS, CS96/524.

¹⁷⁰ NAS, CS96/524. 6 November 1707

¹⁷¹ Ibid, 7 January 1708

¹⁷² Ibid, AC9/154. 10 January 1705.

regarding wine from the Canary Islands which had been bought at Lisbon, and Fraser was named as one of the merchants who was intended to receive half a pipe of wine.¹⁷³ Despite his relocation to London, Fraser never forgot his Scottish origins as a will written in December 1715 makes apparent. In his will he bequeathed the vast majority of his estate to his brother James, including government bonds worth £1500 sterling.¹⁷⁴ Fraser also left £50 sterling to the charity schools in Inverness with a further £50 sterling for schools in the Highlands.¹⁷⁵ Interestingly, Fraser notes that these legacies and similar gifts of money to his nephews and nieces should be paid for out of the interest 'of the money I have in the funds in the government of England'.¹⁷⁶ Other items in his possession included two diamond rings and a gold snuffbox bequeathed along with the remainder and the personal estate to his brother James, with Alexander Grant, Fraser's nephew, appointed executor.¹⁷⁷ Fraser's estate shows him to be a wealthy and successful merchant who, although he did not have any children himself provided for the children of his siblings, as well as Scottish institutions. While Fraser made his will in 1715 he was alive until at least 1723, with John Steuart writing in a letter to Alexander Rose that Fraser was involved in a cargo of salt.¹⁷⁸

Fraser was not alone as a London-based Scot dealing in Iberian trade with other examples providing more evidence of how Scots in London acted as a conduit for Iberian trade. John Home also bought quantities of Segovia wool on behalf of the Newmills textile factory from London, which placed a request for 3000 lbs of the wool in January 1682.¹⁷⁹ By the end of February George Home, likely to be a relation, was ordered to write to John asking him to purchase 700 (of an unknown weight) of the finest Segovia wool, along with 300 of the lesser quality and 100 of the poorest quality on behalf of the company.¹⁸⁰ These transactions also show the wealth and reputation of both Home and the company, Home being instructed to pay for the wool in 'ready money' and draw it from the company's accounts.¹⁸¹ June 1683 saw another letter to Home where he was requested to purchase 50 bags of Spanish wool on behalf of the company. Further, the company asked that he obtain credit for six to eight months.¹⁸²

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ TNA, PROB 11/549/306. 20 December 1715.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Mackay, ed, *The Letterbook*, 202.

¹⁷⁹ Scott, ed., *The Records of a Scottish Cloth Manufactory*, 15. 31 January 1682. The next days entry on page 16 proves Home's residence in London.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 17. 24 February 1682.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid, 52. 6 June 1683.

He was also instructed to find out the difference between paying immediately for the wool or buying on credit, amounting to the interest that would be charged on the six-month loan.¹⁸³ Home was clearly one of the main suppliers for the company as he was again asked to buy more Spanish wool in June 1684.¹⁸⁴ James Foulis, previously noted in the letters of John Dunlop, also provided Castile soap for the company in February 1701.¹⁸⁵

Merchants in London were not necessarily connected to the Newmills textile factory and dealt in other commodities. Walter Stewart was noted as a partner involved in the shipping of cod to Lisbon on the *Jacob of Pittenweem*.¹⁸⁶ The shipment was in conjunction with James Gordon, a merchant of Edinburgh, and John Innes, writer of the fishing company Dunbeath and Cromarty, with the cargo made up of both dry and fresh cod.¹⁸⁷ Another Scot, John Hossack, also arranged trade from London, albeit on an intermittent basis. Hossack was a merchant and baillie of Inverness whose career spanned over twenty years and was in London at least twice in 1722 and 1727.¹⁸⁸ In July 1722 Hossack wrote to William McLean & Co to inform them that he had purchased twenty tons of Portuguese salt, which was to be shipped on Mr Rankin's ship to Inverness.¹⁸⁹ The redistribution of Iberian goods from London continued in the eighteenth century, with Charles Dalrymple writing to Hew Dalrymple from London that he had shipped Madeira wine from London to Leith for him.¹⁹⁰

Unfortunately, serious scholarly investigation into the Scottish merchants' community in London is currently lacking and it is not possible within the scope of this thesis for this subject to be fully examined - even though it is probable that such an examination would uncover more Scots involved in dealing in Iberian goods. For example, in the London Metropolitan Archives a three-volume source exists of the business dealings of John Richards and John Rooke. The first volume of this source consists of over three hundred pages of business transactions - the vast majority involving Spain- from October 1617 to May 1672. Following a brief consultation with this source it is possible to establish that Scots, such as William Gordon, purchased Iberian

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, 71. 28 June 1684;

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, 233. 12 February 1701.

¹⁸⁶ NAS, AC9/521. 12 October 1712

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Documents stored in NAS indicate that Hossack was involved in mercantile activities from 1721 until at least 1749 (see GD23/2/42 and GD23/6/43). Two letters are noted as being from London, although due to the presence of other letters it can be ascertained that Hossack was not solely resident in London during the period between these dates (see GD23/6/43, GD23/6/60 and GD80/880).

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, GD23/6/60. John Hossack to William McLean & Co, 7 July 1722.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, GD110/903, Charles Dalrymple to Hew Dalrymple, 28 December 1725.

goods from these men.¹⁹¹ The Richards and Rooke manuscript reveals that Scots received Iberian goods in considerable quantities from London. However within in the scope of this project it is simply not possible for every avenue regarding London based Iberian trade to be explored. This would require a far more detailed analysis of the London economy and the importance of Scottish merchants in London as a whole. Further a comparison would be required in regards to the prominence of Iberian trade for Scottish London merchants compared to trade with other areas.

That said, what can be seen here is that Scottish merchants were involved in redistributing Iberian goods from London. William Fraser, George Home, John Hossack and George Ouchterlony all engaged in shipping Scottish goods from London to Iberia or vice versa. There is also evidence of Scots in England organising or taking part in journeys to Iberia from English ports, such as William Dunlop. The previously mentioned John Dunlop wrote several letters to his father discussing the preparations of his brother William's journey to Cadiz from Plymouth.¹⁹² In particular, John discussed the attempts to gain the security of an armed merchant vessel as they did not expect a royal vessel to travel with them.¹⁹³ When William did eventually undertake his journey, his ship was accompanied by three merchant ships, one of 36 guns, one of 22 guns and one of 16 guns.¹⁹⁴ William was preparing for another journey to Spain by August of the following year.¹⁹⁵ By May 1686 William had emigrated to South Carolina and kept up a correspondence with Sir James Montgomery and discussed his brother James who was a merchant in Rotterdam.¹⁹⁶ The Dunlops were obviously heavily involved with trade; John in London travelled to New York in 1683, William traded to Spain and Holland and settled in South Carolina and, James was based Rotterdam.

2.3 Rotterdam

The Scottish connection with the Dutch Republic, both with the staple port and with Rotterdam, have already been examined in this thesis. The trading activities of the Dutch Republic itself have also been subject to intense scholarly scrutiny due to both its

¹⁹¹ London Metropolitan Archives, CLC/B/189/MS19017/001. 13 August 1716.

¹⁹² Glasgow City Archives, MSS 120/D12/1-44. William is mentioned somewhere or another in almost every letter held in this collection.

¹⁹³ Ibid, MSS 120/D12/14. John Dunlop to James Dunlop, 23 September 1682.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, MSS 120/D12/16. John Dunlop to James Dunlop, 7 October 1682.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, MSS 120/D12/43. John Dunlop to James Dunlop, 25 August 1683. John, by this point, was writing from New York, having journeyed there in 1683.

¹⁹⁶ NAS, GD3/5/772-778. William Dunlop to James Montgomery. In an undated letter William wrote, 'I have drawn £5 upon my brother James Dunlop at Rotterdam for beads and other things'. See NAS, GD3/5/772.

meteoric rise and its conflicts with the Cromwellian Protectorate and the Stuart monarchy in regards to trade.¹⁹⁷ Following the Treaty of Münster in 1648, the Dutch Republic was at long last recognised by Habsburg Spain, and for the first time since 1621, was allowed legal access to ports and markets within the remit of the Spanish Habsburgs. As a result, Dutch freight and insurance prices dropped significantly, allowing the Dutch to challenge a market that England had held control of since 1630 - Spanish trade.¹⁹⁸ In short space of time merchants of the Dutch Republic had strongly reasserted themselves in this trade.¹⁹⁹ With such evidence, it is unsurprising that a vast number of ships arriving in the ports of Aberdeen, Dundee and Leith came from ports in the Dutch Republic and that they carried a diverse array of goods. As with London, a variety of Iberian goods such as sack were imported into Scottish ports.²⁰⁰ There is also evidence of Scots taking part and re-exporting Iberian goods from the Dutch Republic to Scotland.

Take, for example, the case study of Alexander Andrew, a Scottish merchant who lived in Rotterdam. Andrew was heavily involved in trade and dealt in Iberian goods, for example with John Steuart of Inverness. In October 1716 Steuart wrote to Andrew questioning why he was yet to receive 300 pieces of eight that he had ordered to be sent from his correspondents in Bilbao.²⁰¹ Earlier in June Steuart had written that Van Duffle and Archer (both discussed in chapter six) were due him money for fish and he had requested that they send the funds to Andrew in Rotterdam.²⁰² In this letter Steuart wrote that he did not find a very good market for fish in Bilbao and asked Andrew's advice on whether fish would sell well at Hamburg and Bruges.²⁰³ A year later two other merchants from Inverness, James Mackintosh and Thomas Robertson, wrote to Andrew to discuss the voyage of the *Good Success of Inverness*.²⁰⁴ Mackintosh and Robertson wished for Andrew to load the vessel with 40 tons of Lisbon salt as well as 24 tons of French brandy.²⁰⁵ In July 1721 Steuart wrote again to Andrew via the *Marjorie of Inverness*, which was carrying a cargo of beer to two other Scots in Rotterdam, Hugh

¹⁹⁷ It is not possible within the scope of this thesis to examine all Dutch trading activities in the seventeenth century. This subject is best discussed by J.H Israel in his numerous publications on the subject. The conflicts between the Cromwellian commonwealth/the Stuart monarchies and the Dutch republic (more commonly known as the Anglo-Dutch wars) will be explored further in chapter five.

¹⁹⁸ J. H Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade* (New York, 1989), 198-200.

¹⁹⁹ J. H Israel, *Empires and Entrepots: The Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy and the Jews, 1585-1713* (London, 1990), 210.

²⁰⁰ NAS, E72/1, E72/7, E72/15.

²⁰¹ Mackay, ed, *The Letter Book*, 29-30. 27 October 1716.

²⁰² Ibid, 20-1. 7 June 1716.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ NAS, GD23/6/36. 20 July 1717.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

and Andrew Munro.²⁰⁶ Steuart further explained that the skipper would pay money due to Andrew and because he did not want the vessel to return home empty, Andrew was to load enough Lisbon salt to ballast the ship, along with other goods.²⁰⁷ In April 1725 Steuart wrote again to Andrew stating that he believed that a cargo of fish which he had sent would not sell for the desired price in Rotterdam.²⁰⁸ Thus, he instructed Andrew to keep the salmon until September and then to wash the salmon and repack it in clean pickle so that it could be sold as new salmon either at Bilbao or La Havre.²⁰⁹ From his base in Rotterdam Andrew was heavily involved in trade with other Scottish merchants, providing Iberian goods for Steuart, Mackintosh and Robertson.

The activities of the Scottish merchant Andrew Russell based in Rotterdam have received scholarly attention by T.C Smout. Smout notes that while it is unclear why Russell moved to Rotterdam he started acting as a factor immediately.²¹⁰ Russell was a prolific merchant who received letters from almost 90 different Scottish merchants in 1680 alone and procured a huge range of goods for them.²¹¹ Through his business Russell dealt with trade involving Iberia and traded in Iberian goods, as shown by his correspondence with Francis de Mulinares and co. from the Spanish Netherlands city of Bruges. While the letters do not provide any details of the goods brought or exchanged they do show Russell had business transactions with merchants from Iberian-held territories.²¹² The sums of money involved in his agreements with Mulinares are significant, with a letter of 10 May 1671 stating 'I had order from Mr Peiter Fratex to pay unto your order £318. 10sh'.²¹³ Another letter eight days later similarly discusses the sum of £221 pounds, 17 shillings and sixpence, this having being converted from ducats.²¹⁴ In his letter to Andrew Russell in February 1678 Robert Turnbull discussed a letter he had received from another Scot, John Robertson, based in Lisbon.²¹⁵ Turnbull was acquainted with Russell due to business dealings carried out in Stirling in the 1660s before Russell left for the Dutch Republic.²¹⁶ Russell and Turnbull, along with Alexander Baird and Patrick Thomson, formed a joint stock

²⁰⁶ Mackay, ed, *The Letter Book*, 154. 15 July 1721.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid, 220-1. 17 April 1725.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 100-2.

²¹¹ Ibid, 103-4.

²¹² NAS, RH15/106/139. Francis de Mulinares to Andrew Russell.

²¹³ Ibid. Francis de Mulinares to Andrew Russell. 10 May 1671.

²¹⁴ Ibid. Francis de Mulinares to Andrew Russell. 18 May 1671.

²¹⁵ Ibid, GD1/885/34. Robert Turnbull to Andrew Russell, 5 February 1678.

²¹⁶ Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 111.

company in the 1680s with links all over Europe.²¹⁷ Robertson had written in his letter to Turnbull that he was going to travel under convoy for Cadiz and load salt for his owner's account before returning home.²¹⁸ Presumably, 'home' was Scotland as Turnbull added 'I shall be glad to see him in safety'.²¹⁹ In a postscript to the same letter John Brown, another merchant of Edinburgh, requested that Russell send 200 lbs of 'fynest whyt powder shougar' as well as 50 lbs of orange skins.²²⁰ Robert Mein was another correspondent of Russell. Mein, who was appointed keeper of the letter office in Edinburgh by Charles II following the restoration, wrote in November 1682.²²¹ In his letter to Russell he discussed some general business before ordering goods, including confected oranges and lemons.²²² Another correspondent, Thomas Gourlay, was based in Lisbon. In March 1685 Gourlay stated that he had been worrying about consigning 'any salt' although he wrote that it is said (by whom is not disclosed) to be 'altogether impossible'.²²³ A second letter sent four days later remarked that English and Dutch merchants were in his company and that they had been there for around twenty days.²²⁴ In this letter Gourlay talked about his attempts to get salt shipped for Russell, saying that he had sent the account for the loading of salt.²²⁵ As Smout has shown, Russell was heavily involved with trade all over Europe, providing a crucial link for merchants based in Scotland to the continent. Russell was not just involved in traditional trade with Northern Europe though as he also kept links with the Spanish Netherlands and Portugal, as well as probably sourcing Iberian goods. Russell and Andrew were not the only Scottish merchants based in the Dutch Republic who were involved in Iberian trade. William Dundas, for example, comes to light as a merchant of Rotterdam who was pursued by Matthew Robertson on behalf of John Laing, previously a merchant in Cromarty but at the time a minister in Maryland.²²⁶ Dundas owed Laing £102, six shillings and eightpence sterling for cod exported from Cromarty to Bilbao.²²⁷

Once again the textile demands of the Newmills factory provides evidence of Scots in the Dutch Republic dealing in Iberian goods as well as showing the strength

²¹⁷ Murdoch, *Network North*, 143-7. Murdoch has expanded on Smout's research to show that Russell was not the most important partner in this company and that each member was pivotal in their own right.

²¹⁸ NAS, GD1/885/34. Robert Turnbull to Andrew Russell, 5 February 1678.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid, RH1/2/797. Robert Main to Andrew Russell, 16 November 1682.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid, RH15/106/578. Thomas Gourlay to Andrew Russell 16 March 1685.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid. 20 March 1685.

²²⁶ Ibid, AC9/1301. 29 January 1734.

²²⁷ Ibid.

and breadth of that manufactory's supply network. In February 1701 Alexander Herriot was instructed to enter into the company records that Mr John Drummond and his business partner, both based in Amsterdam, had been paid the sum of £4,048 sterling for twelve bolls of Spanish wool sent via William Bell's ship in May 1700.²²⁸ Another sixteen bolls were sent via John Matheis' ship in July of the same year leading to a bill for the company, including the postage of letters and interest payments, of £4,868 sterling.²²⁹ Another invoice followed in April 1702 with Drummond and Vanderhoyden's billing for ten bolls of Spanish wool which, with charges, amounted to an invoice of over £5,000 sterling.²³⁰ This wool had been requested by the company in February 1701, with it noted in the same entry that the men were to be paid £3,000 sterling for bills remitted by them, suggesting the wool sent in the summer of 1700 was still being paid for.²³¹ Further, Drummond's letter noted that another 26 bolls had been purchased amounting to £8,000 sterling.²³² In June of the same year the minutes instructed that Drummond and another man, James Muriesone, were to be commissioned to buy twenty and ten bolls of Spanish wool respectively.²³³ Muriesone replied to the company in July stating that he would purchase the wool and informed the board that the price of exchange was 24 and a half pence per pound sterling.²³⁴ This was not the first time Muriesone had been requested to purchase Spanish wool, as he had been asked to buy eight bolls in January 1701. The bill for this, amounting to just under £2,500 sterling, was received by the company on 12 March 1701.²³⁵ William Fraser was also involved in these transactions, mainly being instructed by the company to remit bills to Amsterdam for the payment of Drummond and Vanderhoyden and Muriesone. In December 1701 the company recorded that money due to Drummond would be remitted via Fraser 'as formerly', suggesting this form of payment had occurred before.²³⁶ By March 1702 another 20 bolls had been ordered from Drummond and his partner, with Muriesone asked to provide ten bolls.²³⁷ Drummond sent his invoice to the company for this order

²²⁸ Scott, ed., *The Records of a Scottish Cloth Manufactory*, 232-233. 12 February 1701. According to the editor, transactions in these accounts are in pounds sterling. See Scott, *The Records of a Scottish Cloth Manufactory*, xxiv.

²²⁹ Ibid, 232-233. 12 February 1701.

²³⁰ Ibid, 246. 30 April 1701.

²³¹ Ibid, 231. 5 February 1701.

²³² Ibid, 246. 30 April 1701. When the invoice for the further 26 bolls arrived it was for the sum of £8261 sterling.

²³³ Ibid, 259. 25 June 1701.

²³⁴ Ibid, 268. 23 July 1701.

²³⁵ Ibid, 226. 15 January 1701; 240. 12 March 1701.

²³⁶ Ibid, 288. 31 December 1701.

²³⁷ Ibid, 296. 25 March 1702.

in May, charging just under £9,000 sterling for 24 bolls.²³⁸ Drummond appeared to have problems being paid on this occasion as the company ordered Alexander Weir to write to Drummond and tell him to draw upon William Fraser for a portion of the money due.²³⁹ Once again a complex financial system emerges in the dealings of the company. Fraser had paid Drummond, and the company now owed Fraser £910 sterling, which was to be paid in bills payable in London.²⁴⁰ However, the bills had to be made out to the value of £1,000 sterling as, unlike cash, bills incurred a ten percent deduction for exchange.²⁴¹ For his part, Muriesone invoiced the company in March 1703 and was, like Drummond, advised to draw the money from Fraser in London.²⁴² Fraser was clearly an important link between the company and their Scottish Dutch-based suppliers. The expectation of the necessity of trust is once again evident with the merchants in the Dutch Republic trusting that they would be paid and the company, trusting that Fraser would act in their best interests. While the Newmills textile factory is one of the only manufactory for which records survive, its importance surpasses that of mere record survival. It also provides evidence of how Scottish merchants worked together to obtain Iberian goods and provides evidence of a complex network in which to pay for them. This provides further evidence that Scottish merchants resident in the Dutch republic did not just deal in goods from Northern Europe but also from Iberia.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to show that Scottish trade with Iberia did not necessarily have to be direct and that due to the prevalence of triangular trade Scottish trade was almost certainly more prolific than port records account for. Thankfully, there is significant evidence of triangular trade involving Scotland and Iberia. The evidence shows that this was not merely an occasional and sporadic trade but regular and significant. John Steuart is a perfect example of a Scottish merchant involved in Iberian triangular trade, arranging for vessels to visit ports in the Mediterranean and giving detailed instructions both to his representative on the vessel and the merchants of the ports visited. In providing more detailed evidence of triangular trade Steuart's examples also show how complicated this practice was, with trusted connections required at every

²³⁸ Ibid, 303. 20 May 1702.

²³⁹ Ibid, 327-8. 28 October 1702. Fraser was also to be contacted and told to accept Drummond's bills on the company's account.

²⁴⁰ Ibid, 338. 3 February 1703.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid, 343. 17 March 1703.

stop for the venture to be a success, as well as the trust of those on board the vessel to execute the interests of the merchants funding the vessel.

However, as this chapter has shown, trading to Iberia and beyond was perceived to be more dangerous than voyages to Northern Europe. The entrepôt status of both London and Rotterdam, therefore, gave another avenue for Scottish merchants to obtain Iberian goods, while also acting as a one-stop-shop for goods from Asia, the New World and the rest of Europe. Similarly to evidence already published for Scottish merchant activities in other parts of Europe, it is clear that Scottish merchants who obtained their Iberian goods from London and Rotterdam did so by contacting other Scots already resident in these areas. William Fraser and George Ouchterlony organised the shipping of goods to their counterparts based in Scotland, with Fraser's journal giving evidence of a thriving trade in a diverse manner of commodities from London. While Andrew Russell's commercial dealings have already been subject to scholarly scrutiny, the vast quantities of records available regarding this merchant mean that it is still possible to uncover new information about his trade. Russell not only sent goods, such as oranges and lemons, to Scotland, he also kept up correspondence with merchants based in Bruges and Lisbon, with Alexander Andrew another example of a similar practice. The Newmills textile factory also provides several examples of Scottish merchants based in both London and the Dutch Republic trading in Iberian goods. The venture is frequently used in historiography, primarily because it is one example for which records still exist.²⁴³ It must therefore be questioned how many other manufactories were established which had links to Iberian commodities as the sheer quantity of Spanish wool imported by Newmills, at least, shows its popularity as a commodity in Scotland. While it could be argued that this trade is not relevant, the significant volume of Iberian goods making their way to Scotland from these ports means that it would have been detrimental not to include them in the scope of this thesis. This chapter has shown that it is necessary to look beyond direct trade in order to gain an understanding of Scottish commercial relations with Iberia.

²⁴³ Lythe and Butt, *An Economic History of Scotland*, 47.

Chapter Four: Test run for Great Britain? the Early Stuarts and Cromwell

‘Wm Dick is hardlie spoken of for trafficking w[i]t Spane’¹

Following the death of Queen Elizabeth, the island of Great Britain experienced a period of significant political change. England gained a new king from a foreign dynasty, while Scotland had to adapt itself to the prospect of being governed by an absentee monarch. Not content with the throne he had coveted for decades, James saw himself as the author of a new history for both England and Scotland. He sought to achieve this through the creation of a new political entity under the banner of Great Britain. To achieve this James sought several constitutional changes to further his ‘perfect union’.

While James consulted his parliaments in order make the internal changes required to combine his two British kingdoms, his attempts to bring them in line with his own agenda proved unsuccessful. Nevertheless, alterations to Stuart foreign policy designed to include his new kingdom did not require the permission of his parliamentarians and were made immediately. These changes also involved trade, with consuls and trade treaties being re-scripted to refer to Great Britain rather than simply Scotland or England. However, James’s plans were not without opposition as there were Scots who rejected this new form of representation and preferred to remain distinctly Scottish particularly where long-held commercial benefits had been enjoyed. While the examination of consular records does not provide direct evidence of trade, the arguments regarding representation and the sheer number of consuls deployed to the Iberian peninsula, especially in Andalusia, proves the commercial connection to have been significant. After all if Iberian trade was not important merchants would not have raised complaints in regard to who represented them, nor would there have been the need for as many consuls who clearly worked on behalf of Scottish merchants. Proof also emerges of a small resident community developing in Spain and Portugal through documents from Iberian archives. Once again, while some of the information is not very detailed it does provide evidence that Scots lived and worked in the region.

The death of James VI in 1625 ushered in yet another new period for ‘Great Britain’. With Charles eager to prove himself and defend his sister, the embattled Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia, Scotland, by default, became involved in his foreign policy decisions. This equated to war with both France and Spain which, although it provided new opportunities for Scots in the form of privateering, also impacted on

¹ NAS, GD112/39/38/7. Patrick Campbell to the Colin Campbell, Laird of Glenurquhay (Glenorchy), 21 May 1628.

established trading connections. The Scots, however, just as their English neighbours had done during the Anglo-Spanish war, found ways to continue trading. Evidence for this comes through the case of William Dick whose activities reveal that the profit Iberian goods could create made obtaining them worth the risk regardless of royal policy. Following the end of the conflicts of the 1620s, the subsequent decade ushered in a new period of peace and stability. Once again we find Scottish merchants strengthening and building upon their commercial relations with Iberia with hitherto unnoticed results.

This stability was not to last, and the 1640s were another turbulent period for Scotland. As usual Scottish merchants continued to trade as normally as possible, with several examples showing the resilience, or perhaps necessity, of merchants maintaining trade abroad despite ongoing turmoil at home. The subsequent decade famously resulted in the Cromwellian Occupation over Scotland. As the country had been conquered, this decade has often been subject to misinterpretations in regards to the state of the Scottish economy. In comparison to the 1640s, however, the 1650s were characterised by a desire to return to normality both by Scottish traders and by Cromwell and his regime. This wish was not necessarily fulfilled, with new conflicts against Spain and the Dutch Republic disrupting trade for all parts of the British Isles.

Evidence for actual trade during this period is sporadic and in some cases disappointingly scarce. Unlike the latter decades of the seventeenth century, or indeed the Anglo-Spanish war of the late sixteenth century where trade between Scotland and Spain was recorded for intelligence reasons, documentation for this intervening period is limited. What substantive evidence is available, however, shows that trade did continue and was considered normal. Contrary to existing orthodoxies, there is no evidence to support a hypothesis that trade to Iberia was either uncommon or an exceptional undertaking. Further Scottish-Iberian trade was not easily given up. Even during the turbulent 1640s where Scotland was crippled by the cost of supporting the Covenanting army combined with civil war and plague, individuals remained determined to trade to Iberia and its dominions. Therefore, rather than an examination of the size and relative importance of Scottish trade with Iberia, the information provided instead shows that, contrary to the historiography, trade with Iberia did exist.

1.1 The diplomatic relationship post-1603.

Upon the accession of James to the English throne in 1603 there was an immediate ceasefire in the Anglo-Spanish war and Spanish ports were opened to English vessels.² James believed that the war between Spain and England was Elizabeth's affair and 'irrelevant to a king from Scotland' and immediately organised discussions for a peace treaty.³ This followed in August 1604 and the treaty made careful reference to all of the dominions of James, with articles allowing a resumption of trade as it had been before the conflict.⁴ Furthermore, the treaty allowed merchandise from the British Isles to be transported to Spain and its dominions without the payment of a new customs tax and, instead, only the usual taxes paid were implemented against merchants from James's dominions.⁵ Despite the fact that a formal peace agreement was not agreed upon until 1604, trade between England and Spain resumed immediately.⁶ In May 1603, around a month after Elizabeth's death, the *Corregidor* of Guipuzcoa wrote that,

the King of Scotland has succeeded to the throne of England and he has always been a friend of ours and it is understood that he desires to continue as one.⁷

As Pauline Croft has discussed the Treaty of London not only brought the war against England to an end, but also offered merchants of James's dominions better protection against the Inquisition than they had previously enjoyed.⁸ This was as a result of article 21 of the treaty which stated that subjects of King James should not be 'molested' for the 'said cause of conscience'.⁹ Essentially the article ensured that merchants were now able to conduct their business without fear of serious physical harm from the Inquisition.¹⁰ Another important change occurred in 1607 when a royal decree prevented both the Inquisition and customs officials from charging merchants for visiting their ships. Having to fund such enterprises themselves both bodies essentially stopped searching ships.¹¹

² Loomie, 'Religion and Elizabethan Commerce', 47.

³ Howat, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy*, 17.

⁴ *Articles of Peace, Entercourse and Commerce....in a Treatie at London*, 16-7.

⁵ Ibid, 22-3. It was clear by this point that Habsburg Spain was in serious financial difficulties and trying to raise money by any way possible including debasing of the coinage, see Lynch, *The Hispanic World*, 53-83.

⁶ Croft, 'English Commerce with Spain', 242-3.

⁷ SP Online, *SP94*, IX, fo. 20, 'Orders for the Good Treatment of British Subjects', 21 May 1603.

⁸ Pauline Croft, 'Englishmen and the Spanish Inquisition, 1585-1625' in *English Historical Review* 87 (1972), 262.

⁹ *Articles of Peace, Entercourse and Commerce....in a Treatie at London*

¹⁰ Croft, 'Englishmen' 265.

¹¹ Ibid, 266

The appointment of new consuls following Elizabeth's death is one indication that trade resumed very quickly. In the same way as conservators, although without the same level of authority, consuls provided support to both short-term merchants and permanent residents. Knowledgeable in local languages, laws and customs, consuls also engaged in intelligence gathering for their home countries as shall be shown in chapter 6. One of the first merchant consuls to be appointed following the cessation of hostilities was Alonso Cortejo, consul for English, Irish and Scottish merchants in Cartagena.¹² Cortejo was appointed in December 1603, a full eight months before the peace treaty was signed. Interestingly, the document was signed by a number of individuals with anglicised names, such as William Cooper, George Wood and Thomas Wick, adding further proof that an English merchant presence had continued despite the conflict.¹³ As with his diplomatic corps elsewhere, James attempted to ensure that consuls in Iberia would represent all of his kingdoms, thus eliminating the need (and costs) for several consuls in one place.¹⁴ This was commented on by the Earl of Salisbury, who wrote to the Earl of Dunfermline that 'the king resolves to establish consuls in Spain for the support of merchants there'.¹⁵ He further added that there would be an impost on merchandise to pay for it and he thought Scottish merchants should contribute as 'they will share the advantage'.¹⁶ With this in mind, Sir Francis Cottington arrived in Seville in late 1611 to act as consul for merchants from the Stuart kingdoms.¹⁷ Cottington, however, was effectively usurping an Englishman by the name of Thomas James, head of a group of Catholic English merchants who were extremely protective of their position and had no desire to allow their monopoly to be infiltrated by every trader in the Stuart dominions.¹⁸ Thomas James then began an active campaign to smear Cottington's reputation, pointing out his 'heretical' religion and indicating that the future of English Catholics in Spain could be in doubt. He suggested that Cottington would inform the Stuart king of the activities of the Catholic English merchants who only

¹² *Archivo Municipal Cartagena*, CH01998-00007, 9 December 1603. It has to be noted that Cortejo's appointment was still pending 'final classification'; however, the actions of the authorities in Cartagena make it clear that they believed the war would soon be over and wished to resume normal trading.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ For more information on James VI's diplomatic corps post-1603 see Steve Murdoch, 'Diplomacy in Transition: Stuart-British Diplomacy in Northern Europe, 1603-1618' in A. I. Macinnes, T. Riis and F. G. Pederson, eds., *Ships, Guns and Bibles in the North Sea and the Baltic States, c.1350-1700* (East Linton, 2000), 92-114.

¹⁵ *CSPD*, 1611-18, 83. October 1611.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *DNB*, Fiona Pogson, 'Cottington, Francis, first Baron Cottington (1579?-1652)'. Cottington was previously the secretary to the resident ambassador in Madrid, Sir John Digby

¹⁸ Loomie, 'Thomas James: The English Consul of Andalucia (c.1566-1613)', *Recusant History* 11 (1972) 173.

wished to live in peace.¹⁹ In August it was finally decided that as King James had no authority in Spain and did not know of the mercantile customs, Cottington's appointment would not be confirmed. Instead Seth Wadesworth, a former chaplain to a previous ambassador, Charles Cornwallis, was appointed, apparently as the choice of the merchants from the British Isles.²⁰ In this case the British king's attempt to have his own candidate appointed as consul failed. Not only was Cottington a Protestant, which instantly cast suspicion as to his true purpose among the Spanish authorities, but he was also unwanted by the entrenched merchant community in Seville, who did not wish to see their monopoly on Spanish trade encroached.

The power that Thomas James held over the general 'British' merchant community was over-bearing. This became apparent after he died and a free-for-all ensued in regards to vacant consular positions.²¹ In December 1617 a Scottish consul, independent from either Stuart or Habsburg nomination, was created, in part as a result of claims of ill-treatment of Scottish merchants by Thomas James.²² In the letter regarding his appointment it is noted that James Kirkcaldy stated that Scotland 'has always had consuls of their own nation in all of Christendom'.²³ The document states that in Andalusia, however, Scots had to negotiate with the English and with Thomas James dead it was hoped that Scottish merchants could have their own consul appointed.²⁴ Kirkcaldy was recommended for the post, not only due to his nationality but also his religion and spouse, with it being noted that he was Catholic and married to a Spanish woman.²⁵ A further document in July 1620 discussed William Semple's recommendation of Kirkcaldy, with Semple informing the Spanish authorities that Kirkcaldy was both a Catholic and the child of Catholics. Further, Semple pointed out that Kirkcaldy had served in Flanders, while again mentioning his marriage to a Spanish woman.²⁶ Kirkcaldy served Scottish merchants in the region until at least 1623.²⁷

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid, 174. Philip III was quick to point out that Wadesworth, who had converted to Catholicism, was appointed as it was desired by the merchants.

²¹ AGS, Estado Legajo 2867. In this bundle, which deals primarily with consul appointments in the early seventeenth century, several documents mention the death of Thomas James. The fact that so many people were being appointed to positions that were previously only undertaken by one man shows the power which he held. For more on Thomas James's activities see, Loomie, 'Thomas James'.

²² Ibid, 23 December 1617. Translated from Spanish by the author, any errors are my own. As Croft has pointed out, the Scots waited until James was dead before they claimed grievances; see Croft, 'English Trade with Peninsular Spain', 387.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid, 11 July 1620.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid. 21 June 1623.

Kirkcaldy was not the first Scottish consul to be appointed post-1603 with the Convention of Royal Burghs appointing a consul in Portugal in 1609. William Crawford was assigned in reaction to complaints by skippers regarding the activities of an Englishman who was charging customs on Scottish ships arriving at Lisbon.²⁸ The Convention stated that Crawford was to advise Scottish merchants on the laws of the country and assist them in their affairs.²⁹ This Englishman was probably Hugh Lee, appointed as consul by the English Spanish Company in September 1605.³⁰ Lee may well have felt entitled to claim customs from Scottish ships as the Spanish Company's new charter permitted the company to appoint consuls to represent all of James VI & I's kingdoms.³¹ Despite the Spanish company's disbanding, Lee received confirmation of his appointment by the English Privy Council, who described him as 'consull of the English nation'.³² Confusingly, the Privy Council commanded 'every of yow in his Majestie's name to respect him', thus technically including Scots and Irish merchants too.³³ The Spanish authorities were similarly confused, with Lee being described as consul for the English, Scottish and Irish but also for English merchants only.³⁴ Lee served as the English consul in Lisbon until his death and was replaced by John Easton in around 1618.³⁵ These appointments show that despite the ideas of James VI & I, Scottish merchants in Iberia and the Scottish authorities wished for Scots to be represented by Scottish consuls and not those representing Great Britain, a kingdom which to them was a concept rather than an actual state.

Consuls representing the separate nations of Great Britain, however, were not uncommon. Alonso Courtship has already been noted but Andrew Burman, an English merchant, was also appointed as consul for the 'English, Scottish and Irish nations' in Malaga in 1605.³⁶ At the same time as James Kirkcaldy was appointed for Scottish merchants in the 'ports of Andalucia', William Barton represented both English and Scottish merchants in Puerto de Santa Maria.³⁷ Two further letters from 1618, and an

²⁸ *CRB*, II, 279-80. 5 July 1609.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Croft, ed, *The Spanish Company* (London, 1973), xliii. Spanish documents appear to date Lee's appointment from June 1604: it may be that Lee had been appointed earlier but the Company did not record his appointment until 1605. See AGS, Estado Legajo, 2867. 1609.

³¹ *Ibid.*, xxxvi. Within a year of Lee's appointment the company was dissolved with a bill for free trade into Spain, Portugal and France.

³² J. R. Dasent, ed., *Acts of the Privy Council of England*, XXXIII (London, 1921), 97-8. 23 June 1613.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ AGS, Estado Legajo 2867, 1609; undated, but as it discussed John Easton, who replaced Lee, it is likely to be from around 1620.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 17 March 1620. Lee also kept up a regular correspondence with Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury see SP Online, *SP* 89, III.

³⁶ AGS, Estado Legajo 2742, 27 August 1605.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Legajo 2867, 15 May 1618.

undated document, confirm Barton's position as consul for both the English and the Scottish merchants.³⁸ Although described in July 1620 as the consul for the English nation, evidence suggesting Barton's appointment as a consul for both England and Scotland far outweighs evidence to the contrary.³⁹ Consuls did not necessarily represent only British kingdoms, as Irishman Robert Comoforte acted on behalf of merchants from Scotland, Ireland, Germany and Flanders in La Coruña in the first quarter of the seventeenth century.⁴⁰ Jorge Comoforte replaced his father after his death and also represented English merchants from 1638.⁴¹ As La Coruña was the location of the largest Irish community in Galicia and the port through which Spanish correspondence passed to Ireland, it is perhaps not surprising that this large community also represented its close neighbours - it simply may not have been possible for separate consuls to maintain a living.⁴² Bartolome Escrete, an Irishman, acted for both Irish and Scottish merchants in Puerto de Santa Maria in 1624 and again the Council of State noted that he was married to a Spanish woman.⁴³ An undated document, but likely to be from around 1620, which details consuls in Lisbon from 1583 makes mention of a John Talat, an Englishman, who represented English, Irish and Scottish merchants for three years.⁴⁴

The advent of dynastic union did cause serious problems, for the historian at least, in regards to the countries that consuls were representing. For example, in October 1620 John Easton was appointed by the 'King of Great Britain' as consul for 'the English nation' in Lisbon.⁴⁵ Easton was appointed following the death of Hugh Lee and, considering what is already known as regards the diplomatic corps of James VI and his attempt to appoint Frances Cottington in Spain, it seems unlikely that he would appoint Easton as merely a representative of English merchants.⁴⁶ It is also possible that the Iberian authorities merely viewed Scotland as a now defunct kingdom which had been assimilated into its larger neighbour, in much the same way that the Spanish Habsburg's hoped Portugal had been. Finally, it could be surmised that the appointment

³⁸ Ibid. 1618.

³⁹ Ibid, 11 June 1620.

⁴⁰ AGS, Consejo y Juntas De Hacienda, Legajo 744, 27 May 1636; 22 September 1638. In conjunction with his consular activities Robert organised trade to Ireland in partnership with his brothers and was one of the wealthiest merchants in La Coruña. Lyons and Connor, *Strangers to Citizens*, 93.

⁴¹ Ibid, Legajo. 753, undated but likely to be from 1636.

⁴² Ciaran O'Shea, 'The Irish Catholic Exile in Early-Modern Galicia, 1598-1666' in Thomas O'Connor, ed, *The Irish in Europe, 1580-1815* (Dublin, 2001), 29.

⁴³ AGS, Estado Legajo. 2867, 2 January 1624.

⁴⁴ Ibid, undated but likely to be from around 1618/9.

⁴⁵ Ibid, there are numerous documents relating to the appointment of John Easton.

⁴⁶ Ibid, undated.

is entirely correct. Despite calling himself 'King of Great Britain' James may have intended this appointment to be for English merchants only. Interestingly, unlike Hugh Lee there is no mention of John Easton in any of the major primary or archival documents in Britain.⁴⁷

As this section has shown it is clear that in the period immediately following the Union of the Crowns there was no set policy regarding how a consul was appointed. Several different authorities were involved and all of these bodies named consuls during the first three decades of the seventeenth century. The Convention of Royal Burghs thought itself the ultimate authority on trade in Scotland and appointed consuls not only in Iberia but in other European kingdoms and in particular controlled the appointment of the Scottish conservator at Veere.⁴⁸ However as can be seen in the case of Francis Cottington, James VI also became involved in order to try and extend his idea of 'Great Britain'. As Steve Murdoch has shown Spain was not the Scottish kings only target with a 1606 treaty between James VI and Henry IV of France approving the appointment of 'Conservators of Commerce' in both France and Britain.⁴⁹ Individual companies also named consuls, as the example of Hugh Lee appointed by the English Spanish Company shows. This led directly to the Convention of Royal Burgh's naming their own representative, William Crawford, in 1609.⁵⁰ Finally the Spanish authorities also named consuls, although mostly on the recommendations of merchants, as appeared to be the case in regards to Seth Wadesworth and Alonso Cortejo.⁵¹ These differing methods of appointment, which were not truly resolved until after the Treaty of Union show that while King James may have been determined to incorporate his overseas representatives, Scottish merchants were not as keen. In particular the complaints by Scottish merchants regarding Thomas James and Hugh Lee show that Scots wished to be 'Scottish' and not 'British' merchants. Irish merchants also received distinction as is shown by Robert Comoforte's role in La Coruña and Nicolás Vis in San Lucar.⁵² Much like James Kirkcaldy, Viz's appointment was helped along by a countryman who held some sway over the Spanish authorities, in this case Florence Conry, an exiled

⁴⁷ Hugh Lee is present in the *State Papers Portugal, 1598-1633*, as well as the *Acts of the Privy Council of England, 1615-1616* and the *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, East Indies, China and Japan, 1513-1616*. John Easton does not appear in any similar publications, which seems somewhat strange considering his appointment.

⁴⁸ McLoughlin, 'The Control of Trade', 56-7.

⁴⁹ Murdoch, *Network North*, 151, appendix A 4:1.

⁵⁰ Croft, ed, *The Spanish Company* (London, 1973), xliii; *CRB, II*, 279-80. 5 July 1609.

⁵¹ Loomie, 'Thomas James', 174; *Archivo Municipal Cartagena*, CH01998-00007, 9 December 1603.

⁵² Schuller, 'Irish-Iberian Trade', 185-6.

archbishop, petitioned for Viz's appointment.⁵³ Further Irish merchants also disliked being represented by Hugh Lee and complained about his charging of consular fees to their vessels.⁵⁴ In similarity to their Scottish counterparts, Irish merchants also wished to be seen as 'Irish' rather than 'British'. Although the similarities of language and culture may have made the appointment of a single consul desirable (and possibly financially essential) that did not necessarily mean that merchants from the British Isles wished to be called British. In fact during the first two decades after the regal union, it was more desirable to remain as separate kingdoms, in terms of commerce if not diplomacy. These desires were not always respected or understood by either the Spanish or English authorities and following the passing of the English Navigation Acts problems become even more prevalent as will be examined in the next chapter.

1.2 Trade Post 1603

The sheer presence of so many consuls representing Scottish merchants in Andalusia indicates that a significant trade was occurring between the two areas. As has been discussed previously, port records are rare in Scotland prior to the 1660s; however, it is still possible to glean some information regarding trade in the 1603-1630 period. For example, we know from the last will and testament of James Logan that the *Diamond of Leith* traded to Spain in 1606.⁵⁵ The following year evidence is provided for the presence of wine from the Canary Islands in Scotland in the *Register of the Privy Council Records* when Thomas Inglis, an Edinburgh merchant, complained to the Council about the customs due on Canary wine.⁵⁶ Inglis requested that Canary wine be charged the same customs as French because,

the canarie wyne is not so goode as the seck and thair is far greatair basaird, chargeis, and expenssis in bringin hame of the canarie wyne nor of the seck.⁵⁷

The previously mentioned Alexander McMath is also noted as trading with Spain again, this time along with Ninian McMorrane. In September 1611 the pair loaded the *Grace of God* with coal for a journey to Spain.⁵⁸ McMorrane was not a newcomer to

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ NAS, CC8/8/43. 31 March 1607. Many thanks to Sue Mowatt for bringing this to my attention.

⁵⁶ RPCS, VIII, 24. 17 December 1607.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ NAS, E71/29/6.

Iberian trade, having imported wine from Iberia the previous year.⁵⁹ The surviving Leith port books show more examples of trade with Iberia, with the *Pellagon* recorded as sailing for Spain in November 1611.⁶⁰ Trade was not confined to Leith, either, as *The Margaret*, for example, arrived in Dundee from Spain in July 1613 carrying wine and salt.⁶¹ In January 1614 the *Gift of God* also returned from Cadiz carrying a cargo of wine and figs that was sold to local merchants, with *The Fox* following with a cargo of salt and wine in March.⁶² The 1620s provide evidence of more examples, with Alexander Dounie's vessel arriving in Leith from an un-named Spanish port in January 1622 and David Anderson's ship from Ostend entering the port in 1623.⁶³ The *Grace of God* of Leith, skippered by David Auchmowtie, returned from Portugal in March of the same year, carrying a cargo of salt.⁶⁴ David Cockburn and Andrew Kerr's vessels arrived shortly after, from unnamed ports in Spain, both carrying cargoes of raisins.⁶⁵ Evidence also exists of Scottish merchants organising shipments to Iberia, with John Sloan and David Cuthbertson chartering a ship to Bilbao in June 1624.⁶⁶ Unfortunately, from this point on what remains of the early port records from Leith become confusing. As has been discussed in chapter one, unless explicitly stated as from Spain, the commodity of salt is discounted from this thesis due to the fact that this also came from France. An example of confusing entries in the early Leith port books occurs in March 1623 when Patrick Dounie's ship is noted as returning from 'Callie in Spayn' carrying a cargo of salt.⁶⁷ In an earlier volume, however, there are numerous references to 'Calleis', occasionally 'in France' is added, although, not always.⁶⁸ Due to the cargo that Patrick Dounie was carrying it is impossible to tell where the mistake was made: for example, did the clerk mean Cadiz or did he simply write Spain rather than France. With a cargo such as salt it is impossible to say with certainty where the ship came from.

As with the pre-1603 period, the years after the dynastic union continued to see Scots engaging in the carrier trade despite Anglo-Spanish peace. Indeed, Scots also

⁵⁹ James Johnston Brown, 'The Social, Political and Economic Influences of the Edinburgh Merchant Elite, 1600-1638', (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1987), Appendix, 494. Johnston Brown has referenced this to a collection within the National Archives of Scotland (GD135/124/3/29); unfortunately, this collection has been closed to the public by the owner and the original could not be consulted.

⁶⁰ NAS, E71/29/6, Many thanks to Professor Steve Murdoch for assistance with these transcriptions.

⁶¹ A. H. Miller, ed, *The Compt Buik of David Wedderburn Merchant of Dundee, 1587-1630* (Edinburgh, 1898), 237.

⁶² *Ibid*, 242-3.

⁶³ NAS, E71/29/7, 8.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, E71/29/8.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*.

⁶⁶ *Edinburgh City Archives*, SL144/1/5, 1624-46. 23 June 1624.

⁶⁷ NAS, E72/29/8.

⁶⁸ NAS, E72/29/7, 8 there are numerous examples of this in both of the volumes.

continued to work in this capacity for other foreign merchants. In 1608 John Matherson's vessel, the *Royal of Leith*, was commissioned by a Bristol merchant, John Shipman for a cargo of salt from Portugal. However, the vessel was then ransacked by an English pirate, John Downes, who was subsequently executed for his crimes.⁶⁹ David Robertson, captain of the *Bonadventure*, was freighted by London merchants to bring spices and sugars to London from Lisbon in the autumn of 1621.⁷⁰ Robertson launched a claim against Andrew Watson and his crew who had sold their vessel in Lisbon and returned to Scotland on the *Bonadventure*.⁷¹ Robertson was due funds from Watson to cover the cost of transporting Watson, his crew and their goods.⁷² Captain John Low also brought goods from Lisbon to Amsterdam on behalf of local merchants Jaspar Moermans and Simon de Mercado.⁷³ In August 1624, John Brown was freighted by merchants in Londonderry for a journey to Bilbao with a cargo of salmon.⁷⁴ Once he had reached Bilbao, Brown and his vessel was commissioned by Spanish merchants for a voyage to the 'south cap of Spain'. However, along the way Brown, along with the support of the crew, stole the goods of the Spanish merchants and threw the Spaniards who were with them overboard.⁷⁵ Another bizarre example comes from a letter from Joseph Mease to Sir M. Stutville in March 1622.⁷⁶ In it the author notes that a ship had arrived in London from Spain with a Scottish master on board. The master of the vessel told 'everyone that directly the huge Spanish fleet, styled the Catholic armada is for some parts of his Majesty's dominions'.⁷⁷ It is unclear if this vessel then went on to a Scottish port or if it remained in London; however, it does provide another example of a Scottish skipper involved in trade with Spain. While there are only a few examples in this period, when combined with what is known due to records of the Anglo-Spanish war period it is likely that trade continued as normal, though it is frustrating that quantitative data can not be produced in the post-1603 period.

⁶⁹ Murdoch, *'The Terror of the Seas?'*, 150.

⁷⁰ HCA, AC7/2, 10 April 1628.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ ONA, Inventory no. 14, act no. 21/56, 4 June 1608.

⁷⁴ RPCS, XIII, 599. 28 August 1624.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ BL, Harley MS 389, 162-163. Joseph Meade to Sir M Stuteville, 29 March 1622. Many thanks to Dr Adam Marks for this reference.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

1.3 Early Resident Scots in the reign of James and Charles

During the period under discussion we see the foundations of Scottish networks based around a combination of the transient Scots discussed above, and those actually resident in Iberian territories. In a manner similar to the traders, their presence is revealed only when events did not continue as they should have. After the Anglo-Spanish war this equated, in some part, to resident-Scots brought in front of both the Madrid and Lisbon Inquisitions due to suspicion regarding their faith. While we have encountered the Inquisition in terms of their interest in itinerant merchants and skippers, their records in the following cases demonstrate the settled nature of many Scots as opposed to their transient nature, even during the Jacobean period. For example, John Fender, a tailor, was brought before the Inquisition in Madrid for a profession of faith.⁷⁸ In this he admitted that he had previously been a Calvinist but that he had 'reconciled' to the Catholic faith and as such was granted admission to the Tailors' Guild in Madrid.⁷⁹ Without the conversion to Catholicism it is highly unlikely that Fender would have received admission to the guild. Fender was not the only Scot to be brought in front of an inquisition. In 1616 William Strachan, a silversmith in Lisbon but from Aberdeen, was called before the Inquisition accused of the serious crime of heresy and was noted as being educated in the Calvinist doctrine.⁸⁰ Luckily for Strachan there was not enough evidence to prove the heresy charge and instead he received Catholic instruction.⁸¹ In other examples, David Ramos, a 29 year old tailor from Dundee, was called before the inquisition in May 1619 accused of Lutheranism; ten years later John Boster a teenager also from Dundee, was accused of the same crime.⁸² Ramos was made to pay a fine and sentenced to 'spiritual penances', whereas Boster was noted as being instructed in the Catholic faith and not believed to be in danger of returning to Protestantism.⁸³ Interestingly, Ramos was married to a Portuguese woman, Olaia Gomes; however, this was not enough to prevent his punishment, whereas Boster appears to have been treated with a kind-hearted approach, possibly due to his youth.⁸⁴ William Lithgow, famous for his travels around Europe in the early seventeenth century, was also brought before the Spanish Inquisition in Cadiz and he noted that a Scot from Dunbar was

⁷⁸ AHN, Inquisición 108, Exp. 30. 27 January 1617

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ ATT, PTT/TT/TSO-IE/021/00947. 23 March 1616.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² ATT, PT/TT/TSO-IL/028/01401. 4 May 1618; PT/TT/TSO-IL/028/05146. 4 April 1628.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ ATT, PT/TT/TSO-IL/028/05146. 4 April 1628.

assisting the Spanish authorities in their investigations.⁸⁵ Alexander Lay, a cooper, was supposedly translating Lithgow's diaries for the local governor and was paid for the task.⁸⁶ Thus in these cases we get glimpses of a fledgling community of Scots, though we do not know how many others there were in whom the Inquisition had no interest. Rather we are left with tantalising leads telling us it was possible for Scots to settle, and to a degree, integrate into Iberian society during the 1580-1649 period.

In 1619 John Rutherford was given a *Carta de Naturaleza* from the *Casa de Contratacion* which dealt with all matters regarding trade in the Americas.⁸⁷ The licence allowed Rutherford to reside and trade in the city of Mexico in New Spain while also naturalising him as a Spaniard.⁸⁸ It is possible that Rutherford had purchased his naturalisation as this became a popular method for the Crown to attempt to fund its involvement in the Thirty Years' War.⁸⁹ In his investigation of the sale of letters of naturalisation Antonio Dominguez Ortiz has shown that, between 1621 and 1645, 196 letters were given to various foreign merchants allowing them to trade with the Indies.⁹⁰ This is compared to the last quarter of the sixteenth century when only 24 individuals received privileges; however, with a profit of 400-500 ducats per letter given it is easy to see how the Crown could make money during difficult times.⁹¹ Perhaps, unsurprisingly, Portuguese and Flemish merchants were the recipients of the lions' share of the letters both pre- and post-1600, with Genoese merchants also popular. Rutherford is so far the only Scot to have been documented, although another individual who may have been at least of British descent was Nicholas Grave, who was born in San Lucar.⁹² As Ortiz found, the real numbers of true foreign immigration were actually very low, with most of those who obtained letters being born in Spain to foreign parents who had resided there for many years.⁹³

As previously discussed in chapter one, both Regina Grafe and Xabier Lamikiz have investigated the presence of an English community in Bilbao. However, not all of

⁸⁵ Lithgow, 'Total Discourse', 163-4.

⁸⁶ Ibid. Lithgow reports that Lay was paid '30 pieces of Silver' although this is probably too poetic to be correct.

⁸⁷ AGI, Contratacion, 596B. 1619. This bundle only contains those who applied to the *Casa de Contratacion* which dealt primarily with Indies trade.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Christopher Storrs, 'Foreign Penetration of the Spanish Empire 1660-1714: Sweden, Scotland and England' in Allan I Macinnes and Arthur H Williamson, eds., *Shaping the Stuart World, 1603-1714* (Leiden, 2006), 353.

⁹⁰ Antonio Dominguez Ortiz, 'La Concesion de 'naturalezas para comerciar en Indias' durante el Siglo XVII', *Revistas de Indias* 76 (1959), 231.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid, 229.

⁹³ Ibid.

those individuals in the community were English, Gavin Dunbar, for example, being recorded as a Scottish merchant in Bilbao in 1625.⁹⁴ Dunbar had been a merchant in Bilbao since at least 1623 and, along with William Parnel, an English merchant, was involved in a transaction with Pedro de Berganza consisting of salmon and wax.⁹⁵ Two other Scottish merchants are revealed in a letter from Charles Cornwallis to the English Privy Council in February 1607/8. Cornwallis was the resident Stuart ambassador to Madrid from 1603 until 1609 and was mainly ensuring that the terms of the 1604 Anglo-Spanish peace treaty were being observed.⁹⁶ His correspondence ostensibly concerns remuneration due to several London merchants for 'corn and other provisions' that would be paid from a royal fund that Cornwallis held in Madrid.⁹⁷ He continued,

the like I have procured for one James Jorrett, a Scotsman recommended hither by his Majesty's letters. For Tho. Anderson, a Scotsman, in the same manner, for so much as was due to him in Lisbon.⁹⁸

While much of the evidence of Scottish trade and Scottish residence in Iberia is piecemeal, collectively the sources reveal that Scotland and her merchants continued to have a significant trading relationship with the area after the Anglo-Spanish war. Contemporary writers also indicated the trade was more common than port records account for. During his visit to Scotland, Taylor, the Water Poet, was surprised at the amount of victuals Scotland shipped abroad 'into Spaine, France and other forraine parts', while still having enough for the Scottish people.⁹⁹ Scots traded with, had consuls in and resided in Iberia, where the like of John Rutherford received a coveted *Carta de Naturaleza* which allowed him access to South American markets.

2. The End of James and the Folly of Charles

As shown with the Anglo-Spanish war, political events and conflicts between other European kingdoms could also shape Scottish trade with Iberia even when Scotland was technically not involved in the events. As discussed above, Spain used the selling

⁹⁴ AFB, JCR 0183/013, 1625. I would like to extend my thanks to Professor Regina Grafe of Northwestern University, USA for advising me as to the presence of Scottish merchants in Bilbao and sharing her research of the English merchant community in this area.

⁹⁵ AFB, JCR1625/067. 10 May 1623. 16 months later however Dunbar had run foul of the authorities, being accused of raping Marina, the daughter of Domingo de Iturriaga and Marina de Elorriaga; unfortunately the outcome of the case is not documented, see AFB, JCR0183/013. 1 August 1625.

⁹⁶ *DNB*, Chris R. Kyle, 'Cornwallis, Sir Charles (c.1555–1629)'.

⁹⁷ *Cecil Papers*, CP120/63. 6 February 1607-8.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*.

⁹⁹ Hume Brown, ed., *Early Travellers*, 112. Taylor, the Water Poet, 1618. Many thanks to Professor Steve Murdoch for drawing my attention to this reference.

of letters of naturalisation to fund its activities in the Thirty Years' War. Despite orthodox histories to the contrary, recent scholarship has established that Scotland and, indeed, Britain did play a role in the conflict. In Scotland part of this involvement stemmed from the fact that Frederick V of the Palatinate was married to Elizabeth Stuart, daughter of James VI, who was widely considered a Scottish princess, even after her removal to London as a seven year old girl.¹⁰⁰ Thousands of Scots were eager to serve in the continental war, and Alexia Grosjean has stated that of the 30,000 British troops that served Sweden during the Thirty Years' War over 25,000 were probably Scots.¹⁰¹ Scots also served Elizabeth on the orders, albeit secret, of King James himself. While James officially declared the actions of his son-in-law illegal he did organise immediate assistance, under the guise of protection for his daughter.¹⁰² James used the soldiers from the Scots-Dutch brigade, which, as Steve Murdoch has argued, allowed the troops to respond swiftly as they were already based on the continent.¹⁰³ There had been a Scottish military presence in the Dutch republic since 1572, when the earliest Scots are recorded serving the Prince of Orange in his attempt to wrest the Netherlands from Spanish rule.¹⁰⁴ By 1573 these Scots had been formed into an official Scottish regiment in the Dutch republic, with two regiments in permanent service by 1603.¹⁰⁵ For their part, the Spanish Habsburgs were bound by their familial links to the Austrian Habsburgs to assist them in their conflicts.¹⁰⁶ The participation of troops from Dutch regiments also gave the Spanish an excuse to plan for a resumption of war with the Dutch Republic. In 1621 the truce between the Dutch Republic and Habsburg Spain, which had been in place since 1609, expired and both decided to renew war rather than extend the treaty.¹⁰⁷ It had become clear that, regardless of the overwhelming financial difficulties that the Spanish Habsburgs were facing, they had to resume war with the Dutch Republic in order to protect their dominions in America and Asia, which had come under threat.¹⁰⁸ Finally, there was of course the religious element, which, while not as

¹⁰⁰ Steve Murdoch, 'Introduction' in Steve Murdoch, ed, *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War* (Leiden, 2001), 3.

¹⁰¹ Alexia Grosjean, 'Scotland: Sweden's Closest Ally?' in Steve Murdoch, ed, *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War* (Leiden, 2001), 151.

¹⁰² Steve Murdoch, 'James VI and I and the Formation of a Scottish-British Military Identity' in Steve Murdoch and Andrew MacKillop, eds., *Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience c. 1550-1900* (Leiden, 2002), 19.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Hugh Dunthorpe, 'Scots in the Wars of the Low Countries, 1572-1648' in Grant J. Simpson, ed., *Scotland and the Low Countries* (East Linton, 1996), 105.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 105-6.

¹⁰⁶ E. A. Beller, 'The Thirty Years' War' in J. P Cooper, ed, *The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years' War, 1609-48/49* The New Cambridge Modern History, 4 (Cambridge, 1970), 309.

¹⁰⁷ Lynch, *The Hispanic World*, 98.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 98.

clear cut as previously believed, was another reason for the Spanish Habsburg's to resume hostilities with the Dutch.¹⁰⁹

When warfare restarted Scottish ship-owners became uneasy that ships they had legally purchased from Dutch owners would be captured by Spanish privateers. In September 1622 one such skipper, Robert Durie, requested that the Privy Council of Scotland provide him with a document showing him to be the owner of the *Blessing of God*, which he had legally bought.¹¹⁰ With Spain and the Dutch Republic at war, both sides would issue letters of marque to their skippers allowing them to seize enemy shipping, and thus the document was required to protect Durie's ship from seizure.¹¹¹ In early 1623 the conflict even entered into Scottish harbours when two ships under Spanish colours were effectively blockaded by Dutch vessels. This was a tricky situation for King James, as he did not wish to show favour to either side in the conflict, but neither could he allow Dutch ships to blockade two of his kingdom's largest ports (Aberdeen and Leith) and threaten ships under their protection.¹¹² These ships were clearly in Scotland to trade and yet were attacked by the Dutch ships, leading to the destruction of one of the vessels. This led to a fire-fight between Royal Navy vessels and the Dutch ships, causing diplomatic tension between the Stuart dominions and the Dutch Republic.¹¹³ The conflict between Spain and the Dutch Republic did not involve Scotland directly but was an inconvenience to Scottish traders, since they traded with both regions.¹¹⁴ Scottish merchants and their ships were therefore in danger of being seized by privateers from both sides for trading or carrying what had become defined as contraband cargo.

The situation became even more inflamed following Prince Charles's return from Spain and his failed attempt to secure the hand of the Infanta Maria. Charles returned home without a bride to jubilant celebration of his bachelor status and of his untarnished Protestant faith, which had been believed to be under threat by marriage to a Catholic.¹¹⁵ Recently, there have been several reinvestigations of the 'Spanish Match',

¹⁰⁹ Beller, 'The Thirty Years' War', 306.

¹¹⁰ *RPCS*, XIII, 62. 9 September 1622.

¹¹¹ Murdoch, *The Terror of the Seas?*, 158.

¹¹² *Ibid*, 159-160.

¹¹³ This incident is written up in detail in Murdoch, *Terror of the Seas?*, 159-160.

¹¹⁴ The Scottish Staple was technically the only place in the Low Countries that Scottish merchants could take staple goods, as defined by various treaties. Rooseboom, *The Scottish Staple*, Davidson and Gray, *The Scottish Staple at Veere*.

¹¹⁵ Elizabeth McClure Thomson, ed, *The Chamberlain Letters – A Selection of the Letters of John Chamberlain concerning life in England from 1597 to 1626* (Great Britain 1966), 311-312. 10 October 1623, 'I have not heard of more demonstrations of public joy than were here and everywhere, from the highest to the lowest....such numbers of bonfires, both here and all along as he went as is almost incredible'.

including W.B Patterson's examination of the event in the context of James VI's irenic policies and his desire to achieve a religiously balanced peace in Europe.¹¹⁶ As Glyn Redworth has shown, King James' attempt to secure a Spanish bride for his son did not begin with Charles, as he had undertaken such negotiations for his first son Prince Henry before his untimely death.¹¹⁷ However, when Charles became aware that the Spanish had no intention of assisting his sister and her brother-in-law his enthusiasm for his wedding to the Infanta diminished and his dislike of the Spanish grew.¹¹⁸ Following his return, Charles was now more confident and began lobbying for war with Spain, which, due to the situation on the continent involving Charles's sister the Princess Elizabeth, was publicly favoured.¹¹⁹ By early 1625 Spain and the Stuart dominions effectively were at war, although still not officially.¹²⁰ By 8 September Charles (who was now king following his father's death) and the Dutch Republic had agreed to the Treaty of Southampton, which was an offensive alliance against Philip IV.¹²¹ However, while the public may have been clamouring for war with Spain, the English Parliament was less enthusiastic especially in regards to the funds required.¹²² As a result, the fleet which was readied to capture and sink Spanish shipping, as well as intercept the South American silver fleet, was poorly prepared and supported.¹²³ The man who lead them, Viscount Wimbledon, himself reported that the ships were not fit for purpose and too old.¹²⁴ This led to the embarrassing failure of the expedition, while the Spanish advisor, the Count de Olivares, seriously considered an invasion of England on the scale of the 1588 armada plans.¹²⁵

This was technically a disaster for trade with Iberia, since the dominions of Philip III now became the enemy and, as such, trade with the area was prohibited. Furthermore, in September 1626 Charles made it illegal for any Scottish vessel or any sailor, skipper or master to go on any voyage without express licence from the Privy Council.¹²⁶ In July 1627 Charles proclaimed that admirals, captains and all his subjects could equip vessels for the purpose of seizing any vessels, either foreign or domestic,

¹¹⁶ W. B Patterson, *King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom* (Cambridge, 1997), 315.

¹¹⁷ Glyn Redworth, 'Of Pimps and Princes: Three Unpublished Letters From James I and the Prince of Wales relating to the Spanish Match', *Historical Journal* 37:2 (1994), 401.

¹¹⁸ Brennan C. Pursell, 'The End of the Spanish Match', *The Historical Journal* 45:2 (2002), 717.

¹¹⁹ *DNB*, Mark A. Kishlansky and John Morrill, 'Charles I (1600–1649)'.

¹²⁰ Murdoch, *Terror of the Seas?*, 162.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, 164.

¹²² *DNB*, Kishlansky and Morrill, 'Charles I'.

¹²³ *Ibid*.

¹²⁴ Murdoch, *Terror of the Seas?*, 164.

¹²⁵ Lynch, *The Hispanic World*, 101-2.

¹²⁶ *RPCS, ii, I*, 430-2. 28 September 1626.

which were taking goods, including war commodities and victuals, to Spain or its dominions.¹²⁷ With this in mind, it is perhaps unsurprising that in a letter to the Lord of Glenorchy, James Campbell described William Dick as being 'hardlie spoken of for trafficking w[i]t Spaine'.¹²⁸ However, there may be more to this case than meets the eye. The previous February Dick and a William Gray had been appointed by the Privy Council to travel to Peterhead, where the ship the *Marie of Lubeck* was in distress.¹²⁹ The ship had beached after being captured by Scottish privateer George Langlands, in his vessel the *St Peter of Montrose*, while returning from a trading voyage to Spain. The privateers had been attempting to lead the vessel to Leith when poor weather forced it onto the shore.¹³⁰ Dick and Gray were to secure the ship and its cargo and, if possible, ensure its cargo was transported to Leith in order for the perishable goods to be sold quickly and thus allow for monies to be distributed to whoever the Admiralty Court decided the vessel belonged to.¹³¹ Further, they were to be furnished with anything they required be it ships, sailors and men. It was also noted that when the decision was made regarding the ownership of the vessel the owners would have to reimburse the costs of the salvage to Dick and Gray.¹³² In March, however, the episode became more suspicious. The Privy Council was desperately short of funds and required £24,000 in order to pay sailors who had served on three royal warships.¹³³ This significant sum was to be borrowed from Gray and Dick, who were to be allowed to sell the undamaged wine and raisins that were onboard the vessel. The men were instructed to return any profit to the Privy Council.¹³⁴ The value of the cargo was significant, with the wine valued at £320 per ton - thus meaning that the men only had to sell 75 tons in order to recoup their loan.¹³⁵ It is therefore possible that Gray and Dick pocketed any profit they had made and hoped not to be discovered, but were found out.

This case shows two attitudes during the conflict. War with Spain at this point was an emotive issue and some Scottish merchants and ship-owners turned to privateering. Unlike the Anglo-Spanish war, the situation in Europe during the 1620s led to a marked dislike of the Spanish monarchy and the wider Habsburg family. While

¹²⁷ *RPCS*, ii, II 9-11. 12 July 1627.

¹²⁸ *DNB*, David Stevenson, 'Leslie, Alexander, first earl of Leven (c.1580–1661)'; NAS, GD112/39/38/7. 31 May 1628. In 1624 two of Dick's vessels carrying grain were taken into Dunkirk or Ostend following a proclamation by King of Spain. See Taylor, ed, *Aberdeen Council Letters* I, 232. 6 July 1624.

¹²⁹ *RPCS*, ii, II, 238-40. 20 February 1628.

¹³⁰ Murdoch, *Terror of the Seas*, 179, 379 Appendix 4:3; *RPCS*, ii, II, 238-40. 20 February 1628.

¹³¹ *RPCS*, ii, II, 238-40. 20 February 1628.

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 274-76. 20 March 1628.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

certain institutions, such as the Scottish Kirk, could always be relied on to disapprove of trade with Catholic Iberia this had, during the Anglo-Spanish war, been largely ignored by Scottish traders. However, the plight of Princess Elizabeth and her family in the 1620s was an inflammatory cause and garnered far more support against the Spanish Habsburgs than proclamations by the Scottish Kirk.¹³⁶ Privateering was both a viable and a profitable option for those who wished to assist Elizabeth and it was an inexpensive way for a monarch to damage the enemy.¹³⁷ As Steve Murdoch has pointed out, it could be far more profitable to arm a privateer and take prizes than attempt to sail with a cargo through a privateer-infested sea.¹³⁸ Scottish vessels certainly engaged in privateering in this period and with considerable success.¹³⁹

Nonetheless, it is difficult to say with certainty if trade with Iberia ceased during this period. While there was obviously sympathy for Elizabeth and her plight, there was also economic necessity. After all, the Privy Council wished to ensure that the goods on board the *St Marie* were sold in Leith - buyers were clearly willing to purchase Spanish goods despite the war against Spain. The king was also not as strict about the importation of wine when it came to his own table. In February 1629 it was decided that Scottish merchants should import wine (with the exception of French) as the king was planning to visit and without it his Scottish subjects would be unable to entertain him properly.¹⁴⁰ Furthermore Charles I was not only at war with Habsburg Iberia during the 1625-30 period but also with France (1627-1629). War with both of these areas simultaneously would have made obtaining certain goods common to both regions, such as Biscay salt and wine, technically illegal. Obtaining salt was also difficult and more problematic as it continued to be vitally important to the Scottish fishing industry. However, from 1625-1630 the import of salt from foreign ports remained consistent with previous years, if somewhat fluctuating. Considering the general preference for Biscay salt, it is unlikely that this product was not obtained from that area.¹⁴¹ Iberian commodities, therefore, may have continued to make their way to Scotland through deception or via triangular trade with other areas of Europe. Elsewhere studies have

¹³⁶ Steve Murdoch, 'Introduction', in Steve Murdoch ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War: 1618-1648* (Brill, 2001), 2-4.

¹³⁷ Murdoch, *The Terror of the Seas?*, 9.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid, 163-180.

¹⁴⁰ *RPCS*, ii, III, 44-45. 12 February 1629.

¹⁴¹ Whyte, *Scotland Before the Industrial Revolution*, 278; in Taylor, ed, *Aberdeen Shore Work Accounts*, 612. Appendix 2, Table of Imports 1596-1636.

proven that despite being at war with France in the 1690s, Scottish traders continued to trade with Bordeaux, therefore, this could also be the case with Iberia.¹⁴²

3. Peace and Plenty: The 1630s.

Following peace treaties with both France and Spain, in April 1629 and November 1630 respectively, trade was now able to resume freely, as evidenced by wills and testaments with their mentions of commercial connections. Edinburgh merchants, who had played such a dominant role in overseas trade in the early seventeenth century, were also trading with Iberia. The testaments of the Edinburgh merchant Patrick Wood shows a prolific merchant whose entire estate was worth more than a £100,000.¹⁴³ Included in his inventory was money invested in a venture to Spain, worth £1,700 with another £783 from a venture to the Canary Islands.¹⁴⁴ John Fleming's inventory, recorded in 1642, also documents Spanish goods, although to the much smaller value of £8.¹⁴⁵ In the tallying of his estate, Alexander Brown was recorded as owning goods in a Spanish venture in 1643.¹⁴⁶ Bills of health, given to ships in a time of plague or other diseases, also provide evidence of trade with Spain. In March 1632 the *Margaret of Queensferry*, James Dawling master, was provided with such a document as was the *Jonas of Leith*, John Glass master in October 1635; both intended to sail for Spain.¹⁴⁷ In another example, goods are recorded as arriving in Edinburgh (presumably after being unloaded in Leith) from the Canary Islands, Portugal and Spain between November 1636 and November 1639.¹⁴⁸ Further, Eric Graham has tabulated four vessels arriving in Leith from Spain in 1638.¹⁴⁹

In a more informative case, John Dougal's letters provide another example of a Scottish merchant involved in Iberian trade in the 1630s. As has been investigated by Siobhan Talbott, John Dougal traded primarily to France and had assistance from Scots, such as John Clerk who resided in Paris.¹⁵⁰ France was not the extent of Dougal's

¹⁴² Murdoch, 'The French Connection', 34-38.

¹⁴³ Donaldson, *Scotland: James V-James VII*, 252.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ NAS, CC8/8/60. 15 June 1642.

¹⁴⁶ Brown, 'The Social, Political and Economic Influences', appendix 7, 450.

¹⁴⁷ Marguerite Wood, ed., *Extracts from The Records of the Burgh of Edinburgh: 1626-41* (Edinburgh, 1931), 104-5, 168.

¹⁴⁸ Brown, 'The Social, Political and Economic Influences', appendix 2, 431. This information has come from the Records of the Merk of the Tun, 1636-9 - held at Edinburgh City Archives. Unfortunately, the volume has been misplaced and thus could not be consulted.

¹⁴⁹ Graham, *A Maritime History of Scotland*, 144. Graham notes that these figures have been compiled by Sue Mowatt from various records of NAS, E71/E72.

¹⁵⁰ See Talbott, 'An Alliance Ended'.

trade, however, as his letters to John Clerk discussed trade with Bilbao and San Sebastian. In February 1638 he wrote to Clerk, 'I have moneyis lying at Rotchell remittit out of bilbao and snt Sabastien'.¹⁵¹ Clerk, it appeared, relied on the Scot James Brown for his business dealings in Bilbao.¹⁵² This is highly likely to be the same James Brown noted as being a Scottish merchant in Bilbao in the late 1630s by Regina Grafe.¹⁵³ Another example is provided by William Gray who, as noted earlier, was involved in the salvage of a vessel carrying Spanish goods in 1628. Despite this slightly dubious event Gray continued to trade in Iberian goods, primarily wine, although it is unclear from his letters whether he was obtaining this commodity from the source or from another port. In January 1635 Gray wrote to the Laird of Glenorchy (Colin Campbell) stating that he had got filled 'twa litill barells wt malago', which cost 20 shillings a pint, as well as a 'flakett' of sack, which was sold for 24 shillings.¹⁵⁴ In March of the same year Gray wrote again regarding the procurement of Malaga wine, stating that the best Malaga wine of late had arrived.¹⁵⁵ Further letters to the same recipient were sent in February and September 1636, discussing the procurement of both Malaga wine and sack, although in February 1636 the sack had undergone a dramatic price cut, costing only 18 shillings a pint.¹⁵⁶ Gray was not the only one to be sending Iberian goods to Glenorchy, with Archibald Campbell writing in March 1634 that he had sent his wife Spanish oranges as well discussing the arrival of new sack from Spain.¹⁵⁷ This, therefore, shows not only that trade in Iberian commodities continued during this time, but also that Iberian goods were not merely present in the urban centers in Scotland but also in the Highlands.

4. The Covenanters and the Interregnum.

The political and economic turmoil of the 1640s and 1650s has been extensively studied by scholars of seventeenth-century Scotland. The Solemn League and Covenant, in particular, has been accredited with forcing Scotland into a deep recession which marked the country for years. Some historians have observed that decline in Scotland during the Cromwellian union was also, in part, due to the events of the 1640s.

¹⁵¹ NAS, GD18/2380/2, John Dougal to John Clerk. 13 February 1638.

¹⁵² Ibid, John Dougal to John Clerk. 17 March 1638.

¹⁵³ Grafe, 'Northern Spain between the Iberian and Atlantic Worlds', appendix 3, 243.

¹⁵⁴ NAS, GD112/39/55/23. William Gray to Colin Campbell, Laird of Glenorchy, 17 January 1635.

¹⁵⁵ NAS, GD112/39/54/14. William Gray to Colin Campbell, Laird of Glenorchy, 19 March 1635.

¹⁵⁶ NAS, GD112/39/58/12. William Gray to Colin Campbell, Laird of Glenorchy 24 February 1636; GD112/39/60/28, William Gray to Colin Campbell, Laird of Glenorchy, 13 September 1636. There is also another letter - undated - which states that March would be a better time to travel and carry wine and rather than the date when the letter was written.

¹⁵⁷ NAS, GD112/39/5116. Archibald Campbell to Colin Campbell, Laird of Glenorchy, 3 March 1634.

Keith Brown observed that Scottish economic collapse was fundamental to the conquest of Scotland by Cromwell.¹⁵⁸ T.C. Smout concurs, arguing that Scotland was too weakened by the events of the 1640s to take advantage of the opportunities offered by Cromwell.¹⁵⁹ While T.M Devine, in particular, has noted that the economic situation was not as poor as previously thought and that, during the Cromwellian period, Scottish trade and the economy actually improved.¹⁶⁰

By agreeing to assist the Parliamentarians militarily, the Covenanters inadvertently created a difficult situation for their own kingdom. Scotland was left inadequately protected by the removal of the Covenanting army to England and, due to their union, acquired the enemies of the Parliamentarians. Primarily this meant that Scottish ships were in danger from the activities of Irish confederate privateers. In her work on the subject, Jane Ohlmeyer points out that, by the end of the decade, the Irish Confederate fleet may have been 50 to 60 ships strong and that, by lurking on the east coast of the British Isles, it created a menace to all ships irrespective of their allegiance.¹⁶¹ More recently, Elaine Murphy has revised that figure, stating that even at their height in 1649 there were not more than 40 confederate privateers at sea.¹⁶² Scottish ships did suffer predation by Confederate privateers, as a report written in December 1648 for Aberdeen's city council records the loss of a valuable ship to Irish confederate privateers in June 1644, followed in March 1645 by another which met the same fate.¹⁶³ The Edinburgh Burgh Records record that, in May 1646, the *Alexander of Brownstones* was captured by an Irish frigate and both ship and goods were taken as prize.¹⁶⁴ Research suggests that Scottish trade suffered serious damage during this period, with the number of ships entering Aberdeen dropping 35% in the 1643/4 to 1648/9 period in comparison to the 1620/1-1624/5 period.¹⁶⁵ The number of Scottish ships entering the Sound was similarly affected, reporting a drop of over 40 percent in the years 1644-48 in comparison to the years 1625-29.¹⁶⁶

¹⁵⁸ Keith M. Brown, *Kingdom or Province? Scotland and the Regal Union, 1603* (Basingstoke, 1992), 136.

¹⁵⁹ Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 195.

¹⁶⁰ T. Devine, 'The Cromwellian Union and the Scottish Burgh: The Case of Aberdeen and Glasgow, 1652-60' in John Butt and J.T Ward, eds., *Scottish Themes: Essays in Honour of S.G.E Lythe* (Edinburgh, 1976), 1-15.

¹⁶¹ Jane H. Ohlmeyer, 'Irish Privateers During the Civil War, 1642-1640' in *The Mariner's Mirror* 76:2 (Greenwich 1990), 125-126.

¹⁶² Elaine Murphy, 'No affair before us of greater concern': the War at Sea in Ireland, 1641-49 (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Dublin, 2007), 247.

¹⁶³ Taylor, ed, *Aberdeen Council Letters* III, 114-115. 6 December 1648.

¹⁶⁴ Wood, ed, *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Edinburgh 1642-1655*, 126. 2 April 1647.

¹⁶⁵ Data collected from Taylor, ed, *Aberdeen Shore Work Accounts*, 608-609. Figures compiled in February 2010 by Claire McLoughlin.

¹⁶⁶ Data collected from, Nina Bund, ed, *Tabeller Over Skibsfart Og Varetransport Gennem Øresund, 1497 – 1660* (Copenhagen, 1906). Figures compiled in February 2010 by Claire McLoughlin

Trade journeys still continued to Iberia and its dominions despite these problems. For example, the *Unity* arrived in Dundee from Cadiz in July 1647.¹⁶⁷ Trade also continued to Spanish dominions, such as the port of Ostend, in seeming oblivion to the internal situation which had prominent statesmen describing Scotland as ‘this miserable country overburdened with uncouth taxation’.¹⁶⁸ The table below shows ships arriving in Ostend from Scotland, Ireland and England, as well as ships going from Ostend (ship nationality unspecified) to the same countries from 1640-48, 1654 and 1655.

Date	Ships from Scotland	Ships to Scotland	Ships from Ireland	Ships to Ireland	Ships from England	Ships to England.
1640	4	1	1	0	116	44
1641	27	4	8	2	171	53
1642	23	2	0	0	105	17
1643	8	1	4	2	99	35
1644 (1st Jan - 30th June) projected numbers for year in red.	4/8	2/4	3/6	1/2	33/66	10/20
1645	2	0	3	0	81	42
1646	6	1	2	3	105	53
1647	6	3	3	4	157	112
1648	3	5	6	4	173	67
1654	5	10	2	1	72	58
1655	9	9	1	0	58	52

De Smet, J, ed, ‘Tables du Commerce et de la Navigation du Port de Bruges 1675-1698 avec en annexe Les Tables de la Navigation du Port d’Ostende 1640-1655’, *Bulletin de la Commission Royale d’Histoire* XCV (1930), 103-244.¹⁶⁹ Unfortunately, this is the only data available in this volume and so comparisons

¹⁶⁷ Dundee City Archives, Register of Shipping 1580-1715, July 1647.

¹⁶⁸ Spalding, *The History of the Troubles*, 187. This statement was made after a new excise tax was introduced by the Covenanted parliament in order to try and combat the spiralling public debt. Most goods were included in the tax. See *RPS*, 1644/1/65. 3 January 1644.

¹⁶⁹ Any misinformation in this table is entirely the fault of the author. I am greatly indebted to Jan D’hondt at Bruges City Archives for her information regarding Scots in the ports of Bruges and Ostend. Anything relating to Bruges or Ostend in this thesis (with the exception of Scottish-based sources, such as those from the National Archives) has been found on my behalf by D’hondt.

between decades is not possible. In 1644 data is only available for the first six months of the year, so in order to compensate the numbers have been doubled and are in red. The author recognises that this is a crude measurement but it does allow basic analysis.

It can be seen from the table that, unsurprisingly, English trade to Ostend was far higher than Scottish or Irish trade to the port. With the exception of the years 1641 and 1642, a few ships a year did make the journey from Scotland to Ostend despite the dire economic conditions that the country was labouring under.¹⁷⁰ While Scottish numbers remained consistently in single figures for most of the 1640s, there were markedly fewer English ships in 1643, 1644 and 1645 when Confederate privateers were making their mark. The continued visitation of Scottish ships to Ostend, even in such small numbers, is impressive. Confederate privateers, however, were not the only enemy that Scottish vessels had to contend with.

In May 1641 the *James of Kirkcaldy* was taken by a Stuart Royalist vessel on its way home from Spain. The ship carried a cargo worth over £25,000 Scots, including over a thousand bolls of Spanish salt, Portuguese and Spanish coins, French crowns, linen and other small items.¹⁷¹ Interestingly, the ship also carried a dozen muskets, with powder, musket balls and picks which, while not a great amount of arms, were possibly being brought for use by the Covenanting army. If this was the case, this ship would be one of many which were sourcing weapons for the army from all over Europe.¹⁷² James Brown, the skipper, stated to the Scottish Parliament that the ship and its commodities were now 'spoiled, wrecked and gone', and that despite assurances of restitution by Charles I the only restitution he had received was a 100 pistols and a small amount of foreign coin.¹⁷³ He now complained that the loss had led to his own ruin and that of his family and requested Parliament's assistance in gaining full restitution.¹⁷⁴

The 1640s were clearly a difficult time for Scotland. The expenses of the Covenanting army and the subsequent effects of funding the conflict took its toll on the Scottish economy. By 1643 public debt was already at over a £1,500,000 Scots.¹⁷⁵ However, as has been shown above, there is evidence of Scottish trade continuing to Iberia. Scottish factors also continued to be involved with Scottish traders during this

¹⁷⁰ While the reason for the high number of ships calling at Ostend in 1641 and 1642 is unknown it is possible that both the Covenanters and the Royalists may have been obtaining munitions. However, there is no evidence to either prove or disprove this theory. Many thanks to Professor Steve Murdoch for discussing this topic.

¹⁷¹ *RPS*, A1641/8/124. 12 November 1641.

¹⁷² See, Steve Murdoch, 'The April Committee, 1640', 43-68.

¹⁷³ *RPS*, A1641/8/124. 12 November 1641.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid*.

¹⁷⁵ Stevenson, 'The Financing of the Cause of the Covenants', 99.

time. The presence of Ninian Williamson shows that not only was a Scottish factor working on behalf of Scottish merchants in Spain but that those Scottish merchants were still trading with Spain in the 1640s.¹⁷⁶ Ninian Williamson represented the interests of Sir William Dick, James Murray, James Steward, James Jack, Robert Sandilands, Andrew Bryson and Andrew Wardlaw.¹⁷⁷ Interestingly, Williamson hired a skipper of Hamburg to take a cargo of wine and fruit back to Scotland, probably to avoid interception by Confederate privateers. However, near Newcastle the vessel was stopped, this time by a Parliamentary ship, which ordered Claud Fecletoune, the master, to come aboard.¹⁷⁸ Fecletoune, believing the captain of the parliamentary vessel to be an enemy, attempted to sail away at which point a brief battle then ensued. Fecletoune's ship was then escorted to either Newcastle or London, and the Scottish Parliament agreed with the owners involved that the ship and goods should be transported without delay to John Pringle, their factor, in Leith.¹⁷⁹ The Scottish Parliament decided to support the merchants by writing to the Scottish commissioners for the Solemn League and Covenant in London to instruct them to intercede with the English Parliament to gain restitution.¹⁸⁰ As Steve Murdoch has investigated, this was not the only incident involving over-enthusiastic Parliamentary captains.¹⁸¹ Despite the unfortunate nature of the incident, this example shows that Scottish merchants were still trading and utilising 'neutral' skippers in an attempt to by-pass Royalist and Confederate privateers. While it was unsuccessful in this instance, it is, when compared to previous examples provided in this thesis, almost certain that others will have traded in the same manner and been successful.

Other Scottish merchants were also still trading despite the difficulties encountered in the 1640s - such as John Dougal senior. In a letter to John Clerk in Paris, Dougal's son, John Dougal junior, who resided in Dieppe, discussed his father's trade.¹⁸² Dougal junior stated that it was his father's intention to freight a boat to Spain with salmon and that he had already sent one ship to Bilbao with the same cargo.¹⁸³ As previously noted Dougal's network also stretched to Iberia and the outbreak of hostilities within the three kingdoms did not prevent him from trading. Scots were also resident in the Spanish Netherlands, with William Hamilton living in the city of Bruges from least

¹⁷⁶ *RPS*, 1645/1/197. 8 March 1645.

¹⁷⁷ *RPS*, 1645/1/197. 7/1/1645.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ Murdoch, *Terror of the Seas?*, 206.

¹⁸² *NAS*, GD18/2380. John Dougal Junior to John Clerk, 21 October 1643.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

1643. In that year he brought a civil lawsuit against Adrian Maertens to whom he had provided 32 tons of dry herring but for which had not yet been paid.¹⁸⁴ In 1650 Hamilton had obviously made the decision to remain in the city buying property in Kuipersstraat and being described as a burgess of Ostend.¹⁸⁵

Finally, while Scotland was suffering from internal unrest, international political developments continued. In 1640 Portugal declared independence from Spain. The Portuguese were dissatisfied with their monarchical union with Spain for a number of reasons. They perceived Spain to be doing little to assist them in their fight against the Dutch, and Portuguese merchants were resented by those of Castile as invading their own empire. Finally, taxation from Philip III caused much discontent.¹⁸⁶ Thus, in December 1640, while taking advantage of Spain's own internal and foreign troubles, Portugal declared independence, and crowned the Duke of Braganza as King John IV of Portugal. Prior to its loss of independence, Portugal had enjoyed good relations with England, with various treaties and alliances stretching back to the fourteenth century.¹⁸⁷ King John was quick to enlist English support, or rather ensure English neutrality, in the struggle to maintain Portugal's new status.¹⁸⁸ He thus granted generous terms for English (and by association Scottish merchants) with the treaty signed in London in 1642 between 'Charles, King of Great Britain and John the Fourth, King of Portugal'.¹⁸⁹ The treaty provided for free commerce while allowing for the appointment of consuls to support British merchants who were not of the 'Roman religion' to reside in Portugal, effectively allowing religious freedom.¹⁹⁰ While Scotland's relationship with the monarchy was decidedly shaky at this point, as the army of the Covenant had defeated a royalist force for the second time in August 1640, Scottish merchants were likely to take advantage of this treaty and the privileges it offered.¹⁹¹

Cromwellian Scotland has also not enjoyed a favourable review under the scrutiny of historians. The Cromwellian Union itself has been described by Keith M. Brown as 'an alien, oppressive police state, detested by all but a tiny minority of republicans and sectarians'.¹⁹² In their investigations on the city of Dundee, Karen Cullen, Christopher Whatley and Mary Young concur, indicating that two years after the

¹⁸⁴ Bruges City Archives, Processen, Nr. 380/26621. 1643.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, Nr. 521/37768. 1650.

¹⁸⁶ Lynch, *The Hispanic World*, 153-4.

¹⁸⁷ Edgar Prestage, 'The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4th Series, 17 (1934), 3-21.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, 21.

¹⁸⁹ Hertslet, ed, *A Complete collection of the Treaties*, 1.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, 3.

¹⁹¹ David Scott, *Politics and War in the Three Stuart Kingdoms, 1637-49* (Basingstoke, 2004), 25.

¹⁹² Keith M. Brown, *Kingdom or Province? Scotland and the Regal Union, 1603* (Basingstoke, 1992), 137.

Cromwellian Union of 1654 the city was in a desperate position.¹⁹³ Contemporary reports appear to provide the impetus for this evaluation of the Cromwellian union, as when, for example, Robert Baillie wrote, 'The Country lies very quiet; it is exceedingly poor; trade is naught; the English has all the moneys'.¹⁹⁴

However, this analysis does not provide a fair representation of the state of Scotland during the 1650s. Rather than being determined to permanently crush Scotland, Cromwell was aware that in order to prevent further uprisings Scotland needed to regain its economic stability and thus he wished to bolster Scottish trade. The protection of Scottish shipping is one example of this, a subject that was taken seriously by Oliver Cromwell and his council. In July 1654 Captain Bunn wrote to the Admiralty Committee to request two or three ships for the protection of the north coast of Scotland as shipping in that area was under threat from 'Charles Stuart's Booters'.¹⁹⁵ The Admiralty thus reported to the Protectorate Council and on 21 September it was decided that forty ships would be provisioned with men and over a thousand guns to protect the coasts of the British Isles during the winter months.¹⁹⁶ The Protector also included Scotland in any treaties made with foreign powers. For example, during the tumultuous period of the British Civil Wars, Portugal assisted the cause of the embattled Stuart king by providing a safe anchorage to his nephew Prince Rupert. On the establishment of the Cromwellian Commonwealth, Portugal suffered with the passing of an extremely disadvantageous trade treaty which was signed in July 1654.¹⁹⁷ This allowed British merchants access to Brazil for the first time, as well as a secret clause that stopped the raising of customs duties without the advice of two English merchants to be chosen by the English consul.¹⁹⁸ It is important to note that this treaty did not merely cover England, but also 'the Countries, Territories, Kingdoms, Dominions and Principalities under their respective Governments', thus including Scotland. As this shows, Oliver Cromwell and his council were not merely concerned with English mercantile matters and were aware that to ensure Scotland's security the kingdom needed greater prosperity.

¹⁹³ Karen Cullen, Christopher A. Whatley and Mary Young, 'Battered but Unbowed - Dundee During the Seventeenth Century' in eds., Charles MacLean, Bob Harris and Christopher A. Whatley, eds., *Dundee: Renaissance to Enlightenment* (Dundee, 2009), 63-65. However, this is after pointing out that reports of Monck's burning and sacking of the city vary and were possibly exaggerated.

¹⁹⁴ David Laing, ed, *The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie*, III (Edinburgh, 1842), 387. Robert Baillie to William Spang, 11 November 1658.

¹⁹⁵ *CSPD*, 1654, 255. Captain Fras Bunn to the Admiralty Committee. 16 July 1654.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid*, 370. 21 September 1654.

¹⁹⁷ Prestage, 'The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance', 22.

¹⁹⁸ Hertslet, ed, *A Complete Collection of the Treaties*, 8-20.

While Cromwell clearly thought of the kingdoms of England and Scotland as part of one commonwealth, the changed political situation caused some problems for the Spanish authorities. For example in a document appointing a judge conservator for Tenerife the Spanish authorities are clearly confused as to the political situation in Britain.¹⁹⁹ This written appointment originally stated 'por juez conservador de la rey', which was crossed out and replaced with 'por juez conservador de las nacione Ingles', however, 'Ingles' was then crossed out to be replaced with 'de las nacione B'.²⁰⁰ Despite the confusion in regards to the new name of the people of the British Isles, the document proves that such an individual was needed for the Canary Islands and was impressive in its own right, but was even more so considering the civil wars. Further, James Cunningham's first recorded employment as a factor can also be traced to this turbulent period in Scottish history. Cunningham may have been hundreds of miles away from Scotland but Andrew Skene, who requested Cunningham to sell linen on Thomas Lumsdell's behalf, did live in Aberdeen, a city commonly portrayed, in the main by the city council, as totally destroyed during the 1640s and Cromwellian period.²⁰¹

However, as a constituent nation of the Commonwealth, in addition to enjoying England's protection Scotland also fell subject to England's enemies. The outbreak of the Anglo-Dutch war in May 1652 created an interesting situation for Scotland. Being part of the Commonwealth, Scotland was therefore at war with the Dutch Republic and, as such, trade through the Danish sound was blocked to Scottish as well as English vessels in 1653.²⁰² The Sound toll records would appear to corroborate this as they show that no Scottish ships passed through the Sound that year.²⁰³ Nonetheless, records for entries into the Swedish ports of Gothenburg, Lubeck, Antwerp and Augsburg show that nine Scottish ships entered these ports in 1653.²⁰⁴ It is also probable that Scottish ships merely started using ports in the Spanish Netherlands, with goods making their way south from places such as Middleburg, Rotterdam and Veere. As has been shown in chapter three, Scottish merchants did, in the later seventeenth century, have commercial connections with the Spanish Netherlands. Further, as shall be shown in chapter five, there is a link between Scotland's state of conflict with the

¹⁹⁹ AGS, Estado Legajo 4192, 1654.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. The idea of a judge conservator will be explored in chapter five.

²⁰¹ Taylor, ed, *Aberdeen Council Letters* III, 225-227. 11 September 1653. For evidence of Aberdeen City Council's declaration of the severe depression of the city see Ibid, 203-6, 16 June 1653; 253-8, 1660.

²⁰² Allan I. Macinnes, *The British Revolution* (Basingstoke, 2005), 208. Denmark-Norway was obliged to assist the Dutch republic under the terms of their alliance of 1649, see Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, 173-180.

²⁰³ Bund, ed., *Tabeller Over Skibsfart*.

²⁰⁴ Christina Dalhede, ed, *Handelsfamiljer på Stormaktstidens Europamarknad*, CD (Stockholm 2001), data collected from CD database in February 2010 by Claire McLoughlin.

Dutch Republic and the number of Scots who became burgesses in the city of Bruges. Although there are only two years' worth of data from Ostend, it is interesting to see that the number of ships going from Ostend to Scotland in 1654 and 1655 is double the number that made the journey in previous years. While it is possible that this was merely a return to normal trading conditions, it is more likely that Dutch goods, or more accurately goods that Scots obtained from Dutch ports, were making their way to Scottish ports via the Spanish Netherlands.

Even more impressive was the report from Thomas Tucker that, during the Anglo-Spanish War, Scottish merchants were disguising themselves as Dutch with Dutch ships in order to escape capture.²⁰⁵ This was a shrewd move: just as English merchants benefitted when the Dutch republic was at war with Spain, so did the Dutch become the biggest winners when England was at war with the region.²⁰⁶ Therefore, an increase of 'Dutch' merchants in Spain would perhaps not have been surprising, although some officials in Spain were likely to be suspicious of the true nationality of such individuals. Initially, Cromwell had courted both France and Spain, playing them off against each other in an attempt to secure the most advantageous alliance.²⁰⁷ However, Cromwell's personal feelings against Spain, combined with a useable fleet which was idle, meant that Spain, or more specifically, its empire, was decided on as the target.²⁰⁸ The military campaign was not a success, and the attempt to capture San Domingo was a total failure. Although Jamaica was brought under Protectorate control, it was not heavily defended and at the time was believed to be of little value.²⁰⁹ The mission was considered so poor that the two commanders, Captain Robert Venebles and Admiral William Penn, were sent to the tower of London upon their return.²¹⁰ In retaliation the Spanish did inflict some damage on British trade with the area during the conflict through an auction of English, Irish and Scottish merchants' goods in San Sebastian which raised 168,156 silver *reales*.²¹¹ In San Sebastian the Scottish merchant Andrew Gordon (along with other English merchants) had his goods seized to the value of over

²⁰⁵ Murray, ed., *Report by Thomas Tucker*, 44. Not only were the Scots using Dutch passes but they were also travelling in flat-bottomed ships favoured by the Dutch.

²⁰⁶ Ángel Alloza Aparicio, 'La represalia de Cromwell' y los mercaderes ingleses en España', *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma* 4th Series, 13 (2000), 107.

²⁰⁷ Barry Cowan, *The Cromwellian Protectorate* (Manchester, 2002), 131.

²⁰⁸ David Armitage, 'The Cromwellian Protectorate and the Languages of Empire', *The Historical Journal* 35:3 (1992), 536.

²⁰⁹ Cowan, *The Cromwellian Protectorate*, 134.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Aparicio, 'La represalia de Cromwell', 102.

700 *reales*.²¹² Interestingly, Gordon was described as a Scot but later he was listed as part of the English merchant community, with the only merchant noted as of a separate nationality an Irish merchant.²¹³ This ill-considered conflict aside, the relative domestic stability of the 1650s in comparison to the Covenanting parliaments of the 1640s allowed the Scottish economy to regain some of what it had lost in the previous decade. While the Anglo-Dutch war and the Anglo-Spanish war (which should perhaps be more appropriately named to reflect the whole commonwealth's input) caused problems, Scottish merchants, like all other merchants, found a way round the problems. In particular, they made use of Spanish Netherlands during the Dutch war and assumed different identities in order to continue trading with Spain.

Conclusion

The cessation of war between England and Spain in 1604 did not lead to a return to normality for Scottish merchants, who had a new dynastic situation to contend with. James VI & I's insistence on his dominions being referred to as British created confusion and strife, such as in the case of Thomas James and Francis Cottington. In his application for appointment as Consul for Scottish merchants, James Kirkcaldy made it clear that Scottish merchants had suffered due to the activities of Thomas James and the apparent monopoly and influence he held with the Habsburg authorities. Politically 'Great Britain' did not exist and, contrary to the ideas of their monarch, both Scottish and English merchants were more likely to be represented by consuls who acted on behalf of the separate dominions of the British Isles than those who actually represented 'Great Britain'.

Evidence also abounds for Scottish trade with Iberia post-1603 and one of the greatest indicators of a flourishing trade was the sheer number of consuls representing Scottish merchants in the first quarter of the seventeenth century. Scottish skippers traded with Iberia from Scotland and also on behalf of merchants from England. Scots continued to live in Iberia too, with John Rutherford being granted the right to trade with South America.

²¹² This example has been discovered via Aparicio's article, '*La represalia de Cromwell*', however, the original sources were verified by the author. AGS, Contraduria del Sueldo, serie II, Legajo 158, February 1656.

²¹³ AGS, Contraduria del Sueldo, serie II, Legajo 158, February 1656. The issue of differentiating various nationalities will be discussed in chapter five.

The advent of war once again made the situation precarious for merchants with the renewal of Spanish and Dutch hostilities involving Scottish harbours and Scottish-owned vessels that were Dutch-built. Scotland soon became involved in war with Spain itself as Charles I was eager to defend his sister and repair his pride following his attempt to woo the Spanish Infanta Maria. Charles failed disastrously in both of these aims; however, Scottish merchants once again took the advantage, turning to privateering in righteous indignation at the treatment of their Scottish princess, or indeed simply continuing to trade using covert means.

While a return to trading was heralded by the 1630s it was not long before trading conditions began to deteriorate again with the 1640s proving one of the most difficult periods in the seventeenth century for Scotland. Once again, Scottish merchants continued to trade, with John Dougal providing the perfect example and Ninian Williamson shrewdly using foreign vessels in an attempt to evade privateers. The 1650s did herald some form of normality as Cromwell was eager to improve Scotland economically, recognising that a successful country would be less likely to rebel. Conflicts against the Dutch Republic and Spain, however, led to difficulties but, as usual, Scottish merchants found ways round them.

Chapter Five: Charles II to Carlos II

My love to my loving brother William who i desyer in his nixt to show me qt is the best comoditie from ys to Cadiz¹

The Restoration of Charles II in 1660 brought a return of normality for Scottish merchants and commerce was no longer disturbed by the internal turmoil described in the previous chapter. Evidence of trading connections with Iberia during this period are comparatively abundant, in large part due to the survival of port records for the second half of the seventeenth century. The port records of the four principal trading cities in Scotland - Aberdeen, Dundee, Glasgow and Leith - have been utilised for this thesis.² Examination of these records provides evidence not only of trade with Iberia, but also the way in which business was conducted. Further information on those who undertook these activities becomes apparent, with several merchants heavily involved in Iberian trade.

Merchants, factors and consuls were also present in Iberia during this period, some of whom were themselves Scots while others worked on behalf of Scottish merchants. James Cunningham, in particular, provides an informative example of a Scot trading and living in Iberia and through his career several Scots and Britons living in Spain are revealed. While it would be foolish to attempt quantification of the Scottish community in Iberia during this period, Cunningham's case study gives an idea as to how Scots lived and worked in the region. As the previous chapter demonstrated the Union of Crowns led to some difficulties in regards to the representation of Scottish merchants and this persisted into the later seventeenth century, with it becoming apparent, especially at consular level, that there was serious confusion in regards to representation.

Conflict continued to affect Scottish merchants, with the Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-French wars providing an opportunity, in the form of privateering, as well as disruption for those who continued to trade. During the Anglo-Dutch wars, in particular, the importance of the neutral Spanish Netherlands becomes clear with Scots moving south while Scottish ships utilised both the cities of Ostend and Bruges to continue trading. As the century came to a close the Company of Scotland was formed and the story of its disastrous expedition to Darien is well-known by historians. This chapter investigates those who invested in the Company, and concludes that despite historiography to the

¹ Glasgow City Archives, 120/D12/27. James Dunlop to Joh Dunlop, 23 December 1682.

² The description of these cities as Scotland's principal urban centres can be found in T.M Devine, *The Scottish Nation, 1700-2000* (Middlesex, 2000), 158.

contrary several prosperous Scottish merchants were wary of the promises of the enigmatic William Patterson and did not invest in the company. The plight of Captain Pinkerton and his men is also important, particularly the efforts of Martin Westcombe to use confusion regarding England and Scotland as a way to try and free the men.

1.1 Vessels to Scotland from Iberia and its Dominions

For this investigation all vessels travelling to Iberia from Glasgow and Leith have been collated into appendices which list (where known) the date, name of the vessel, its destination and the name of the skipper.³ However, there are a few things which must be noted when analysing the data. Firstly, the E72/15 customs books (second series) for Leith show 31 arrivals from Iberia - exclusively Spain - in the years 1672 to 1691, with 17 vessels sailing to Iberia.⁴ While this averages at just over 1.5 ships per year a significant portion of the records do not note where a vessel came from. Thus, there are more vessels which, due to their predominately Iberian cargo, can be strongly suspected to have sailed from Iberian ports, although this cannot be confirmed. Secondly, books are missing; the records from 1676 to 1680 for Leith have not survived, although there is evidence to show that trade with Iberia continued during that time. For example, in January 1676 an anonymous merchant book records the arrival of the *Maesay of Pittenweem* from Cadiz, mastered by John Aitchison.⁵ The same source also records the arrival of the *James of Pittenweem*, James Cook master, in February of the same year.⁶ Interestingly, it is noted that, while 89 tons of Spanish wine was entered, 'there was found to be in his sd ship 120 tuns of wyne and wye: commodaties which I pass for 100 tuns entrie it pd' - suggesting that the author of the record book may have been some form of customs official.⁷ In April 1677 John Scott recorded a Lisbon voyage and paid £60 Scots into the Crown Money box at Trinity House, Leith.⁸ In September of the following year John Aitchison sailed to Spain again, this time on the *John of Pittenweem*.⁹ In another example, William Dunbar was commissioned as supercargo by the owners of the *George of Leith* for a voyage to Lisbon, Cadiz or 'the straits' in

³ See Appendices 1 and 2.

⁴ NAS, E72/15.

⁵ Ibid, CS96/1575.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid, GD226/7/1.

⁹ NAS, AC7/7, 8 June 1686.

November 1679.¹⁰ Thus while the surviving port records for Leith are of use, one must be aware that they are not comprehensive.

While Leith was, for most of the seventeenth century, the principal port in Scotland, towards the end of the century a shift towards Glasgow was already in the offing. This change would mark the beginning of decline in Leith while Glasgow grew from strength to strength thanks to trade from the colonies, especially post-1707.¹¹ In relation to commerce with Iberia, Glasgow had a larger share of the trade than Leith. The E72/10 and E72/19 customs books (second series) for Glasgow show 47 arrivals from Iberia from 1666 to 1696.¹² In return, 45 vessels left Glasgow for Iberian ports or Iberian islands, such as the Canaries or Madeira.¹³ It is wise to note, however, that the Glasgow port books are generally more detailed than their east coast counterparts and the number of entries which do not list where a vessel is going to or has arrived from is negligible in comparison to the Leith records. Again years are missing from these records with the years 1674-1679 unaccounted for and the years 1692 -1694 also unavailable.

Leith was not the only port on the east coast which played host to trade from Spain. Even smaller ports, such as Prestonpans in East Lothian, conducted trade with the far away ports of southern Europe. The *Robert of Irvine* and the *Margaret of Leith* left for Spain carrying wheat in 1681 and 1683 respectively.¹⁴ Dundee, while predominantly conducting trade with Holland, recorded a vessel travelling to Cadiz in September 1664.¹⁵ The vessel, the *Charles*, was freighted with salmon, cloth and wheat by several merchants.¹⁶ In May 1669 the *Charles of Dundee* arrived back in that port after a voyage to Spain.¹⁷ On 22 December 1671 a vessel left Aberdeen for Bilbao loaded with salmon and stockings.¹⁸ Interestingly, the vessel had not intended to visit Aberdeen and was carrying onions to Bilbao from an unspecified port when it was forced into Aberdeen due to bad weather. Unfortunately for the skipper, the vessel was

¹⁰ NAS, RH15/91/16. 21 November 1679.

¹¹ Christopher A. Whatley describes Glasgow as Scotland's seventeenth century 'boom town' which by the end of the century had a stable, albeit illegal, trade with the colonies while also being the provider of goods to Scots in the North of Ireland. See Christopher A. Whatley, *Scots and the Union* (Edinburgh, 2007), 112.

¹² NAS, E72/10, E72/19.

¹³ Ports visited in the Spanish Netherlands will be examined later in the chapter due to their connection with the Anglo-Dutch wars.

¹⁴ NAS, E72/21/1; E72/21/5. Many thanks to Sue Mowat for bringing these references to my attention.

¹⁵ Ibid, E72/2/1.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid, E72/7/4.

¹⁸ Ibid, E72/1/3.

charged double the customs duty because it was 'a stranger'.¹⁹ In 1683 the *Hope of Aberdeen* arrived from Spain, carrying a cargo of salt for Robert Blackwood who was both the master and the main merchant of the voyage.²⁰ A further three vessels made their way from Aberdeen to Bilbao and all three ships were either skippered or freighted by members of the Burnet family. Thomas Burnet freighted John Anderson's vessel in September 1684, with Robert freighting the *Elphinstone of Aberdeen* in March 1686.²¹ Finally, William Burnet was a skipper and freighted his own ship for a journey to Bilbao in November 1690.²² July 1690 saw the return of the *George of Aberdeen* from Cadiz, carrying a cargo entirely for one merchant, John Johnston.²³ While the east coast ports of Scotland have long been associated with trade to the Low Countries and the Baltic it is clear that their trade did stretch further afield. Further evidence of the popularity of trade with Iberia can also be shown from official documents, such as the 'Memoriall to be exhibite to the honourable Committie of trade in Scotland'.²⁴ In this document Scotland's primary trading destinations are described as (in the order given in the source) the Low Countries, France, England, Spain, Norway and the Baltic.²⁵ A more detailed description of trade with Spain, in the same proposal, describes the connection as important but costly due to the distance and risk involved.²⁶ The document then went on to bemoan that trade with France had begun to damage trade with Spain, which provided an outlet for Scotland's commodities.²⁷ The fact that trade with Spain was discussed in detail in this document shows that commerce with the area was more commonplace than the port records or secondary sources account for.

Vessels also, unsurprisingly, made their way from Scotland to ports in the Spanish Netherlands. As shall be examined later in the chapter, this was more frequent during the Anglo-Dutch conflicts of the seventeenth century, although there is evidence of direct trade between Scotland and the Spanish Netherlands at other times. From Dundee an unnamed vessel made its way to Ostend carrying Scottish goods in October 1664.²⁸ In another example, the *Hopewell of Dundee* undertook the same journey in

¹⁹ Ibid, E72/1/3.

²⁰ Ibid, E72/1/11.

²¹ Ibid, E72/1. Thomas Burnet is likely to be the same man who traded to Rotterdam from the late 1660s until at least the 1690s and was part-owner of the vessel, *The Hunter*, see NAS, E72/1; Aberdeen City Archives, *Propinquity Book*, 1637-1705, 1. The vessel *Hunter* was owned by Alexander Burnet Jr, Thomas Burnet, Thomas Shand, George Burnet and Gilbert Anderson; 29 March 1667.

²² Ibid, E72/1/19.

²³ NAS, E72/1/18.

²⁴ *RPCS, ii, VII*, 665-673. 28 November 1681.


²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid, E72/2/1.

February 1681, while the *Anna of Leith* returned from Ostend, carrying Spanish wine, in October of the same year.²⁹ In July 1681 two vessels arrived in Kirkcaldy on the same day from Bruges.³⁰ Records from Bruges also show a number of Scottish ships arriving at that port.



Jos De Smet, ed., 'Tables du Commerce et de la Navigation du Port de Bruges 1675-1698 avec en annexe Les Tables de la Navigation du Port d'Ostende 1640-1655' in *Bulletin de la Commission Royal d'histoire* (Brussels, 1930), 156-199.³¹

While most of the entries merely state Scotland as a point of origin a few do provide more information; in 1676, for example, ships arrived from Aberdeen and Leith. Four ships from Kirkcaldy and five ships from Scotland made the journey in 1679. Kirkcaldy appeared to have a good trading connection with Bruges, with 18 ships from that port arriving in 1682 and a further 18 the following year. In 1686 27 Scottish vessels made the journey, with 21 arriving in 1688, and although the number of vessels tailed off somewhat in the 1690s perhaps due to the presence of French privateers.³² However a few still deemed the journey profitable enough to sail to the Spanish Netherlands. Journeys continued into the 1690s, with Patrick Sym paying £24 Scots into the Crown

²⁹ Ibid, E72/7/6; E72/15/23.

³⁰ NAS, E72/9/10.

³¹ Missing years within this table are due to missing data in the original source. Unfortunately for the year 1678 data only exists for the period from 1 October to 31 December.

³² This shall be examined in more detail later in the chapter.

Money Book for a voyage to Ostend in October 1696 and James Culbertson following in June 1698.³³ These journeys show that a significant number of vessels made their way from Scottish ports to those in Iberia and the Spanish Netherlands, proving the trade to be more vibrant than previously thought.

1.2 Merchants and Traders

Ships from Iberia to both Leith and Glasgow were likely to carry wine, with over half the entries showing a cargo consisting predominantly of that commodity.³⁴ Information on who purchased wine shows that most individuals who acquired Spanish wine did so on a small scale, such as Robert Walwood who procured half a butt in January 1685.³⁵ In Glasgow over 60 separate individuals paid for Spanish or Canary Islands wine, some buying only half a butt of wine, some over 100 butts in one purchase.³⁶ Wine was also obtained on behalf of others, such as William Kenner who procured 24 butts for James Marshall in January 1685.³⁷ Nevertheless, a few individuals did buy considerable quantities of Spanish wine, such as the Gibson family. James, Robert and Walter Gibson obtained hundreds of butts of Spanish wine in the 1680s and 1690s.³⁸ Walter, later a provost of Glasgow, also had his brother James purchase Spanish wine on his behalf.³⁹ In Leith, John Marjoriebanks bought Spanish wine from several vessels that arrived during the 1680s, with his brothers James and Edward also purchasing significant quantities of Spanish wine.⁴⁰ As Siobhan Talbott has already shown, the Marjoriebanks were prolific buyers of French wine, as well as of the Spanish variety.⁴¹ Local merchant accounts provide further evidence as to the popularity of Iberian wine. The account book of James Lawson, merchant in Anstruther, shows him distributing Spanish commodities (in small quantities) to individuals in Fife with William Robertson, a baillie in Crail, receiving a pint of sack in July 1694 and Agnes Barkely also buying the drink from Lawson in April 1691.⁴² Further Lawson sold 'sack glasses' to numerous individuals, further proving the popularity of the wine.⁴³

³³ NAS, GD226/7/1

³⁴ See Appendices 1 and 2.

³⁵ NAS, E72/15/33.

³⁶ Ibid, E72/10, E72/19.

³⁷ Ibid, E72/19/10.

³⁸ Ibid, E72/10, E72/19.

³⁹ Ibid, E72/19/5, RH15/71.

⁴⁰ Ibid, E72/15.

⁴¹ Talbot, 'An Alliance Ended?', 74.

⁴² NAS, CS96/3263.

⁴³ Ibid.

As discussed in chapter one, import duties on Spanish and Portuguese wines were significantly higher than those for French wine, although it is not clear why. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that the imports of French wine significantly outweighed those of Iberian origin.⁴⁴ As shown in chapter three this could be due, in part, to the superior strength of Iberian wines, meaning that they were still 'luxury wines' in comparison to French wines.⁴⁵ However, one must also question the origins of wine stated as coming from 'France'. As discussed in chapter four, Thomas Inglis requested that the Privy Council charge his Canary wine under the French wine tariff and not the Spanish.⁴⁶ While Inglis actually asked the authorities, one wonders how many merchants did not and merely declared their wine as French when it was actually from Iberia. In her investigation of the wine trade between the Dutch Republic and France, Henriette de Bruyn Kops stated:

The statements of authenticity regarding a wine's national provenance, be it French, Iberian or Rhenish, are so often in direct opposition to the current political situation that they become amusing. When the war against Spain caused the Dutch Government to subject Iberian wine to a very high tariff, the experts swore 'upon their lengthy career in the business and vast experience' that the tested barrels contained French or Rhenish wine. After war broke out with France, the barrels were invariably filled with good Spanish wine, 'with not a drop of French wine mixed in'.⁴⁷

As evidence from chapter two has shown, Scottish merchants were quite capable of passing off English goods and commodities as their own, and it is possible that this practice may have worked in reverse. Triangular trade may have assisted by allowing skippers to name their port of origin as French and not divulging that they had also travelled to Iberia. Unfortunately, details of such practices are not left for the historian to scrutinise, although, whatever the case, it is clear that Iberian wine had a market and was not merely resorted to when French wine could not be had. In fact, as shall be examined later in the chapter, war with France did not result in increased imports of Iberian wine.

Several skippers were seasoned veterans of the journey to Iberia, such as James Rae who is listed in the port books as skipper from 1682 until 1696, skippering several vessels and journeys.⁴⁸ Rae is further mentioned in letters from John Dunlop in

⁴⁴ Talbot, 'An Alliance Ended?', 75-6. Talbot has tabulated the import of French wine in comparison to Spanish wine imports.

⁴⁵ Francis, *The Wine Trade*, 66.

⁴⁶ *RPCS*, VII, 24. 17 December 1607.

⁴⁷ Henriette de Bruyn Kops, *A Spirited Exchange: The Wine and Brandy Trade between France and the Dutch Republic in its Atlantic Framework, 1600-1650* (Leiden, 2007), 113-4.

⁴⁸ NAS, E72/10, E72/19.

London to his father, James Dunlop. While it is unclear where Rae was sailing to, it is interesting to note that letters from Dunlop concerning Rae were written in September 1682.⁴⁹ According to the Glasgow customs records, Rae was on a journey to Cadiz at that time, leaving in late August and returning in early November.⁵⁰ If it is, indeed, the same James Rae, this would indicate that he stopped in London, which was not noted in the customs records, and also shows an impressive sailing time. James Campbell, John Miller and John Anderson were also popular skippers and undertook around a dozen journeys between them.⁵¹

Unsurprisingly, disagreements did arise, such as the one involving James Simpson's journey to Spain in August 1686. In February of the following year Sir James Dick petitioned Simpson and two merchants of Edinburgh, William Menzies and Edward Brown.⁵² On Dick's behalf another merchant, Thomas Logie, had sent in Simpson's ship the *Albany of Leith* goods amounting to £810 10 shillings Scots. It appears that Menzies and Brown were supercargos on this vessel as they had been instructed to sell the goods in Spain and ordered to buy six butts of Spanish wine.⁵³ However, when the vessel arrived in Leith one of the butts was found to be spoiled with sea water and Dick attempted to gain compensation. Simpson argued that the wine had been spoiled by bilge water in a storm, but, after sending a representative to taste the wine and, following discussions with other skippers, the Dean of Guild Court ruled that Simpson's explanation was highly improbable. John Marjoriebanks was similarly affected, with one of his five barrels unfit for consumption in exactly the same circumstances as James Dick's cargo and on the same vessel.⁵⁴ Simpson was ordered to pay £185 Scots compensation to both James Dick and John Marjoriebanks.⁵⁵ While the ruling of the Guild Court does not make it explicitly clear, they obviously believed that Simpson had sold the wine and then attempted to cover up the theft by stating that the weather was to blame for ruining the drink. Unfortunately for Simpson, the delivery of the other barrels in pristine condition made his explanation highly unlikely.

Analysis of those who bought goods from Iberia and those who sent commodities to Iberian ports shows that it was far more common to buy Iberian goods than to send items there. In Glasgow over 130 individuals bought goods from Iberia in comparison to

⁴⁹ Glasgow City Archives, MSS 120/D12/9-14. John Dunlop to James Dunlop, various September 1682.

⁵⁰ NAS, E72/19/6; E72/19/8.

⁵¹ Ibid, E72/10, E72/19.

⁵² Edinburgh City Archive, SL144/1/7. 16 February 1687. Many thanks to Dr Alistair Ross for providing me with this example.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

the 67 who sent cargoes to Iberia. In Leith only 15 individuals sent goods to Spain, with over 60 buying goods from vessels arriving from Spain.⁵⁶ As noted in chapter three, the vast majority of those who bought Iberian goods did so in quantities that would be deemed for household use rather than for re-sale. For example, David Campbell who purchased only half a butt of sack in December 1682.⁵⁷ However, there were several prolific buyers in Glasgow, such as the previously discussed Gibson family who were not only interested in Spanish wine, but also purchased indigo and sugar from the *Walter of Glasgow* which arrived in September 1682.⁵⁸ Walter Gibson also shipped goods on board the *Nightengale of Renfrew* in June 1681, which was scheduled to sail for Spain.⁵⁹ A year later the *James of Wairwater* was preparing to sail to the Canary Islands and Walter Gibson again provided a significant part of the cargo.⁶⁰ As well as the Gibson family, George Lockhart was a prolific buyer of Iberian goods and contributed cargo to a vessel traveling to Madeira in the 1690s.⁶¹ Thomas Weir is another Glaswegian example, buying large quantities of wine and salt from vessels arriving from Cadiz as well as sending cargo to the Canaries, Madeira and Bilbao.⁶² Skippers were also involved as exemplified by John Anderson. He was both a merchant and skipper sailing to and from Iberia.⁶³ While these merchants were successful the petition of John Gilhagie to the Scottish Parliament shows how easy it was for even a prosperous merchant to have financial difficulties. According to his own deposition to Parliament Gilhagie had been involved in several ventures to the Canary Islands and Madeira.⁶⁴ Following the loss of one of his ships while returning from France with wine, in conjunction with a serious fire in Glasgow which destroyed 20,000 merks worth of both property and stock, Gilhagie was left in serious financial difficulties. This was made worse by the diminishing profits of his coal works.⁶⁵ Gilhagie claimed that creditors were preventing his attempts to reestablish his business and he requested that parliament protect him from the debtors so that he could rebuild his businesses.⁶⁶

⁵⁶ NAS, E72/10, 15, 19 - this number excludes those merchants recorded in the wine import books who have already been discussed.

⁵⁷ Ibid, E72/19/8

⁵⁸ Ibid, E72/19/5.

⁵⁹ Ibid, E72/19/2.

⁶⁰ Ibid, E72/19/6

⁶¹ Ibid, E72/19

⁶² Ibid, E72/10 and E72/19. Weir also had business dealings with James Foulis, buying wine (origin unspecified) from him on several occasions. See RH15/14/37/2.

⁶³ Ibid, E72/10.

⁶⁴ RPS, 1698/7/62, 8 August 1698.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid. The request was granted.

To date only a few merchants in Leith have been found to have made noteworthy purchases, such as Henry Bothwell and William Menzies.⁶⁷ Charles Charters is another example and he sent significant quantities of Scottish commodities to Iberia in December 1672 and August 1684.⁶⁸ Charters also distributed his cargo in order to lessen the risk. In the same month in which he sent salmon to Lisbon he also sent the same cargo to St. Malo - ensuring not only that all his cargo was not one ship but also that it was going to separate markets.⁶⁹ The previously discussed John Marjoriebanks also sent cargoes to Spain, sending a large cargo of Scottish goods in May 1683 in the *Alexander of Leith*.⁷⁰ Two months later he loaded a similar cargo aboard the *Crown of Burntisland*.⁷¹ A small Scottish vessel, or even a few Scottish vessels in convoy, would be easy prey for a large North African corsair fleet. By spreading his cargo across two vessels which left two months apart Marjoriebanks was significantly lowering the risk of losing all the money he had invested.

A final example is provided by Thomas Sommerville, who sent a significant cargo of Scottish goods to Cadiz on the *William and John of Leith* in July 1683 and sent wheat in August 1686.⁷² It appears that, in the case of the *William and John*, Sommerville made the charter party on behalf of Charles Charters, with Sommerville bringing the case before the Admiralty Court as he was due over £300 from Charters for the freight. Sommerville was also due money from William Dunbar for the same journey, with the ship returning to Scotland in November 1683.⁷³ In another case brought before the Admiralty Court in June 1686 Sommerville was again the pursuer, this time regarding a ship of Andrew Malloch. In this case James Home, a merchant of Edinburgh, had freighted Malloch's vessel in 1680, with Sommerville providing cargo for the vessel, the profits from which were to be used to buy wine at Cadiz. However, Malloch did not sail in the company of other vessels (which, interestingly, were going to Brazil) and, instead, dropped anchor off the west coast of England. He remained there for 30 weeks during which time sea water got into the cargo and spoiled it.⁷⁴ In August 1688 Somerville brought more grievances to the Admiralty Court, this time concerning debts due for Spanish goods, mostly wine. Despite the attempts of some of the debtors to refute the charges, all were ordered to pay what they owed to Sommerville including two

⁶⁷ Ibid, E72/15.

⁶⁸ Ibid, E72/15/11, E72/15/28.

⁶⁹ Ibid, E72/15/11.

⁷⁰ Ibid, E72/15/26.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² NAS, E72/15/26, E72/15/37.

⁷³ NAS, AC7/6, 25 March 1684. Both Charters and Dunbar were ordered to make payment in this case.

⁷⁴ HCA, AC7/7, 1 June 1686.

individuals who may have been his relations, Alexander and Robert Sommerville.⁷⁵ Thomas also bought Iberian goods, both from vessels returning directly from Iberia and from vessels coming from London.⁷⁶ From this evidence it is apparent that Sommerville was a factor based in Scotland who conducted trade and obtained goods for several individuals.

While far less popular than seagoing trade with London, the Dutch Republic and the Baltic, trade with Iberia did provide another outlet for Scottish primary goods such as coal, meal, fish, butter and some manufactories, such as stockings and candles. In return Scottish merchants obtained the essential commodity of salt, although, most other goods from Iberia were luxuries. It has been argued that Scotland's trade to Iberia was insignificant due to the low number of ships which made the journey; however, this must be placed into context with the commodities involved.⁷⁷ It is true that the number of vessels was small in comparison to vessels arriving from the Low Countries and London. However, the goods obtained from Iberia were, for the most part, high value luxury items. Scotland did not strictly need Iberian goods in order to sustain itself and in times of hardship, commodities such as wine and oranges could be given up. Iberia was not in such an advantageous position and needed the basic commodities that Scotland and other countries provided. Trade to Iberia was therefore very much in Scotland's favour - despite its lack of vessels.

2. Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-French Wars

The Anglo-Dutch wars have been the topic of much serious scholarly investigation, with English protectionist policies generally seen as the instigator of the conflicts.⁷⁸ As discussed in chapter three, the Treaty of Münster, in which Habsburg Spain finally recognised the independence of the Dutch Republic, had a detrimental effect on English trade. Prior to this event English merchants had held a monopoly over Spanish trade in comparison to other European countries.⁷⁹ With the re-entrance of the Dutch into the Spanish market, however, this dominance was challenged and, indeed, badly damaged.⁸⁰ In a petition to Cromwell, masters of London vessels said of the Dutch:

⁷⁵ NAS, AC7/9.

⁷⁶ Ibid, E72/15.

⁷⁷ Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 173.

⁷⁸ J. R Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century* (London, 1996), 4.

⁷⁹ Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 198-200.

⁸⁰ Israel, 'Spain, the Spanish embargoes and the Struggle for the Mastery of World Trade', 210.

the Dutch eat us out of our trade at home and abroad; they refuse to sell us a hogshead of water to refresh us at sea and call us 'English dogs' (which doth much grieve our English spirits).⁸¹

The English authorities naturally retaliated, primarily with protectionist trade legislation in the form of the Navigation Acts. Originally, Cromwell wished for a union between the two republics, however, the Dutch saw this as an attempt at political domination.⁸² Instead, the first Navigation Act was passed, banning non-English ships from carrying goods from the plantations to England, with the later 1660 act further specifying that three-quarters of the crew on ships involved in colonial trade had to be English.⁸³

The second and third Anglo-Dutch Wars (1665-67 and 1672-74) have been, largely, due to the mere names of the conflicts, assumed to be exclusively English affairs. However, as a fellow kingdom of the Stuart monarchy, Scotland was also involved and technically at war with the Dutch Republic. Recently, investigation has been undertaken to investigate Scotland's role in these conflicts, the most in-depth work has been carried out by Steve Murdoch. His study has shown that Scots were heavily involved in the Anglo-Dutch wars, with privateering a common role for Scots to undertake.⁸⁴ As previously discussed, turning to privateering during a time of war was a lucrative way to avoid the perils of trying to trade during conflict.⁸⁵ Nonetheless, the Dutch republic was a vitally important trading partner of Scotland and by utilising third-party ships and ports in the Spanish Netherlands trade could still be conducted with this important market.

The port records of Leith provide illuminating information for both the second and third Anglo-Dutch wars. During both wars the share of trade that began to arrive from the ports of Bruges and Ostend increased tenfold. For example, in April 1666 Jacob Dames's vessel arrived from Bruges, in convoy with another vessel, the *St John of Bruges*, Adrian Leven master, with both carrying cargoes of Spanish wine.⁸⁶ Over the summer of 1666 three un-named vessels arrived from unspecified ports carrying cargoes of Spanish wine, showing that, despite the threat from Dutch privateers, trade involving Spanish commodities was continuing.⁸⁷ A similar pattern can be shown for the third Anglo-Dutch war, with ports in the Spanish Netherlands replacing their northern

⁸¹ CSPD, 1658-9, 8. 6 May 1658.

⁸² Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars*, 11.

⁸³ Macinnes, *Union and Empire*, 156. This was essentially similar to Spanish legislation which banned foreigners from the Indies trade.

⁸⁴ Murdoch, *Terror of the Seas*, 237-81.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 9.

⁸⁶ NAS, E72/15/2-4.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

counterparts for the duration of the conflict. There are dozens of examples, with Spanish wine making its way from Ostend to Leith in August 1673 as well as Castile soap.⁸⁸ Aberdeen also showed an increase in the arrivals from ports in the Spanish Netherlands during the conflict.⁸⁹

Another common way round trading embargoes was to use neutral shipping. Further, merchants would carry numerous flags and sets of documentation in order to try and fool privateers.⁹⁰ Scottish merchants were no different and during the Anglo-Dutch wars they used neutral ships in order to continue their trade in Iberian goods. During the second Anglo-Dutch war a ship of Bruges brought figs and raisins to Leith in December 1665, with *St John of Ostend* bringing Spanish wine into Leith in May 1667.⁹¹ The *Anna of Bruges* skippered by Francis Delopas arrived in Leith in January 1673, carrying a cargo of dried fruit.⁹² Henry Wilkie, a merchant of Edinburgh gives a more detailed example of how such voyages were carried out. From December 1666 to February 1667 the *St John of Congolfe* was freighted by David Bryson and Alexander Simpson, with salmon, herring and Irish butter, for a journey to Bilbao.⁹³ The ship was then to sail to Bordeaux, loading 140 tons of French wine before returning to Scotland.⁹⁴ However, on the return journey the ship sailed into the Thames to escape 'the enimie' and Henry Wilkie asked for permission to sell the goods in London due to their perishable nature.⁹⁵ On 19 June 1667 Wilkie was granted a warrant to sell the French goods in any English port, although the situation portrayed was a little different from the one on the petition.⁹⁶ Wilkie was described as a merchant of Spain rather than a merchant of Edinburgh and the ship, it appears, had not made it to Spain. Instead, it had been seized by a French man-of-war and had not been released until after Easter, forcing the vessel to exchange the salmon for French goods.⁹⁷ Despite the differing stories, Wilkie was permitted to sell his goods.

⁸⁸ Ibid, E72/15/16.

⁸⁹ Taylor, ed., *Aberdeen Shore Work Accounts*, 515. 27/8/1665; 525. 5/4/1666.

⁹⁰ Murdoch, *Terror of the Seas?*, 264.

⁹¹ NAS, E72/15/1-8.

⁹² Ibid, E72/15/13.

⁹³ Ibid, E72/15/6. The ship is listed in this source as being the *St John from Gothenburg*. But it is listed in the other sources as the *St John of Congolfe*. Congolfe is almost certainly Kungälv (also spelt Kungelf and Kongelf) which is an inland town north of Gothenburg. Many thanks to Adam Grimshaw for this information.

⁹⁴ Swedish Riksarkivet, Anglica VII, vol. 542 (1660-1670), undated, unfoliated, c.1666/7. Many thanks to Steve Murdoch for this example.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ *CSPD*, 1667, 209. 19 June 1667.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

Scots did not merely trade to different areas or use different ships; several merchants actually moved to different regions while the conflict raged. Following the Treaty of Münster, free trade resumed between the Dutch Republic and the Spanish Netherlands.⁹⁸ Of the 21 Scots who were registered as citizens of Bruges during the timespan of this project, 16 of them registered during various Anglo-Dutch conflicts.⁹⁹ The city accounts add to this number, with nine further Scottish individuals recognised as citizens.¹⁰⁰ For example, Joseph Marjoriebanks, registered as a citizen in January 1666.¹⁰¹ As shown earlier in this chapter, the Marjoriebanks family were significant buyers and sellers of Iberian goods in the later seventeenth century, and Joseph may well have been part of this familial network. It appears highly unlikely that Marjoriebanks would have travelled from Scotland to the Spanish Netherlands during the second Anglo-Dutch war and is more probable that he was based at one of the larger Scottish communities in the Dutch Republic and moved south when the war began to effect trade. When compared with another Scot, Patrick Suty this certainly appears to be the case. Suty was noted as being in Bruges in November 1665, with his previous residence given as Veere in the Dutch Republic.¹⁰² In another example, merchant James Steuart who was documented in the city accounts in November 1666, indicated that although he was from Edinburgh he had arrived in Bruges from Amsterdam.¹⁰³ The trend of Scots seeking citizenship in Bruges continued during the third Anglo-Dutch war, with the skipper Robert Gray from Leith arriving in early 1673.¹⁰⁴

Scots carried on their trade as normal while they were in Bruges, leading to the usual round of arguments. In 1666 local merchant Segher vande Walle pursued Thomas Hamilton. Hamilton was brought barrels of wine by Walle from his vessel the *St. Elizabeth*, skippered by Baldwin Houdegoedt, but had neglected to pay for them.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, Walle brought the case to the civil court in order to seek permission to sell the wine.¹⁰⁶ John Mitchel, merchant from Ratho near Edinburgh, arrived in Bruges in 1673 and was noted in the city accounts in April.¹⁰⁷ At some point in 1673 he had a

⁹⁸ Bruneel, 'The Spanish and Austrian Netherlands', 227.

⁹⁹ Bruges City Archives, Register of citizens, 1588-1794, nr.130, various folios.

¹⁰⁰ A James, ed., *Bruges Poorters: Opgetekend uit de stadsrekeningen aangevuld uit de Poorter-en Ferieboeken en ingeleid door* (Zedelgem, 1990), passim.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 235.

¹⁰² Ibid, 231.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 240.

¹⁰⁴ Bruges City Archives, Register of citizens, 1588-1794, nr.130, fo. 19; A James, ed., *Bruges Poorters*, 249. This is likely to be the same Robert Gray who completed journeys to London and Rotterdam from the 1680s onwards. See NAS, E72/15

¹⁰⁵ Bruges City Archives, Processen, Nr. 924/70448. 1666.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, Register of citizens, 1588-1794, nr.130, fo. 19v; A James, ed., *Bruges Poorters*, 250.

disagreement with another Scot, James Hamilton, over a disputed sum of 323 guilders. In this disagreement he submitted a document from his own accounts as evidence, dated 1669 at Rotterdam, proving that Mitchell had come to Bruges from the Dutch Republic.¹⁰⁸ The debt was said to be due to several unpaid bills of exchange and in August 1672 Mitchell confiscated goods and money from Hamilton to the value of the money due. These had been placed with Frans de Muelenaere, probably Francis de Muilinares.¹⁰⁹ Relocating to ports in the Spanish Netherlands during war with the Dutch Republic was a sound business choice for Scottish merchants. Due to the free trade between both those regions and the neutrality of the Spanish Netherlands, merchants could continue their trading practices. The number of Scots who became citizens during the conflict in comparison to the total number of Scots shows that it was a popular practice and, in at least two cases, it is certain that the men, while Scottish, had arrived from the Dutch Republic. While this chapter has shown that there were a few Scots in the Spanish Netherlands, this community dramatically expanded during periods of conflict with the Dutch Republic. In his study of British merchants during the second Anglo-Dutch war, Andrew Little has concurred, stating that the Spanish Netherlands were 'a natural conduit through which the trade of the combatants flowed or was diverted during wartime'.¹¹⁰

The Dutch Republic was not the only region that Scotland was at war with during the later part of the seventeenth century. The Anglo-French war of 1689-1697 also affected Scottish trade with Iberia. In similarity to the Anglo-Dutch wars, this conflict has been investigated from a Scottish maritime perspective; however, trade elements have also been researched. Steve Murdoch and Siobhan Talbott have both examined Scottish trade with France during these conflicts, concluding that, for the most part, trade continued with this area.¹¹¹ However, it was not only Scottish trade with France that was affected by these conflicts; trade with Iberia was also disrupted.

As shown from appendices one and two, vessels travelling to Iberia would occasionally leave in convoy but return home as fast as possible to gain the best price at market for their goods. However, during the conflict with France, from 1689 to 1697, gaining the best market was simply too dangerous due to the activities of privateers and was deemed not worth the risk. French vessels were spotted near Aberdeen, the

¹⁰⁸ Bruges City Archives, Processen, Nr. 1059/83745. 5 April 1673.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Andrew R. Little, 'Thee said warr, which beeinge both by land and sea, cuts off all trade here'. A Window on the Year of Disaster, 1672' in Erik Van der Doe, Perry Moree and Dirk J. Tang, eds., *De Gekaapte Kapper: Brieven en scheepspapieren uit de Europese handelvaart* (Zutphen, 2011), 38.

¹¹¹ See Murdoch, 'The French Connection' and Talbott, 'An Alliance Ended?'.

Hebrides, Orkney, the Isle of Skye and Stranraer.¹¹² Scottish vessels trading to Iberia were caught up in hostilities, as when the *Concord of Glasgow* sailing from Lisbon to Amsterdam was captured by a French man-of-war in February 1688; it is, therefore, unsurprising that skippers wished to lessen the risk of capture by sailing together.¹¹³ For example, in January 1696 the *John and James of Leith*, skippered by Edward Burd, and the *Thomas of Glasgow*, skippered by John Kerr, arrived in Glasgow from Bilbao and San Sebastian respectively.¹¹⁴ On 4 March the *Margaret*, *Adventure* and *Angel*, all of Glasgow, came in on the same day from San Sebastian, skippered by James Rae, Alexander Stewart and Charles Ramsay.¹¹⁵ In May, the *St John* and *Concord*, again of Glasgow, also arrived from Bilbao and San Sebastian.¹¹⁶ July 1693 saw another arrival from northern Spain to Leith, with John Brown entering his payment in the Crown Money Book.¹¹⁷ In July 1695 Michael Hor and co., resident in Bilbao, prepared the *Saint Dorothy* for a journey from San Sebastian to Scotland.¹¹⁸ Once again neutral vessels were used to carry out journeys that were dangerous for Scottish merchants. In May 1691 the *Mary of Ostend*, skippered by James Holbrand, arrived from Bilbao carrying Iberian goods.¹¹⁹ While defensive measures, such as convoys and the use of neutral ships, may have provided some protection they would not have dissuaded a French privateering fleet from attacking. This provides an indication of how important the continuation of trade was for Scottish merchants and in turn the Scottish economy.

The arrival of these vessels from predominantly northern Spanish ports and their cargoes gives some suspicion as to where the goods were actually coming from. During periods of war with France it is arguable that imports of Spanish wine and other Spanish goods decreased, with Scottish merchants ceasing to visit Andalusian ports and instead journeying to San Sebastian or Bilbao to load cargoes of brandy.¹²⁰ For example, in March 1696 the *Adventure of Glasgow* sailed from San Sebastian to Glasgow carrying a cargo that included over 100 barrels of brandy.¹²¹ There were in fact 15 vessels which arrived in Glasgow from northern Spanish ports (Bilbao and San Sebastian) whose

¹¹² Murdoch, *The Terror of the Seas?*, 289-291.

¹¹³ *RPCS*, iii, XIV, 75. 21 August 1688. This example is discussed in more detail in chapter three.

¹¹⁴ NAS, E72/19/23. As San Sebastian and Bilbao are only 60 or so miles apart on the coast it is probable that by prior arrangement the skippers decided to meet to sail home.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ NAS, GD226/7/1.

¹¹⁸ AFB, JCR0304/030. 9 July 1695.

¹¹⁹ NAS, E72/15/44.

¹²⁰ NAS, E72/15, E72/19.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, E72/19/23.

cargoes can be confidently argued as having come from France.¹²² This is in comparison to the 11 vessels whose cargoes were Iberian or from Iberian dominions in the same period.¹²³ Several vessels also sailed into Leith with French goods during the wartime period. For example, in April 1691 an unnamed ship came into Leith from Bilbao carrying brandy; a month later another arrival from Bilbao brought 99 tons of French wine.¹²⁴ T.C Smout has stated that, 'it was only in wartime that Spanish wines became the more important beverage'.¹²⁵ However, from the evidence above it can actually be shown that the opposite was true: the popularity of French wine as an everyday table wine meant that during periods of wartime merchants obtained French wine at ports in northern Spain. As the case of Glasgow shows, more ships carried French goods from Iberian ports than actually carried Iberian goods. For the import of Spanish goods it was actually better that Scotland was at peace with France.

3. The Later Resident Community: 1650-1707

We have so far seen that there were a number of merchants and skippers involved in Iberian trade. Moreover, we can see where these goods were headed, not only to the burghs, but also to unexpected hinterlands, the like of Glenorchy in Argyll. Further, it had also been indicated above that there were settled Scots within Iberian territories, both artisans, merchants, factors and consuls. To obtain Iberian goods, the Scots needed facilitators such as these, and we have far more information on those in the later period under review than on those in the confusing period of Elizabeth and James. One of the most prominent Scottish merchants and consuls in Spain was James Cunningham, based in Cadiz. He is first described as factor to the Earl of Mar and his son John Lord Erskine in June 1650, in a document regarding lands in Blairlogie.¹²⁶ In 1653 the Aberdeen Council letters named him as a factor in Cadiz who, along with S. Calynholt, undertook to send to Andrew Skene, an Aberdonian merchant acting on behalf of Thomas Lumsdell, bills of exchange for a cargo of linen.¹²⁷ A decade later Cunningham was still residing in Spain and wrote to the Scottish Privy Council

¹²² Ibid, E72/19. From 1689-1696. Unfortunately port books for the years 1692-1694 are not present for the series E72/19 so these figures are likely to be well short of the actual numbers of vessels from Spanish ports carrying French cargoes during this period.

¹²³ Ibid, E72/19.

¹²⁴ Ibid, E72/15/49.

¹²⁵ Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 174.

¹²⁶ NAS, GD172/1503. 15 June 1650.

¹²⁷ Taylor, ed, *Aberdeen Council Letters* III, 225-7. 11 September 1653. Many thanks to Professor Steve Murdoch for bringing this to my attention.

requesting a birth-brieve for the Spanish authorities, presumably in order to prove his good standing and possibly beginning the process of gaining naturalisation.¹²⁸ Three years later he entered into a bet with one John Bain over the outcome of the second Anglo-Dutch War.¹²⁹ The bet was for the sum of 200 pesos, a reasonable sum of money, and perhaps why the bet was officially recorded.¹³⁰ Little over a month later, along with several other British merchants, he was named on a certificate regarding a vessel which was planning on sailing to the West Indies.¹³¹ While it is unclear whether these merchants were involved in the voyage itself, it appears that they were assisting in the procurement of new masts. This is possibly because the man ordered to buy the masts, Don Pedro Colarte, would have been purchasing them in Amsterdam from Daniel Smout, possibly from the British Isles.¹³² Smout was to freight a vessel solely for the purpose of bringing the masts to Spain, with the British merchants witnessing the agreement.¹³³ Another Scot identifiable from this letter is John Duncan, who also signs a similar letter dated the previous day.¹³⁴ Duncan and another co-signatory, John Frederick, were merchants and passed military information about the Spanish armada to the Stuart authorities. In September 1672, A. Duncan wrote Williamson stating,

In obedience to yor commands I have inquired consering ye Spanish Armada & find yt our house in Sevilla Jon Ffredricks & Jon Duncan writes Sir Jon Ffredricks & Mr Herne of ye 23rd Augt.¹³⁵

Duncan and Frederick had also reported intelligence gained from Cadiz regarding the activities of a French vessel, from which in turn he had obtained reports that an armada was provisioning in Lagos bay (Portugal).¹³⁶ John Duncan was, according to his will, born in Invergowrie, to William Duncan and Margaret Ogvily, and described himself as resident of the city of Seville. Much like William Fraser, Duncan wanted his estate distributed to his family back in Britain in the event of his death. His cousin, James Duncan, based in London, was to be the recipient of 3,000 pesos, with another cousin who lived in Scotland, Alexander Duncan, also provided for.¹³⁷ Duncan's original will

¹²⁸ *RPCS*, iii, I, 432. 16 September 1663.

¹²⁹ Archivo Municipal de Cadiz, CA2105, 164. 6 August 1666.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ AGS, Estado K 1664, fo. 166. 29 September 1666.

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ SP Online, SP29, CCCXV, f. 100-1. 18 September 1672. The letter is signed only as A. Duncan. This may be Andrew Duncan who is mentioned in John Duncan's will but this is not certain. See TNA, PROB 11/347, 11 February 1674.

¹³⁶ TNA, PROB 11/347, 11 February 1674.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

was written in Spanish, indicative of a residence of some duration and the clauses in the testament show that Duncan was in a position to provide for his relations following his death, suggesting a degree of success in his activities.

In 1681 Cunningham had a disagreement with two English merchants, William Nutt and Samuel Sowton. They procured naval supplies for Royal shipyards and traded any surplus into Spain.¹³⁸ Trading directly with Cunningham to begin with, they then began trading with Edward Ford once Cunningham was 'made a gentleman of Spain'.¹³⁹ Presumably Cunningham was elevated to the Spanish nobility, who were not allowed to engage in trade until 1682.¹⁴⁰ Ford, who was likely to be the same Edward Ford who signed the certificate for the procurement of masts in Amsterdam in September 1666, obviously traded on Cunningham's behalf.¹⁴¹ When Ford died Nutt and Sowton claimed that Cunningham had not settled an account with them and appealed for King Charles II's assistance.¹⁴² They requested that if the first attempts were unsuccessful a letter be sent to the Court of Spain 'for the recovery of the same, and the taking off of Cuningham's protections, that the petitioners may be enabled to prosecute their right there by law'.¹⁴³ Cunningham also gained a letter of naturalisation which allowed him to trade with the Spanish Empire in 1684. Cunningham paid 200 *doubles* to procure the letter, and it is unclear which requirement for naturalisation Cunningham had not been able to fill.¹⁴⁴ He did, by the 1680s appear to have a place of residence and met the requirement of living in Spain for 20 years. It is possible, however, that his real estate was not worth the required 4,000 ducats or that he had not married a local woman.¹⁴⁵ Cunningham was obviously no longer a mere merchant.

Nonetheless, like many of the Spanish nobility, Cunningham was in need of funds. In December 1687 he wrote to Sir James Dick (a former Lord Provost of Edinburgh) to notify him that he had received a Royal patent appointing him consul 'for the most ancient Kingdom of Scotland in all the dominions of Spain'.¹⁴⁶ He also stated that he had been given permission to recover all profits that the English consul had made in Cadiz or elsewhere. He added that he did not intend to make use of this money himself, instead asking his countrymen at home that they may consider granting him an

¹³⁸ *CSPD 1680-1681*, 149. 28 January 1681.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ See chapter one.

¹⁴¹ AGS, Estado K 1664. fo 165. 28 September 1666.

¹⁴² *CSPD 1680-1681*, 149. 28 January 1681.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Ortiz, 'La Concesion', 236-7.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 227-8. All are described as necessary to gain naturalisation.

¹⁴⁶ University of Edinburgh Special Collections, DK 7. 55, 9 December 1687.

allowance to help him maintain his title of baronet and the lifestyle expected of a consul.¹⁴⁷ He asked that Dick use his influence at the meeting with the Lord Provost of Edinburgh and his magistrates and stated that he would be greatly obliged to him and would assist Dick and any of his relations for whom it was in his power to do so.¹⁴⁸ So, while he had been appointed by King Charles II and had been given the right to charge Scottish vessels and recover monies from English consuls, he preferred to be given a salary, possibly in realisation that he would be unlikely to recover funds from English consuls, or that the number of Scottish ships would not provide a sufficient income. Cunningham's assertion of his royal appointment as Scottish consul for Spain was confirmed by both the Scottish Privy Council and the Convention of Royal Burghs in July 1687 and 1688 respectively.¹⁴⁹ He also, despite his consular status, continued to trade and acted on behalf of George Macartney of Belfast on occasion.¹⁵⁰ Cunningham did appear to have a prosperous lifestyle in Cadiz as a letter from John Dunlop to his father, James Dunlop of Glenkirk indicates. In discussing his brother William's impending journey to Cadiz, John wrote that he had a letter from his brother to a James Hamilton which was to be directed to a Mr Murie, who would be 'found at James Cunningham's house in Cadiz'.¹⁵¹ Cunningham therefore had the facilities to provide accommodation to other merchants, suggesting a residence reasonable for his position.

While Cunningham was a prominent Scottish consul and merchant, he was not alone in Cadiz. James Baillie provides another example of a Scotsman present in Cadiz acting as a factor. As Steve Murdoch has discussed, factors were individuals who represented single merchants, groups of merchants, towns or entire kingdoms and were appointed to conduct trade on behalf of their employers. Due to their familiarity with local language, laws and customs, factors were well-placed to obtain the best deal for those they represented.¹⁵² It appears that Baillie left Scotland for Cadiz in September 1676, with a commission from Hector MacKenzie.¹⁵³ In the commission MacKenzie consigned to Baillie a cargo of cloth, including over 160 yards of Yorkshire cloth.¹⁵⁴ In return Baillie was to send ten butts of wine and trusted his business 'taken by me in your ship and the prudent management where of I leave in your care'.¹⁵⁵ In July 1678

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. He is described as a baronet in July 1687, although it is unclear when he was conferred the title. See *RPCS*, iii, XIII, xviii, 30 July 1687.

¹⁴⁸ University of Edinburgh Special Collections, DK 7. 55, 9 December 1687.

¹⁴⁹ *RPCS*, iii, XIII, xviii, 30 July 1687; *CRB*, IV, 78, 5 July 1688.

¹⁵⁰ Jean Agnew, *Belfast Merchant Families in the Seventeenth Century* (Dublin, 1996), 181.

¹⁵¹ Glasgow City Archives, 120/D12/11. 16 September 1682.

¹⁵² Murdoch, *Network North*, 151-2.

¹⁵³ NAS, RH15/49/4. 8 September 1676.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

Baillie was involved in an Admiralty Court case regarding a shipment of wine he had organised.¹⁵⁶ A year earlier Baillie had shipped 10 butts of sack on the *Crown of Burntisland*, skippered by Thomas Dewar, for the Edinburgh merchant John Falconer.¹⁵⁷ Baillie was to assist the case by attesting, on oath, as to whether the butts were half butts or full butts, with Cunningham passing the information on to the court.¹⁵⁸ A commission dated from 1680 placed Baillie back in Scotland where he requested a William Davidson, who was sailing to Cadiz on the *Dolphin*, to sell a cargo of wheat on his behalf.¹⁵⁹ In return Davidson was to purchase wine for Baillie, with Baillie anxious that the wine should be of good quality.¹⁶⁰ In September 1691 a case heard in the Admiralty Court brought to light another factor in Spain, a Mr Williment.¹⁶¹ An analysis of those involved in the case in comparison to the Leith wine books makes it almost certain that the ship was the *Joseph Maria of Ostend*, mastered by Jacob Girbrante.¹⁶² Williment had freighted the vessel with a cargo of wine; however, two merchants of Edinburgh then disagreed over 10 butts of wine. William Dunbar claimed that William Lamb had not paid for his share of the cargo, with Lamb counter-claiming that he had paid for the wine, including the customs duty, but that the wine had not been released.¹⁶³ The judgements of the Admiralty Court in these cases do not reveal a clear winner with both judgements siding with the pursuer. On 11 August it was ruled that Lamb had been badly treated by Dunbar, who had allegedly refused to release the wine, and he was ordered to release the wine or pay him the value of the cargo.¹⁶⁴ However, a month later, in the case of Dunbar versus Lamb, Dunbar argued that Lamb had not paid the £332 7 shillings and 4 pence that was due and the court ruled that the defendant must pay what was owed. Further, Lamb was ordered pay to £40 expenses to Dunbar.¹⁶⁵

Evidence of other mercantile Scots resident in Spain comes to light through documents which discuss Cunningham's business dealings. For example, John Bain is mentioned and, although no further information was given regarding this individual, it can be presumed that Bain was, at the very least, from the British Isles.¹⁶⁶ Another

¹⁵⁶ NAS, AC7/4. 23 July 1678.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, RH15/49/4. 15 August 1680.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, AC7/9. 11 August 1691 and 11 September 1691.

¹⁶² Ibid., AC7/9. 11 August 1691 and 11 September 1691; E72/15/51.

¹⁶³ Ibid, AC7/9. 11 August 1691 and 11 September 1691.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Archivo Municipal de Cadiz, CA2105, 370. August 1667.

individual present in records concerning James Cunningham is John Rendon, who in 1667 was obligated to pay Cunningham 204 pesos.¹⁶⁷ In a letter from John Watson a merchant in Edinburgh to Thomas Macnamara there is evidence of another Scottish merchant in Spain, this time in San Sebastian. Watson advises Macnamara to make use of Thomas Burd a merchant in the region.¹⁶⁸ The register of the citizens of Bruges provides more incidences, with David Tod, a skipper of Kirkcaldy, recorded as a citizen in October 1690.¹⁶⁹ While the Spanish Netherlands may have been eclipsed historically by their more successful northern neighbours, there was clearly a trading connection between Scotland and that region.

Another example is provided by Francis De Muilinares in Bruges. As discussed in chapter one, he provided Bruges lace to Alexander Brand, with Brand petitioning the Privy Council for permission to sell the lace as he had ordered it prior to the ban on foreign textiles.¹⁷⁰ Chapter three also showed that Muilinares had a commercial relationship with Andrew Russell.¹⁷¹ In 1670 Muilinares bought Scottish wool from a merchant in Bruges named Brian Reeve.¹⁷² It is unclear whether Reeve was a Scot, but he was certainly dealing in Scottish goods, with a case coming before the civil courts as Reeve was due money from the other merchant in the scheme, Jan de Vos.¹⁷³ Reeve had therefore confiscated the goods of de Vos until the £81 had been paid.¹⁷⁴ In June 1686 it was Muilinares who was being pursued for non-payment by George Clerk, an Edinburgh merchant, who brought his case before the Admiralty Court. Clerk stated that Muilinares owed him the sum of over 4,200 guilders but that he had only received just under 2,500.¹⁷⁵ Muilinares was ordered to pay the amount due, as well as damages.¹⁷⁶ As this brief case study shows, it made little difference whether a factor was Scottish, what mattered was the expectation of trust. These commercial networks facilitated by mutual trust were the predominant method employed by Scottish merchants to conduct trade either as individuals or in small groups.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, 368. 1667.

¹⁶⁸ NAS, CS96/3309. 15/1/1697.

¹⁶⁹ Bruges City Archives, Register of citizens, 1588-1794, nr. 130, fo. 23; City accounts, nr. 216., 12 October 1690.

¹⁷⁰ *RPCS*, iii, VII, 143-144. 12 June 1681. See also chapter one.

¹⁷¹ See chapter 3.

¹⁷² *Bruges City Archives*, Processen, Nr. 1013/78745. 1670.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. It is also unclear whether this sum is in pounds Sterling or pounds Scots.

¹⁷⁵ NAS, AC7/7, 29 June 1686.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

4. The Problem Regarding Representation

While it is clear that James Cunningham represented Scottish merchants in Spain, this was not always as clear cut in regards to other consuls. As discussed in the previous chapter there were numerous bodies which could and indeed did appoint consuls in Iberia. Further Scottish merchants themselves, along with their Irish counterparts, had no desire to be described as British. This led to some uncertainty as to whom consuls actually represented and this incertitude continued into the 1650's with the Habsburg authorities struggling to decide which nation was represented by a new Judge Conservator. Despite the Restoration this confusion remained, with numerous consuls appointed without clarity regarding who they were representing. This confusion originated at the very top of policy making; for example, the first *Cedula* signed on 19 March 1645 stated the following:

For as much as on the part of you Richard Anthony, Consul of the English nation, by you, and in the name of vassals of the King of Great Britain.¹⁷⁷

This first *Cedula* granted the merchant community certain concessions for the sum of 2500 ducats, of which 1,000 was to be paid immediately to the Spanish Crown, with the rest to be paid the following month.¹⁷⁸ In return the merchants were granted several privileges, one of the most important being that customs officers could not search merchants houses after goods had been registered, therefore preventing them from searching for undeclared goods.¹⁷⁹ The other was the provision of a Judge Conservator for Andalusia, who would ensure the *Cedula* was adhered to, as well as deal with judicial affairs.¹⁸⁰ While this first *Cedula* appears to apply to the subjects of the King of Great Britain, the second, passed in June of the same year, only made reference to 'subjects of the Kingdom of England which reside and trade in Andalusia'.¹⁸¹ The situation changed again when Philip IV signed a third *Cedula* in November which stated:

¹⁷⁷ Hertslet, ed, *A Complete Collection of Treaties*, 165. While this has been translated from the original Spanish the original copy is also included and states the same. Thus it is not a translation error.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, 165, 167.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 171.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 173, 175.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, 179. In regards to the second *Cedula* it appears that Juan de Villalva did not officially issue the document as he (along with others in the Spanish administration) was unhappy with the privileges conferred.

Forasmuch as by my Letter and Decree of the 19th March, of this present year, I did grant to you, the subjects of the King of Great Britain, who reside in Andalusia.¹⁸²

As Stein and Stein have discussed, these *Cedulas* were agreed due to direct pressure from the 'English' merchant community in Andalusia and were regarded by Marques de Mancera, secretary of the Consejo de Estado, as less of an international treaty and more a private one between the merchants of Andalusia and the Consejo.¹⁸³ Nevertheless, they further argue that their importance should not be discounted as they provided evidence as to how

the English merchant community forged a network of privilege within which to operate in order to protect imports from England and to participate legally (and illegally, too) in Lower Andalusia's colonial trade.¹⁸⁴

However, while Stein and Stein discuss the 'English' merchant community in their work, it is clear that this was not necessarily who these *Cedulas* represented. The first and the third *Cedula* both make reference to the subjects of the King of Great Britain, thus including Scottish merchants too.¹⁸⁵

While the authors of the 1645 *Cedulas* were obviously confused as to the political status quo in Britain, the authors of the 1667 Treaty of Madrid were clear as to whom their treaty represented stating:

First, it is agreed and concluded, that from this day forward there shall be, between the Two Crowns of Great Britain and Spain, a general, good, sincere, true, firm and perfect Amity, Confederation and Peace.¹⁸⁶

The treaty also recognised the confusion of the *Cedulas* by conferring the privileges granted in 1645 to all merchants who were subjects of the King of Great Britain.¹⁸⁷ Further, the treaty allowed for the presence of British consuls, 'for the help and protection of the subjects of Great Britain'.¹⁸⁸ This treaty makes it implicitly clear that merchants from the dominions of Great Britain would be conferred any privileges which may previously have been believed to be for English merchants only. Consuls would also represent all merchants serving the King of Great Britain. With this in mind, James Cunningham's position as Scottish consul should technically not have existed.

¹⁸² Ibid, 185.

¹⁸³ Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *Silver, Trade and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Balti, 2000), 60.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, 61.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Hertslet, ed, *A Complete collection of the Treaties*, 140.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, 144.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, 152.

Despite this numerous consuls were appointed in the late seventeenth century where it is unclear which nation, or nations, those consuls represented. As appendix three shows, 18 individuals were appointed with the most common variation being that they were appointed 'by the King of Great Britain for the English nation'.¹⁸⁹ It appears that this confusion was also shared by those appointed. For example, Alexander Stanhope, who was noted as being the 'British' minister at Madrid from 1689 until 1699 apparently struggled to make the Spanish see the difference between the British kingdoms.¹⁹⁰ In a letter to his son, James Stanhope, written at Madrid in July 1699 Stanhope discussed the Darien affair, writing 'it is impossible to make these people understand the difference between the English and Scotch'.¹⁹¹ Stanhope did go on to say that the Spanish appeared to have no problem with making such distinctions when he complained about the conduct of individuals in Aragon or Biscay as he would be answered by Spanish ministers that the king was only the King of Castile.¹⁹² However, in a letter to Mr Blathwayte at the end of August in the same year Stanhope talked about 'our Scots', suggesting some form of familiarity, or more crudely, ownership.¹⁹³

While during the Anglo-Spanish war and into the early seventeenth century Scots were determined to maintain and appeared relatively successful in asserting a separate identity, this may have been eroded as the century wore on. It is interesting to note that, while there was a separate category for Irish merchants in San Sebastian, Andrew Gordon was counted among the English merchants and appeared only to emphasise his Scottish identity when it became clear that his goods would be seized due to Cromwell's actions in the Caribbean.¹⁹⁴ As can be seen from James Cunningham's case, although he was the Scottish consul he was also involved in the broader British community. There may have been a religious element to this, both from an internal and external point of view. For example, the Spanish authorities may have considered the English and Scottish community to be one and the same as they were both from the same island and of (from the Spanish point of view) the same religion. Similarly, internally shared Protestantism and a shared monarchy may have led English and Scottish merchants to stick together. While this is only a theory and has yet to be

¹⁸⁹ AGS, Estado Legajo 4191, Estado 4192. Both of these *consulado* records in the archive use this phrase on numerous occasions.

¹⁹⁰ Lord Mahon, ed, *Spain Under Charles the Second: or Extracts from the Correspondence of the Hon. Alexander Stanhope, British Minister at Madrid, 1690-1699* (London, 1844), 1. Spanish sources document Stanhope as Judge Conservator at Seville as well as ambassador extraordinary. See AGS, Estado Legajo 4191. March 1695.

¹⁹¹ Ibid, 176. Alexander Stanhope to James Stanhope, 8 July 1699.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid, 187. Alexander Stanhope to Mr Blathwayte. 27 August 1699.

¹⁹⁴ AGS, Contaduria del Suedo, serie II, Legajo 158. February 1656.

conclusively proven, it may provide a credible reason as to why the Spanish authorities found it so difficult to understand whom consuls were representing.

5. Darien

While a concerted effort has been made to show that the 'Darien Disaster' was not the be all and end all of Scottish commercial relationships with Spanish and Portuguese territories, it would be detrimental to this project to ignore the enterprise completely. The events of the venture itself are well-known; it was a Scottish attempt to set up a trading colony on the isthmus of Panama (preceding the Panama canal by two hundred years) which failed dismally, with great loss of both life and up to a quarter of Scotland's liquid capital.¹⁹⁵ The failure of the scheme itself has been widely interpreted as the main reason for the formation of the British state: the loss of capital, the 'necessity' of the colonial market for Scottish economic success and financial repayment by England in the Treaty of Union is generally seen as fundamental to Scotland's economic need for union with its neighbour. T.M Devine has argued that the scheme caused political as well as economic unrest which led the land-owning classes in Scotland to believe that 'Scotland's miseries were all rooted in the Regal Union of 1603'.¹⁹⁶ Much blame was laid at the feet of the monarchy itself, and King William caused anger amongst Scots for refusing to support the scheme, his reasoning being that he could not incite disagreement with Spain.¹⁹⁷ This lack of support and public resentment has been cited as the reason behind the nasty Worcester affair in which the Captain of an English East India vessel and two of his crew were hanged on charges of piracy.¹⁹⁸ Whatley has described the incident as fuelling the Scottish population's desire for some form of revenge on England for her attitude to Darien.¹⁹⁹ The economic impacts have also been cited, with the financial loss to Scotland being described as between one-quarter and one-sixth of the kingdom's liquid capital, although an exact measurement is not available.²⁰⁰ Michael Lynch writes:

The role of economic issues in the debate over the Union of 1706-7 is a highly contentious subject, but there can be little doubt that it was the aftermath of the Darien collapse, exacerbated by other loosely related

¹⁹⁵ The most up-to-date publication regarding the Darien venture is Douglas Watt's *The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union and the Wealth of Nations* (Edinburgh, 2007).

¹⁹⁶ Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, 6.

¹⁹⁷ Brown, *Kingdom or Province*, 182-3.

¹⁹⁸ Whatley, *Scots and the Union*, 200.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, 49.

economic issues, which brought about a political crisis in the last two years of William's reign and put Union back on the political agenda.²⁰¹

However, care must be taken when discussing Scottish support for the Darien scheme, which was described as containing the hopes and dreams of the 'Scottish people' in 1695.²⁰² Several prominent Scottish merchants were conspicuous in their absence from the list of subscribers. James Foulis provides one example. Foulis was heavily involved in the early stages of the Company of Scotland, which initially wished to raise half of its total subscription from London. As Watt has shown these early stages of the Company showed it to be a 'London company... and was run by London Scots and English merchants'.²⁰³ This period in the Company's history was a resounding success. Foulis, acting as the treasurer at this time, managed to secure the full subscription of £300,000 sterling within around ten days of the books being opened on 6 November 1695.²⁰⁴ However, the activities of the Company soon attracted unwanted attention - mainly from the English East India Company, which was seriously alarmed at the idea of a competitor and interloper upon their monopoly.²⁰⁵ On 11 November 1695 they banned any member of the company from having anything to do with the Company of Scotland.²⁰⁶ Following petitions from both the English East India Company and the Levant Company, the English House of Lords issued an address discussing the threat that the Company of Scotland posed to both English East India trade and the American plantation trade.²⁰⁷ Surprisingly, the East India and Levant companies were not the only individuals concerned about the Company of Scotland. In January 1695 Edward Randolph, a collector of customs for New York, wrote about Scottish transgressions regarding trade to the colonies.²⁰⁸ He went on to state that he feared that the Company of Scotland would establish a 'staple' for trading European and Colonial commodities which would be 'so great a mischief to England'.²⁰⁹ These alarmist developments led to a mass desertion of the English subscribers with Foulis stating in July that he had

²⁰¹ Micahel Lynch, *Scotland: A New History* (London, 1991), 309.

²⁰² Smout, *A History of the Scottish People*, 225.

²⁰³ Watt, *The Price of Scotland*, 34, 39; James Foulis was the son of John Foulis, who was an apothecary in Edinburgh and died in 1689. See A. W Cornelius Hallen, ed., *The Account Book of Sir John Foulis of Ravelston: 1671-1707*, Scottish History Society, XVI (Edinburgh, 1894), xxi. Foulis is previously discussed in chapter three.

²⁰⁴ Watt, *The Price of Scotland*, 36.

²⁰⁵ John Prebble, *Darien: The Scottish Dream of Empire* (Edinburgh, 1968), 37.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 37.

²⁰⁷ *Journal of the House of Lords, Vol. 15: 1691-96*, online at: www.british-history.ac.uk. Address, representing the Inconveniences and Disadvantages to the Trade of this Kingdom, which attend the Scots Act for establishing an East India Company, 13 December 1695.

²⁰⁸ *Lambeth Palace Library*, MS 942 1522-1705, January 1695.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid*.

returned all the money he had received.²¹⁰ The Company was then forced to remove its base of operations to Scotland and any ideas of English support vanished.

Interestingly, the Scottish London merchants who had been the backbone of the Company while it was based in London also appear to have withdrawn all support completely. James Foulis is not listed in the first court of directors nor are any of the other Scots who had previously been involved in the venture, the only exception was William Patterson himself.²¹¹ Of the London-based Scottish promoters of the Company, all are conspicuously absent by the time the Scottish subscription lists were opened.²¹² None of these individuals made an appearance on the Scottish lists nor did they seem to take any further part in the Company's business.²¹³ As far as can be ascertained, Foulis's only other involvement in the Company was to send correspondence, which included copies of letters sent from New York in October 1699 written by George Moffat (supercargo on the vessel the *Caledonia*) which confirmed the rumour that the settlement had been abandoned.²¹⁴ Hugh Fraser's (another London backer) only other involvement in the scheme was to act as a debt collector for the Company after a young merchant, James Smyth, embezzled Company funds given to him by Patterson.²¹⁵ Fraser also provided the funds for Captain Pinkerton and his crew to return to Scotland and was reimbursed £5 from the Company funds.²¹⁶ The fact that these men did not continue with the scheme once it lost English backing shows an excellent degree of understanding, on their part, of the necessity of, if not English support, at least English neutrality towards the scheme. When it became clear that the king, the English Parliament and English trading companies were actively hostile to the project, the merchants appear to have wanted nothing more to do with it. A lack of confidence in, or perhaps a more realistic opinion of, the enigmatic William Patterson was also held by one of the London Scots, David Nairn, who in a letter to the Earl of Leven wrote,

²¹⁰ *The Case of Mr William Paterson in Relation to His Claim on the Equivalent; As the same is stated in A Petition given in by Himself and A Report made by Mr Roderick Mackenzie; To the Honourable Exchequer of North Britain* (Edinburgh, 1708), 8.

²¹¹ Watt, *The Prize of Scotland*, Appendix II, 264.

²¹² The London-based Scottish promoters were: James Chiesly, Thomas Coutts, Thomas Deans, Hugh Fraser, James Foulis, David Nairn, John Smith and Walter Stuart. See Prebble, *Darien*, passim. Walter Stuart may well have been Walter Stewart, the London-based Scottish merchant previously discussed in chapter three.

²¹³ John Hill Burton, ed, *The Darien Papers: Being a Selection of Original Letters and Official Documents Relating to the Establishment of a Colony at Darien by the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, 1695-1700* (Edinburgh, 1849), appendix. Searches through Watt's publication, *The Prize of Scotland*, reveal no mention of these men in relation to Company matters.

²¹⁴ Prebble, *Darien*, 232-3.

²¹⁵ Watt, *The Prize of Scotland*, 112.

²¹⁶ *Royal Bank of Scotland Archives*, D/22/3. Journal of the court of directors of the Company of Scotland, 20 August 1700.

'My Lord I am far from being against the India trade but I must be free to tell your lordship that I think Mr Patterson talks too much and peoples expectations are raised too great'.²¹⁷

These men were fully aware of the power of the English East India Company and knew that, without English support, subscribing to the Company of Scotland was too risky and they were not prepared to invest money in such a venture.

Several Scottish-based merchants were not so cautious, including a number of merchants who had previously purchased Iberian goods. James Balfour is perhaps the best example. Balfour was heavily involved in the Company, being on the board of directors as well as investing £1,000 sterling in the venture.²¹⁸ George Lockhart of Glasgow similarly put forward the hefty sum of £1,000 sterling as did Charles Charters. John Marjoriebanks and James Baillie also contributed to the Company.²¹⁹ While it is clear that a number of Scottish merchants involved in Iberian trade did pledge significant amounts of money to the venture, merchants did not form the largest social group of investors. It was the nobility who made up the majority, comprising 48.6 percent of the subscription, while merchants from Edinburgh and Glasgow alone made up a little less than half that percentage, 22.3 percent and merchants from other royal burghs contributed 4.9 percent.²²⁰ These figures are telling: while the nobility certainly had the funds to invest, so did merchants and it is surprising that their contribution did not constitute a higher percentage. William Patterson was undoubtedly a very persuasive man and managed to get some of the country's most successful merchants to pledge money to the Company of Scotland. But many Scots were conspicuous by their absence, suggesting that for all the patriotism involved they were not willing to take the risk on such a venture. For example, Walter Gibson was not present on the subscription lists, nor was fellow Glasgow merchant Thomas Weir. Thomas Sommerville of Edinburgh was not listed, nor were Henry Bothwell and William Menzies.

While those who subscribed in Scotland had to deal with the loss of their investments upon the scheme's failure, Captain Pinkerton and the crew of the *Dolphin* nearly lost their lives as a result of the Darien expedition. At the beginning of February 1699 Pinkerton was instructed, along with Captain John Malloch, to sail the *Dolphin* to

²¹⁷ NAS, GD26/13/43. 16 June 1696.

²¹⁸ Burton, ed., *The Darien Papers*, appendix.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 150.

the Dutch-held entrepôt of Curaçao as well as the island of St Thomas to trade.²²¹ However, at the beginning of March another man, Captain Pilkington, returned from Cartagena to report that Pinkerton and the crew had been taken prisoner in that city.²²² Further details are found in a statement from Captain Pinkerton, which was made after his release. In this he stated that on 5 February the ship struck a rock and that, despite the best efforts of the crew, the vessel began to sink and so they ran the vessel ashore at Cartagena.²²³ The Treaty of Madrid did give British ships the right to seek shelter in Iberian-held ports, if required, and thus Pinkerton and his crew probably felt they would be safe at Cartagena - or perhaps they did not have a choice.²²⁴

Interestingly, this story does not quite tally with the one received in the Darien colony itself. In a letter from one of the colonists, George Douglas, to the laird of Strathendry Douglas stated that Pinkerton and his crew may have been able to leave Cartagena safely but had been betrayed by the lieutenant of a French ship.²²⁵ This is likely to be an example of propaganda - the governors at the colony were trying to make the capture sound a more honourable affair. Whatever the true story, the reaction in the colony was one of anger, and it was decided that Captain Pilkington should be dispatched without delay to Cartagena to demand the release of the prisoners and state that if this request was refused letters of reprisal would immediately be given to Pilkington and Captain Sands.²²⁶ However, at the end of March the messenger returned with a steadfast refusal from the Governor of Cartagena.²²⁷ Indeed, the prisoners were transferred to Havana and then to Cadiz in September 1699.²²⁸ Two of the prisoners, George Cowan and Andrew Livingston, appear to have escaped Spanish custody during this transfer, with Cowan actually wishing to return to Darien and Livingstone presented with four gallons of the Company's brandy.²²⁹ After petitions from Pinkerton's wife, the Company finally decided to write to King William in order to help secure the release of the sailors. Unfortunately for the imprisoned men, the directors were

²²¹ Burton, ed., *The Darien Papers*, 183. Report by William Patterson to the Directors - Report of matters relating to the colony of Caledonia of the Indian and African company of Scotland - at Edinburgh the 19 day of December 1699. Curaçao is just off the northern coast of modern day Venezuela and the island of St Thomas is part of the modern day United States Virgin Islands in the Caribbean.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid, 102. Statement by Captain Pinkerton. Undated - but it must be assumed that it was after the crew's release as the statement discusses their liberation.

²²⁴ See chapter one.

²²⁵ NAS, GD446/39/15. 5 March 1699.

²²⁶ Burton, ed., *The Darien Papers*, 186.

²²⁷ Ibid, 187.

²²⁸ Ibid, 102.

²²⁹ *Royal Bank of Scotland Archives*, D/22/3, Journal of the court of directors of the Company of Scotland, 4 June 1700 and 13 June 1700.

chancing their arm, asking not only for assistance with the release of the prisoners but also the use of three royal navy vessels.²³⁰ Even worse, the Company decided to send Lord Basil Hamilton, brother to the Duke of Hamilton, whom William suspected of disloyalty.²³¹ In a letter to Lord Carmichael the Duke of Hamilton strongly refuted the claims, stating that he had been misrepresented to the king and that 'my brother Basil's journey was far from being his choice but what the company most peremptorily put upon him'.²³² William did indeed refuse to see Lord Basil, although he did read and respond to the petition.²³³ William ignored the Company completely and wrote directly to the Scottish Privy Council stating that he would ask Carlos II to release the prisoners.²³⁴

The plight of the men was, by this point, well-known and invoked the interest of Martin Westcombe. The first mention of Westcombe as consul in Cadiz is in a letter from the consul in Lisbon, Thomas Maynard, to Westcombe in Cadiz in December 1664.²³⁵ Westcombe had an astonishingly long career and is recorded as consul in Cadiz until at least 1715.²³⁶ After the 1707 Treaty of Union it is certain that Westcombe represented all British merchants; however, as previously discussed, prior to 1707 this was not always clear. Despite this, it is apparent who Westcombe believed he was representing. In a memorial to the Marquess of Navarre Westcombe argued strongly on behalf of Pinkerton and his crew, despite the previous English hostility to the Company of Scotland.²³⁷ In this document Westcombe described himself as 'consul and agent general of his majesty of Great Britain' and further stated that Pinkerton and company were the 'subjects of his majesty of Great Britain'.²³⁸ While admitting that the men had sailed from Nova Caledonia, Westcombe stated that, 'the said *English* were not found in the exercise of anything that was prohibited and were only sailing to the parts of the dominions of the *King of Great Britain*'.²³⁹ Westcombe's attempt to describe the men as English and under the protection of the King of Great Britain is interesting. King William famously made his feeling towards the Company of Scotland, and that country in general, very clear. Westcombe was obviously trying to make the Spanish authorities

²³⁰ Prebble, *Darien*, 271.

²³¹ NAS, GD406/1/9071. 19 December 1699.

²³² NAS, GD406/1/4547/1. 3 January 1700.

²³³ William Fraser, ed., *The Annandale Family Book of the Johnstones, Earls and Marquises of Annandale, vol II: Correspondence and Index* (Edinburgh, 1894), 197-9. James, Viscount of Seafield to William, Earl of Annandale, 11 January 1700.

²³⁴ Prebble, *Darien*, 272. Attempts have been made to find this letter from William, however, it has not yet been discovered.

²³⁵ TNA, SP89/6, 298. 22 December 1664.

²³⁶ TNA, SP94/213. Westcombe was consul until early July 1716 and was replaced by Charles Russell.

²³⁷ NAS, GD248/558/31. 16 January 1700.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

²³⁹ *Ibid.* Italics are the author's own.

believe that King William cared about the fate of these men. Westcombe's attempt, however, was unsuccessful and in a letter to Lord Basil Hamilton Pinkerton wrote that he and the other prisoners had received poor treatment and that consular assistance was not improving matters for them.²⁴⁰ The letter also discusses Pinkerton and the crew's understandable apprehension at how events could unfold.²⁴¹ Pinkerton's questioning by the authorities at Seville asked how he (an experienced sailor) could not be aware of the fact that Darien belonged to the King of Spain.²⁴² Pinkerton replied that he had never traded there previously so was unaware what belonged to the King of Spain and that the native Americans at Darien told the arriving Scots that they had never been conquered by any European nation.²⁴³ Pinkerton's explanations were all in vain, however, as in late June Pinkerton, Benjamin Spencer, John Malloch and James Graham were sentenced to death for the crime of piracy, with David Wilson being exempt from the penalty because of his young age.²⁴⁴ On 21 June Westcombe wrote again, this time to Edward Villiers, the Earl of Jersey, a prominent minister in the English Privy Council and Secretary for State for the Southern Department to plead for assistance in the case.²⁴⁵ Westcombe asked Jersey to 'acquaint his majty with it, and procure his gracious order in their behalf'.²⁴⁶ In July James Ogilvy, the Earl of Seafield and a noted opponent to the Darien venture, wrote to the king directly reminding him of his letter to the Privy Council in January and making William aware that the men were now under sentence of death.²⁴⁷ On the same day Seafield wrote to William Carstares, a prominent courtier who was also appointed King William's chaplain while he was Prince of Orange and following the Glorious Revolution had immense influence and power in Scotland on the king's behalf.²⁴⁸ Seafield asked for Carstares' assistance stating,

I would not have written to his Majesty this night, but that the accounts from Spain do bear, that Captain Pinkerton, and those of his crew, are sentenced to

²⁴⁰ NAS, GD248/558/31. 30 April 1700.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Burton, ed., *The Darien Papers*, 106. Questions proposed to Captain Pincartone by the Judges at Seville and his answers.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ NAS, GD248/558/31. 26 June 1700. It appears that Benjamin Spencer may not have been part of the original crew of the *Dolphin* but was actually picked up after being left on the shore by a vessel leaving Darien. Massachusetts Historical Society Boston citing 'Audiencia de Panama Estado 161 lejago 2540 (69-6-6)'.

²⁴⁵ Ibid; *DBN*, Stuart Handley, 'Villiers, Edward, first earl of Jersey (1655?–1711)', Jersey gave up his position as Secretary of the Southern Department at some point in June 1700 for the position of Lord Chamberlain, but it is unlikely that Westcombe would have been aware of this.

²⁴⁶ NAS, GD248/558/31. 21 June 1700.

²⁴⁷ *DNB*, John R. Young, 'Ogilvy, James, fourth earl of Findlater and first earl of Seafield (1663–1730)'.

²⁴⁸ *DNB*, Tristram Clarke, 'Carstares, William (1649–1715)'.

die and, if they suffer death it will very much increase the ferment in Scotland, as you well know.²⁴⁹

The King finally wrote on 22 July and the letter obviously arrived in time as Pinkerton and the rest of the prisoners were freed around 20 September 1700 and returned to Scotland.²⁵⁰ As Christopher Storrs has argued, while Spain as a world power may have been in decline in comparison to its position in the sixteenth century, it was still more than capable of defending its territories against interlopers.²⁵¹ Had the Scottish scheme enjoyed English support the outcome may have been very different - but, the concerns of the East India Company and William's desire not to antagonise his Spanish counterpart, meant that vital English support was not forthcoming. The case of Pinkerton and his crew, however, shows that the Scots were not fully abandoned: Martin Westcombe, in particular, attempted to assist, invoking the name of Great Britain and even attempting to describe Pinkerton and co. as English to try to secure their release. His actions were such that, following the return of the prisoners to Scotland, the Company decided to write a letter of thanks to Westcombe for his efforts.²⁵² Even those who had steadfastly refused to support the Company of Scotland, such as the Earl of Seafield and William Carstares, provided assistance in this case by recognising that if the men were executed Scottish dissent with the crown would only grow.

Conclusion.

This examination of Scottish trade with Iberia in the late seventeenth century has proven beyond doubt that Scotland and her merchants participated fully in Iberian trade. The dangers from North African corsairs did not deter a small but significant group of merchants from obtaining Iberian goods directly from the source. Precautions were taken - for example, John Marjoriebanks split his cargo across two vessels which departed at different times or the prevalence of skippers travelling together on their journeys to Iberia. The opportunity to conduct trade in profitable commodities, which

²⁴⁹ Joseph McCormick, ed., *State Papers and Letters Addressed to William Carstares* (Edinburgh, 1774), 558-9. 12 July 1700. Seafield to Carstares.

²⁵⁰ NAS, GD248/558/31/10, 22 July 1700; Burton, ed., *The Darien Papers*, 104. Statement by Captain Pinkerton.

²⁵¹ Christopher Storrs, 'Disaster at Darien (1698-1700)? The Persistence of Spanish Imperial Power on the Eve of the Demise of the Spanish Habsburgs', *European History Quarterly* 29:1 (1999), 27-8.

²⁵² *Royal Bank of Scotland Archives*, D/22/3, Journal of the court of directors of the Company of Scotland, 20 August 1700.

were popular with a burgeoning gentry class, was enough of an incentive for some merchants and skippers to take the risks involved in trading to southern Europe.

While Scotland may have been a more stable country at the end of the seventeenth century than it had been in the 1640s and 1650s, other conflicts did occur which affected Scottish merchants. The Anglo-Dutch wars, which due to their very title have ignored Scottish contributions, did influence the shipping and trade of Scottish traders. Nonetheless, as in previous conflicts, Scottish merchants were equal to the task, sailing to and living in the ports of the Spanish Netherlands in order to continue trading. During the French war the further precautions of convoys and the use of neutral shipping was undertaken. As Steve Murdoch has shown, remarkably few Scottish ships were taken prize during this conflict, showing that these methods were successful, although French affinity with the Scots was likely to be an important factor.²⁵³

These Scottish merchants were supported by an existing merchant community in Iberia, particularly in Cadiz and the surrounding Andalusian coastline and Lisbon. Factors and consuls were present, providing local knowledge, assistance and, in the case of James Cunningham, a place to stay. Cunningham was certainly not alone, with a handful of Scottish factors as well as the wider British community also present, which judging from the mixture of Scottish and English signatures on documents in the Iberian archives suggests a degree of integration despite the political independence of both countries. The efforts of Martin Westcombe in relation to the Darien affair also show a sense of integration, despite the confusion that some of his colleagues, the Spanish, and even the Stuart authorities, probably felt in regards to his position. The Darien expedition and, indeed, the Spanish reaction to it, also showed that while Spain was not the power it had been it was still an important European kingdom, a point it would continue to emphasise in the following century.

While the Darien event is different from the rest of this chapter, it would have been impossible not to mention it within the scope of this thesis. In analysing the Scottish London merchants involved in early parts of the venture it can be safely said that experienced merchants with a detailed knowledge of English trade knew that without English neutrality or support the scheme would collapse. Thus they refused to get involved financially once it became clear that the English authorities were hostile to the idea. The actions of Martin Westcombe, in his efforts to have Pinkerton and the crew of the *Dolphin* freed, however, show an attempt to hoodwink the Spanish

²⁵³ Murdoch, 'Terror of the Seas', Appendix VII:2, 404-7; Talbott, 'An Alliance Ended?'.

authorities with the use of terms that technically did not have legal weight until 1707. Even King William himself was aware that to allow the men to die without appearing to intervene in any way would only further turn opinion against him in Scotland, which, with the continued Jacobite threat was dangerous.

Chapter Six: The War of Spanish Succession to the Siege of Gibraltar.

‘the imports into this place consists chiefly in dried cod fish from Scotland, Newfoundland & New England’¹

The end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth brought significant uncertainty to Europe in the form of the Spanish succession crisis. Following the death of Carlos II in 1700, the whole of Europe was anxious to resolve the problem of the vacant monarchy with the choice of the Bourbon Philip V plunging Europe into a conflict which was not resolved until 1713. After the disaster that was the Darien expedition Scotland had its own problems with the English government threatening to pass the Alien Act if negotiations for a political union were not undertaken. Evidence for trade to Iberia during this period is confined to a few scattered sources with the Crown Money book of Leith demonstrating that, despite the rise of Glasgow as a trading entrepôt, Leith was still a hub of European trade with traffic to Iberia and its dominions greater than has been previously understood. The market for Iberian goods such as wine and citrus fruits also provides evidence as to the popularity of the trade, with the Duchess of Hamilton providing one of many examples. Voyages did not always go to plan, however, and records of disagreements show how the War of Spanish Succession affected commerce. This resulted in many Scots resorting to the employment of devious methods to continue trading. Taken together the information collated here shows that, in spite of the conflict, trade with Iberia once more continued to be popular.

The official end of hostilities technically came with the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Nonetheless, tensions remained, with Spain humiliated by a treaty which saw it lose most of its European territories. The loss of Gibraltar, which was essentially part of the Spanish mainland, was particularly hard to bear for the new Bourbon monarchy and soured political relations between Britain and Spain. This tension led to another brief spat in 1718 which culminated in the disastrous Jacobite invasion of 1719 which came with the backing of the new Spanish monarch and ended in catastrophe for Spanish troops at Glenshiel. During this time British ships were arrested in Spanish ports with several Scottish individuals reporting the seizure of their goods. Once again sporadic evidence shows that trade did continue through the connivance of third parties with a Dutch-French factor, Juan van Duffe, acting for Scottish merchants and organising trade on their behalf. In particular, John Steuart’s letters to Van Duffe reveal the extent

¹ NAS, RH9/14/102, 14 January 1727.

to which Steuart trusted Van Duffe to provide up-to-date information. In another case study, the career of Mark Pringle is examined in closer detail. Pringle's career, specifically, his role prior to being appointed as official consul, requires this focussed attention as the problems he encountered are less to do with the surrounding tensions between Britain and Spain but rather jealousy in the British merchant community. Further Pringle provides an excellent example of how a merchant consul dealt with matters such as merchant disputes in conjunction with maintaining his own trade.

Finally, the chapter examines the events leading up to the siege of Gibraltar in 1727. Primarily, it investigates the diplomatic build-up to the event, involving David Dunbar, the consul of San Sebastian, in his dual role of consul and informant. The chapter concludes with an examination of British trade during this incident and compares the diplomatic tensions with the actual effect upon merchants trading with Iberia at the time. In particular Edward Burd's journal provides evidence not only of the desire of merchants to continue trading but also of a significant trade in Scottish fish to Barcelona. In combination these case studies reveal the continued importance of Scottish-Iberian trade both before and after the British treaty of Union.

1. The Spanish War of Succession

While it was not clear until the 1690s that Carlos II of Spain would die without issue, his almost constant state of ill health meant that as early as the late 1660s European leaders were making clandestine agreements as to how Spain would be ruled after his death.² Several secret partition agreements were rendered invalid either by changing conditions or the untimely death of those whom the Spanish crown was settled upon.³ Of course, the Habsburg authorities in Spain themselves were the most anxious as to what would befall the country following the king's death. Carlos II and his council did not wish Spain and its dominions to be partitioned and looked for a candidate who they believed could secure Spain and its territories.⁴ Philip, the Duke of Anjou and grandson of Louis XIV, was named as King of Spain in Carlos's will and was welcomed by the Spanish people.⁵ While other European powers were unimpressed with this settlement, it was not until after Louis XIV had invaded the Spanish Netherlands and declared (contrary to Carlos's will) that Philip may still be King of France that a 'grand alliance'

² Kamen, *Spain, 1469-1715*, 262.

³ Ibid, 262-3.

⁴ David J. Sturdy, *Fractured Europe: 1600-1721* (Oxford, 2002), 321.

⁵ Ibid, 321.

was formed in opposition to Philip.⁶ This alliance consisted of the Stuart monarchy, the authorities of the Dutch Republic, the Austrian Emperor and the Portuguese Crown, each of whom had different reasons for entering the conflict. The Stuart monarchy and the Dutch Republic both wanted to extend their trading influence in the Mediterranean and the Americas. Described by Henry Kamen as a global war, the conflict continued until the Treaty of Utrecht brought peace in April 1713.⁷

Of course the destiny of Spain was not the only concern of the Stuart monarchy, with the fate of its own kingdoms also being debated. Traditional historiography of the Treaty of Union has emphasised the necessity of this event for Scottish economic growth. T.C. Smout, for example, stated that, while the Unionists were naive as to what the Union would achieve, their understanding of the commercial situation (and the importance of English trade to that) was essentially correct.⁸ Rosalind Mitchison concurred, stating that Scotland's major trade was with England and that, due to the 'bondage' with England's foreign trade policy, Scotland had to give up its overseas connections.⁹ Christopher Whatley takes a more revisionist approach stating that Scotland's economy was not as backward as has been argued, although, he agrees that, in comparison to England, Scotland was considerably behind.¹⁰ However, there is another angle to consider. Christopher Storrs has argued that the two events (the Treaty of Union and the War of Spanish Succession) should not be seen in isolation. He asserts that the very method of English and Scottish incorporation was directly affected by the events on the continent.¹¹ The English and Scots, he states, were fearful of Louis XIV and wished to avoid French-style absolutism.¹² The early eighteenth century, therefore, was a period of serious uncertainty for both Scotland and Spain.

Once again, these difficult times did not stop trade from continuing and, while documentation similar to the customs and excise records does not exist for the late 1690s and early eighteenth century, there is no lack of evidence of trade with Iberia for this period. In April 1701 the *Robert of Glasgow*, master Hugh Campbell, arrived home from Cadiz carrying Spanish wine.¹³ Wine on board this vessel was the subject of a bond by William Bogell to Archibald Mure and James Houston (both customs officials)

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Kamen, *Spain 1469-1714*, 264-5.

⁸ T. C. Smout, 'The Anglo Scottish Union of 1707. I. The Economic Background', *The Economic History Review: New Series*, 16:3 (1964) 465.

⁹ Rosalind Mitchison, *A History of Scotland* (London, 1997), 304.

¹⁰ Christopher Whatley, *The Industrial Revolution in Scotland* (Cambridge, 1997), 9-17.

¹¹ Christopher Storrs, 'The Union of 1707 and the War of Spanish Succession', *Scottish Historical Review* 87 (2008), 34.

¹² Ibid, 36.

¹³ NAS, E75/78. 29 January 1718.

for the sum of £426 a shilling and sixpence Scots, the customs payment due for 11 butts and a quarter cask of sack. Interestingly, the document was not registered until 29 January 1718.¹⁴ The Crown Money Book of Leith also provides evidence of numerous journeys between Scotland and Iberia during the war, with 27 journeys recorded.¹⁵ Unsurprisingly, 12 of the voyages were undertaken to northern Spanish ports and, considering the composition of cargoes from these ports during the Nine Years' War it is most likely these vessels brought French wine to Scotland. Journeys were also undertaken to Cadiz, the Canaries and Lisbon with several entries only noting destination at a national level.¹⁶ The Dundee register also provides evidence post-1700 with several Scottish ships journeying to Portugal.¹⁷ For example, in April 1709 the *Margaret of Dundee*, skippered by Robert Rankin arrived carrying 'merchant goods', followed by an unnamed ship, skippered by John Kincaid from the same port carrying salt in July 1711.¹⁸ Christopher Whatley has used these sources to show that the Treaty of Union fostered an increased trade with Iberia.¹⁹ However, caution is required when attempting to understand long term trading patterns. For example, the Dundee shipping register used by Whatley only encompasses a 13 year period from 1700-1713 which makes long-term analysis difficult. Further, in the case of the Crown Money Book for Leith, as previously noted, data regarding destination was not always recorded: while some years show a disposition to note the port visited, other years do not and merely discuss money paid for 'a voyage'. Therefore, while these sources are excellent for showing that trade with Iberia continued, they are not necessarily helpful in trying to establish long-term trading patterns and care should be taken when utilising them.

The prevalence of Iberian goods among the household accounts of the gentry also show their popularity and obtainability in this period. In January 1704 Elizabeth the Duchess of Hamilton wrote to her husband, who from the context of the letter was presumably in Edinburgh. She requested that he obtain Canary wine, oranges and lemons and instructed him to ask Captain Bruce, 'for he knows who has those'.²⁰ In a similar letter the Earl of Mar wrote to his wife, Margaret, informing her that

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Crown money was collected by the skipper and theoretically paid by every member of the crew with payment supposed to be made after every voyage. However, sometimes several voyages were paid for at once and the destinations of the vessels were not always recorded. Many thanks to Sue Mowatt for drawing my attention to this resource.

¹⁶ NAS, GD226/7/1. Any error calculating these figures are my own.

¹⁷ Dundee Archive and Record Center, Register of Shipping 1580-1715.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Christopher A. Whatley, 'Causes and Consequences of the Union of 1707: A Survey' in *The Scottish Historical Review*, 68 (1989), 171-173.

²⁰ NAS, E75/78. 29 January 1718.

he had obtained oranges and lemons for her in Edinburgh but that ‘there is not a lobster nor partain in toune’.²¹ Spanish sack, indigo and figs all feature in Charles Stewart’s account of goods supplied to the Breadalbane family in February 1705.²² Robert Milne’s record of money due to him by the Earl of Southesk is much the same, noting a variety of household items, including Spanish salt and oranges.²³

Scots also continued to reside in Spain with a deed registered at Leith in 1702 documenting the affairs of an Archibald Blackadder, resident in Cadiz.²⁴ Whether this is any relation to the Balthasar Blackadder who was also in Cadiz in 1707 is, as yet, unclear. In August 1707 a letter of payment was recorded between Balthasar Blackadder and Antonio Garcia & co.²⁵ Blackadder, from Tulliallan, is noted as the legitimate son of James Blackadder and Elena Smart. In a letter from John Dunlop to his father in 1683 a Mr Blackadder is mentioned as living in Cadiz with his servant James Weir, who was Dunlop’s contact in Iberia.²⁶ This individual could be Archibald, Balthasar, or someone else entirely.

As always, disagreements provide further evidence of trade or intended trade with Iberia. In 1708 Charles Mitchell hired a crew for a voyage from Inverness to Lisbon. Due to poor weather, however, the ship was forced into Greenock and the crew deserted.²⁷ Two of men involved, Alexander Hutton and James Violence, were vouched for by relations, with James’s father, Ludovick, stating that his son would return to the vessel and William Hutton, a merchant burgess of Edinburgh, promising that Alexander would pay his expenses.²⁸ Inverness and its surrounding area was the Scottish port involved in another case regarding a journey to Lisbon in 1709, with John Roy, a merchant of Forres, pursuing the master of the *Three Brothers of Leith*, Charles Mitchell.²⁹ Due to poor weather the ship had been forced to seek shelter in Autumn 1708, with the refitting that was then required causing arguments over expenses to erupt between the merchants involved and the skipper over expenses.³⁰

The Spanish War of Succession itself also caused problems, with Robert Gray’s vessel providing an instance of this. As discussed in chapter three, Gray obtained

²¹ NAS, GD124/15/231/4. Earl of Mar to Countess of Mar, April 1705.

²² NAS, GD112/35/21. 6 February 1705.

²³ NAS, E657/103. The list of the account runs over the years 1715-16.

²⁴ NAS, RD4/91. 1702

²⁵ Archivo Municipal de Cadiz, CA2384, 1326-1328. 28 August 1702.

²⁶ *Glasgow City Archives*, MSS 120/D12/26-27. Dunlop states that he and Weir were old school friends, hence their acquaintance.

²⁷ NAS, AC10/67. 14 September 1708.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ NAS, AC8/110. 1 November 1709.

³⁰ Ibid.

insurance at Rotterdam for his ship's onward journey to Lisbon from Benjamin Dubois.³¹ Gray was sailing as part of a convoy from Rotterdam to Lisbon but that did not prevent his ship being taken by two French privateers before he reached Lisbon.³² A more complex example, while not resulting in the loss of a vessel, does provide information as to the difficulties involved in trading during wartime. In 1708 James Smith entered into a charter party with Robert Stewart and James Brebner and undertook a voyage from Fraserburgh to Bilbao.³³ The journey was undertaken successfully, with the disagreements beginning upon the vessel's return. Smith pursued Stewart and Brebner, arguing that they had not paid all the freight charges, namely the costs of a Spanish crew who were brought onto the vessel at Bilbao.³⁴ Smith argued that Brebner had attempted to obtain a French pass for the ship in order that it could complete its journey in safety. However, as this could not be obtained, Smith claimed that the factor he dealt with in Bilbao advised getting a Spanish pass (necessitating a Spanish crew) to ensure the safety of the homeward voyage.³⁵ Brebner counter argued that the charter party stated that Smith should have a sufficient crew. Further, the defendants pointed out that as the crew already onboard the vessel managed to ensure its safe arrival at Bilbao they should have been able to sail it back to Scotland.³⁶ While this voyage was completed successfully, it does indicate the level of precaution that was undertaken and also the ability of merchants to find ways round the problems caused by war.

As Steve Murdoch has investigated, the French authorities granted passes to Scots and Irishmen in France, allowing them to trade despite the conflict.³⁷ This enabled France to obtain necessary produce, as well as attempt to deepen divisions between the Stuart kingdoms.³⁸ Siobhan Talbott concurs, and also points out that Queen Anne gained a reputation for issuing passes allowing Scottish merchants to trade with France.³⁹ The gaining of a French pass (or indeed a Spanish pass), therefore, was a common way to continue trading during the War of Spanish Succession. Why Brebner could not obtain the French pass is uncertain but Smith (and possibly the factor at Bilbao) obviously deemed some form of protection necessary for the home journey. Whether the success of the homeward journey was due to the Spanish pass is

³¹ NAS, AC9/284. 1707.

³² Ibid.

³³ NAS, AC9/319. 1708.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Murdoch, 'The French Connection', 37.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Talbott, 'An Alliance Ended?', 197.

debatable; as Murdoch has shown, very few Scottish vessels were taken by the French during the conflict, with over a hundred ships entering Bordeaux with French passes between 1707 and 1712.⁴⁰ This does not include neutral vessels undertaking trade on behalf of Scots or Scottish vessels disguising themselves as neutral.⁴¹ The continuing affinity between the Scots and the French (as well as economic necessity) clearly allowed trade to France and, due to the new familial connections in Philip V, Spain to continue.

Despite both the conflict and Scotland's own tensions with England in the early years of the eighteenth century, Iberian goods continued to make their way to Scotland. Indeed, for the gentry class they appeared to be normal commodities and were widely available. Although the case of Robert Gray shows the ill effects conflict could have on trade, this was far outweighed by the continuation of normal trade. A perfect example of this is given by William Fraser. Despite the political insecurity between Scotland and England, Fraser remained in London, continuing to trade to Iberia and sending supplies to the Newmills textile factory in Haddington.⁴² His views on Scotland's new political arrangement are also clear. Writing to his cousin Robert Fraser, an advocate in Edinburgh, he wrote 'you have been too long a lieut. generall of the noes as to the Union to expect any share in the equivalent here now'.

2. An Uneasy Peace? 1713-1726

While the war of Spanish succession was concluded by the Treaty of Utrecht, tensions continued to simmer between the new country of Great Britain and Spain. Spain had been stripped of large parts of its foreign territories, with Austria gaining the Spanish Italian territories, the Spanish Netherlands no longer in Spanish control, and the islands of Gibraltar and Minorca declared British territories. Kamen has described the loss of these territories as beneficial to the Spanish economy, Spain was finally able to concentrate solely on itself.⁴³ Perhaps unsurprisingly the new Bourbon monarchy did not consider the loss in the same light. In particular, Philip IV's second wife, Elizabeth Farnese of Italy, was single-minded in her desire to provide an inheritance for her

⁴⁰ Murdoch, 'Terror of the Seas', Appendix VII:2, 404-7; Murdoch, 'The French Connection', 38.

⁴¹ Murdoch, 'The French Connection', 38.

⁴² NAS, CS96/524.

⁴³ Kamen, *Spain, 1469-1714*, 268.

sons.⁴⁴ Indeed, Charles Russell, the British consul of Cadiz wrote to the British authorities stating

The Treaty of Utrecht was in the opinion of most, more a cessation of hostility between Great Britain and Spain than a reconciliation of the motives that occasioned the late war.⁴⁵

Further, Russell went on to discuss the effects of the War of Succession on trade stating that Andalusia and Castile had been reduced to dire poverty through the raising of soldiers and that merchant numbers had almost halved.⁴⁶ By the winter of 1717 tensions were at breaking point again, with Elizabeth's advisor Cardinal Alberoni (another Italian) sending a fleet to recapture Sicily under the Marquis of Leda.⁴⁷ The British government responded by sending a fleet under Admiral Bing and in August 1718 the British fleet destroyed the Spanish fleet at Cape Passaro, which led to the Spanish authorities arresting all British ships and goods in Spain.⁴⁸ For example, in an attempt to gain recompense several merchants of the port of Bidesford (in Devon) listed their losses at the hands of the Spanish in the autumn of 1718. The list consists of five vessels, all carrying cargoes of Newfoundland fish and ranging in value (ship and goods) from £1250 - £2700.⁴⁹ The most valuable, the *Neptune of Bidesford*, was a new ship on her first voyage when it was seized in La Coruña in late September 1718.⁵⁰ This led to a declaration of war by Britain and France in December 1718, compounded by the Spanish recognition of James Francis Edward as King of Britain.⁵¹ John Cross, British consul of Tenerife, also had his goods seized and wrote that if it were not for the timely intervention of the Bishop of the Canaries, the authorities would have seized his clothes and bedding too.⁵² Cross also claimed that one of his own ships was taken at sea in late 1718- early 1719, the *Queen Anne*, skippered by Thomas Gibbs.⁵³ Other Scottish vessels were also seized such as the *Providence*, skippered by David Hawkins and owned by David Gordon. The ship was arrested while at Cadiz with recompense

⁴⁴ William G.F Jackson, *The Rock of the Gibraltarians: A History of Gibraltar* (Grendon, 1987), 116.

⁴⁵ NAS, GD158/1653. Charles Russell to unknown (likely British authorities), 18 November 1718.

⁴⁶ Ibid. While Russell does not make clear if this is British or Spanish merchant numbers, or just merchants in general, he does make clear that he believes this has affected all trade.

⁴⁷ Black, *British Foreign Policy*, 1.

⁴⁸ Jackson, *The Rock*, 117-9.

⁴⁹ NAS, GD158/1666. It is not clear whether this is sterling or pounds Scots.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid, 117-9.

⁵² Steckley, 'The Wine Economy', 348-9.

⁵³ Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JO/10/3/231/33-37, 13 May 1735. There is not a conclusive date for this seizure but it lies between two others dated November 1718 and March 1719. Gibbs is likely to the same individual who recorded a journey to Bilbao in Crown Money Book of Leith in 1715.

valued at over £1,900 sterling.⁵⁴ Peter Fraser's ship the *Princess* was detained at Bilbao in December of the same year with the value recorded as nearly £600 sterling.⁵⁵ In further retaliation, the Jacobite Duke of Ormond left Spain with a fleet of six ships and 6,000 men to land in Scotland in the hope of instigating a rebellion against the Hanoverian George I.⁵⁶ The expedition was an abject failure and Britain and France responded by sending a French army led by the Duke of Berwick to invade northern Spain.⁵⁷ Peace was declared in 1720; nevertheless, tensions remained high: the Spanish had no desire to accept Gibraltar's new ownership and the British public became so attached to the peninsula that giving it up was not an option.⁵⁸

The actions of factors representing British merchants, however, show that, while this period was one of tension, merchants tried to continue as normal, with factors not necessarily having to be Scottish in order to represent Scottish merchants. One prominent example was Juan Van Duffe, a factor based in Bilbao, who organised trade for Scottish merchants. Van Duffe was the son of Anthony Van Duffe from Rotterdam and Mary Dubrocq from Bayonne in France and provided a birthbrieve in order to settle in Bilbao in May 1708.⁵⁹ Having his hometown as Bayonne may have been useful to Van Duffe when he was applying for citizenship in Bilbao as the province of Vizcaya and the French province of Labourd (now modern day Pyrénées-Atlantiques) made agreements in both 1653 and 1694 which lessened restrictions on Franco-Spanish trade due to war.⁶⁰ John Steuart was one of the Scottish merchants who dealt with Van Duffe and his letters to Van Duffe show a complex trade network. In May 1712 Steuart wrote regarding a ship of Inverness, *The Alexander*, which had carried a cargo of fish to Bilbao, of which the proceeds had been sent to a Mr Robert Gordon of Bordeaux for the 'company' account.⁶¹ As research by Steve Murdoch has shown, Gordon was a prominent merchant and Jacobite sympathiser in France and assisted many Jacobite exiles.⁶² Steuart wrote that *The Alexander* had arrived back in Inverness, with an Archibald Dunbar disclosing to Steuart that a man called Archer (whom Steuart believed to be Van Duffe's partner) had requested orders regarding the proceeds of a packet of

⁵⁴Ibid. The documents list dozens of ships and it is likely that there are more Scottish examples, however, this cannot be conclusively proven.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Bruce Lenman, *The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689-1746* (Bungay, 1984), 190-4.

⁵⁷ *DNB*, Stuart Handley, 'Fitzjames, James, duke of Berwick upon Tweed (1670-1734)'.

⁵⁸ Jackson, 115.

⁵⁹ AFB, JCR1221/015. 25 May 1708; JCR2690/043. 12 December 1729; Antigua 0391/001/013. 1708.

⁶⁰ Grafe, 'Northern Spain', 171.

⁶¹ Mackay, *The Letter Book*, 18-9. 12 May 1712.

⁶² Murdoch, 'The French Connection', 39-41.

fish.⁶³ According to records at the archives in Bilbao this Archer could refer to one of two gentlemen. The first was Michael Archer who provided a birthbrieve in 1731 and had married a Mary Geraldino in Bilbao in 1716.⁶⁴ The second, John Archer, was also named in records of the *Archivo Foral de Bizkala*; unfortunately there is, as yet, no indication as to which man Steuart was discussing.⁶⁵ Whichever Archer was involved, Steuart wrote to Van Duffe that he wanted the money to be sent to Alexander Andrew.⁶⁶ He also asked that in the future any money was to be sent to either London or Rotterdam (likely to George Outcherlony and Alexander Andrew) and not to Robert Gordon.⁶⁷ Steuart finally requested information regarding the market for fish in Bilbao in the year 1712 as there was a surplus of fish in Scotland that year.⁶⁸ Steuart continued other trade for some years, corresponding with both George Outcherlony in London and Alexander Andrew in Rotterdam and did not contact Van Duffe again until April 1721. He again enquired after the state of the market in Bilbao. He further wrote that he had received Van Duffe's letter of August 1720 in which he advised not to send any fish or salmon to Bilbao as it would not sell.⁶⁹ In June 1721 Steuart once more requested the state of the market at Bilbao in regards to fish and Baltic goods.⁷⁰ Considering the other occasions where Steuart discussed sending goods to Bilbao, it is highly likely that their correspondence was a regular one. For example, in March 1721 Steuart wrote to George Urquhart of Cromarty suggesting that he send his cod-fish and salmon to Bilbao where the salmon 'might pass for new fish'.⁷¹

Steuart was not the only Scot with whom Van Duffe dealt; in October 1714 another group of merchants from Inverness, Dumoor and Company, sent correspondence to Bilbao. In this letter the power of recommendation is very much in evidence, with it being noted that Van Duffe was being contacted due to the recommendation by Thomas Robertson of Inverness.⁷² Dumoor and Co. were to send over 400 barrels of fish (cod and salmon) in the vessel *The Alexander*, with it being requested that Duffe load the vessel with 30-35 tons of Portuguese salt before it sailed

⁶³ Mackay, *The Letter Book*, 18-9. 12 May 1712

⁶⁴ AFB, Bilbao Antigua, 0397/001/003. 1731.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 0082/002/003/010. 1730.

⁶⁶ Mackay, *The Letter Book*, 18-9. 12 May 1712.

⁶⁷ Ibid, It is not clear why Steuart did not want money to be remitted to Gordon. It was not due to Gordon's Jacobite sentiments as Steuart was also sympathetic to the Jacobite cause. It may therefore have been a purely practical agreement.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 18-9. 12 May 1712.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 146-7. 7 April 1721.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid, 141-2. 17 March 1721.

⁷² NAS, GD23/6/26. Dumoor & Co. to Juan Van Duffe, 18 October 1714.

to St Martines in France.⁷³ The merchants also requested that, when the vessel arrived in Bilbao, Van Duffle contact Robert Gordon of Bordeaux so that he could have the cargo to be collected in St Martines ready for loading.⁷⁴ The letter shows just how complicated business transactions could be: as well as requesting that Duffle load the salt and inform Gordon that the vessel had arrived, Duffle was also instructed to pay the master.⁷⁵ However, if this was not possible then a bill was to be sent to Amsterdam and London.⁷⁶ Van Duffle was an experienced trader as the records held at *Archivo Foral de Bizkala* show. Much like the Scottish High Court of Admiralty, the surviving documents in this Spanish archive regarding trade dealings predominantly concern disputes. From this it can be seen that Van Duffle had trading relations with Spanish, French and English merchants.⁷⁷ Van Duffle clearly had contact with several Scottish merchants, not all of them based in Scotland. Robert Gordon traded from Bordeaux while, as shown in chapter three, Van Duffle probably corresponded with Alexander Andrew in Rotterdam.

Trade disagreements also continued to occur. In 1718 James Graham, merchant of Anstruther, pursued Philip Brown, the master of the *John of Anstruther*, for non-fulfilment of a charter party.⁷⁸ Brown had entered into a charter party in November 1715 with Graham and was chartered to sail to Bruges with coal, reload with any merchandise he thought convenient and then sail to Sebútal and collect a cargo of salt before sailing to a safe port in the Forth of Firth. Graham stated that Brown was guilty of failing to ply the voyage which had been agreed in the charter party and, further, that Brown had not paid any of the proceeds. Brown argued that he had sailed to Wemyss to collect the cargo of coals and had waited for instructions from Graham, which never came. He then sailed to Anstruther to pick up the rest of his cargo but had to put into the harbour at Elie. While there, Brown claimed that the ship was seized by Captain O'Brian, commander of a Royal Navy vessel. Brown alleged that O'Brian took the vessel and the crew to Leith as he suspected them of being part of the 'rebellion', presumably the 1715 Jacobite rebellion. He then claimed he was not released until February 1716 and, ergo, it was not his fault that he could not execute his voyage in the correct time and, therefore, 'the pursuer only has himself to blame and he ought to

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ AFB, JCR2073/028. 18 November 1716; JCR0432/034. 03 April 1720; JCR1660/009. 28 May 1721; JCR0883/025. 28 July 1733.

⁷⁸ NAS, AC9/469. October 1717.

make up the damage the defender sustained in that matter'. Brown further attempted to bolster his defence by including a letter from William Poyntz, 'consul general for his majesty of Great Britain in this kingdom and dominions of Portugal', in June 1716. Poyntz stated that Brown had told him that there were no orders left for him at Bruges or Lisbon and that Brown,

declared in my presence that, he did protest, against the said James Graham, for all costs, losses and damage that he hath sustain, or may happen to sustain, for the said Grahams not performing the tenure of his charter party.⁷⁹

Graham responded to these claims by arguing that he was unconcerned about the treatment that Brown received from Captain O'Brian as Brown was not supposed to sail to Elie. He further argued that the charter party made clear what Brown's instructions were, which negated the need for any further instructions, and that 'the protest at Lisbon cannot be regarded because St Ubes & not Lisbon was the port of discharge fixed by charter party'.⁸⁰ The High Court of Admiralty agreed with Graham and ordered Brown to pay Graham £4500 Scots as well as £50 costs.

A voyage from Cadiz to Leith was the subject of another disagreement when James Barclay, master of Leith, pursued Robert Wightman, a merchant of Edinburgh.⁸¹ Barclay was master of the *Mary of London*, which had sailed to Cadiz and brought to Scotland a cargo of Iberian goods.⁸² Barclay was due payment for a third of the cargo by Robert Wightman, dean of the guild of Edinburgh, amounting to the sum of over £400 sterling.⁸³ In this case Robert Wightman was ordered to appear before the Admiralty Court.

A Portuguese case study is provided by Edward and John Main. Although the nationality of the Main family cannot be identified with certainty it is highly likely that they were Scottish. A letter from Edward Main to William Stirling of Herbertshire (near modern day Denny) discusses the purchase of lands in Powhouse.⁸⁴ In the letter Main discusses the sale of Stirling's lands to his brother William on his behalf and thanks Stirling for 'giving me ye preference of said sale to other than had an equal view with me', suggesting some prior personal connection.⁸⁵ As discussed in chapter three

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ NAS, AC9/754. 14 November 1720.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ NAS, GD214/706. Edward Main to William Stirling, 5 November 1728.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Edward Main was in Lisbon by 1723 at the very latest, acting as Lisbon factor on behalf of James Murray with Robert Trail the skipper charged with disposing Murray's cargo of coal with Main.⁸⁶ In 1730 a dispute between Richard Brown, master of the *Joseph of Berwick*, and John Baird, a merchant of Leith, also involved Edward and John Main.⁸⁷ The Main's were to receive cargo of coal from Newcastle/Limekilns on Baird's behalf.⁸⁸ The Main's continued acting as factors during the 1740s with two further cases highlighting their continued activities.⁸⁹

2.1 Mark Pringle

An informative case study of this period, and the typical activities of a British consul, is encapsulated in the example of Mark Pringle. Pringle was a British consul in Andalusia albeit his appointment did not arise without some problems. Charles Russell, the previous consul, died very suddenly, it appears, on 8 August 1721 and within days there was a clamouring both for his post and for his replacement.⁹⁰ On 12 August Thomas Bradyll wrote to John Carteret, second Earl of Granville and the new secretary for the southern affairs.⁹¹ While appearing to show sympathy and concern upon Russell's death, the letter's primary aim was to attempt to get Carteret to appoint Bradley as his replacement.⁹² In fact, Bradley even alluded to a previous attempt to take-over Russell's position, writing

I humbly beg yor Ldship will be pleas'd to give me leave to renew the pretensions I made to that consulship in the late Mr Secretary Craiggs time and to suspend the grant of it to any else until my arrivall.⁹³

A day earlier twenty members of the British merchant community at Cadiz signed a document requesting that Mark Pringle be appointed as interim consul. Pringle was described as a 'proper person & well qualified.... who has resided in this country several

⁸⁶ Ibid, AC9/6397. 15 July 1723.

⁸⁷ Ibid, AC9/1141. 11 December 1730.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ HCA, AC9/1525, 2 March 1742; AC9/1619, 12 June 1746.

⁹⁰ Russell is likely to be the same Charles Russell who was a merchant in a charter party which arranged a voyage to Lisbon from London. See NAS, GD8/935, 2 November 1701.

⁹¹ TNA, SP94/213. Thomas Bradyll to John Carteret, 12 August 1721; *DNB*, John Cannon, 'Carteret, John, second Earl Granville (1690–1763)'. Carteret was new to his post; his predecessor, James Craggs, had died suddenly of smallpox in April 1721.

⁹² TNA, SP94/213. Thomas Bradyll to John Carteret, 12 August 1721.

⁹³ Ibid, Russell himself discussed this previous attempt on his position in August 1720 writing to Craggs: 'I againe repeate my acknowledgement for the favour & honour you have done in keeping mee in the Consulshipp when others very vigorously attempted to take it away'.

years'.⁹⁴ This request, however, was dismissed by the Judge Conservator of 'England', Manuel Torres.⁹⁵ In a consultation held in Madrid on the matter two members of the 'English' merchant community in Cadiz, Thomas Butler and Daniel Bernard (whose signatures appear on the request from the British merchant community), stated that the removal of Mark Pringle from the post of interim consul was to the detriment of merchants, who described Pringle as being 'the only man of intelligence and confidence in San Lucar'.⁹⁶ The Spanish authorities disagreed with Torres and pointed out that in other cases where the consul had died or suffered an accident an interim had been appointed prior to official royal appointment from Britain.⁹⁷ Thus Pringle could stay in the position until an appointment was made, which occurred when David Foulis was named consul, presumably in the spring of 1722.⁹⁸ At this point Pringle was not present in the official British records of Spanish consuls.⁹⁹

Pringle was not entirely cast aside upon the appointment of Foulis, as Foulis's letters to Lord Carteret show. From his arrival in Spain and indeed, on the journey to Spain Foulis battled with ill health, spending ten days in quarantine onboard the ship before being allowed on land and having spent at least a week in Cadiz before feeling well enough to travel to San Lucar.¹⁰⁰ By February of the following year Foulis appeared no better, writing that he was unable to travel to Seville due to his health which 'has reduced me to so weak a condition that I am not yet able to stir abroad'.¹⁰¹ He stated that once he was well enough to travel he would journey to Seville and appoint someone there to act in his stead.¹⁰² In late spring of 1724 Foulis was so ill that he requested, and was granted, permission to travel to Montpellier for his health, leaving Mark Pringle in charge.¹⁰³ Foulis did not return until December 1724 despite having stated in his letter that he would return by the end of September when the year's busiest trade began.¹⁰⁴ If Foulis was as unwell as he claimed to be, and was sincere in his

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ AHN, Estado 623, Exp. 4, 7 March 1722.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid. Foulis arrived in Cadiz in September 1722, so a spring appointment is plausible, giving Foulis time to put his affairs in Britain in order and prepare for the voyage.

⁹⁹ TNA, SP94/215. Pringle is not listed as a consul in the volumes SP94/210-14, which note English and British consuls from 1684.

¹⁰⁰ TNA, SP94/214. David Foulis to Temple Stanyan, 12 September 1722. David Foulis to Lord Carteret, 14 September 1722. Temple Stanyan was the younger brother of Abraham Stanyan and was a politician connected with the southern department from 1717. See *DNB*, Philip Woodfine and Claire Gapper, 'Stanyan, Abraham (1672–1732)'.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. David Foulis to John Carteret, 5 February 1723.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid. David Foulis to John Carteret, 5 March 1724.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. David Foulis to the Duke of Newcastle, 17 December 1724.

description of Mark Pringle as ‘truly zealous in his majesty’s service and the trade of his subjects’, then May to December 1724 was probably not the only time Pringle was asked to step in for Foulis.¹⁰⁵ Interestingly, David Foulis was the son of James Foulis, a prominent Scottish merchant based in London, implying that the world of international trade was probably familiar to him.¹⁰⁶ As Steve Murdoch has examined at length, simply being Scottish may have been enough to recommend Pringle to Foulis.¹⁰⁷ While there is no evidence of it in this case, the Scottish merchant community was, in other parts of Europe, tight-knit and it is acknowledged that ‘Scots would help and entertain Scots simply for the sake of their nationality’.¹⁰⁸ With such a small ‘British’ merchant community in Iberia, and an even smaller Scottish contingent, it would be surprising if Pringle and Foulis’s shared nationality was not a bond between them and did not assist Pringle in some way.

In October 1727 there was a consultation approving Pringle as the British consul in Seville and San Lucar following the death of David Foulis, with the Spanish Council recognising the original patent dispatched by King George on 31 October 1726.¹⁰⁹ Interestingly, the document notes that in the reign of Carlos II there had been two consuls and that a Mr Thomas Rumbol had acted as consul in San Lucar, however, the Council decreed that the area should only be served by one consul.¹¹⁰ A letter written in November 1726, from Sir John Clerk to Father Clerk in Spain, already recommended Pringle as ‘one of our consuls in Spain’, suggesting the appointment had been confirmed.¹¹¹ In December 1727, however, Pringle was having problems convincing the Spanish of his appointment as another man, Daniel O’Brien, was trying to collect consular fees, arguing that they had been charged incorrectly to Mark Pringle, who had been acting as consul without approval.¹¹² Pringle himself alluded to the difficulties in a letter to Thomas Pelham Holles, the Duke of Newcastle, in July 1727 stating that, when he was presented at Madrid by William Stanhope, ‘the court was deaf to all the

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. David Foulis to John Carteret, 7 May 1724.

¹⁰⁶ NAS, RH15/14/37/6. David Foulis signed numerous documents on his father’s behalf in London in the late seventeenth century. The signatures of these documents and those from his time as consul are remarkably similar.

¹⁰⁷ Murdoch, *Network North*, 77-82.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 78.

¹⁰⁹ AHN, Estado 641, Exp. 18, 07 July 1727

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ NAS, GD18/5351. Sir John Clerk to Father Clerk, 17 November 1726. Father Clerk is likely to be Father William Clerk who was the Confessor to King of Spain (It is unknown whether this was Philip or his son Louis - who was king for a short while before his untimely death from smallpox - following Louis’s death Philip took the throne again). See *The Scots Magazine*, 1739-1803 5 (Edinburgh, 1743), 428. Many thanks to David Dobson for this information.

¹¹² AHN, Estado 641, Exp. 26, 10 December 1727.

memorials [patents showing his position] presented'.¹¹³ This went on into 1728, with a consultation on the measures to be carried out against both Pringle and O'Brien for the return of consular fees they had charged.¹¹⁴ A further letter in July 1730 regards a consultation on the fine and seizure carried out against Pringle, who had been appointed without the proper documentation.¹¹⁵ This took place on 14 September 1730 with Mark Pringle recorded as being due money from the Spanish authorities due to the sale of his effects which was ordered by the Governor of San Lucar.¹¹⁶ However, from the British point of view, Mark Pringle was the royally appointed consul of the British nation in San Lucar and is listed in the British state papers as being so.¹¹⁷ Thus the episode caused anger in Britain, with the Duke of Newcastle writing to Walpole regarding the issue. Newcastle wrote

you will have seen by them with what violence the King of Spain's officer at San Lucar have proceeded against Mr Pringle his Majesty's consul there, I shall have the Kings Orders to write in very strong terms to Mr Keene upon this subject.¹¹⁸

Confusingly, throughout this period of uncertainty, Pringle was described in other official Spanish documentation as being a consul for the British nation.¹¹⁹ For his part, Pringle continued his consular duties, writing to Newcastle in March 1730 and discussing passes which ships required for the Mediterranean due to the actions of North African corsairs.¹²⁰

Surviving documentation involving Pringle gives a good insight into the duties and activities of a consul during this time. In 1732 a dispute between a skipper and a supercargo shows the assistance that Pringle gave individual merchants. In October 1731 John Carmichael had entered into a charter party with skipper Robert Dawling.¹²¹ Dawling was to sail to Rotterdam and then on to San Lucar under Carmichael's instruction; however, when the ship arrived in Rotterdam and while in the house of a Mr Andrew (probably Alexander Andrew) an altercation arose and Dawling allegedly

¹¹³ TNA, SP94/215. Mark Pringle to the Duke of Newcastle, 1 July 1727.

¹¹⁴ AHN, Estado 620, exp. 23, 21 July 1728.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, Estado 608, Exp. 11, 15 July 1730.

¹¹⁶ Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JO/10/3/231/33-37. Copy of the Demands made by the English Commissaries of Ships taken at Sea, 17 April 1732. While a monetary amount is recorded the value of the Spanish currency is unclear.

¹¹⁷ TNA, SP94/215; SP94/216; SP94/217.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, SP78/195. Duke of Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 11-12 June 1730.

¹¹⁹ AHN, Estado, 620. Exp. 11, 4 April 1728.

¹²⁰ TNA, SP94/216. Mark Pringle to the Duke of Newcastle, 14 March 1730.

¹²¹ NAS, AC9/1206. Originally William Miln had been the skipper agreed to in the charter party, however, upon his sudden death James Patterson (trade surveyor at Leith) recommended Robert Dawling.

threatened to depart with the ship and leave Carmichael to fend for himself.¹²² Dawling then disappeared with the vessel but was found by Carmichael as he had been detained after having sailed to Briel.¹²³ Despite Dawling's behaviour Carmichael knew he was in danger of losing the market and, after writing to James Paterson, the trustee for the owners of the ship, to inform him of the situation, the ship set sail for Spain with Dawling still at the helm. Paterson replied and gave Carmichael permission to transfer control of the vessel to the mate, Thomas Kay. Thus Carmichael called upon Pringle's assistance to deal with Dawling. Dawling was given the opportunity to be relieved of his post, with the wages he was due, and passage on a ship sailing to England the following day.¹²⁴ He would be paid full wages until the vessel landed and have a declaration from Pringle dated 26 March (presumably to ensure he would be paid).¹²⁵ This offer was refused by Dawling; perhaps he realised the damage that such an incident could cause to his reputation, combined with the likelihood that he would not receive his wages. Whatever the reason, Dawling boarded the vessel and attempted to assume command, which ended with Carmichael putting him ashore.¹²⁶ The Admiralty Court ruled in Carmichael's favour with Dawling ordered to pay over £300 Sterling both for damages and legal costs - although considering his behaviour he was lucky not to be charged with piracy.¹²⁷

In addition to his role as consul, Pringle continued to remain active in trade, sometimes blurring the consular and merchant's role. In November 1738 Robert Mackenzie was chartered by George Sandilands and William Knox in Bordeaux (on behalf of John Grant, a merchant in Edinburgh) to sail to San Lucar and 'receive a full cargo of such goods as Mark Pringle Esq. should think proper to load' before sailing to Leith.¹²⁸ When Mackenzie arrived in San Lucar, Pringle instructed him to sail from there to 'la Puebla'. Mackenzie therefore claimed the cost of this extra part of the journey as well as a third of the port charge.¹²⁹ Interestingly, a bill of lading written by Mark Pringle in January 1739 did not indicate this extra part of the voyage, only recording that Mackenzie was to sail from Bonanza to Leith.¹³⁰ The bill of lading also recorded the

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid. It is not explicitly clear why Dawling was detained but it was more than likely due to the fact that upon hearing of Dawling's plans to leave without him Carmichael seized the vessel's passport.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid, AC8/578.

¹²⁹ Ibid. This port is presumably La Puebla del Rio which lies around 5km south of Seville on the Guadalquivir river.

¹³⁰ Ibid. Bonanza is a small town just to the north of San Lucar de Barrameda.

cargo that was loaded on to the vessel: 'two hundred chests of sour oranges, twenty chests of china oranges: twenty chests of lemons & ten barrells figgs & six jarrs olives'.¹³¹ According to the Spanish State Papers, Pringle was still acting as consul as late as December 1752, marking an impressively long career.¹³² A lawsuit between Pringle's second wife and sons against his son by his first marriage shows that Pringle returned from Spain in 1755 and retired to London.¹³³ It also documents that he bought the estate of Crichton in Midlothian in 1737; however, upon his death in June 1761 the estate had debts of over £7,500 sterling.¹³⁴ As is common, there was some confusion regarding the nation that Pringle represented, with it being listed in separate documents that he represented the English, Scottish and British nations. It is clear from this assessment of Pringle's activities that a consul's role was very varied: as well as assisting merchants locally, he dealt with disputes, such as the one between Carmichael and Dawling, passed military information back to Britain and continued to trade himself. Further, despite the tensions of the period Pringle and other merchants carried on their business as best they could.

3. The Gibraltar Crisis: Diplomats and Merchants.

The political tensions regarding the state of Gibraltar, which had so dogged British-Spanish relations post-1713, eventually resulted in conflict over the rock in the first months of 1727. The loss of territories which were essentially on the Spanish mainland was more than a thorn in the side of the Spanish Crown, it was an insult. Historically, the 1727 attack against Gibraltar has been portrayed as dismally ineffective and presented as a footnote in the wider history of British-Spanish relations. Much of the historiography regarding the incident is outdated, and the subject of British foreign policy in the late 1720s, in general, requires serious scholarship, as has been pointed out by Jeremy Black.¹³⁵ Coverage of the 1727 siege is limited to a handful of publications which are disappointingly frugal in their description of the events. John Drinkwater published a history of several Gibraltar sieges in 1785; however, his only note regarding the 1727 siege was that a failure by the Spanish to cut off links to the sea meant that Gibraltar was still able to receive supplies.¹³⁶ In 1935 Arthur

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² TNA, SP94/227.

¹³³ BL, Add MS 36171, f. 287. 23/1/1767 The Appellants Case.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Black, *British Foreign Policy*, 2.

¹³⁶ John Drinkwater, *A History of the Siege of Gibraltar* (London, 1785), 23.

McCandless Wilson wrote only that the siege was 'badly conducted... and the casualties of the British resulted principally from the explosion of their own guns'.¹³⁷ Jeremy Black similarly stated only that 'both sides sought to intimidate the other and many feared war, though actual hostilities were restricted to an unsuccessful Spanish siege at Gibraltar in 1727'.¹³⁸ While general political histories of the period do not give the event much attention, local histories of Gibraltar are more forthcoming.

Having lost almost the entirety of his navy at Cape Passaro, Philip V of Spain asked his military advisors if Gibraltar could be recaptured without naval support. His most experienced military commanders made it clear that without naval support any attack would fail as it would be impossible to stop the British settlement from gaining supplies.¹³⁹ Unfortunately for Philip, the young Count of Las Torres advised that a ground assault would be all that was needed and, despite a lack of military experience he was appointed in command.¹⁴⁰ Perhaps unsurprisingly, the siege was unsuccessful, with the British never lacking for supplies and Torres's force finding it impossible to break through the fortress's defences.¹⁴¹ Indeed, despite digging for almost 17 weeks, Spanish forces failed to expand a cave (which they planned to use as a mine) by more than a few meters - the limestone rock providing one of the best defences for the British.¹⁴² However, the British did have problems, mainly in a lack of men to complete repairs.¹⁴³ By 23 June, though, an Irish colonel serving with the Spanish approached under a flag of truce, and a cessation to hostilities was agreed in the following days.¹⁴⁴

The purpose of this section is to investigate the effect of this siege upon diplomacy and trade. Initially, the activities of David Dunbar in the prelude to event are examined and, in particular, Dunbar's secondary role as an informer for the British government. The effect of this conflict upon trade is then considered, with particular reference to the *Christian* and its supercargo Edward Burd. This provides a stark comparison between how the diplomats considered the tensions with Spain and the reactions of merchants.

The case of David Dunbar is a prominent example of the rising tension between Britain and Spain in 1726. Dunbar was the British consul in San Sebastian and sent

¹³⁷ Arthur McCandless Wilson, *French Foreign Policy During the Administration of Cardinal Fleury, 1726-1743* (London, 1936), 162.

¹³⁸ Black, *British Foreign Policy*, 6.

¹³⁹ George Hills, *Rock of Contention* (London, 1974), 263.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Jackson, *The Rock*, 128-131.

¹⁴² Darren Fa and Clive Finlayson, *The Fortifications of Gibraltar, 1086-1945* (Oxford 2006), 25.

¹⁴³ Jackson, *The Rock*, 130-1.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 131.

numerous letters to important statesmen, such as the British ambassador to Spain William Stanhope, Henry Pelham Thomas, Duke of Newcastle and Secretary of State, and Robert Walpole. Dunbar's letters provided important information regarding the military capabilities of Spain and became more detailed as 1726 wore on, to the consul's great personal disadvantage. In April 1726, for example, Dunbar wrote about the fortifications of the town of San Sebastian, stating

the town is lately fortified with high & strong walls, and newly crowded with soldiers there being 3 battalions.... the troops here are kept to strict duty & every single person examined by the sentry. I find that all are very apprehensive of war.¹⁴⁵

The following month, in a letter to the Duke of Newcastle, Dunbar provided a more detailed description, which also included a report of a shipyard where a ship of 80 guns had been launched in January but still required masts and rigging.¹⁴⁶ According to this communication two other vessels of 36 guns were ready to sail, two of 70 guns were preparing to launch, with two of 40 guns being built.¹⁴⁷ Being so close to the French border, a traditional point of strife for Spain, troops were common in the area, and Dunbar commented 'there are many horse & foot in this province as make up fifteen thousand men, sent hither to prevent any invasion from France'.¹⁴⁸ In early May Dunbar was given instructions by 'the English ambassador at Madrid' regarding a Frenchman, Count Lambilly, who left Madrid on the first of the month in very suspicious circumstances.¹⁴⁹ The request, presumably from William Stanhope, instructed Dunbar to attempt to discover the whereabouts of the man, whom it was believed would try and board a ship to Holland.¹⁵⁰ He was believed to have been sent by the Spanish court with a secret commission and had been given 'a great sum of money in gold'.¹⁵¹ Naturally, Dunbar was expected to ensure that his enquiries did not attract the attention of the Spanish authorities.¹⁵²

In spite of this secrecy, the Spanish were already suspicious of Dunbar's true reason for being in San Sebastian. He wrote at the end of May that the masters of three

¹⁴⁵ TNA, SP94/214. Dunbar to unknown recipient, 30 April 1726.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, David Dunbar to the Duke of Newcastle, 6 May 1726. Dunbar described the shipyard as being across the bay from S. Andero. As yet it has not been possible to discover exactly where it was, Dunbar described it as being opposite a large bay, which could indicate either Sandero, just north of Bilbao, or Santander.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. Unknown author to David Dunbar, 6 May 1726.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

English vessels told him that they had been ordered by the mayor of the town not to pay Dunbar his duties.¹⁵³ The merchants went on to say that as Dunbar had made no demand of 'consulage on the vessels I found here it was thought I did not come on that account'.¹⁵⁴ Dunbar told the masters to pay him what he was due and that if they refused he would complain to the Secretary of State.¹⁵⁵ This did not prevent Dunbar from continuing his more covert duties and, following the arrest of the Duke of Ripperda at William Stanhope's house in Madrid in late May, he pursued these tasks with even more zeal.

After the bizarre triumph of the Treaty of Vienna, Ripperda's career came to a sudden end when it transpired that he had not only made promises he was not permitted to make but had also managed to defraud the Spanish monarchy. He sought refuge in Stanhope's residence and, in an attempt to gain the British ambassador's support, supplied sensitive information. However, Walpole could not protect him and Ripperda was taken from the ambassador's house and sent to the castle of Segovia.¹⁵⁶ In conjunction, Dunbar reported to the Duke of Newcastle from San Sebastian on 31 May that an express sent by Stanhope was intercepted at Vitoria and taken back to Madrid.¹⁵⁷ On 4 June Dunbar wrote to Horatio Walpole concerning the steps he was taking in order to verify the report. He wrote that he had sent his servant to Vitoria, carrying letters to merchants in order to disguise the real reason for the journey, which was to ascertain whether the story of Ripperda's arrest was true. Further, once the servant had returned, Dunbar planned to go to Bayonne in order to warn any messenger carrying an express from Britain and secure any messages to Madrid.¹⁵⁸ According to his own letter Dunbar must have left for Bayonne on 4 June and, as well as his intentions to warn any messengers, he met with Benjamin Keene, who had been appointed consul-general at Madrid in 1724.¹⁵⁹

By 18 June Dunbar back was in San Sebastian and stated that the town authorities were unhappy with his presence due to his training as an engineer and involvement in the siege of San Sebastian in the regiment of the Duke of Berwick.¹⁶⁰ By late June and early July the benevolent quality with which Dunbar had previously discussed the Spanish military preparations was replaced with a more aggressive tone.

¹⁵³ Ibid, David Dunbar to unknown recipient, 24 May 1726.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Jackson, *The Rock*, 127.

¹⁵⁷ TNA, SP94/213. Dunbar to the Duke of Newcastle, 31 May 1726.

¹⁵⁸ BL, Add MS 73988. David Dunbar to Horatio Walpole, 4 June 1726.

¹⁵⁹ *DNB*, M. J. Mercer, 'Keene, Sir Benjamin (1697–1757)'.

¹⁶⁰ TNA, SP94/214. David Dunbar to Charles Delafaye, 18 June 1726.

On 2 July Dunbar referred to Spanish troops as 'rats' and remarked that one 'English' regiment would beat four or five Spanish ones.¹⁶¹ A few days later Dunbar assisted the British messenger, Mr Storer, in disguising his documents. Dunbar made him a bundle of blank letters, appropriately wrapped and sealed. If Mr Storer was stopped on the way to Madrid it was then hoped that handing over this fake bundle would give him time to dispose of or destroy the real one.¹⁶² Ten days later Dunbar was again in France, this time sending Horatio Walpole a detailed report that he had received from his servant. While his servant believed there were 20,000 Spanish troops ready for action, Dunbar offered his opinion that there was a smaller number, perhaps only as many as 10-12,000. Nevertheless, Dunbar did write that the previously mentioned warships were ready to sail and only awaited a convoy from Cadiz before Dunbar believed they would sail to England.¹⁶³ Finally, Dunbar discussed his own position, stating that the Spanish were suspicious of his activities believing that he was a colonel in a regiment and remarking that, after he had left for Bayonne, the town mayor had requested to see him. Dunbar's opinion of the Spanish reached a new low, and his closing remark stated: 'the Spaniards are a base treacherous, cowardly people if they have any jealousy of a man they dispatch him from behind a bush'.¹⁶⁴

Despite his assertions that he would not return to Spain, Dunbar was clearly ordered to by the British government and by 30 July he had dispatched a letter to Walpole stating that, upon his return to the San Sebastian, two men came to his lodgings late at night and told him that he was to come immediately as the town's mayor wanted to see him. Dunbar replied that it was late and that he would call upon the mayor in the morning but the men insisted.¹⁶⁵ Upon meeting the mayor Dunbar was told that Philip V desired him to go to Salamanca. Dunbar sensed that the Spanish authorities wanted him away from where he could observe their military preparations and tried to refuse. He argued that while the King of Spain could order him to be removed from the country he could not order where he went in the country and that the British authorities would not be happy at this treatment of him. Finally, Dunbar agreed to go, but on the proviso that he was provided with a written order to do so. Understandably, the mayor was reluctant to provide such an order, arguing that his

¹⁶¹ Ibid. Dunbar to Charles Delafaye, 2 July 1726.

¹⁶² BL, Add MS 73988. David Dunbar to Horatio Walpole, 10 July 1726.

¹⁶³ Ibid. David Dunbar to Horatio Walpole, 12 July 1726. The report of the servant stated that there were seven companies garrisoned at Castro, 3,000 men at St Antonio, 10,000 at St Andero and a further four regiments beyond St Andero. Two of the awaited vessels were Spanish, however, the other eleven were from Russia.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. Dunbar to Horatio Walpole, 30 July 1726.

verbal command was sufficient.¹⁶⁶ Dunbar received the passport the following day, however, he still had no written order and complained that the passport offered gave him no distinction as a gentleman. It was then replied that he could have whatever titles he desired but that he would not receive written orders to leave. Dunbar stood his ground, though, and eventually received the written order to leave, which he could produce if questioned by his colleagues about his removal from San Sebastian.¹⁶⁷

Dunbar did initially go to Salamanca and William Stanhope wrote to the Duke of Newcastle on 18 September that he had presented a memorial to Philip V regarding Dunbar's situation.¹⁶⁸ Dunbar had clearly not spent long in Salamanca as he was in Madrid by this point and wrote to Walpole regarding court gossip.¹⁶⁹ Dunbar stayed at Madrid until December, with Stanhope writing to Newcastle in October that his memorial regarding Dunbar's situation had not received any answer.¹⁷⁰ In early December, and having acquired intelligence regarding the Spanish plans to attack Gibraltar, Stanhope commissioned Dunbar to take the information to Malaga and board a vessel for Gibraltar, carrying letters addressed to the governor of Gibraltar, Richard Kane, and to Admiral Edward Hopson.¹⁷¹ According to Nicholas Holloway, the British consul for Malaga, Dunbar arrived on 14 December and stayed there for four days until he could get passage on a ship returning to Britain, the *Grape*.¹⁷² He boarded the vessel that evening and the ship departed. However, due to the calm weather it did not get far from the shore before the governor of Malaga gave chase with two small boats filled with armed men. Dunbar was then brought ashore by force and imprisoned, with Holloway not allowed to see him.

When Holloway protested at Dunbar's treatment he was told that Dunbar had been arrested as he had been concealed in Holloway's house and had not sought an audience with the governor to obtain permission to leave.¹⁷³ Holloway replied that permission to leave had never been required before and that he looked upon the matter as an 'act of hostility'. The governor responded that he was only accountable to Philip V and that the British and Spanish were 'en visperado guerra'.¹⁷⁴ The order to arrest Dunbar appeared to come directly from the Spanish king, with an undated document

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, David Dunbar to Horatio Walpole, 1 August 1726.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, Add MS 73921. William Stanhope to the Duke of Newcastle, 18 September 1726.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, Add MS 73988. David Dunbar to Horatio Walpole, 14 September 1726.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, Add MS 73922. William Stanhope to the Duke of Newcastle, 4 October 1726.

¹⁷¹ Ibid. William Stanhope to the Duke of Newcastle, 9 December 1726.

¹⁷² TNA, SP94/214. Nicholas Holloway to William Stanhope, 20 December 1726.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. 'On the eve of war'.

requesting the governor of Malaga to arrest and detain Dunbar.¹⁷⁵ The news reached Stanhope, who wrote to the Duke of Newcastle that he had met with the Marque de la Paz, detailing the violations that he believed had occurred.¹⁷⁶ Stanhope stated that an ambassador's passport had been violated as well his letters seized, and, further, a British vessel under British colours on the open seas had been boarded by an armed force.¹⁷⁷ Despite this, the Marques de la Paz would not accept any memorial from Stanhope, regardless of Stanhope's insistence that his refusal to accept the memorial and the acts involving Dunbar essentially amounted to a declaration of war.¹⁷⁸ By 6 January Stanhope had still not received any answer or obtained 'any satisfaction for the outrage or affront put on him [Dunbar]'.¹⁷⁹ For the Spanish part, the Marques de la Paz wrote that Dunbar was being kept in the Mayor's house, which was described as better accommodation than the town's prison.¹⁸⁰ Despite Stanhope's complaints, Dunbar remained imprisoned and the Marques de la Paz stated that he was under orders not to discuss the matter.¹⁸¹ Meanwhile, reports from Nicholas Holloway indicated that Dunbar was not receiving the treatment appropriate to a man of his status. Dunbar was not permitted to see anyone and his treatment was said to be severe.¹⁸² The political situation was, at this point, extremely strained and on 11 March 1727 William Stanhope left Madrid for Bayonne.¹⁸³ Diplomatic efforts to free Dunbar had come to a standstill, with the political situation between the two countries now on a war footing.

Dunbar was, however, released just a few days before William Stanhope left Madrid. It is unclear why he was released; the Spanish authorities may have decided that as they were moving their military forces into position around Gibraltar there was no need for secrecy and thus Dunbar posed no threat. On 7 March Dunbar wrote to Charles Delafaye stating that he had been released after 88 days in close confinement. He went on to say that he had been ordered to leave Spain but was to go via the 'frontiers of France'.¹⁸⁴ On 19 March he reached Madrid and despite being under orders to leave the country, he still found the time to bring himself up to date with the gossip of

¹⁷⁵ AGS, Estado 6870. 1726

¹⁷⁶ BL, Add Ms 73922. William Stanhope to the Duke of Newcastle, 30 December 1726.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, William Stanhope to the Duke of Newcastle, 6 January 1727.

¹⁸⁰ AGS, Estado 6870. 14 January 1727.

¹⁸¹ BL, Add MS 73922. William Stanhope to the Duke of Newcastle, 17 February 1727.

¹⁸² TNA, SP94/215. Nicholas Holloway to the Duke of Newcastle, 7 January 1727; Nicholas Holloway to the Duke of Newcastle, 21 January 1727; Nicholas Holloway to the Duke of Newcastle, 11 February 1727.

¹⁸³ BL, Add MS 73923. William Stanhope to Newcastle, 23 March 1727.

¹⁸⁴ TNA, SP94/215. David Dunbar to Charles Delafaye, 7 March 1727.

the court.¹⁸⁵ He also wrote that he had been provided with a new passport but had been forbidden to return to San Sebastian; by May, at the latest, Dunbar was back on British soil.¹⁸⁶

Dunbar's lengthy escapade shows the dual roles which a consul could be expected to perform. Primarily, Dunbar's job was to provide support to British merchants and, through his extensive correspondence, we can see that he did carry out his consular duties in this regard. However, as 1726 wore on and tensions between Britain and Spain continued to rise, Dunbar's role shifted from consul to spy. He provided ever more detailed descriptions of the mobilization of Spanish troops, artillery and ships. How much of the information he provided was already public knowledge is not clear; however, the Spanish authorities clearly thought him dangerous. They ordered him to leave the coast and, when it became apparent he was carrying letters for the governor of Gibraltar, went to the trouble of chasing his vessel and arresting him - although the letters were not recovered. Dunbar was not alone in passing on information to the British authorities: Nicholas Holloway also discussed the encampment of around 6,000 soldiers near Gibraltar and reported that it was believed that a council of war would be held in the coming days.¹⁸⁷ In February the consul of La Coruña, John Parker, wrote to the Duke of Newcastle: 'I shall zealously observe what your Grace Commands me and take the proparest methods to get information of all that passes in any part of the country'.¹⁸⁸ Mark Pringle also contributed, writing to John Norris in Lisbon that the Spanish fleet was 'abominably manned'; this letter was sent to the Duke of Newcastle in April 1727.¹⁸⁹ Even once the immediate situation had been calmed, information still periodically made its way from consuls in Spain to the British authorities. In July 1735 Pringle stated that he would follow instructions given by John Norris in Lisbon, which requested that he pass on information which 'may be for his majesties service'.¹⁹⁰ He wrote that several regiments had passed through San Lucar on their way to the border with Portugal.¹⁹¹ Clearly, consular duties were varied and not merely confined to the protection of merchants, with consuls providing a flow of information for the British authorities.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. David Dunbar to Charles Delafaye, 20 March 1727.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. David Dunbar to the Duke of Newcastle, 3 May 1727.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. Nicholas Holloway to the Duke of Newcastle, 7 January 1727.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. John Parker to the Duke of Newcastle, 5 February 1727.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, SP89/34. James Dormer to the Duke of Newcastle, 21 April 1727.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, SP94/217. Mark Pringle to the Duke of Newcastle, 12 July 1735.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

At a diplomatic level the build-up of tension in 1726 was considered incredibly dangerous; however, as Edward Burd's journal shows, merchants considered the event to be more of an inconvenience. As mentioned in previous chapters, Edward Burd was a prolific skipper and trader who had been involved in Iberian trade for some time. This was probably why Burd was appointed as supercargo by William Carmichael, James Newlands, Robert Dundas, William Hutton, Walter Scott, Robert Smith (all merchants of Edinburgh or Leith) and Robert Robertson (a merchant of Glasgow).¹⁹² Burd had been chartered to sail from Leith to Newfoundland and on to Barcelona in the ship the *Christian*, which was owned by William Hutton and his brother Alexander, who was also the ship's skipper.¹⁹³ The *Christian* took an impressive array of goods to Newfoundland, with linen, men's and women's shoes, hats, stockings, buttons, capes, spoons and barley all part of the cargo.¹⁹⁴ Much like the emerging American colonies and the Iberian islands, Newfoundland was dependent on such imports having, at this point, no manufactures of its own. While the journey, in general, was close to a disaster, due to a slow vessel, poor selling prices and damaged cargo, that there is a Spanish element to it, especially in 1727, is of interest.¹⁹⁵ On Tuesday 15 November 1726 Burd made note of the port of Gibraltar recording, unsurprisingly, that there was a squadron of warships present, however he also recorded that there were 'above 30 sail of merchantmen'.¹⁹⁶ Despite the threat of war, merchants were obviously continuing their business and Burd wrote that,

I thought it best to make use of it [a fair wind] & to proceed for Barcelona, seeing at this time there was noe Declaration of Warr, & that the Governour had said he believed wee would be verry safe to offer for a mercate in any Port of Spaine.¹⁹⁷

Before leaving Gibraltar Burd wrote to Mark Pringle, who was one of the factors involved in the journey. In this letter Burd stated, that, due to a lack of orders from Pringle (which were expected to be at Gibraltar), he had decided to sail for Barcelona and that on the return to the south of the country he expected to receive from Pringle 40 butts of Spanish wine and fruit.¹⁹⁸ It was not until 5 December that the *Christian* made it

¹⁹² Olaf Owe Janzen, 'A Scottish Sack Ship in the Newfoundland Trade, 1726-27' in *Scottish Economic and Social History*, 18 (1998), 5. Jansen points out that the merchants involved were all experienced traders with domestic and foreign business experience.

¹⁹³ Ibid, 5.

¹⁹⁴ NAS, RH9/14/102. May 1726.

¹⁹⁵ See Janzen, 'A Scottish Sack Ship'. Janzen provides a full account of the vessel's journey, detailing the problems it encountered.

¹⁹⁶ NAS, RH9/14/102. 15 November 1726.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

to Barcelona.¹⁹⁹ Burd then went ashore with a letter from the shareholders addressed to a Mr William French, which asked for assistance with selling the cargo of fish, purchasing cork and remitting the rest of the proceeds of the fish to Pringle in San Lucar.²⁰⁰ As appears to be the norm, Burd was given lee-way and allowed to use his best judgement and, thus, entered into a discussion with Mr French on 24 December as to whether it was best to send the money to Mark Pringle or to send it with Burd and the ship.²⁰¹ Burd, taking the advice of French, decided to remit the money to Pringle and \$4500 were sent; however, the cork was proving impossible to obtain and thus Burd had agreed to take wine to Gibraltar on behalf of a Richard Neiland.²⁰² He also took wine to Cadiz for William Windar, the British consul in Barcelona, and several other individuals, which detained the ship in Barcelona for far longer than was intended.²⁰³ Thankfully, for the historian, while this was bad for the ship's shareholders, it allowed Burd to make observations of the port of Barcelona.

In his journal Burd wrote that 'the imports into this place consists chiefly in dried cod fish from Scotland, Newfoundland & New England & c'.²⁰⁴ Burd went on to write that

Scots fish never fails to sell here..more than any fish that come to this place, The reason they give for it is this; that the Scots fish allways stand the summer better than any other.²⁰⁵

He also documented the factors in Barcelona, and recorded that Windar & Ferrand along with Dutch Consul dealt with the majority of the trade from England.²⁰⁶ Gregory French was described as receiving trade from Ireland and some Scottish trade, and Burd wrote that he was better than the other factors as he was 'a denizon of Barcelona, & of the popish religion'.²⁰⁷ Of the fourteen ships that Burd recorded six were carrying Scots fish, with the names of the merchants involved also recorded in some cases. Robert McLeish's ship was first to arrive, followed by another vessel carrying Scottish fish. More ships anchored at Barcelona bearing Scottish fish on board, John McLeish's

¹⁹⁹ Ibid. 5 December 1726.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. 14 May 1726. French is referred to as Gregory French and not William in the rest of the journal: there is no indication that French was part of a company, with another man with the same surname - although it is possible. It appears more likely that Hutton & co. just believed his name to be William when in fact it was Gregory.

²⁰¹ Ibid. 24 December 1726.

²⁰² Ibid. 26 December 1726

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid. 14 January 1727.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

was one of them and George Ouchterlony's another. While the first known account of Ouchterlony is his venture with John Steuart, it is probable that he had traded with Barcelona prior to this, mainly as he knew who Steuart should contact at Barcelona to assist with the sale. The information that Burd provided is interesting for two main reasons. Firstly, it shows that Scottish vessels did indisputably have a significant trade with ports in Spain. Six vessels out of fourteen (not including the *Christian*) are indicative of a serious trade and not merely an opportunistic venture. Secondly, it also shows that despite the rising political tensions and the military preparations of the Spanish authorities against Gibraltar, trade was continuing as normal. Moreover, although scholarly work regarding the incident is, as previously discussed, scarce, the evidence relating to trade suggests that Spain was not concerned with war with Britain *per se* but merely wanted Gibraltar back.

When the *Christian* eventually made it to Gibraltar on the morning of 14 February the Spanish had already begun their artillery attack. It is interesting to note that Burd originally thought the firing from the battalion on Gibraltar to be some form of celebration.²⁰⁸ He also wrote that there were a great number of merchant ships present as well as the eight British warships. On this visit there was a letter waiting from Mark Pringle discussing how Burd was to proceed, with the current hostilities being discussed as more of an inconvenience than a serious threat to trade.²⁰⁹ Pringle suggested that Burd contact Richard Holroid in order to ascertain the true state of affairs as the information he was receiving was conflicting.²¹⁰ Pringle advised against coming to Cadiz but stated that if Burd was determined then he was to enquire after Pringle at the house of Bowman & Eyre, who would direct him.²¹¹ In his letter to Hutton and the other partners Burd also appeared unconcerned by the state of affairs,

The warr broke out hereupon Saturday last, at which time the fort here began to fire upon the Enemy who are 20,000 strong lying incamped round this place. I desired Mr Pringle to procure us a pass if possible; but he says none are granted as yet, soe that now nothing remained for the ship to do, but to goe for Bourdeaux.²¹²

As Olaf Owe Janzen has pointed out, Burd treated the whole event as a holiday, writing in his journal on 19 February that he had walked around the fortifications, which gave

²⁰⁸ Ibid. 14 February 1727.

²⁰⁹ Ibid. 22 January 1727. Copy of letter from Mark Pringle to Edward Burd.

²¹⁰ Ibid. A later letter to Gregory French stated that Holroid was a merchant based in Gibraltar. See NAS, RH9/14/102. Copy of a letter from Edward Burd to Gregory French. 24 February 1727.

²¹¹ Ibid. Copy of a letter from Mark Pringle to Edward Burd, 22 January 1727.

²¹² Ibid. Copy of a letter from Edward Burd to William Hutton & co, 15 February 1727.

him an excellent view of the Spanish encampment.²¹³ Burd did also have business matters to attend to and realising that the current situation would not allow his ship to sail to Cadiz, he instructed Pringle to remit the money he had received from Barcelona to Claud Johnson in London for the account of William Hutton & co.²¹⁴ Another letter was also dispatched to Gregory French which acquainted him with the situation at Gibraltar and stated that he believed Pringle had remitted \$4500 back to London, which Burd believed, was too much and he wondered whether Mr French had sent more than he was meant to.²¹⁵ The capture and imprisonment of Edward Hill in Malaga received mention too; this was blamed on the current situation, but again there was no great alarm expressed and Burd quickly moved on to discuss business matters.²¹⁶ While Burd appeared to be highly unconcerned at the unfolding events Alexander Hutton, master of the *Christian* and brother to one of the shareholders, was not so content. On 27 February the men quarrelled, with Hutton stating that he wished to leave and sail for Leith, avoiding the Channel and sailing round the top of Scotland.²¹⁷ When Burd replied that it would be 'inconvenient', Hutton apparently told him to 'mind his own business'.²¹⁸ Burd advised him that if he was determined to go he should take goods and passengers to Lisbon and then load fruit, salt and wine there before going home, but Hutton was determined to go directly to Leith.²¹⁹ Poor weather prevented Hutton from leaving immediately and gave him time to rethink his decision and, on 1 March, a number of merchant ships were able to leave Gibraltar under convoy, with more following a few days later.²²⁰ Finally, on 14 March the *Christian* left Gibraltar in convoy, with an unknown number of British ships, sailing to Bordeaux. Burd and the ship parted company, Hutton and the *Christian* sailed on to St. Martine-de-Ré and Burd meandered back to Britain via Paris.²²¹

²¹³ Janzen, 'A Scottish Sack Ship', 11; NAS, RH9/14/102, 19 February 1727.

²¹⁴ Ibid. Copy of a letter from Edward Burd to Mark Pringle, 20 February 1727.

²¹⁵ Ibid. Copy of a letter from Edward Burd to Gregory French, 25 February 1727.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid. 27 February 1727.

²¹⁸ Ibid. While it was a relatively common way of avoiding problems in the Channel sailing round the top of Scotland was not without its own difficulties. For a start, it added considerable time to the journey, and secondly, the sailing conditions could be very dangerous especially at that time of year. The word *apparently* is used in this sentence because it must be remembered that this is Burd's journal and is probably a little biased.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ibid. 1 March 1727, 3 March 1727.

²²¹ Ibid. 14 March 1727; Janzen, 'A Scottish Sack Ship', 11.

While the voyage itself was not a commercial success, Burd's accounts are useful for gauging the mood of merchants during this period of conflict.²²² In stark contrast to the tensions of the diplomatic build-up and the cataclysmic impact upon trade that was implied by the consuls and diplomats, merchants appeared to view the whole episode as a mere annoyance. In his letter to Claud Johnson, the London link of the chain back to the partners in Leith, Burd wrote 'this rupture with Spain has proved a great disappointment to us'.²²³ Burd continued to organise trade while in Gibraltar and conducted a correspondence with his British factors, who in the case of William Windar and Mark Pringle had, it appeared, been ordered to leave Spain. In correspondence to the Duke of Newcastle in July 1727 Pringle wrote that he was 'horribly seized with gout...when the order came from court for all his Britannick Majesty protestant subjects to retire out of the country'.²²⁴ This episode of gout is not mentioned in any of the correspondence to Burd, nor does it appear that William Windar left Spain, or for that matter Nicholas Holloway or John Parker.²²⁵ Through Burd's journal it can be seen that Pringle and Windar were still maintaining their trade links despite the state of conflict. This lends more credence to the theory that Spain was more interested in regaining Gibraltar than actual war with Britain and, while Britain defended and retained Gibraltar it also did not appear to desire all-out conflict with Spain. This does not mean that the event did not have importance, the sheer volume of consular letters discussing the rising tensions in 1726 shows that, no matter the outcome of the actual military conflict, the incident was of the utmost significance. Had the siege expanded into all-out war between Britain and Spain, previous conflicts show there would have been a more serious effect upon trade.

Conclusion

The eighteenth century began with instability for both Scotland and Spain. Following the death of Carlos II, Spain was plunged into uncertainty as the European powers fought over who would be allowed to control that country and its wealthy dominions. In

²²² Indeed, the problems experienced did not put the investors off trading with Iberia, with the will of one of the investors, James Newlands, noting that his estate was due money from Mark Pringle for a cargo of wheat and that in 1734 the *Christain* sailed to San Lucar, mastered by Alexander Thomson, with the journey financed by several merchants, including Newlands and William Hutton. See NAS, CC8/8/98. 30/7/1736.

²²³ NAS, RH9/14/102. Copy of a Letter from Edward Burd to Claud Johnson, 27 February 1727.

²²⁴ TNA, SP94/215. Mark Pringle to the Duke of Newcastle, 1 July 1727.

²²⁵ Ibid; NAS, RH9/14/102. Holloway and Parker wrote letters back from Malaga and La Corunna respectively through-out the early months of 1727 and Windar and Pringle are both present in Burd's journal.

Scotland the succession crisis and the threat of the Alien Act resulted in negotiations which would end the kingdom's independence. Despite the problems of both the War of Spanish Succession and the tensions between Scotland and England, Scottish trade to Iberia continued at the same pace as it had done throughout the 1690s.

Technically the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 should have brought peace to Europe. However, the peace was far too humiliating for Spain to accept it and, along with the ambitions of Elizabeth Farnese, tensions remained. In 1718 war began again between Britain and Spain, with losses for British merchants. Mark Pringle's career began during this period of strife, and his appointment did not initially progress as it should have. Pringle's story provides evidence as to path the career of a consul could take and the support he provided to merchants during this time. Pringle also continued to trade himself, even during the 1727 conflict and defied an order to leave the country.

Losing Gibraltar was a particularly hard defeat for the Spanish Crown and, in late 1726, plans were made to regain the territories. The actions of David Dunbar reveal the efforts that were made by both sides to gain and hide information from each other. While dealing with merchant matters, Dunbar was also an informant for the British government and a messenger for important communications. This was at personal cost to himself and, as he was not alone in providing information, it must be surmised that all consuls faced a certain level of danger within their employments. The actual siege itself was something of a damp squib and experienced traders and consuls maintained their business almost as normal. Mark Pringle and other consuls ignored orders to leave the country, with Pringle citing ill-health as his reason for being unable to leave. He may well have been suffering from gout; however, it didn't appear to stop him trading as normal.

Conclusion

One must question the reasons as to why this type of study has not been attempted previously. Given the size and political importance of Iberia, particularly from 1580 to 1640, its continued neglect within the topic of Scottish diaspora studies leaves an awkward gap in the subject. From the Scottish side of things, part of the problem stems from the usual issues regarding the difficulties in differentiating between the various kingdoms of the British Isles. Never was this more apparent than in late sixteenth century: where merchants decided where they came from depending on where they were at a given time. Scottish merchants did endeavour to ensure that they were recognised as subjects of a separate kingdom. The appointment of William Orde was an attempt to show the Spanish authorities that although existing on the same island England and Scotland were separate countries. Scottish traders, however, did not necessarily help themselves in this situation by acting on behalf of and carrying goods for their English counterparts. Even one of the most obviously Scottish individuals in Spain, James Cunningham, has been described as English in Spanish historiography.¹ This is not a purely Scottish problem, with María Begoña Villar García lamenting the difficulties in extracting Irish individuals from a community that the Spanish crown mostly labelled as 'English'.² Further, García argues that Irish individuals in Spain would utilise their nationality and, perhaps more importantly, their religion, but would not be afraid to seek the protection of English statesmen in Spain under the guise of the Stuart and Hanoverian monarchies when necessary.³ The Scots were not alone, therefore, in bewildering the Spanish authorities and using this confusion to their advantage when required. Later in the century the problems became even more acute, especially after the Cromwellian union between England and Scotland in 1654. As the records show, several consuls were appointed post-1660 where it is simply unclear whom the individuals were intended to represent.

While there was certainly a desire by Scots pre-1630 to be recognised as a distinct merchant community, this lessened as the century progressed. The relatively small size of the merchant community in Iberia (in comparison to Scottish/British trading

¹ Manuel Bustos Rodríguez, 'La Burgesía Mercantil en el Cádiz del Siglo XVII: Proceso de formación y Estructura' in Luis Miguel Enciso Recio, ed, *La Burgesía Española en la Edad Moderna III* (Valladolid, 1996), 1264.

² María Begoña Villar García, 'Irish Migration and Exiles in Spain: Refugees, Soldiers, Traders and Statesmen' in Thomas O'Connor and Mary Ann Lyons, eds., *Irish Communities in Early-Modern Europe* (Dublin, 2006), 174.

³ Ibid.

communities in northern Europe) meant that British merchants tended to band together. In the earlier phases this facilitated the duplicitous actions of some traders where Englishmen pretended to be Scots and Scots pretended the goods they were carrying were Scottish. In the later period the more genuinely integrated British community blurs the lines between English and Scottish merchants making it more difficult to distinguish between nationalities and their relative share of commerce to the British isles.

Such confusion, coupled with a lack of official records of Scottish-Iberian trade has also made it easier for scholars in previous decades to disregard the subject as unworthy of investigation. T.C. Smout, in his ground-breaking 1963 publication *Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union*, presumably did not have the time or resources to look beyond the surface and therefore concluded that 'Iberia was probably the only area where there were no Scots'.⁴ In fact, Smout's attempt to examine Scotland's trade with all of Europe has spawned dozens of thesis, books, articles and papers devoted to studies of a number of separate countries, kingdoms and regions of Europe. Scholars today have access to resources, search engines and online documentation that could not have been dreamt of in the 1960s. With archival trips now lasting days instead of months due to digital imaging, it is amazing that Smout's investigation was as detailed as it was.

Nevertheless, if one looks beyond port records, dozens of examples of trade with Iberia come to light, along with information on the merchants who participated in that trade and resided in the Peninsula. The work of Eric Graham and Sue Mowat in indexing all the High Court of Admiralty records in particular, provides a wealth of collated information that would not have been available twenty years ago. This resource has also led to an understanding of the importance of triangular trade with regard to Scotland's commercial relationship with Iberia. Other online resources, such as *Medieval and Early Modern Sources Online*, have made searching for individuals in dozens of publications immeasurably faster than previously, with keyword searches providing an array of information that would have formerly required months of tedious research. This does present some new problems for scholars, however, as it leads to an abundance of material so vast that one of the main challenges of this thesis has been deciding what to omit.

The religious element has further confused the issue, with a general assumption being that those Scottish merchants in Iberia were either run-away Catholics or

⁴ Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 98.

Jacobites.⁵ The globalised nature of Habsburg Catholicism, combined with the perceived brutality of the Inquisition, has led to a certain assumption that Scottish merchants who did move to Iberia were totally naturalised and immersed into Iberian culture, without a backward glance. Alison Games, in particular, has discussed the apparent cruelty of the Inquisition towards English merchants in Lisbon in the period from 1584 to 1600, seemingly disregarding the fact that for most of this period England was at war with Philip II's dominions, which included Portugal. Further, she discussed a man who was sentenced to death for criticising 'the sexual behaviour of Catholic priests to a friar'.⁶ Quite apart from the fact that the man should never have been in Lisbon due to the conflict, the naïveté of the individual in question is beyond belief. This type of discussion in regards to Iberia is not indicative of how the vast majority of merchants behaved and shows an unacceptable level of partiality. It completely ignores the pragmatism of British merchants in relation to trade. As has already been shown elsewhere in regards to French conflicts and in this thesis, British merchants cared far more about maintaining a good profit margin than unrealistic ideals regarding religion. If they did disagree with the religious practices of the Peninsula most were not stupid enough to openly proclaim such views.

The evidence provided in this thesis shows that Scotland had a strong and active trading relationship with Iberia. Even more importantly, from a Scottish perspective, the balance of trade was entirely in Scotland's favour. Despite, or because of, the wealth from the New World, Iberia was no longer able to sustain itself, relying on imports of basic foodstuffs from all over northern Europe.⁷ In return, Scotland received high cost, low quantity items; importantly, these were not items that Scots needed for survival on a day-to-day basis. While Scotland has often been described as a poor and backward country in the early modern period, in this example, at least, it is clear that the Scots had the economic high ground.

Scots drank Iberian wine, ate Iberian fruits and, in the early seventeenth century at least, smoked tobacco from the Iberian dominions. The overwhelming evidence from household accounts and personal letters alone shows that Iberian commodities were not unheard of but common among the gentry classes. Lemons, figs, olives, olive oil, oranges, raisins and wine were all regularly referred to as household goods and, in the case of the Duchess of Hamilton, Canary wine was her preferred tipple.⁸ Despite the

⁵ Dobson, *Scots in Southern Europe*, Introduction.

⁶ Games, *Web of Empire*, 100.

⁷ Lynch, 'Spain', 156-7.

⁸ NAS, GD406/1/6888. Duchess of Hamilton to the Duke of Hamilton, 24 January 1704.

risks presented by sailing to southern Europe, Scottish vessels made their way to Iberia in significant numbers: by the end of the seventeenth century Glasgow, in particular, had a thriving trade with the region. Leith and the ports of the east coast of Scotland also sporadically sent vessels to Spain, with the islands of the Canaries and Madeira proving increasingly popular in triangular trade involving the colonies. While this lack of vessels has led to an assumption that the trade was not important, this was not the case. The high value, luxury nature of the commodities that Scotland was receiving from Iberia meant that few ships were needed. The very fact that Scots could trade to Iberia when they *wished* to and did not *need* to shows the value of the trade in economic terms for Scotland.

While Scots did not have communities in Iberia akin to their counterparts in Stockholm, Rotterdam or those in Poland-Lithuania, numbers of Scots were resident in Iberia and facilitated trade on behalf of their colleagues based in Scotland. It is very difficult to put a precise figure on the number of Scots in Iberia at any one time. Due to a lack of information there are several individuals, such as John Rendon, for whom it is clear where they were (in Rendon's case, Cadiz) but not what activities they were engaging in. According to his brother's letters, William Dunlop travelled to Spain twice in the 1680s, and through this guests such as Mr Murie are understood to be at James Cunningham's house. Dunlop and Murie were presumably in Spain for trading purposes, but, so far it has not been possible to confirm this. In this light the Scottish community in Iberia is probably more akin to the Scottish community in the Elbe-Weser region of Germany than its equivalent in Rotterdam or Gothenburg. Nevertheless, considering what was understood previously, the evidence certainly shows the presence of a far more important merchant community in Iberia than has formally been believed.

This thesis certainly does not claim to be the be all and end of investigation into Scottish trade with the Iberian world in the early modern period. Andalusia alone could actually be investigated in a project of a similar scale. Scottish connections with other areas, London especially, also need to be completed before entrepôt trade can be fully understood. William Fraser, George Outcherlony, James Foulis and William Home are probably only the tip of the iceberg in regards to Scottish traders in London who dealt in Iberian goods. The lack of indexing at municipal archives in Iberia, for example Cadiz, Mallorca and the Inquisition records at Aquivo do Torre Tombo in Lisbon means that it is highly likely there is much more information available - but due to the constraints of time it was simply not possible to search through all the material. Evidence for trade post-1730 also abounds, with the archives in Seville showing letters of naturalisation

giving permission for Scots to proceed to South America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. There are several mentions of Scots in secondary literature for the eighteenth century. For example, in her investigation on the British and Irish community in Cadiz in the last decades of the eighteenth century María del Carmen Lario has noted 15 Scots, five with the surname Gordon, suggesting some form of family network.⁹ José Antonio Salas Auséns has estimated that between 1764 and 1773 there were 79 merchants of English and Scottish origin in Spain.¹⁰ While Auséns has not differentiated between the two groups, which could have been labeled 'Britons', his work provides further evidence and could provide another starting point for a stand-alone investigation of Scots in Iberia post 1730. Other articles in the same edited collection also make reference to Scots in the later part of the eighteenth century, such as Manuel Hernández González's work on foreign merchants trading from the Canary Islands to the Americas.¹¹ While the constraints of time and space have meant that it has not been possible for this thesis to investigate beyond the first decades of the eighteenth century there is certainly scope to do so and on a larger scale than this project.

Finally, a major theme in this thesis has been conflict. It is clear that, whether Scotland was involved or not, the wars of its closest neighbours and Iberia affected Scottish trade with the Peninsula. Scottish merchants were taken for Englishmen and had their goods and vessels seized during the Anglo-Spanish war of the late sixteenth century. Dutch-Spanish conflicts spilled into Scottish harbours during the 1620s, with the internal upheavals of the 1640s and 1650s causing problems for all Scottish trade and not merely trade to Iberia. However, these incidents also show an admirable resilience. During one Anglo-Spanish (1584-1603) war, in particular, Scottish merchants exploited every advantage given to them by the conflict. A complicated and extensive network of Scots trading on behalf of English merchants emerges, and with the example of William Hunter, at least, it is clear that James VI was fully aware of the situation. The Habsburg authorities, for their part, also knew of this and while some Scots were deprived of their goods and ships, Spanish economic necessity allowed the practice to continue. The Anglo-Dutch wars showed further ingenuity by Scottish merchants who

⁹ del Carmen Lario, *La Colonia Mercantil Británica e Irlandesa*, Apéndice A. I.

¹⁰ José Antonio Salas Auséns, 'Pequeños Comerciantes Extranjeros en La España del Siglo XVIII' in Ana Crespo Solana, ed, *Comunidades Transnacionales, Colonias de Mercaderes Extranjeros en el Mundo Atlántico (1500-1830)* (Madrid, 2010), 129. The research in this article focusses on merchants of small means and, therefore, it is likely that the number of English and Scottish individuals is higher.

¹¹ Manuel Hernández González, 'Los Mercaderes de Origen Extranjero en el Tráfico Canario-Americano Durante La Etapa Del Libre Comercio (1765-1808)' in Ana Crespo Solana, ed, *Comunidades Transnacionales, Colonias de Mercaderes Extranjeros en el Mundo Atlántico (1500-1830)* (Madrid, 2010), 161, 178-9. See also Morales, 'Conectores'.

appeared to merely move their base of operations to the Spanish Netherlands while the conflicts raged. Finally, the British-Spanish spat in 1726-7, while inducing an almost hysterical reaction diplomatically, was regarded as a nuisance by British merchants who clearly just wished for the powers that be to leave them alone to trade in peace. It appeared that no matter the situation or conflict, the attitude of Scottish merchants was clear: 'keep calm and carry on'.

Appendices

Appendix I

Trade to/from Iberian Peninsula and Islands from Glasgow

- This appendix notes all entries in the E72/10 and E72/19 Exchequer Records of the National Archives of Scotland
- Due to the constraints of space only the principal cargoes are recorded.
- For ships leaving Glasgow the last date recorded is utilised. That is to say, that a vessel may be recorded several times during the time of its loading but in order to try and give an accurate departure date the last recorded date is used. Conversely with ships arriving to Glasgow the first date is utilised in this table.
- Any errors are my own.

Date	Name of Vessel	From	To	Cargo	Master	E72
22 May 1666	Providence of Glasgow	Spain	Glasgow	wine, raisins, figs	unknown	10/1
27 Sep 1666	Providence of Glasgow	Glasgow	Spain	tallow, salmon, butter	John Scott	10/1
15 Oct 1666	St Francis of Bruges	Glasgow	Bilbao	Herring	unknown	10/1
24 Dec 1666	Bruges vessel	Glasgow	Bilbao	Herring	unknown	10/1
11 Feb 1667	Providence of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	Wine.	John Scott	10/1
6 Dec 1669	Elizabeth of Leith	Spain	Glasgow	Salmon	Edward Burd	10/2
3 May 1670	Providence of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	Wine	John Anderson	10/2
10 Aug 1670	Providence of Glasgow	Glasgow	Cadiz	Candles	John Anderson	10/2
18 Dec 1671	John of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	Wine	John Miller	10/3
18 Oct 1672	Providence of Glasgow	Glasgow	Cadiz	cloth, candles, salmon	John Anderson	10/3
27 Nov 1680	Speedwell of Glasgow	Glasgow	Spain	Candles, tallow	John Woodside	19/2
2 Feb 1681	Robert of Irvine	Spain	Glasgow	Wine	Robert Alison	19/1
23 Feb 1681	Unicorn of Glasgow	Glasgow	Spain	Butter, linen	Archibald Murphy	19/2
8 Apr 1681	Walter	Spain	Glasgow	Wine, raisins, olives	George Lyon	19/1
13 Apr 1681	John of Glasgow	Spain	Glasgow	wine, raisins, oranges, lemons, olives	Alexander Watson	19/1

Date	Name of Vessel	From	To	Cargo	Master	E72
4 Jun 1681	Old Hope of Glasgow	Spain	Glasgow	wine	John Lerkie	19/1
15 Jun 1681	Nightingale of Renfrew	Glasgow	Spain	Beef, Butter, Candles, linen cloth, stockings	George Lyon	19/2
21 Jun 1681	Isobel of Renfrew	Glasgow	Spain	Stockings, fine linen, candle, wheat, tallow, stockings	William Glabraith	19/2
2 Aug 1681	Speedwell of Glasgow	Spain	Glasgow	Salt, Olive Oil, olives, dry confections	John Woodside	19/3
3 Sep 1681	Robert of Irvine	Spain	Glasgow	Wine.	Robert Alison	19/1
12 Sep 1681	Pelican of Glasgow	Spain	Glasgow	wine, cochineal, olives	William Craig	19/3
4 Jan 1682	Nightingale of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	Wine, oranges, lemons, cochineal	George Lyon	19/4
9 Jan 1682	Isobel of Glasgow	Spain	Glasgow	wine, salt, figs, raisins, cochineal, oranges, lemons, oil	William Galbraith	19/5
10 Jan 1682	Andrew of Belfast	Spain	Glasgow	Wine, figs, raisins	unknown	19/5
8 Aug 1682	Isobel of Glasgow	Glasgow	Cadiz	candles, stockings, linen cloth.	George Lyon	19/6
25 Aug 1682	Janet of Glasgow	Glasgow	Cadiz	linen cloth, stockings, candles, beef, butter	James Rae	19/6
26 Oct 1682	Nightingale of Glasgow	Glasgow	Cadiz	butter, linen cloth, candles	James Wilson	19/6
8 Nov 1682	Janet of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	wine, salt, raisins	James Rae	19/8
12 Dec 1682	Isobel of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	wine, oranges, lemons, oil, figs	George Lyon	19/8
12 Dec 1682	Janet of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	wine, figs, raisins, oil,	John Miller	19/8
14 Aug 1683	Janet of Glasgow	Glasgow	Cadiz	candles, stockings, butter	John Miller	19/8

Date	Name of Vessel	From	To	Cargo	Master	E72
27 Aug 1683	Charles of Glasgow	Glasgow	Cadiz	linen cloth, candles, stockings, butter, tallow	William Anderson	19/8
31 Oct 1683	Success of Glasgow	Glasgow	Cadiz	cloth, shoes, stockings, plaiding hose, gloves, tobacco pipes, grind stones	unknown	19/8
3 Jan 1684	Janet of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	raisins, figs, wine,	John Miller	19/9
7 Apr 1684	Charles of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	wine, raisins	William Anderson	19/9
6 Aug 1684	Isobel of Glasgow	Glasgow	Cadiz	linen, stockings, butter, candles	James Campbell	19/9
24 Nov 1684	Isobel of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	wine, raisins, figs, olives, olive oil	James Campbell	19/9
30 Jan 1685	Amity of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	Wine, raisins, cochineal, figs	James Wilson	19/9
12 Aug 1685	Isobel of Glasgow	Glasgow	Cadiz	butter, shoes, linen, stockings	James Campbell	19/11
28 Aug 1685	Charles of Glasgow	Glasgow	Cadiz	linen cloth, stockings, butter	William Campbell	19/11
1 Oct 1685	Leopard of Glasgow	Glasgow	Cadiz	butter, linen, candles, beef, stockings	James Rae	19/11
7 Dec 1685	Charles of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	wine, lemons	William Campbell	19/12
9 Jan 1686	Leopard of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	wine, raisins, figs, cochineal, oil, currants	James Rae	19/12

Date	Name of Vessel	From	To	Cargo	Master	E72
23 Feb 1686	Richard and John of London	Glasgow	Cadiz	linen, shoes, tobacco pipes, thread, playing cards, stockings, nails, feathers, candles, knives, horse shoes, night caps, gloves	James Moodie	19/13
2 Mar 1686	Isobel of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	oil, olives, wine, lemons, oranges, figs, raisins,	James Campbell	19/12
10 Jul 1686	Charles of Glasgow	Glasgow	Cadiz	linen, stockings	James Biskett	19/13
16 Aug 1686	Swan of Glasgow	Glasgow	Spain	linen, shoes, stockings	Quentin Crawford	10/13
13 Sep 1686	Dolphin of Boston	Glasgow	Madeira	gloves, thread, stocking, hats, sack cloth, coal, grind stones	Alexander Coll	19/13
9 Oct 1686	Providence of Belfast	Glasgow	Madeira	unknown	John Loriner	19/13
4 Dec 1688	Pelican of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	wine, cochineal, oil, salad oil, raisins, lemons, oranges, figs	Ninian Gibson	19/14
17 Jun 1689	Walter of Glasgow	Glasgow	Lisbon	salt, sugar.	Hew Campbell	19/14
10 Sep 1689	Salisbury of Boston	Glasgow	Madeira	linen, woolen cloth, gloves, coal	Andrew Doberry	19/14
12 Oct 1689	Endeavour of New England	Glasgow	Madeira	coal, linen, flemish sacking	John Brackanbury	19/15
31 Oct 1689	Friendship of Glasgow	Glasgow	Cadiz	butter, linen, tallow, candles, stockings	James Sinclair	19/15
26 Nov 1689	Pelican of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	wine.	Ninian Gibson	19/15

Date	Name of Vessel	From	To	Cargo	Master	E72
3 Apr 1690	Agreement of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	wine, olives, salt, oil, figs, almond	Alexander Spirks	19/18
31 Jul 1690	Friendship of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	wine, oil, salt, raisins, cochineal	James Sinclair	19/18
2 Dec 1690	Agreement of Glasgow	Glasgow	Cadiz	stockings, candles, herring, butter, linen	Alexander Spinker	19/22
8 Dec 1690	Providence of Lisbon	Glasgow	Lisbon	coal	James Bogel	19/22
9 Dec 1690	Alexander of Dublin	Glasgow	Lisbon	coal.	Alexander Younger	19/22
10 Dec 1690	Robert	Glasgow	Lisbon	linen, thread, gloves	Robert Dunlop	19/22
10 Dec 1690	Fortune of Glasgow	Glasgow	Canary Islands	candles, linen cloth, beef, thread	James Campbell	19/22
29 Dec 1690	Marigold of Belfast	Glasgow	Madeira	candle cord, cloth, stockings, herring, linen cloth	Robert Goss	19/22
10 Jan 1691	Joan of Belfast	Glasgow	Madeira	cloth, shoes, stockings, thread, hats, beef	John Harrison	19/22
17 Jan 1691	Plaindealing of Colrairie	Glasgow	Madeira	linen, woolen cloth, stockings, shoes, thread, silk buttons	Samuel Wilson	19/22
20 Jan 1691	Prosperity of Belfast	Glasgow	Madeira	coal	Mathew Scott	19/22
9 Feb 1691	John of Londonderry	Glasgow	Madeira	linen cloth, shoes, hats, stockings	Andrew Cruickshank	19/22
6 Mar 1691	Friendship of Glasgow	San Sebastian	Glasgow	brandy, wine	James Sinclair	19/21
23 Mar 1691	Isobel of Glasgow	Glasgow	San Sebastian	coal	John Finlayson	19/22
22 Apr 1691	Friendship of Glasgow	Glasgow	Lisbon	coal, cloth, tallow	Archibald Yool	19/22
7 Jun 1691	Charles of Glasgow	Glasgow	Lisbon	coal.	James Johnson	19/22
25 May 1691	Fortune of Glasgow	Canary Islands	Glasgow	Wine	James Campbell	19/21

Date	Name of Vessel	From	To	Cargo	Master	E72
2 Jun 1691	John of Greenock	Bilbao	Glasgow	brandy, wine, salt	Francis Duncan	19/21
12 Sep 1691	Adventure of Glasgow	Glasgow	Madeira	linen, stockings, plaiding hose, gloves	Thomas Fisher	19/22
14 Sep 1691	vessel of Boston	Glasgow	Madeira	linen, shoes, thread, gloves	Thomas Eyre	19/22
21 Sep 1691	Fortune of Glasgow	Glasgow	Bilbao	tallow, butter	John Watson	19/22
23 Sep 1691	Friendship of Glasgow	San Sebastian	Glasgow	salt, white wine, brandy	Archibald Yool	19/21
31 Oct 1691	Katherine of Glasgow	Glasgow	Madeira	linen, stockings, thread, shoes, nails, coats	Andrew Cruickshank	19/22
26 Dec 1695	James of Glasgow	Bilbao	Glasgow	salt, sugar.	Thomas Angus	19/23
2 Jan 1696	Thomas of Glasgow	San Sebastian	Glasgow	wine, prunes, brandy	John Ker	19/23
28 Jan 1696	John and James of Leith	Bilbao	Glasgow	brandy, wine, prunes, writing papers, raisins, almonds, olives, walnuts	Edward Burd	19/23
3 Feb 1696	George of Aberdeen	Bilbao	Glasgow	wine, brandy, chestnuts	William Trevier	19/23
29 Feb 1696	Adventure of Glasgow	San Sebastian	Glasgow	Wine, brandy, paper, chestnuts, glasses	Alexander Stewart	19/23
2 Mar 1696	Margaret of Glasgow	San Sebastian	Glasgow	Wine, brandy, chestnuts	James Rae	19/23
3 Mar 1696	Margaret	San Sebastian	Glasgow	wine, brandy	Thomas Gourlie	19/23
4 Mar 1696	Angel of Glasgow	San Sebastian	Glasgow	wine, vinegar, paper, brandy, chestnuts	Charles Ramsay	19/23
6 Apr 1696	Marion of Glasgow	Canary Islands	Glasgow	canary wine, brandy	John Watson	19/23

Date	Name of Vessel	From	To	Cargo	Master	E72
8 Apr 1696	Elizabeth of Glasgow	San Sebastian	Glasgow	salt, brandy, white wine, paper	Robert Sinclair	19/23
9 May 1696	Lamb of Glasgow	Cadiz	Glasgow	wine, lemons, oranges, oil, olives, figs, cochineal	Thomas Ballatine	19/23
11 May 1696	St John of Glasgow	Bilbao	Glasgow	wine, malaga wine, sugar, molasses, lemons, oranges, salt	Unknown	19/23
13 May 1696	Concord of Glasgow	San Sebastian	Glasgow	salt, brandy, white wine, canary wine, paper	Robert Arthur	19/23
26 May 1696	Drothea of Glasgow	Bilbao	Glasgow	salt, raisins, prunes, brandy, paper	John Scarre	19/23
5 Jun 1696	Chestour of Glasgow	Bilbao	Glasgow	brandy, wine, prunes, paper, canary wine	David Dunlop	19/23
25 Jun 1696	James of Glasgow	Canary Islands	Glasgow	Canary wine	John Morrison	19/23
Total		49 From Iberia.	45 to Iberia.			

Appendix II

Trade to/from Iberian Peninsula and Islands from Glasgow

- This appendix notes all the entries in the E72/15 Exchequer Records of the National Archives of Scotland.
- Other notes for this appendix are the same as appendix one.

Date	Name of Vessel	From	To	Cargo	Master	Source
7 Feb 1667	St John of Gothenburg	Leith	Bilbao	salmon, herring, Irish butter.	Henry Wilkie	E72/15/6, Swedish Riksarkivet, Anglica VII, vol. 542 (1660-1670), undated, unfoliated, c. 1666/7.
2 Jul 1667	Green Parrot of Statten	Leith	Bilbao	tallow, salmon.	Unknown.	E72/15/6.
20 Dec 1671	unknown	Leith	Lisbon	salmon.	William Bosworth	E72/15/11.
22 Mar 1672	James of Pittenweem	Cadiz	Leith	raisins, lemons, oranges, olives.	John Cook	E72/15/12.
22 Mar 1672	Anna of Pittenweem	Cadiz	Leith	wine, raisins	John Aitchson	E72/15/12.
22 Mar 1672	Janet of Leith	Cadiz	Leith	figs, raisins, oil.	Andrew Hall	E72/15/12.
3 Jan 1681	William and John of Leith	Cadiz	Leith	wine	John Hay	E72/15/22.
26 Feb 1681	Beatrice of Burntisland	Cadiz	Leith	wine	John Rutherford	E72/15/22.
16 Dec 1682	George of Leith	Cadiz	Leith	wine.	Edward Burd	E72/15/27.
21 May 1683	Albony of Leith	Leith	Cadiz	Victual	Alexander Stevenson	E72/15/26.
21 May 1683	Margaret of Leith	Leith	Cadiz	linen, felt hats.	William Moncrieff	E72/15/26.
29 May 1683	Alexander of Leith	Leith	Cadiz	wheat, tallow, biscuit and candles	Robert Dunbar	E72/15/26.
6 Jul 1683	Crown of Burntisland	Leith	Cadiz	Victual, biscuit, candles	Thomas Dewar	E72/15/26.

Date	Name of Vessel	From	To	Cargo	Master	Source
12 Jul 1683	James of Leith	Leith	Cadiz	Victual	James Burnet	E72/15/26.
11 Aug 1683	William and John of Leith	Leith	Cadiz	Victual, Butter, Biscuit, Linen .	John Hay	E72/15/26.
20 Nov 1683	William and John of Leith	Spain	Leith	Wine.	John Hay	E72/15/29.
26 Nov 1683	Alexander of Leith	Cadiz	Leith	Wine.	Robert Dunbar	E72/15/29.
10 Dec 1683	Red Lion of Leith	Spain	Leith	Wine.	Unknown.	E72/15/29.
4 Jan 1684	James of Leith	Cadiz	Leith	Wine.	James Burnet	E72/15/29.
17 Jan 1684	Henry of Leith	Cadiz	Leith	Wine.	John Taitt	E72/15/29.
25 Feb 1684	Albony of Leith	Cadiz	Leith	Wine.	Alexander Stevenson	E72/15/29.
11 Aug 1684	unknown	Leith	Spain	Linen, butter.	John Hay	E72/15/28.
29 Aug 1684	unknown	Leith	Spain	Wheat	John Muir	E72/15/28.
12 Jan 1685	Henry of Leith	Cadiz	Leith	Wine	John Swift	E72/15/33
9 Feb 1685	Sophia of Leith	Leith	Spain	Victual	John Mackie.	E72/15/31.
20 Feb 1685	Elizabeth of Leith	Spain	Leith	Wine	John Muir	E72/15/33.
17 Sep 1685	Unknown	Leith	Spain	Wheat.	Robert Dunbar	E72/15/32
5 Oct 1685	unknown	Leith	Spain	Wheat.	James Dounie	E72/15/32.
1 Apr 1686	Alexander of Leith	Spain	Leith	olive oil, olives, oil, figs, raisins, wine	Robert Dunbar	E72/15/36, E72/15/39, E72/15/38.
1 Apr 1686	Speedwell of Leith	Spain	Leith	raisins, olives, olive oil,	James Dounie	E72/15/36, E72/15/38.
21 Aug 1686	unknown	Leith	Spain	wheat.	James Simpson	E72/15/37.
4 Sep 1686	unknown	Leith	Spain	wheat, linen.	James Dounie	E72/15/37.

Date	Name of Vessel	From	To	Cargo	Master	Source
1 Feb 1689	Speedwell of Leith	Cadiz	Leith	Figs, olives, raisins, olive oil.	James Dounie	E72/15/40, E72/15/43
11 Feb 1689	Lyon of Leith	Spain	Leith	figs, raisins, oil, wine	James Kendall	E72/15/40, E72/15/42, E72/15/43
31 Oct 1689	unknown	Spain	Leith	wine	James Kendall	E72/15/40
8 Jan 1690	The George of Leith	Leith	Bilbao	Unknown	Robert Gilmour	E72/15/44.
10 Sept 1690	Sophia of Pittenweem	Spain	Leith	raisins, olives, olive oil, wine, indigo.	John Aitchson	E72/15/44, E72/15/47. RH15/59/2
1 Oct 1690	Lion of Leith	Cadiz	Leith	raisins, currants, white powder sugar, olive oil, canary wine	James Kendall	E72/15/47.
20 Dec 1690	Friendship	Bilbao	Leith	Brandy	Claus Fassie	E72/14/44, E72/15/49.
15 Apr 1691	Constancia of Copenhagen	Bilbao	Leith	Brandy	Michael Lawson	E72/15/44, E72/15/49, E72/15/51
19 May 1691	Mary of Ostend	Cadiz	Leith	Wine, raisins, almonds, figgs, olive oil, small goods	James Holbrand	E72/15/44, E72/15/49, E72/15/51
26 May 1691	St Martine	Bilbao	Leith	French Wine, brandy, wine, vinegar	Peter Barndler	E72/15/44.

Appendix III

Consuls

- This is a list of consuls who, due to the Treaty of Madrid (1667) should have represented all British merchants but who are normally listed as consul for the English nation appointed by the King of Great Britain.

Name	Date	Place	Source
Charles Black	late 17th century.	Cadiz	AGS, Estado 6870
Thomas Cunningham	1670	Canary Islands	AGS, Estado 6870
Nicholas Holloway	1698	Malaga	AGS, Estado 4192
Charles Burgoin	1690	Galicia	AGS, Estado 4192
Robert Gode	1690	San Lucar de Barrameda, Sevilla	AGS, Estado 4192
Martin Westcomb	1690	Cadiz	AGS, Estado 4192
John Parker	1690	Galicia	AGS, Estado 4192
Mr Doleman	1690	Alicante	AGS, Estado 4192
Edward Smith	1690	Canary Islands	AGS, Estado 4192
James Pendaes	1681	Malaga	AGS, Estado 4191, 4192
Thomas Moore	1694	Cartagena	AGS, Estado 4192
Alexander Stanhope	1695	Sevilla/Malaga	AGS, Estado 4191
William Frankland	1685	San Sebastian, Bilbao	AGS, Estado 4191
Felix Neito	1685	Canary Islands	AGS, Estado 4191
Thomas Jeffries	1687	Valencia, Murcia & Balearics	AGS, Estado 4191, 4192
William Paulin	1683	Alicante	AGS, Estado 4191
Christopher Joiner	1686	Cartagena	AGS, Estado 4191
William Garret	1690	Alicante	AGS, Estado 4192

Appendix IV

Notes for online database.

<http://live-scots-in-iberia.gotpantheon.com/node>

This database started as a tool with which to store notes during my research. Running from 1580-1730 the database covers individuals and vessels which I have discovered while researching my thesis. However, there are some important points to note:

- Due to the fact that trade during the Anglo-Dutch Wars' artificially inflates Scottish trade with the Spanish Netherlands this has not been included.
- The database does not include entries or departures from Glasgow or Leith.
- It also does not include voyages that were chartered for Iberia but did not arrive or it is not clear that they arrived.
- The database does occasionally make note of events post 1730, but this is normally in relation to an individual or ship which appeared pre-1730. For example, in the case of Mark Pringle.
- Admiralty Court Records (prefix ACX/XXX) where these records are preceded by the acronym *HCA* the record has been created from Sue Mowat and Eric Grahams edited collection, *The Records of the High Court of Admiralty of Scotland, 1627-1750*. However, when preceded by NAS the original document has been consulted.
- Occasionally individuals are included whose purpose is unclear - this is in the hope that their purpose will be discovered at a future date.
- Non-Scots have been included where they interacted with or influenced the trade of, Scottish merchants.
- Names have been noted in modern English spelling unless none is available.
- In order to keep the database as succinct as possible only prominent Scottish based merchants involved in trading Iberian goods have been included.
- Abbreviations are the same as those within the main project.

Finally, the database is not exhaustive by any means. These are only the individuals that have been discovered following three years of research. I have no doubt that many more individuals or vessels are waiting to be discovered and I welcome any additions.

Any errors within the database are entirely my own.

Bibliography

For the most part manuscript sources have been listed at collection level, following the conventions of individual archives with full references to individual documents present in the footnotes. The exceptions are those documents that do not have a collection title and only a reference number in which case the reference number is noted in the bibliography. In the cases of sources which are listed as being online, the vast majority are available in paper copy or permission can be obtained from the hosting institution.

A. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES.

Belgium

Bruges City Archive

Nr. 380/26621	Processen.
Nr. 521/37768	Processen.
Nr. 924/70448	Processen.
Nr. 1013/78745	Processen.
Nr. 1059/83745	Processen,
Nr. 130	Register of citizens, 1588-1794.
Nr. 216	City accounts.

I would like to thank Jan D'hondt for providing digital copies of these documents.

Britain

Aberdeen City Archives

Propinquity Book, volume 1, 1637-1705
SR0 25/3/2 Acts of Convention 4 July 1610 to July 1636

I would like to thank Steve Murdoch (St Andrews) for providing me with a transcription of entries from the Acts of Convention.

Dundee Archive and Records Centre

Register of Shipping 1580-1715

Edinburgh City Archives

SL144 Dean of Court Minute Records.

Glasgow City Archives, The Mitchell Library

120/D12/1-44 Dunlop of Garnkirk MSS

Lambeth Palace Library

MS 942 1522-1705 Miscellaneous Papers

Lincolnshire Archives

8ANC3/58 The Spanish Armada

London Metropolitan Archives

CLC/B/189 Records of Merchants John Richards and John Rooke, comprising invoice and account of sales books

National Archives of Scotland

AC	High Court of Admiralty Records
CC8	Edinburgh Commissary Court
CS96	Productions in Processes.
E71	Exchequer Records: Customs Books (First Series)
E72	Exchequer Records: Customs Books (Second Series)
E75	Exchequer Records: Customs Miscellanea
E657	Exchequer Records: Forfeited Estates Papers 1715: Particular Estates: Southesk.
GD1	Miscellaneous small collections of family, business and other papers
GD1/885	Correspondence of Andrew Russell, merchant, Rotterdam
GD1/1126	Rev. Henry Patton Collection.
GD1/885	Correspondence of Andrew Russell, Merchant, Rotterdam relating to trading matters.
GD3/5	Montgomerie Family, Earls of Eglinton: Correspondence
GD8	Boyd Papers, Burgh of Kilmarnock.
GD110	Papers of the Hamilton-Dalrymple Family of North Berwick
GD18	Papers of the Clerk family of Penicuik
GD23	Warrant of Bught
GD29	Papers of the Bruce family of Kinross (Kinross House Papers)
GD44	Papers of the Gordon family, Dukes of Gordon (Gordon Castle Muniments)
GD69	Papers of Balfour of Pilrig, Midlothian
GD80	MacPherson of Cluny Papers
GD109	Papers of the family of Dalrymple-Hamilton of Bargany, Ayrshire.
GD112	Papers of the Campbell family, Earl of Breadalbane (Gordon Castle Muniments).
GD124	Papers of the Erskine family, Earls of Mar and Kellie
GD158	Papers of the family of Hume of Polwarth, Berwickshire, Earls of Marchmont
GD172	Papers of the Henderson family of Fordell.
GD214	Papers of Professor Robert K. Hannay
GD226	Records of the Corporation of the Master and Assistants of the Trinity House of Leith
GD248	Papers of the Ogilvy Family, Earls of Seafield
GD406	Papers of the Douglas Hamilton Family, Dukes of Hamilton and Brandon.
GD446	Papers of the Douglas family of Streathendry, Fife
RD	Register of Deed's, Index.
RD1	Register of Deed's First Series, Scott's Office.
RH1/2	Transcription and photocopies of Miscellaneous Charters and Papers
RH9/14	Edinburgh and Leith Papers

RH15/14	Alexander Campbell, merchant in Edinburgh, and Alexander Campbell, advocate, his son-in-law
RH15/49	James Baillie, Captain of the Town Guard, Edinburgh.
RH15/59	John Charteris, Merchant in Edinburgh
RH15/91	Papers of the Maxwell Family of Orchardton, parish of Rerrick, Stewartry of Kirkcudbright, and Ulster.
RH15/106	Papers of Andrew Russell, merchant in Rotterdam.
RH15/140	Jolly Family, Prestonpans.
JC66/8	Miscellaneous Papers

I would like to thank Dr Kathrin Zickermann (University of Highlands and Islands) for providing a transcript of entries from the papers of the Jolly Family.

Parliamentary Archives (London):

HL/PO/JO/10/3/231/33-37	Depredations of the Spaniards
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Royal Bank of Scotland Archives

D/22/3	Journal of the court of directors of the Company of Scotland.
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State Papers Online online at: <http://go.galegroup.com>

BL	Cotton Manuscripts, Vespasian C VIII Spain, 1588-1600.
SP12	State Papers Domestic, Elizabeth I
SP29	Secretaries of State: State Papers Domestic, Charles II
SP78	Secretaries of State: State Papers Foreign France, 1577-1780
SP89	Secretaries of State: State Papers Foreign Portugal, 1577-1780
SP94	Secretaries of State: State Papers Foreign Spain, 1577-1780
SP52	Secretaries of State: State Papers Scotland Series I, Elizabeth I, 1558-1603

The British Library

Harley MS 389	Harley Manuscripts
Add MS 36171	Hon Charles York, Lord Chancellor: Briefs in the House of Lords, Appeals, 1753-1769
Add MS 73988	Walpole Papers
Add MS 73922	Walpole Papers
Add MS 73923	Walpole Papers

I would like to thank Dr Adam Marks for providing a transcript of the Harley Manuscripts

The National Archives at Kew, London

E190/161	Records of the Exchequer: Port Books, The Port of Berwick
E190/185	Records of the Exchequer: Port Books, The Port of Newcastle
HCA 13/26	Records of the High Court of Admiralty and colonial Vice-Admiralty Courts.
PROB 11/347	Records of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury
PROB 11/549	Records of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury
SP78	State Papers Foreign: France
SP89	State Papers Foreign: Portugal

SP94 State Papers Foreign: Spain

University of Edinburgh Special Collections

DK 7. 55

Netherlands:

Gemeentearchief Rotterdam

Oud Notariële Akten Individual Items as cited in the text.

Portugal:

Arquivo do Torre Tombo:

PT/TT/TSO-IL/028	Processos.
PT/TT/TSO-IE/021	Processos.

Spain:

Archivo Cartagena:

CH01998-00007 Gobierno y administración

Archivo Foral de Bizkala:

JCR1221/015	Judicial, Corregidor, Civil
JCR2690/043	Judicial, Corregidor, Civil
Bilbao Antigua, 0391/001/013	Municipal, Archivo Municipal de Bilbao.
Bilbao Antigua, 0397/001/003	Municipal, Archivo Municipal de Bilbao.
Bilbao Antigua, 0082/002/003/010	Municipal, Archivo Municipal de Bilbao.
JCR2073/028	Judicial, Consulado, Mercantil
JCR0432/034	Judicial, Corregidor, Civil
JCR1660/009	Judicial, Consulado, Mercantil
JCR0883/025	Judicial, Consulado, Mercantil
JCR0183/013	Judicial, Corregidor, Criminal
JRC0304/030	Judicial, Consulado, Mercantil
JCR1625/067	Judicial, Corregidor, Notarial.
JCR0183/013	Judicial, Corregidor, Criminal.

I would like to thank Felipe Pozuelo Rodríguez for providing digital copies of these documents.

Archivo General de Indias:

Contratacion, 596B	Naturalezas de extranjeros.
Contratacion, 2867	Registros de Venida de Canarias a España.

Archivo General de Simanacas:

Legajo 158	Contaduria del Suedo, serie II.
Estado Legajo 181	Corono de Castille, 1598.
Estado Legajo 190	España, 1603.
Estado Legajo 839	Inglaterra, 1584-1600.
Estado Legajo 967	Estado Roma, 1596.
Estado Legajo 2742	España 1605.
Estado Legajo 2867	Consulados.
Estado Legajo 4192	Consulados.
Estado Legajo 6879	Inglaterra, 1728-29.
Estado Legajo 6870	Inglaterra, 1726.
Estado K 1567	Correspondencia de D. Bernardino de Mendoza.
Estado K 1664	Iguales Consultas, 1664-74.
Legajo 744	Consejo y Juntas De Hacienda.
Legajo 753	Consejo y Juntas De Hacienda.

I would like to thank Cynthia Fry for providing a transcription of Estado 839 and to Dr Peter Maxwell Stuart for a translation of the same document.

Archivo Historico Nacional:

Estado 623	Junta de las Dependencias y Negocios de Extranjeros
Estado 641	Junta de las Dependencias y Negocios de Extranjeros
Estado 620	Junta de las Dependencias y Negocios de Extranjeros
Estado 608	Junta de las Dependencias y Negocios de Extranjeros
Inquisición 108	Consejo de Inquisición
Inquisición 2948	Consejo de Inquisición
Inquisición 2949	Consejo de Inquisición
Inquisición 3077	Consejo de Inquisición

Archivo Municipal de Cadiz

CA2105	Protocols.
CA2384	Protocols.

Sweden

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